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Abstract. 
The German Army and National Socialist Occupation Policies in the 
Occupied Rear Areas of the Soviet Union 1941-1943. 
During the Second World War, with the failure of the German invasion 
of the Soviet Union to maintain its momentum, large areas of captured 
Russian territory remained under German Army jurisdiction for the 
entire duration of the conflict; rather than being turned over to 
National Socialist civilian administrators. 
Evidence drawn from the files of two of the military government 
rear areas (KorOcks) is used in order to consider the institutional 
response of the Army towards this unanticipated problem. 
Methodological approaches associated with 'history from below' are 
combined with orthodox 'history from above' in order to reassess the 
findings of secondary literature on the topic. Particular 
consideration is given to primary data which describes the war from 
the perspective of the German soldiers who conducted policy on the 
ground. 
Initially, the controversial historical debate which has developed 
as to the Wehrmacht's role in the occupied areas is discussed and set 
against the wider background of the place of the armed forces within 
the Third Reich. The character and organisation of military 
government in the Soviet Union is then described so as to indicate 
the complex and difficult conditions under which the German troops 
operated. Following on from this, a range of diverse issues are 
discussed, including economic policy, anti-partisan warfare, the 
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, army relations with the 
civilian population, Wehrmacht co-operation with the SS, criminal 
behaviour amongst the German soldiers, and troop morale and fighting 
power. A number of highly critical interpretations of Wehrmacht 
activities are thus re-evaluated; especially those which emphasise 
the extent to which members of the German armed forces were 
influenced primarily by ideological considerations. 
Overall, while full regard is given to the weight of evidence which 
seeks to demythologise 'apologist' arguments that deny the calculated 
involvement of the German Army in the racial war of annihilation 
conducted in the East, equal attention is drawn to the varied 
responses and conduct of the German troops directly involved in 
implementing such policies. Accordingly, due regard is also given to 
the importance of social, socio- psychological and institutional 
factors in influencing individual and group behaviour within the 
Third Reich. 
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Preface: 
This thesis is concerned with German Army occupation policy in the 
Soviet Union-during the period from 1941-1943. Vast tracts of the 
occupied territories behind the front were never given over to 
civilian administration, but remained under the jurisdiction of the 
German military for the duration. It was in these rear areas that 
some of the most controversial aspects of German rule in the East 
were implemented. Accordingly, given the scale and importance of army 
government in the East, the relative lack of material on the topic 
remains a serious omission. (I) Moreover, despite the tendency of very 
recent work to focus on the front-line experiences of the rank and 
file within the Wehrmacht, similar research has not been undertaken 
on the ordinary German soldiers whose task it was to implement policy 
in the rear areas. (2) This thesis sets out to address these 
deficiencies by considering the behaviour of the troops in the 
military hinterland against the backdrop of the wider social and 
political conditions under which they operated. 
When the idea for this project was proposed in the late 1970s, the 
first wave of scholarship that set out to demythologise the 'white 
shield' image of the, Wehrmacht had started to appear and it would 
have been fashionable, not to say convenient, to follow the trend. 
Nearly a decade later, despite the weight of material that is now 
assembled in support of the 'anti- apologist' line, there is still 
much to be said for continuing to pursue such an approach. This is 
particularly true given the stubborn refusal of many to come to terms 
with the painful findings of such research. (3) 
It would be incorrect, however, to assert that the 'new orthodoxy' 
merely requires to be consolidated against entrenched opposition. A 
need can also be identified to re-evaluate some of those 
'traditional' arguments, regarding the determinants of German army 
policy, which appear to have been discarded as part of the 
iconoclastic zeal to exorcise the past. Moreover, it should be 
recognised that the powerful weight of evidence which underpins much 
of the anti-apologist scholarship may itself only serve to raise a 
number of 'open questions' as to the-nature of life during the Third 
Reich. Questions which must be approached in a differentiated manner 
that is concerned as much with the reconstruction of the lives of 
human beings, as it is with the analysis of historical structures. (4) 
The starting point for this investigation into German Army occupation 
policy in the Soviet Union during the period from 1941 to 1943 is a 
critical assessment of the state of the debate, based on the range of 
literature that has appeared over the last four decades. A number of 
methodological approaches are then discussed, along with the problems 
associated with the source material on which the work is based. 
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Individual chapters are initially given over to an account of the 
organisational structure of German military government in the East, 
and the conditions and circumstances under which the German forces 
operated. Despite the narrative feel of some of this early material, 
this is not mere description designed to simply elaborate dry, if 
neglected, areas of research. Much of the subsequent analytical 
writing on more contentious topics, such as the German Army's 
relations with the civilian population, its treatment of captured Red 
Army prisoners of war or troop morale, must be seen against this 
backdrop. 
As the section on methodology indicates, one of the more favoured 
approaches in the research is 'history from below' (Geschichte von 
unten) or the 'history of everyday life' (Alltagsgeschichte). 
However, while much time and attention is given over to material 
which deals with the experiences of ordinary soldiers, due regard is 
taken of the limitations of such a method when used in isolation. 
Accordingly, it would be more accurate to see this research as an 
attempt to combine 'history from below' with 'history from above. ' 
Indeed, the integration of these two historical perspectives is 
immediately evident from the structure of the work. Each thematic 
chapter commences with a discussion of the 'higher' political and 
economic framework, and then goes on to evaluate this material in the 
specific context of evidence drawn from the files of German Army rear 
area units directly responsible for the implementation of policy in 
the field. 
It should not be supposed, however, that such an integrative method 
immediately offers some form of panacea to the fundamental problem of 
assessing the nature and extent of National Socialism's impact on 
German society. Even when further combined with sophisticated 
analysis available from Michael Geyer's work on the character of 
modern industrialised warfare, or socio-psychological approaches such 
as those associated with Shils and Janowitz, it only serves to 
emphasise the complex nature of the material. 
All historical investigation of the Third Reich is, in any case, 
fraught with difficulties. As Ian Kershaw reminds us, 'whereas 
historians traditionally try to eschew moral judgement (with varying 
degrees of success) in attempting to reach a sympathetic 
understanding (Verstehen) of the their subject matter, this is 
clearly an impossibility in the case of of Nazism. (5) The argument 
can thus be advanced with some conviction that it is necessary for 
all serious scholars to demonstrate even by the very language they 
employ - as in the use of terms such as 'criminality' or 'barbarity' 
in connection with the Nazi regime - their moral detestation for 
Nazism. At the same time, given the problematical nature of the 
subject matter it is the historian's responsibility to employ the 
rational tools of scholarship. In this endeavour balanced judgement 
is, as Wolgang Mommsen remarks, as necessary as moral fortitude. (6) 
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Note: 
Throughout this thesis place names in the Soviet Union have been 
given in the form in which they appeared in the German Army files 
for the period. Even here though the records are not always 
consistent as, for example, in the spelling of town names such as 
Wjasma (Vjasma), Mogilew (Mogilev) or Rshew (Rshev). In these 
instances, the name as it appears in the relevant military files has 
been used, even though this may give rise to some apparent 
inconsistencies within chapters. Furthermore, the words 'Russian' 
and 'Soviet' have been inter-changeable, except in those instances 
were it was necessary to make a clear distinction between various 
national groups, or between the Stalin regime and the civilian 
population. 
In the case of German terms, such as 'Bataillon', which resemble 
the Enqlish equivalent 'battalion' (or 'Kommissar- 'Commissar') 
the word appropriate to the overall language context of the relevant 
passage has been adopted. Finally, the maps which accompany this 
work show some minor variations in the representation of 
national/regional boundaries. Thus, in the case of Belorussia 
(Bylorussia), the map on page x gives the borders for 1939, while 
that on page 50 marks the borders for the period of the war itself. 
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THE GERMAN ARMY AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST OCCUPATION POLICIES 
IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS OF THE SOVIET UNION: 1941-1943 
Historians, the German Army and Occupation Policies in the Soviet 
Union: the debate. 
Any work on occupation policy is as much about the occupiers as it is 
the occupied. (1) This research project is no exception to the rule. 
Hence, the emphasis in this essay on the debate regarding the 
character of the German army, as well as the more specific matter of 
military government in the East. Such a character sketch poses 
problems, not least of which is the fact that ever since the 
conception of this thesis, the number, variety and contentiousness of 
explanations has mushroomed. Indeed, the debate on the function of 
the German Army within the Third Reich has often been typified by 
'political' disagreements within the context of 'Bewdltigung der 
Vergangenheit', disputes which often seem to have over-shadowed the 
underlying scholarly arguments. (2) Thus, I make little apology for 
considering a whole range of works, some of which may, wrongly I 
think, appear both exotic and even esoteric. This is, after all, a 
work that attempts, albeit with limited pretensions, to contribute to 
a much wider topic than occupation policy: a social history of the 
Wehrmacht. 
If some criteria in approaching this material are called for; I offer 
at least three: 
i. works that serve as a backdrop to the specific issue of occupation 
policy and illustrate the changing picture that has emerged since the 
end of the war of the character of the German army; particularly its 
inherent value system within (or as part of) the National Socialist 
state. 
ii. secondary sources which refer directly to German military 
government in the occupied territories. 
iii. those works on both the army per se, and the Third Reich in 
general, that offer not only controversial interpretations, but also 
a variety of methodological approaches. (3) 
The contention that widespread scepticism and even opposition on the 
part of the German army to the Hitler regime was more the rule than 
the exception was certainly advanced as early as the Nuremberg War 
Trials. General Hermann Reinecke, who had been Chef des 
NS-Ftlhrungsstabes since the end of 1943, attempted to demonstrate 
during the criminal proceedings that he had acted to thwart the Nazi 
party in its schemes to gain direct political influence on the 
Wehrmacht. In response to the accusation that he had been a 
'pronounced Party-general' (9ein ausgesprochener Parteigeneral') he 
asserted that he 'had used every means to prevent the success of the 
Party' ('er mit allen Mitteln dagegen gekämpft hat, daß die Partei 
zum Erfolg kam'. )(4) 
Officers who openly recognised the close identification of the 
Party and the Army were, however, in a minority, and their insights 
received scant attention. Generaloberst Georg-Hans Reinhardt's 
critical remarks on the matter of the NSFO (Nationalsozialistische 
FQhrungsoffiziere) was a case in point. (5) As far as activities in 
the Eastern theatre were concerned, the defence was offered that the 
German army had either distanced itself from the 'regrettable' 
actions undertaken by the various elements of the SS or, when 
possible, registered its objections. It was even argued that the army 
was often' ignorant of the true character and extent of these 
happenings. 
Forty years later, with the inevitable benefit of hindsight, it may 
seem surprising that the full implications were not drawn from the 
condemnatory weight of evidence to be found in the courtroom 
documentation. To adopt such an approach would, however, ignore the 
mood of the times. This dialectic between the needs of the present to 
legitimise itself in terms of the past was to be a leitmotiv of the 
historiography of the topic. 
Claims that the Wehrmacht was an institution 'outside' the Third 
Reich, and the accompanying caveat that any involvement was closely 
bound up with the dilemma of 'only obeying orders', became a 
relatively indisputable feature of the numerous personal memoirs and 
unit histories that appeared throughout the 1950s and early part of 
the following decade. (6) Franz Halder, the former Generalstabschef 
des Heeres, in his reflections on Hitler als Feldherr (Munich 1949) 
sought to add weight to the 'apologist' case and advanced the 
proposition of 'Hitler's sole responsibility' ('Alleinschuld des 
Ffihrers'. )(7) Examples of this type of 'self- exculpatory' 
literature abound, not only from this period but up to and including 
the present day. Its wider influence is particularly noteworthy, for 
many general works on the Third Reich relied heavily on such 
secondary sources. This is not to say that the overall issue of 
occupation policy was neglected. In the decade after 1945 a great 
deal of specialist literature, often written by former German 
officials, both civilian and military, who had held high ranking 
positions in the East, was published. Almost inevitably, this put 
particular emphasis on the concept of a 'constructive occupation 
policy' ('konstruktiven Besatzungspolitik'). (8) 
Various 'series' of works are worthy of special attention: those 
produced by former officers of the Wehrmacht under the aegis of the 
Historical Division of the U. S. Army's European Command from around 
mid 1945 to late 1961; the volumes issued by the Institut fOr 
Besatzungsfragen in Tilbingen (which also 'closed' in 1961); the 
'Maxwell Airforce Base' studies of 1954, and the publications of the 
Russian Research Centre, at Harvard. (9) But, as many later historians 
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were to note, much of the work seemed flawed in a way that probably 
reflected the political predilections of the time more than it did 
any basic conceptual weakness. For example, the 'German Military 
(History) Program' materials, particularly the 'P-Series' were 
originally solicited because of the pressures of the Cold War. 
Hence, it should be noted that the monographs on topics such as 
partisan warfare or military government in the occupied Soviet Union, 
were not always devised with simple historical 'curiosity' in 
mind. (10) Nonetheless, many of these studies are still of value for 
present day research; particularly the 'case study' type works 
produced at Harvard. Some of these monographs, such as that of 
Alexander Dallin or Oleg Anisimov, which deal with aspects of German 
military rule in the Soviet Union, also offer interesting 
methodological approaches, albeit within the limitations of the 
contemporary 'state of the art'. (l 1) 
Given the apparent 'usefulness' of many of the former Third Reich 
officials, it was hardly surprising that the literature should tend 
to legitimise the roles they had played in the occupied territories. 
Thus, the view that the German military and many of the 'non-Nazi' 
civilians had been both correct in their behaviour and supported by 
many of the indigenous population was reflected in works such as that 
by Otto Br! iutigam on the 'occupied Eastern- territories, and Peter 
Kleist on the dilemmas of those 'decent' Germans caught between 
'Hitler and Stalin'. (12) A clear distinction was drawn between the 
'enlightened and humane' policies pursued by most of the Army 
personnel and a majority of the 'non-Nazi' civilian administrators, 
and the crimes perpetrated by a small Nazi clique and the special 
units of the SS and SD. This line of apologist argument was to take 
on a quasi- definitive status -in many subsequent works, and its 
influence was therefore immense both in establishing 'accepted 
truths' that took on almost 'a priori status, and later in providing 
the main target for what became an attempt to 'demythologise' the 
Wehrmacht. 
The idea of a marked divergence over policy in the East between 
the Army and the Nazi agencies and also of opposition to activities 
that ran counter to the traditions and values of the German military 
was underpinned by the bias in the literature on the general problems 
of resistance. (13) By elevating the July Bomb Plot of 1944 to the 
status of the most significant domestic Widerstand episode it 
would have been illogical to apply different criteria to events 
outside the Reich. Indeed, it was often argued that removed from the 
restraints and pressures inside Germany the vast expanses of the East 
allowed the army to maximize its inherent hostility to the Hitler 
regime. (14) 
The supposed dichotomy between the practices of the German armed 
forces and those of the National Socialist agencies was reflected in 
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the seminal work on German occupation policy in the Soviet Union, 
Alexander Dallin's 'German Rule in Russia', first published in 
1957. (15) In a study that was really more concerned with the civilian 
administration much was made of the assertion that it had generally 
been the 'utilitarian' military who had shied away from political 
issues. More than that, by training and background, the Generalstab 
and the professional cadres were supposedly alien to the entire 
concept of political warfare. (16) Even some contemporary reviews of 
Dallin's work, while grudgingly acknowledging many of the brutal 
realities of Nazi policy in the East, were quick to emphasise his 
basic premise that 'the promise of Russo-German co-operation with the 
aim of destroying the hated system' ('positive Ansdtze zu einer 
deutsch-russischen Zussammenarbeit mit dern Ziel, das vielfach 
verhaBte System zu Stfirzen') were blocked rather than non- 
existent. (l 7) 
To be fair to Dallin, he did introduce a number of controversial 
themes, albeit in a somewhat 'tame' form, which some historians 
claimed to have 'discovered' some two decades later, including the 
contentious matter of the Wehrmacht's treatment of Soviet prisoners 
of war. (18) Nonetheless, he remained over concerned with what might 
be termed the belief that 'things could have been different; if only 
the German occupiers had handled matters more astutely'. Overall, 
Dallin's work on the general area of German policy in the Soviet 
Union has had a deserved longevity, but it could also be argued that 
its quasi- definitive status exercised something of a dead hand on 
research into military rule in the occupied territories. (19) 
Gerald Reitlinger's monograph, which appeared at the same time, may 
have been somewhat less inclined to adopt this stance, but the work 
contained little beyond a basic description of the general structure 
of Army rule in Russia. (20) The author himself went so far as to 
contend that he saw little prospect of remedying this deficiency, 
since the policies carried out by the various military government 
units defied systematic analysis'. This was a rather unfounded 
9complaint' that would echo through the literature over the 
years. (21) 
Within the general debate on the relationship between the German 
Army and National Socialism, the 'apologist' literature was to 
demonstrate stubborn powers of survival. The one concession was the 
tendency to argue that the army, essentially moral by virtue of its 
traditions, was rendered impotent, as far as independent action 
was concerned, by the powers of the totalitarian state. The military 
was seen as having lost the ability, rather than the willingness to 
act. Such an interpretation may have marked a 'step forward' in the 
debate, but the underlying assumption in all this, not only of some 
kind of "dualism' between the fascist party and the Wehrmacht but, 
more importantly, the claim of the 'unpolitischen Soldaten, ' was 
unlikely to remain unchallenged. (22) 
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By the beginning of the 1960s new trends in historical thought 
were starting to emerge. Just as a certain degree of revisionism 
occurred with regard to the place of the German Army within the 
overall resistance movement, so modifications were made to those 
arguments that set the Wehrmacht clearly apart from the National 
Socialist state, particularly in the sphere of occupation policy. (23) 
However, those historians well placed to research the issue , i. e. the Germans themselves, were also undeniably constrained by the 
dilemmas raised by the whole issue of 'Bewdltigung der 
Vergangenheit'. 
Research into the German Army's involvement in the implementation 
of ideologically based policies, such as Hans-Adolf Jacobsen's 
writings on. the Kommissarbefehl, is a case in point. While this 
contribution was made in the overall context of an in-depth study of 
the SS state published in mid-decade, its critical assessment of the 
military was still muted and the real potential lay in the role the 
work would perform as a bridge to later material. (24) Even the 
pioneering and revisionist specialist works on the German Army by 
Klaus-Jfirgen M(iller and Manfred Messerschmidt, which appeared at the 
very end of the 1960s, while certainly iconoclastic, tended to mark a 
transition stage. Here was both the beginning of a new phase in the 
debate, and a codicil to what had gone before. (25) In some ways, a 
new 'school' was starting to emerge, and the argument was refined 
that under National Socialism the German military as an institution 
far exceeded the anti-liberal and anti -parliamentary attitude that it 
had held before 1933 * Messerschmidt had identified the way in which the army, during the 
peacetime period of the regime, had sought to protect its monopoly of 
the right to bear arms ('WaffentrAgermonopol') and had run the risk 
of becoming assimilated into the National Socialist system. It had 
involved itself fully in the violation of human and legal rights or 
complicity in the R6hm Purge, while the activities of pro-Nazi 
elements had enabled the movement to infiltrate the very core of the 
army. (26) This process was hastened because of the fact that many of 
the new army officers and party officials were of the same generation 
and their values had been shaped by common experiences. Reference to 
Broszat's work on the subject introduced the theme that the 
fascination which the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft held for the 
young officers had even been instilled in many of the older soldiers 
as early as the Burgfrieden of 1914. (27) 
Overall, a 'Degenerationsprozess' had taken place during the 1930s. 
The armed forces had moved beyond the phase of being part of the 
alliance between the conservative establishment and National 
Socialism, for now the military had taken on board the ideological 
constructs of, the Party. The end result was that on the eve of the 
war the Army could be regarded as 'integrated' into the National 
Socialist State. The officers of the Wehrmacht were thus incapable of 
concerted action as a corps against the Hitler regime, for they were 
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a functional part of that system. Any conflicts with other National 
Socialist agencies, such as the SS, were indicative not of 
fundamental differences of principle, but 'mere institutional 
rivalry' (ordindre institutionelle Rivalitaten. )(28) 
On the specific matter of timing, a great deal of the latest 
literature on the activities of the German armed forces in the 
Eastern theatre emphasizes that brutal policies were implemented by 
the military from the very start of the campaign, i. e. from at least 
1941, if not earlier. Indeed, F6rster has stressed the need to 
refocus our view of the scale of human suffering, by remembering 
that the mass extermination of millions of Soviet prisoners of war 
preceded the liquidation of millions of European Jews. (29) 
Messerschmidt's conclusions, on the other hand, put a somewhat 
different gloss on the timing of the indoctrination process, and this 
has a bearing on German Army occupation policies. He advanced the 
line that only after the failed Bomb Plot of July 1944 did the 
complete 'weltanschauliche Assimilation der Wehrmacht' seem 
inevitable, unless military defeat preempted this. In other words, 
although the capacity for acts of resistance was severely limited, a 
small 'residual' older officer class, which retained reservations 
about National Socialism continued to exist in some form. (30) 
Without wishing to introduce yet more caveats into a line of 
argument that is increasingly complex and prone to tangential 
wanderings, a few words of caution are necessary before one readily 
accepts that this idea of involvement, albeit imprecisely defined, 
was now the established orthodoxy. It was not simply a matter of the 
'innere Ffihrung' line arousing criticism, although this was certainly 
the case; rather, it took a great deal of time before the basic ideas 
proposed found their way into the general literature. Indeed, it 
would not be unfair to say that a great number of general works on 
the Third Reich, and certainly some 'specialist' monographs on the 
Wehrmacht, seemed not so much dismissive as unaware of the concept 
of a period of marked ideological indoctrination ('Zeit der 
Indoktrination'. )(32) 
This was not only the case with straightforward monographs on the 
army, but it is particularly true of the last major work on 
occupation policy to appear in English: Norman Rich's study of the 
'establishment of the new order', which was published in the mid 
1970s. (33) Here were all the ambiguities. The author either relied 
on the old sources, such as Dallin, and reiterated the concept of the 
Army as the only bastion of decency left capable of checking the 
brutalities of the SS, or else hesitatingly came to recognise the 
inadequacies of such a view. In the end, Rich came back to Dallin's 
idea of the 'decent' German officer. (34) The work also had a major 
structural flaw as far as its treatment of German army rule in Russia 
was concerned. It was accepted that despite plans to the contrary 
the largest part of the territory conquered by the Germans was never 
removed from the zone of military operations, and thus remained under 
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military government throughout the occupation. Yet, in a most 
illogical fashion, the argument was advanced, albeit by a different 
route, to the same conclusion as that reached by Dallin, it was 
unnecessary to give too much attention to military government. (35) 
Such an assessment of the insignificance of military occupation 
policy would not, however, have gone unchallenged in a number of 
important quarters. Historians in the German Democratic Republic, 
although guided by a clearly defined 'bias, were often much less 
restrained than their counterparts in the Federal Republic when it 
came to matters of 'exorcising the past. Admittedly, this was in 
itself a form of legitimisation. But, the Germans on the other side 
of the Wall often seemed slightly more willing to investigate aspects 
of occupation policy than even their Soviet colleagues. Although, 
even if their conclusions were somewhat predictable, the material 
uncovered in the research was of considerable interest. (36) 
Certainly, East German historians not only benefited from access to 
a great deal of source material denied to colleagues in the West, but 
moreover, were to become aware that a major historiographical debate 
was in the making. From the mid 1960s, historians in the GDR had 
been focusing attention on various aspects of what they called 
"faschistischen Okkupationspolitik auf dem Territoriurn der UdSSR". 
The main concern of this work had been, as one would expect, on the 
role of 'Finanzkapital' and 'Militarismus' in planning for the attack 
on the Soviet Union and the economic exploitation of the occupied 
territories. (37) 
Norbert Miller's work on the Wehrmacht's governmental role in the 
East, which appeared in 1971, added considerably to the 
literature. (38) As well as considering the centrality of economic 
objectives in German foreign and occupation policy, this scholarly, 
if not unbiased text, stressed the complicity of the German military 
in all the brutalities of National Socialist rule in Russia. A line 
of argument that Miller was to develop with specific reference to the 
treatment of Soviet POWs well before 'similar' work appeared in the 
West. (39) 
The German army (or more accurately its 'Fahrungsorgane') was 
seen as fully implicated in the scorched-earth policies and abuse of 
the Soviet population; features of the war in the East that most 
western historians still attributed mainly to the SS and its 
dependent agencies. (40) Emphasis on the responsibility of elites also 
fostered an interest in the draconian measures which the German 
military leadership was prepared to take against its own troops, 
particularly in matters of military discipline. (41) 
Despite criticisms that have been expressed as to its bias, 
MillIer's monograph remains the only text to attempt a systematic 
overall study of German military policy in the occupied Eastern 
territories, and as such it has the immediate function of providing a 
foil for many of the ideas expressed in this thesis, somewhat 
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different to that offered by so-called 'bourgeois/non-marxist 
accounts' (bfirgerliche Darstellung. )(42) Admittedly, no one would 
deny the need for caution in the use of communist sources (both East 
German and Soviet), but their value cannot be denied. They often 
provide much more than mere 'background' to matters such as military 
operations. Indeed, on a number of themes central to this thesis, 
such as the partisan war, reference to Eastern European sources is 
essential. (43) 
If there was little doubt that historians in the communist bloc held 
highly critical views of the role of the German army both within the 
Third Reich and, more specifically, the occupied territories, the 
debate in the West was far from static. Further research followed 
that built on the premises of Messerschmidt and K-J MOller and 
provided fine-tuning for the newly emerging picture of the Germany 
army. For example, Volker Berghahn's work on the NSFO added to the 
key concept of 'innere FOhrung' in the Wehrmacht, and was regarded as 
a significant step in the process of 'demythologising' the 
traditional view of an apolitical army. (44) 
Other material in the 1970s also took this more critical line and 
restudied and rethought fundamental aspects of Army policy in the 
occupied territories. Helmut Krausnick's pilot article on the German 
Army's abandonment of the rules of war (KriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlaB), 
especially as manifested in the Kommissarbefehl, was a noticeable 
case in point. The author identified not only the pre-campaign role 
of the military high command in the formulation of these 'criminal 
orders' (verbrecherischen Befehle) but, more significantly, the 
inclination to do so, not on the grounds of obedience or lack of 
courage, but rather because of a marked degree of ideological 
agreement with Hitler's basic political tenets. (45) A number of 
studies of individual officers who had distinguished themselves by 
their opposition to the first real signs of gross brutalities in 
occupation policy also, somewhat paradoxically, drew attention to 
those who had not objected. (46) 
General interest in National Socialist policy throughout 
German-occupied Europe encouraged the logical need for 
comprehensive comparisons, that would build on references to a 
conventional war ('Normalkrieg') in the West and the war of 
extermination ('Vernichtungskrieg') in the East. In the process 
this would challenge the view advanced in communist literature of an 
economically determined uniformity. (47) Even if systematic comparison 
is still only promised (48), the range of specific works on Poland, 
France, Norway, Belgium, Serbia, Holland and Denmark, etc., offer 
both points of reference and methodological approaches for the study 
of German army occupation policy in the Soviet Union. (Not only did 
certain areas of Western Europe remain under military government for 
the duration of the German occupation, but in some cases Rear Area 
units operating in Russia had already seen service in Poland and the 
West. (49)) 
The detailed backdrop against which to set such an enquiry, and the 
necessary analytical tools to perform the task, were also provided in 
a number of other ways. Detail was added to the study of National 
Socialist occupation policy and its impact in works on topics as 
diversely related as the Russian orthodox church under German rule or 
the formation of the so called 'Fremde Heere Ost'. (50) 
A significant body of literature was also starting to emerge on the 
social history of the German army during its operations in the field. 
No doubt it was time that historians writing in German followed the 
lead of their English and American colleagues and gave consideration 
to the 'other side ' of the war. (51) While much of the material was 
far from flattering, or inclined to allow its arguments to be 
diverted into neutral discussions of 'organisational history', it 
certainly started to add the human dimension to an area of study far 
too often regarded as simply a matter for institutional study. That 
the Eastern theatre should figure prominently in much of this work 
was far from surprising given the allocation of German manpower to 
that front and the traumas of the war. Research was forthcoming into 
'everything' from homosexuality and self- mutilation, to venereal 
disease and letters home. Military justice also came to receive the 
same critical attention that had been given to it by scholars in the 
DDR. (52 
Specialist works relevant to the matter of German military policy in 
the Soviet Union continued to make an occasional appearance. Keith 
Simpson's essentially technical account of German Army security 
tactics in the Rear-Areas was certainly one of the more directly 
pertinent offerings. In its choice of source material, however, it 
showed a bias for that which was, to say the least, incomplete, if 
not outmoded. (53) In the same vein, Matthew Cooper published work on 
the German army's response to the partisan menace in the East. (54) 
As far as the origins of the Army's 'decline' is concerned, the 
work of Michael Geyer is of special interest both to the overall 
debate and, as will be discussed later, because of the conceptual and 
methodological issues raised. (55) Much attention was paid to the 
'classic theme' in German military history; the debate as to the 
predominance of aristocratic traditions within the officer corps. 
What emerged was a well defined view of the Army, or more accurately, 
the officer corps, as a far from homogeneous entity. 'Modernisation' 
trends which originated from as early as the First World War had been 
accelerated during Weimar and consolidated ( almost unintentionally) 
by the Third Reich. This had produced a split in the military 
establishment between a residual and orthodox older element on the 
one hand and an effeciency-orientated wing' on the other. (56) 
The legitimacy of the new 'technocratic professionalism' rested on 
the army's function and on the so-called 'deregulation of violence' 
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('Entgrenzung der Gewalt'). In other words, a significant element of 
the German army had become a clearly work-orientated state 
institution, the sole function of which was the organisation of 
violence. Even if the end product was more the result of the 
encompassing character of modern protracted war within the overall 
context of mass industrialised society, rather than conscious 
planning on the part of the Hitler regime, the implications were far 
reaching. The Army was not simply the organiser of violence. Most of 
its officer corps had become 'specialists of violence', and the 
General Staff, whose members had become increasingly disassociated 
from the campaigns, were regarded as the 'managers of violence'. (57) 
Clearly, this related directly to the desire of the military for an 
authoritarian state in which to maximize its proficiency in 
modern technical industrial warfare. Accordingly, the war in the East 
was not simply a means to restore Germany's great power status, but 
also offered the German army the opportunity to exercise its 
preferred function. (58) 
The real quantum 
, 
leap forward in the study of the German army and its 
function as an occupying authority, came in 1978 with the publication 
of Christian Streit's highly controversial account of the treatment 
of Red Army prisoners of war; Keine Kameraden. Here was a research 
project that in many ways represented the expression of the potential 
inherent in the earlier seminal work of Krausnick and 
Messerschmidt. (59) 
Streit's assertion that Hitler's war against the Soviet Union was 
'the most monstrous war of conquest, enslavement, and annihilation in 
modern history' was, as we have seen, not new, even if many German 
historians had been unwilling to recognise this fact. (60) Neither was 
this, as he himself acknowledged, the first study to consider the 
particular issue of the Commissar Decree, or the overall matter of 
the fate of the Soviet POWs who fell into German hands. (61) However, 
the potential emotive power of this study was already suggested by 
the formal title of the original doctoral thesis on which the work 
was based: 'Die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen als Opfer des national- 
sozialistischen Vernichtungskrieges 1941 bis 1945. ' ('The Soviet 
Prisoners of War as Victims of the National Socialist War of 
Extermination 1941-1945'). It was bound to produce a marked response 
since the fate of POWs in general during the war in the East was a 
vexed, if not, tabu subject in the Bundesrepublik. The plight of 
captured German soldiers and the forcible repatriation of various 
'Soviet defectors' had done much to cloud the 'real' underlying 
issues. (62) 
A wealth of new evidence was used to challenge the accepted view 
that the German army had distanced itself from the worst excesses of 
the war in the East. Streit proposed a fundamental and 
'myth-shattering' concept: not only had the military moved from 
'cognizance' of brutal acts in Poland to active 'collaboration' in 
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Russia but, moreover, the German Army had in many ways furthered the 
escalation of the annihilation policies. In support of this argument 
Streit identified a whole complex of 'criminal orders' which had 
existed from the beginning of the Eastern campaign. These had 
permitted ordinary German army units systematically to starve and 
murder well over three million Russian prisoners of war, out of a 
total of some 5.7 millions. The magnitude and essential motivation of 
this action encouraged the view that it was a 'political and moral 
problem comparable to the (Jewish) genocide policy of the Third 
Reich. '(63) Moreover, it was argued that these measures taken for the 
direct and indirect liquidation of millions of Soviet prisoners of 
war prepared the ground for the equally systematic implementation of 
the 'Endldsung'. Here again, regular German army troops were reported 
to have acted in concert with the SS extermination squads, the 
Einsatz- gruppen, in the unlicensed killing. (64) This process, which 
other historians would term 'cumulative radicalisation, made the 
extension of such a programme to the civilian population in the 
occupied territories seem almost 'functional'. (65) 
Streit cast a wide net as far as responsibility for the expansion 
and eventual scale of the 'war of annihilation' was concerned. 
The Army leadership had been as much involved as the OKW for the OKH 
had intensified the 'vague' premises on which the liquidation 
measures were based. Thus, both the Wehrmacht and army leadership had 
played a significant role, both indirectly and directly, in the 
conception, implementation and radicalisation of annihilation policy 
in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union. This was not simply a case 
of the army being forced by 'pressure of circumstances' to become 
involved -in such practices. Neither was it based on the desire of the 
Army to maintain its relative autonomy within the overall Nazi system 
in the face of institutional rivalry from the SS, even if Mfiller's 
concept of a 'policy of preservation' did figure in the 
explanation. (66) Rather, it reflected the more or less unreserved 
agreement of the Army leadership to wage an ideological war in the 
East. An agreement that was, in turn, the expression of the fusion 
of the military's pre-Hitlerian National Conservative values 
(particularly Eastern imperialism and antisemitism) with full 
National Socialist ideological indoctrination of the army leadership. 
The officer corps had submitted itself to the Nazi regime and was 
thus rapidly relinquishing its traditional political and social 
homogeneity. As far as Streit was concerned, any attempts from the 
OKH to weaken the Kommissarbefehl and the related, subsequent orders 
were thus not motivated by the supposedly chivalrous traditional 
values of the Army. Instead, they reflected the pragmatic need to 
avoid the undesirable impact that too much involvement in such 
essentially barbarous measures might have on troop discipline. (67) 
Keine Kameraden was not only the 'best single monograph by which 
to gauge the advances in research and interpretation over the past 
twenty five years'. Streit's iconoclastic study also had far reaching 
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consequences, in terms of the way its ideas were both developed and 
criticised, and with regard to the methodological and conceptual 
problems that it raised. (68) It was certainly far from the last word 
on the debate regarding the German Army or its activities in the 
East. 
The literature that went beyond the beginnings of the army's changed 
character and included a focus on practice, in the style of Streit, 
intensified both the complexities and controversies of the overall 
debate. A great number of threads were being drawn together, 
particularly relating to matters that even the 'apologists' had 
always found difficult to explain. Jrargen F6rster, in an article 
published in 1981 entitled 'Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht im Krieg gegen 
die Sowjetunion', synthezised and clarified a number of these 
'demythologising' arguments that had been advanced by the end of the 
1970s. (69) 
The German armed forces as a whole and the Army per se (i. e. OKW 
and OKH) were fully implicated in both economic and ideological 
planning for the war in the East, including the Jewish question. This 
'destruction of the military tradition'(Zerst6rung der militarischen 
Tradition) had begun immediately in 1933, and the rapid increase in 
size of the officer corps (from 3,858 in 1933 to nearly 21,000 in 
1938) had turned the army into "functionaries of the Nazi Party' 
(Funktionstragerin der Partei. )(70) 
Poland had already shown that the supposed division between the 
military leadership and the SD regarding the brutalities of 
occupation policy was a fiction. In the Soviet Union this 
co-operation and complicity was to be renewed in a range of 
activities that included not only the economic exploitation of the 
occupied territories, but the use of 'catch-all' directives to 
eliminate, either systematically or indiscriminately, all those whom 
the Germans regarded as 'undesirablel. (71) Reference to in-depth 
studies, such as Helmut Krausnick's work on the relationship between 
the German Army and the SD Einsatzgruppen in the extermination 
policies directed against both the Commissars and the Jews, 
reinforced this new credo of complicity. (72) Much emphasis was now 
placed on the Army leadership's full participation in a trilogy of 
evil: 
The military had gone beyond the Commissar Order and systematically 
exterminated not only leading functionaries of the Red Army, but 
millions of the ordinary soldiers. 
Initial 'logistical support' to the Einsatzgruppen had progressed 
to a position where no 'formal' separation of tasks was discernible; 
thus creating an alliance in order to liquidate millions of European 
Jews. 
The Army had purposefully attached the term 'partisan' to all 
manner and numbers of unfortunate Soviet citizens, to whom this term 
rarely, if ever, applied, in order to disguise its extermination 
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policies. This assertion received considerable quantitative support 
in an article by Timothy Mulligan which appeared in 1982; 'Reckoning 
the Cost of the People's War'. (73) 
Such iconoclasm was bound to produce scholarly counters and thus it 
was far from surprising that one of the most harrowing aspects of 
the German occupation, the treatment of the Soviet POWs, came in for 
further attention. Much of this new literature advanced Streit's 
arguments in as far as it recognised that this was a problematical 
issue, but there was a marked trend for the work of authors such as 
Alfred Streim or Hans Roschmann to be applied in defence of the view 
that 'contingencies rather than policy' had determined practice with 
regard to Red Army captives. (74) There was also a tendency to 
adopt the 'quantitative uncertainties' approach that characterised a 
range of writings on the 'Jewish Problem'. Thus, the discrepancies 
between various authors as to the 'exact' numbers of Soviet POWs who 
perished could be exploited to create more fundamental doubts as to 
the 'intentions' of the German army. (75) Similar lines of argument 
were also developed with regard to other contentious matters, such as 
the massive violence applied in partisan warfare. Much was made of 
the 'inevitably' brutal nature of all wars in the East, and the 
'reciprocity" by which both protagonists had 'agreed' not to observe 
the codes of war, supposedly more appropriate for engagements in 
the West. (76) 
The attention that the scholarly literature on the German army 
received in the serious press indicated that this was far more than 
an a matter , of esoteric academic debate. As the first wave of 
revisionism had shown, it touched on many raw nerves connected with 
the peculiar German problem of 'Bewdltigung der Vergangenheit. 
Extreme positions could be taken up, particularly if there were any 
9suspicions' that the research was really as much about 
continuities that extended beyond the end of the Hitler period. 
Indeed, to many citizens of the BRD, including former members of the 
Wehrmacht, any matters of German army occupation policy were as much 
memory as they were history. (77) 
As one might expect, however, most of the popular literature which 
deals with the war in the East is little influenced by the critical 
research into the character of the German army and its role in 
occupation policy. Even an otherwise fascinating collection of 
contemporary photographs taken by serving members of the Wehrmacht in 
the Soviet Union (published in 1984) had an extremely bland covering 
text. (78) There were some exceptions, including the special 
'anniversary' issue of Zeitmagazin for June 1981, which, while 
stressing the idea that many Soviets looked to the invading Germans 
as liberators, also recognised the unpalatable 9fact' that the 
Wehrmacht was 'bound-up with the extermination machinery' ('wurde in 
die Vernichtungsmaschinerie eingespannt'). (79) However, as with the 
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German television screening of the American-Soviet co-production, The 
Unknown War and the various books that accompanied the series, there 
was still a marked reluctance to accept the thesis of total 
complicity. (80) Elsewhere in the visual arts, Soviet director Elem 
Klimov's account of German anti-partisan operations in his 1984 film 
'Idi i smotri' (Go and See) while praised for its cathartic impact 
was at the same time criticised for its near- caricatured depiction of 
'Nazi villains'. (81) 
More surprising, although reminiscent of the state of affairs 
throughout the last three decades, a great deal of scholarly general 
literature on Third Reich shows equal variations in 'awareness'. 
One of the latest general histories of modern Germany does 
acknowledge that the Wehrmacht was 'deeply involved' with the SS in 
implementing the Commissar Befehl. On the matter of the treatment of 
ordinary Red Army POWs it suggests acceptance of the highest 
scholarly estimates as to mortality rates. (82) However, other recent 
works still make reference to the 'rule of terror of the German 
special units' (Terrorherrschaft der deutschen Spezialeinheiten') 
and some, such as the synthetic Explaining Hitler's Germany couch the 
references to the Wehrmacht's role in the executions in the East in 
language that suggests the 'case is far from proved'. (83) 
A recent article, although specifically on the 'genesis of 
Operation Barbarossa', might also seen as devaluing the importance 
and conclusions of the occupation literature because of its highly 
suspect assertion that Hitler was engaged in a preventive war. This 
bias towards traditional diplomatic and military aspects of the 
Eastern campaign was also evident in Hillgruber's overview study of 
the Second World War. (84) Where controversial explanations did 
receive general attention in revisionist works on the problem of 
resistance (such as collection edited by Schmakede and Steinbach) a 
clear measure of restraint was still evident. (85) 
Military histories are no less variegated. Martin van Crefeld's 
comparative work on 'fighting power' offers valuable insights into 
the integrative role of organisation within the German Army. However, 
the two 'major' English- language works on the German Army to appear 
in the last five years are woefully inadequate, as far as the German 
Army's occupation policy is concerned. (86) Certainly, their 
old-fashioned propensity to ignore all but the traditional 
front-line combat role is reinforced by the perennial interest in 
'militaria'. Thus, most of the major research and publishing 
houses, including the MGFA, continue to issue eulogising monographs 
that consider 'neutral' issues such as, individual military 
engagements, abstract strategical problems or the careers of 
respectable officers. (87) 
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In marked contrast, current specialist literature pertaining to 
occupation policy in the East has given rise to a range of research 
which sees the Wehrmacht as nothing less than one of the instruments 
used by Hitler in the service of his Lebensraum ideology. Studies in 
this vein, including dissertations and articles, adopt an overall 
critical line that is often immediately apparent from the titles - as 
with Richard Fattig's doctoral thesis on the Wehrmacht and 'reprisal 
actions' or Omer Bartov's work on the 'barbarisation of warfare'. (88) 
Christopher Browning's enquiries into German Army actions in Serbia 
further advance the line that a 'community of interest' existed 
between the Wehrmacht and the SS to eradicate various groups 
including the Jews, and that this link had been formed long before 
the conventionally accepted beginnings of the Final Solution. (89) 
Thus, it was no wonder that when instituted a systematic, 
European-wide genocide programme met with no meaningful resistance 
from any 'influential' segments of German society, certainly not from 
the Wehrmacht. 
It would be wrong however to argue that an unchallenged, or for 
that matter, definitive 'new-orthodoxy' has emerged on the German 
Army's role in occupation policy. The major edited collections which 
have been published over the last five years make this very apparent. 
Volume 4 of the MGFA's study of the Second World War, Das Deutsche 
Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 
(which appeared in 1983) is probably the most ambitious work to 
date. (90) Essentially a major work of synthesis, with contributions 
on German rule in the East from known specialists in the field such 
as Jilrgen F6rster, the collection, despite freely admitting that a 
systematic study of military government is still unavailable, 
reflects a range of critical arguments which the author and other 
'demythologisers', have produced over the past decade. 
Within the general parameters of 'history from above', considerable 
attention is devoted to events in the Army rear areas, particularly 
the implementation of racial and economic policies, and in this 
regard the material provides a considerable volume of useful evidence 
combined with scholarly analysis. (91) However, the volume also 
contains a great deal of what might be termed 'apologetic' writing, 
as well as traditional military-operational history. This in itself 
would be acceptable were it not for the structure of the work which 
approaches many highly controversial aspects of occupation policy, 
such as the German army's treatment of the Soviet POWs or the 
Jews, at various points in the book. These are almost hermetically 
isolated from each other, so that there is little sense of internal 
debate over these extremely debatable issues. (92) 
The fact that the work, despite these criticisms, still aroused 
considerable controversy, might be taken to indicate that a format 
which offered 'Interpretationspluralismus' was a matter of necessity 
in the face of an apparent 'Tendenzwende'. (93) Certainly, the work 
published subsequently by individual contributors (including JOrgen 
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Fdrster's articles in a number of English language collections, such 
as the recent 'comparative' study on the treatment of Soviet POWs and 
Jews) has often been at pains to provide the missing dialogue. (94) 
Other collections, such as that edited by Gerd-Rolf Ueberschdr in 
1984 under the title 'Unternehmen Barbarossa' while not attempting 
to break new ground, tended to represent a less unadulterated 
synthesis of critical literature, with offerings from authors who had 
made a major contribution to the debate, including Messerschmidt, 
Streit and Hillgruber. (95) 
However, until the publication within the last year of Omer 
Bartov's study of the behaviour of three specific front-line combat 
units active on the Eastern Front, the clear bias of all the 
research, not excluding in any way the most highly critical 
demythologising literature, was still with 'history from above'. (96) 
In itself, such an approach was both valid and necessary, but a 
rather undifferentiated view of the war tended to emerge. Where there 
was a need in the work of Streit, Krausnick, Streim or F6rster for 
case-study examples to underpin certain arguments this remained 
determined by a primary concern with the role of either elites or, at 
the lowest level, the middle order (mittelere Ebene) within the 
German Army. Even Bartov's analysis of the 'barbarisation of warfare' 
while broadening out the debate tended as a result of its somewhat 
contentious approach to the matter of ideological indoctrination 
amongst junior officers to downgrade discussion on the Alltags 
reality of the conflict. (97) 
Overall, the point which the debate has reached serves to give some 
pointer to the way forward. Until the promised appearance of Volume 5 
of the MGFA series, with its 'systematic investigation of the various 
types of German occupation policy in Europe', the relevant material 
in Volume 4 (Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion) probably represents the 
high point of the 'state of the art' in terms of 'history from 
above. '(98) Omer Bartov's treatment of particular German Army units 
active on the Eastern Front indicates the potential of an approach 
that moves the focus away from elites. However, the emphasis, by way 
of a particular methodological bias, on specific front-line combat 
units has not removed the need for further contributions to be made 
towards a social history of the German army. (99) 
The role of the German army in the implementation of National 
Socialist occupation policies in the Soviet Union remains an area 
still bedeviled by problems. Prone to revisionist controversy, it 
remains ripe for further research, not only in terms of the clearly 
identified need for an overall systematic appraisal of military 
government but, more importantly, as far as new methodological 
approaches are concerned. Despite the fact that much of the inherent 
dynamism of the debate derived from the links that could have been 
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made between theory and practice - between the policies of the leadership of the Third Reich and the actions of the troops in the 
field - this dialectic relationship remains relatively unexplored. It 
is to this aspect of life during the Third Reich that this thesis 
hopes to make a contribution. 
### 
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Methodology 
'It is not easy to find a recent book in (German) history in which 
the author applies himself to his subject without writing a 
fifty-page theoretical preface first. '(1) Gordon Craig's pithy 
comment is certainly not without substance; the more so since the 
'affliction' often seems to affect those who write about German 
history in other, less 'awful' languages. (2) However, while 
acknowledging the restraints implied by such a caveat, some 
methodological statement is necessary. 
Firstly, it should be stressed that if this thesis can in any way 
be termed 'military history", then it must be within Michael 
Geyer's definition of military history as social history 
('Militargeschichte als Sozialgeschichte'. ) The 'form' which 
Manfred Messerschmidt has recently and succinctly described as a 
'history of society at war'. (3) And, secondly, by taking up his 
observations on this type of history, one can identify not only the 
incentive to pursue further research but, perhaps more importantly, 
gain some idea of the gaps that are still to be filled: 'Eine 
Sozialgeschichte der Reichswehr (und sie ist nur zu schreiben als 
Geschichte der ganzen Armee, nicht allein des Offizierkorps) und 
weitgehend auch der Wehrmacht existiert in nur kümmerlichen 
Anfdngen. '(4) 
A social history, that considers the 'entire army and not simply 
the Officer corps', should, in many ways, have been forthcoming 
since Geyer made this comment in 1976. After all, the Wehlerite 
$new orthodoxy' in German history which placed so much emphasis on 
elites and elite manipulation had come under considerable attack 
from those who advocated an alternative approach of 'history from 
below' or, to use the rediscovered German term, 
'Alitagsgeschichte'. (5) Yet, as the historiographical essay which 
opened this study has demonstrated, even the most revisionist 
works on the German army showed the inbuilt bias towards a 'history 
from above. Concern with elites and 'higher' political processes 
remains, of course, an integral part of any analysis but the 
historical picture which emerges tends to be incomplete. Indeed, 
despite the outpouring of 'high' literature, the lack of material 
on the military is a serious omission in research on social 
conditions in Nazi Germany. After all, the Wehrmacht structured the 
lives of at least twelve million Germans between 1933 and 1945 
(with over 3.5 million experiencing duty in the Eastern theatre), 
yet we still know surprisingly little about conditions in the 
German armed forces. (6) Thus, while it has become en vogue to 
approach National Socialism inside Germany by examining numerous 
aspects of 'Alltag im Dritten Reich', research into the German 
army, despite the massive outpourings on this topic has not been 
characterised by this trend. (7) This deficiency has been duly noted 
by Ian Kershaw, one of the foremost exponents of the new history, 
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in his 1985 synthezised study of the Third Reich; '.. a social 
history of the German army ... and numerous aspects of decision-making processes and wartime administration both inside 
Germany and in the occupied territories are some areas which still 
require research and analysis'. (8) 
This is not simply to say that every aspect of German history can 
be better understood if studied exclusively 'from below', rather 
than by way of the 'macroscopic tradition'. The pedigree of the 
'new school' which is much indebted to the French Annalists, and 
more particularly the British 'grass-roots' history of 
EP Thompson, does not automatically guarantee it the status of an 
'academic panacea'. Sophisticated debate amongst historians as to 
the relative merits of Alltagsgeschichte has produced numerous 
and justified arguments that implore caution in the use of 
9microscopic' techniques alone. (9) The most immediate risk seems to 
be that Alltagsgeschichte often slips into a sort of 
antiquarianism, recording details rather than addressing problems. 
The end result of which is a 'social history that ignores 
politics'. (10) An attempt to let the 'facts speak for themselves' 
may be very much part of the current trend amongst German social 
historians that attempts to deaggregate received wisdom, and 
reconstruct problems from the 'bottom up', but it implies not only 
a 'history without ideas', but more importantly, an illogical 
approach that denies the fundamental premise on which the 
discipline is based: the testing of hypothesis. (Il) 
Let it be stressed, however, that these caveats in no way negate 
the need for the sort of work that shows a 'new and welcome concern 
with the recovery of everyday human experience in the past'. A form 
of history which Hirgen Kocka has described as manifesting 
'sympathetic affinity to the subject being studied', and Georg 
Iggers had characterised as 'a return from the analysis of 
structures to the reconstruction of the lives of concrete human 
beings'. (12) 
A methodology seems both necessary and appropriate which 
integrates the two approaches (of history from above and below) and 
analyses group interactions in modern German history. A merger is 
required between a history which does not exclude theory from the 
historical account of social context, and that which by 'thick 
description' ensures an awareness of the reactions of 
individuals. (13) As far as the study of the German Military under 
National Socialism and the specific matter of occupation policy is 
concerned, such a methodology would regard the existing literature 
on high politics or social processes within the military as a basis 
from which to move forward to a 'systematic accumulation of a whole 
range of newer sources, especially those concerning the lower 
ranks'. (14) 
A need thus emerges for 'local studies' of the various activities 
of the German Army (including those units operating in the 
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occupied rear areas) that, to paraphrase Richard Evans, offer the 
sort of 'sufficiently detailed evidence to be able to test many of 
the general questions which historians have raised about the major 
features of modern German history, whether it is the extent to 
which the masses were manipulated by the elites or the degree to 
which the Third Reich commanded the assent of its subjects'. (15) In 
the process, such a social history of a 'single small community' 
(in this particular instance, a German Army Rear Area Unit) by 
working the political dimension into the analysis of the 'inside 
view of the warTInnenseite des Krieges') facilitates the thorough 
exploration of the 'meaning and role of politics in everyday life'. 
An interaction which has been referred to in the particular context 
of service life as 'the dialectic between totalitarian control and 
individual existence' ('die Dialektik von totalit5rer StaatsfQhrung 
und individueller Existenz'. )(16) 
Therefore, as far as the constraints associated with the approach 
of 'letting the facts speak for themselves' are concerned, this 
research does not originate in a vacuum. Rather, as the critical 
bibliography indicated, the available literature provides ample 
hypotheses from which to work. The main advantage is that this 
project has not set out, like so much of the writing on the German 
Army, with the fixed and immutable purpose of 'demythologising' the 
Wehrmacht, or conversely reviving the 'old orthodoxy'. Instead, its 
basic premise is to deconstruct all the various approaches and 
lines, and reconstruct on the basis of the available data. 
Such a grandiose claim is bound to engender criticism. After all, 
in any study of a military establishment the historian is dealing 
with an institution that is both part of society and yet also a 
form of artificial society. However, while accepting that the 
military does have a special and perhaps peculiar role within 
German society it is not a unique creation of that society. Just as 
recent work on crime in German history has suggested the need to 
re-evaluate stereotypes, so there is a need to 'normalise' German 
social history as far as the Army is concerned. (17) Certainly, 
there is some danger in assigning an artificially homogenous 
character to the Wehrmacht. As one of the most vehement critics of 
the 'demythologising' literature has asked: what is even meant by 
the term, when it is applied to a military establishment of over II 
million personnel? Every single army group?; every single division 
or even company?; or even every single soldier? (18) 
Of course, the key question is, to use David Blackbourn and Geoff 
Eley's phraseology, how all this should be related to the sphere of 
politics proper, to the question of power'. (19) Although this is a 
challenging undertaking, the methodological problems are not 
insoluble; indeed one of the main analytical planks of this 
research is to approach the topic by applying the concept of an 
'institutional entity' in two very different, though not 
contradictory, ways. 
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On the one hand, as a number of the historical works on the 
character of the army have demonstrated, the concept of a high 
degree of homogeneity within the German army, certainly before 1933 
and, by inference, during the Nazi regime, is open to considerable 
question. On the other, it can be asserted that the unity and 
structure that the military institution imposed on its members may 
well have been more of an obstacle than an aid to its nazification. 
In other words, the bureaucratic form of the German Army was left 
intact by the Nazi regime, and the immediate and dominant 
realities of war (rather than ideological criteria) may actually 
have guaranteed continuities. 
The first 'model', with its suggestion that a distinction can be 
drawn between the 'old' and 'new' elements in the army, relates to 
Dallin's hypothesis that the 'traditional' rear area commanders 
were often at variance with those 'modern' elements in the 
German military which had expanded under National Socialism. 
'Having earned their ranks in earlier days, they (the senior 
officers and generals who acted as military commanders in the Army 
Rear Areas) had higher standards of judgement, and ..... did not 
mind reporting home in terms that ran counter to accepted 
stereotype'. (20) This argument is all the more relevant if one 
incorporates K-J Waller's caveat that Michael Geyer has 
over-stressed the 'modernisation' process and underplayed the 
continuing traditions of the Prusso German state and its officer 
corps; at least amongst some of the 'caste'. (21) In fact, Geyer 
does allow for the concept of a residual and orthodox element which 
still prevailed despite the emergence of a 'modern 
efficiency- orientated wing', even after 1935 when the compact unity 
of the officer corps began to disintegrate as the National 
Socialist regime exerted its pressures and when general 
conscription massively increased the size of the army. (22) Indeed, 
much is made of the institutionalization of the schism as manifest 
in the 1934 division and conflict between Heeresffihrung and 
Wehrmachtfilhrung. 
This point could be pursued in the context of occupation policy 
by the introduction of Christian Streit's arguments, as to the 
central role of the OKH in the development of Policy in the 
East. (23) Even if it is accepted that considerable numbers of the 
German armed forces would have been members of the NSDAP, or that 
most young recruits had been through the process of Nazi education 
in schools and the Hitler Youth, it is surely an apriori assumption 
to make direct causal connections between this and actual military 
practices in the Eastern theatre. (24) Admittedly, recent research 
by Bartov has attempted to pursue Messerschmidt's assertion that 
the process by which 'fanatical Nazi fighters' (Yanatische 
KAmpfertypen") penetrated to the core of the Army, was very much 
related to the fact that many of the new army officers and party 
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officials were of the same generation and their values had been 
shaped by common experiences. (25) However, a range of historians, 
not only those such as Streit who have been directly concerned with 
troop behaviour in the East, but also Ian Kershaw, in his research 
into popular opinion (Volksmeinung) inside Nazi Germany, have 
wrestled with the basic problem of analysing actions when, as they 
see matters, 'the majority of Germans were neither dyed-in-the-wool 
National Socialists nor convinced anti-fascists' ('die meisten 
Deutschen waren weder eingefleischte Nationalsozialisten noch 
fiberzeugte Antifaschisten'. )(26) 
In this context, there is much in favour of the argument that 
history should be concerned as much with 'exceptions to the rule' 
as it is the 'norm'. As in Bronowski's gas law, more is often 
learned from a study of the behaviour of the particles that go 
against the stream, rather than those which simply observe the 
flow. The value of such a methodological approach is well made by 
Roderick Floud when he argues that, 'while it has long been clear 
to social scientists, that, in most circumstances, it is 
illegitimate to make inferences about individual motivation or 
behaviour from mass data, this does not preclude historians from 
contrasting the behaviour of an individual or group with the 
collective behaviour of larger numbers of people considered as a 
whole'. (27) 
Empirical investigation is called for into many of the so called 
9apologist' premises, which interpret controversial actions in 
terms of 'strategies for survival', force of circumstance or even 
pragmatism. Accordingly, due regard should also be given to 
arguments which emphasise troop behaviour in terms of the response 
to manpower limitations, and the psychological profile of the 
soldiers involved. (28) As Shils and Janowitz noted in their work on 
morale in the Wehrmacht, 'empirical evidence seemed to imply that 
the solidarity of the German Army was based only very indirectly 
and very partially on political convictions or broader beliefs'. 
The political attitudes of the soldiers appeared of much less 
importance than 'spatial proximity, the capacity for intimate 
communication, the provision of paternal protectiveness by NCOs and 
junior officers, and the gratification of certain personality 
needs, e. g., manliness, by the military organisation and its 
activities. The larger structure of the army only served to provide 
the 'framework in which potentially individuating physical threats 
were kept at a minimum'. (29) Indeed, in any evaluation of the 
German army by means of 'history from below, some working 
socio -psychological assumptions are necessary, since we are, after 
all, dealing with individual and group behaviour albeit within an 
institutional framework. 
At the opposite methodological extreme the idea of abstract 
historical determinism as an explanation, if not justification, for 
the brutalities of the war in the Soviet Union, may appear to 
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border on quasi-apologist abstraction. However, Geyer's related 
concepts of the 'industrialisation of warfare' and "socialisation 
of war' offer a useful alternative model to ideological 
motivation. (30) The proposal is that the 'legitimacy' of the new 
'technocratic professionalism' rested on the army's function, with 
a significant element of the German army acting as a 
work-orientated state institution; the sole function of which was 
the 'organisation of violence'. Irrespective of whether or not 
there were 'only a handful of National Socialist fanatics in the 
army in 1933', the end product (as manifested in the military's 
propensity for 'unlimited violence') was the result more of the 
encompassing character of modern protracted total war within the 
context of mass industrialised society, than conscious planning on 
the part of the Hitler regime. (31) As one specialist review of 
Geyer has noted, war by the extermination of the enemy, in terms of 
both military and civilian resources, became the technologically 
conditioned norm; "Die totale und terroristische Kriegf0hrung des 
Militärs ohne Rücksicht auf die Bevölkerung - oder genereller - auf 
die sozialen Kosten der Kriegführung gehörte nicht erst zu den 
Schreckensbildern eines von der SS inszenierten Vernichtungs - 
krieges, sondern war das 'normale' Kriegsbild der Reichswehr. Und 
von der Reichswehr wurde es in die Wehrmacht des Dritten Reiches 
getragen'. (32) 
The ethos of those members of the officer corps who had become 
the specialists of violence derived not from a consciousness of 
ancestry and social caste, with a desire to preserve that caste by 
a 'special code of behaviour', but rather from the professional 
sphere which became the exclusive source of justification for the 
German military. Goal achievement amongst what Geyer terms a 
'dominant' military faction thus rated higher than the cohesion and 
unity of the traditional elite. (33) In other words, to use the term 
employed by Ernst Jringer, modern industrialised war was 
'work'. (Arbeit). Indeed, analysis of this phenomenon could be 
reinforced by drawing from the opposite end of the political 
spectrum. Alexander Kluge has argued that the whole brutal 
mechanism could only function by the deliberate creation of 
situations where the victims became abstract quantities in a larger 
(economically determined) process, and where the tormentors 
themselves enjoyed a degree of abstraction. (34) 
Overall, of course, all these premises, be they concerned with 
matters and approaches as diverse as 'history from below', 
ideological determinism, institutional structures, behavioural 
psychology or theories of industrialised warfare must be related to 
the empirical material which will be surveyed in the next section. 
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The Sources. 
An Annales style 'total history' of German military rule in the 
occupied areas of the Soviet Union would appear to be feasible 
given the volume of available material. (35) This project has more 
modest aims, but it does attempt to work at the local level where 
the evidence is sufficiently thickly textured to facilitate a 
thorough exploration of the the meaning and role of politics in 
everyday life and its relations to economic and social 
structures. (36) Accepting this, and Dallin's caveats as to the 
problems inherent in any systematic analysis of the subject, the 
archival material inevitably presents problems. (37) 
A number of major official military sources are at the 
researcher's disposal: - 
The Kriegstagebilcher and Anlagenb! inde - KTB and Anl. - (War Journals and Supplementary enclosures) for: 
The Quartermaster General for the Army Groups and Armies; 
The Headquarters' Staff of the Commanding Officers of the various 
Army Group Rear Areas; 
The Security Divisions under the command of these officers; 
The High Command of the various Armies and Panzer Armies; 
The Headquarters of the Army Corps; 
The Commanding Officers of the Army Rear Areas; 
The Army Economics Officers attached to the Army Group Rear Areas 
and Army Rear Areas; 
The Troop Commanders responsible for military order and discipline; 
The Territorial (Reserve Troop) Commanders in the Soviet Union; 
The Wehrmachtkommandanten assigned to the Occupied Areas; 
The Military Gendarmerie & 
The Geheime Feldpolizei. (38) 
In addition certain other military holdings are -available, 
although their value for this project is rather varied. The KTI)s of 
the individual Military Commands and the units attached to them 
(Kommandobeh6rden und Verbande) are far from complete. Some stop as 
early as 1942, and few go beyond 1943. (39) Similarly, most of the 
surviving material regarding the Local Headquarters Command of the 
Military Government Sections (Kommandanturen der Militarverwaltung) 
relates to the occupied territories in the West. (40) 
Two problems are thus -immediately evident: the sheer volume of 
material and its relevance. The Kriegstagebacher and Anlagenbande 
of the Commanding Officers of two particular army rear areas 
(KorQck 532 & KorOck 582) constitute the core of the archival 
material on which this thesis is based. In itself, this amounts to 
some 84 files: a figure which may appear modest until one adds that 
on the basis of an accurate calculation this amounts to some 11,559 
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pages of text. (41) In addition, 25 selected files from the records 
of a further 8 Korficks have been processed in order to establish 
the representative nature of the data from the two in-depth 
studies. These files, depending on the particular Rear Area 
concerned, span a period that ranges from three to five years 
(1939-1943). (42) Furthermore, working on the premise of a command 
structure based on Norbert Mfiller's schema (which tends more 
accurately to reflect the realities of the situation than that 
proposed by Alexander Dallin and Timothy Mulligan) two other major 
sources have been tapped. (43) 
In the first instance, the files of the KriegstagebUcher and 
Anlagenb1nde for the Commanding General of the Security Troops and 
Commander in the Military Zone of Administration have been 
examined. Special, though not exclusive, attention is given to the 
files for Army Group Centre, (the overall area of operations for 
Korfick 532 and 582). In this instance, some 40 files are 
involved. (44) Included in with this material are three particular 
documents which offer a range of information in terms of 
administrative practice and official analysis: - 'Erfahrungsbericht 
der Militärverwaltung beim Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte für 
die Zeit vom 22.6.1941 bis August 1944'; (45) 'Abschlussbericht über 
die Tätigkeit der Militärverwaltung im Operationsgebiet des Ostens' 
(1941-1943)(46); 'Zusammenstellung der von Abt. VII des Bef. H. Geb. B. 
in der Zeit vom 10.7.1941 bis 30.9.1942 herausgegebenen Anordnungen 
und Befehle von allgemeiner Bedeutung zur Durchführung der Aufgaben 
der Militarverwaltung'. (47) 
Secondly, a limited selection of material which refers to the 
areas of military government has been drawn from 83 files of the 
Reichsministerium f0r die besetzten Ostgebiete. (RMfbO - Reichs 
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories). (48) While the RMfbO 
was not directly concerned with the area under military rule, the 
Ministry did take an active interest in the affairs of the Army 
rear areas. This scrutiny provides both an additional source of 
material and a means of corroborating data. 
Naturally, if much 'history from below' is distorted by what 
Richard Bessel refers to as the 'institutional nature of the 
evidence', due regard needs to be given to the difficulties of 
'viewing daily life from the vantage point of the rulers and 
administrators' when the group under consideration forms part of an 
institution. (49) However, the value of the reports need not be 
belittled, provided certain precautions are taken. Due regard needs 
to be given to the way in which the material was generated, and to 
the underlying purpose of the exercise. Most, if not all, of the 
military reports were designed for internal consumption (and in 
many cases were classified material). As such the integrity of the 
contents must be regarded as an accurate reflection of the 
situation on the ground. 
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Finally, some comment is necessary to explain why in research based 
very much on primary material little, if any, use has been made of 
oral history. As David Irving has noted, there is an ideal moment 
to engage in any kind of research on the Third Reich: not so near 
the events that the participants are reticent to reflect on 
happenings, but yet not so distant as to either cloud memories or 
indeed see the physical demise of sources. (50) Unfortunately, not 
only were the late 1970s probably beyond this portal, but two other 
factors reinforced the difficulties. 
The matter of the age of the key military personnel is discussed 
at length in a different context, suffice it to add here Streim's 
note that some of the senior army officers responsible for rear 
area military government had already died by 1944 as a result of 
natural causes. (51) The last commanding officer of Korfick 532, 
Generalleutenant Bernhard, was in fact executed by the Soviets as a 
war criminal in 1945. (52) Of the 22 members of the Landesschiltzen 
Bataillons 332 who were accused of having committed atrocities 
against Soviet prisoners, only two were still alive in 1973. (53) 
The second equally telling point is that the losses of the rear 
area combat troops were substantial, more especially during the 
final phase of the war. Streim, again, has remarked that very few 
of this class of soldier, who were assigned in 1941/42, survived 
the war. 
Attempts to compensate for this missing source by the use of say 
biographies and 'Nachlasse' run into difficulties. Some valuable 
material can be unearthed, such as the general work by Hermann 
Teske, 'Die silbernen Speigel' or, more specifically, Alexander 
Freiherr von Seebach's memoirs as a staff officer with Kortick 532, 
after it was transferred to the jurisdiction of AOK9. (54) However, 
despite the undoubted worth of this material, it often represents 
the view from above. Moreover, as the archivists of the 
Bundesarchiv/ Militararchiv themselves have noted, it is difficult 
to obtain material on the lower-ranks' first-hand experience of the 
war in the East. (55) 
This comment really forces us back onto the foundations of this 
research; the primary archival material produced by the various 
sections of Army Rear Area government. However, in the light of the 
earlier discussion of a methodology which favours 'reconstruction' 
by means of history from below, a few words of caution are 
necessary. It does not follow that either the approach or the 
choice of sources offers a historical panacea. Often the available 
data present themselves in the form of aircraft crash wreckage in 
which the vital 'black-box' piece of information proves elusive. 
Either that, or the material arrives rather like Scandinavian 
flat-pack furniture, with the assembly instructions missing. To 
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paraphrase Martin van CrF/eld, 'to study history, especially 
military/social history, on the basis of written records is always 
a hazardous undertaking. Much that mattered was never recorded. 
Much that was recorded did not matter'. (56) 
### 
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The Case Study Areas: 
In order to consider and analyse this interface between the 'view 
from above' and the 'view form below', two particular Army Rear Areas 
(Rilckwdrtigte Armeegebiete: KorOcks) with their respective internal 
command structures of Feld- and Ortskommandanturen have been 
selected: KorfAck 532 and Korfick 582. 
Both of these Army Rear Areas were attached to Army Corps operating 
in the forward positions of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre), 
one to the far north of the sector on the border with Army Group 
North, and the other to the extreme south, again on a border, this 
time with Army Group South. 
KorOck 582 was attached to the 9th Armee (AOK9) to the north-east 
of Smolensk around Rshew (in the direction of Kalinin); with the main 
rail route running from Wjasma to Rshew. 
KorOck 532 was under the 2nd Panzer Armee (Pz. AOK. 2) on the borders 
of Belorussia and the Russian SSR proper around Bryansk and Orel; on 
the main railway line ran from Minsk to Orel by way of Orsha, 
Unetcha, Bryansk and Karachev, with the main highway running from 
Smolensk to Orel via Roslavl and Bryansk. These Korficks lay forward 
of the sphere of influence of Rilckwartiges Heeresgebiet Mitte, the 
Army Group Rear Area of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) which 
was so designated on the Ist April 1941 in preparation for the attack 
on the Soviet Union. 
The Army Group fought in this central sector of the Eastern front 
from the onset of the campaign in June 1941 and controlled the armies 
charged with the task of capturing Moscow. After the German forces 
were stopped short of their main objective in the late Autumn 1941, 
the Army Group was engaged in holding actions and defensive 
operations until 1943 when it opened a major offensive drive towards 
Kursk in July. This drive was broken by the Soviet counter- offensive 
in the direction of Orel. In July 1944, during the Soviet summer 
offensive, the Army Group fell back from the Vitebsk-Mogilew area, 
and from late summer until early in 1945 it was responsible for the 
defence of East Prussia and the Warsaw area. 
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German Military Governmorit in the occupied areas of the 
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The Character of the Area. 
Military policy and thereby the actions of individual members of the 
German forces were influenced in no small way by both the sheer size 
and rural character of much of the occupied territory. 
Army Group Centre, (which as has been noted was a far from precise 
or permanent entity) encompassed some 200,000 square kilometres 
(77,000 square miles) with an population under German rule of between 
6.2 millions to 9 millions. (I) Some four-fifths of the inhabitants of 
the region were engaged in agriculture (which was above the national 
average of two-thirds), and thus it was hardly surprising that with a 
population density of little more than 44 per sq. km. only 600,000 
people lived in urban centres. (2) True, within the western areas of 
the central front there were a number of major centres, including 
Minsk, the capital of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
which had boasted a thriving university. The other major towns such 
as Mogilew, Witebsk and Gomel had medical schools, scientific and 
technical institutions. Around 200 newspapers were published in the 
White Russian language alone with a total circulation of over one 
million. (3) However, while Soviet metropolitan society was 
undoubtedly culturally advanced and certainly did not conform to the 
primitive stereotypes so beloved of Nazi racial propagandists, even 
the official Soviet economic and geographic literature, while 
painting a flattering picture of post-revolutionary modernisation 
(with its claims, for example, of total literacy) could not mask the 
essentially backward and hostile nature of much of the region outside 
the urban centres. This was, of course, before the war had made its 
impact on the country. (4) 
Although some of the Soviet centres under military occupation were 
captured virtually intact because they lay so far to the East, they 
were not untouched by the war. The damage to the town of Cholm in 
Army Rear Area (Korack) 582, was fairly typical: the place having 
been fenestrated by the retreating Soviet forces. In many instances 
the German army of occupation was never able to effect repairs 
because of chronic shortages of materials. (5) There were a few 
exceptions to this rule. A case in point is Klinzy, a township on the 
route from Gomel to Bryansk (somewhat to the rear of Korack 532). A 
German serviceman wrote in a contemporary account that he 'saw with 
surprise an undestroyed Russian town in which everyday life was 
taking its normal course' ('sah überrascht eine unzerstörte russische 
Stadt, in der das Alltagsleben seinen gewohnten Gang zu nehmen 
schien'. )(6) However, while wholesale damage did not always occur, 
vast numbers of the inhabitants of the area had either fled or been 
systematically evacuated by the Soviet Regime at the onset of the 
German advance. Kalinin, for a short period in Armeeoberkommando 9's 
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area, with a pre-war population of nearly 250,000, had barely 160,000 
inhabitants when the German forces took over the town. (7) 
In extreme cases, urban centres were described as completely empty, 
while in the countryside, the peasantry were likely to have 
scattered. (8) Even when the some of the towns started to repopulate, 
the Military authorities found themselves faced with all sorts of 
difficulties. Many of the new inhabitants were refugees from other 
parts of the front, which created problems both of accommodation and, 
more alarmingly for the Army, a security risk, since there was a high 
likelihood of enemy infiltration. Smolensk, for example, had 50,000 
German troops barracked in the city, while at the same time over 
20,000 Russian refugees were living in cellars and attics. (9) To make 
matters worse, Stalin's officials had ensured that even where vital 
industrial plant could not be transported, critical damage was 
effected, and key items - such as specialised tools - were 
removed. (10) This last point, often neglected in many accounts of the 
war, was of long-term significance, and its immediate impact on 
military performance will be discussed in due course. 
A more subtle consequence should be noted at this juncture. Even in 
remote 'unscathed' regions, few public buildings fell into German 
hands without some measure of damage. Moreover, the 'missing' 
inhabitants more often than not included the civil servants and 
professionals responsible for maintaining the infrastructure. The 
majority of the male population had been removed and there were few 
if any local officials, village elders or policemen in the small 
towns and communities. Male and female doctors had also been 
evacuated along with lawyers, bank officials, factory managers, 
overseers in dairies and sawmills and the agronomists on the 
collective farms. In short, the entire intelligentsia and ruling 
class who might have been used by the German army of occupation were 
absent. Ortskommandanturen 1/532 (Korfack 582) at Rshew, for example, 
reported in October 1941 that the town had been systematically 
evacuated since mid-July of 1941. All the railway employees and their 
families had been removed, as had the workers from the local 
munitions factory. The remainder of the population, who had fled into 
the surrounding villages, seemed loathe to return, and only 10,000 
civilians remained in the town. By December the number had risen to 
35,000, but most of the new arrivals were refugees. (11) Serious 
reservations were expressed at the difficulties this would entail as 
far as the creation of a new civil administration was concerned. The 
Military commander had been compelled, for instance, to put a village 
doctor in charge of the town's hospital. (12) 
The Army's response to this dilemma, particularly the reliance on 
untried local personnel (who had 'avoided' evacuation) and female 
labour is a topic for later consideration. High-ranking German 
officials, in reviewing military occupation policy after the war, 
went so far as to argue that this factor encapsulated the divergence 
between policy in the West and East. Moreover, as far as they were 
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concerned, it could be inferred that the burdensome nature of this 
posting ('die Barde dieser Aufgaben') determined the harsher methods 
adopted in the Soviet Union. 'Will man der Hauptunterschied der 
Verwaltung im Westen gegenüber dem Osten in einem kurzen Satz 
zusammenzufassen, so kann man sagen: Im Westen konnte sich die 
Kreigsverwaltung im allgemeinen auf die Oberleitung beschränken, 
gewissermaßen "am langen Zügel führen", im Osten war unter den 
dargelegten Verhältnissen dauernde Kleinarbeit, dauernde persönliche 
Einwirkung und Beaufsichtingung erförderlich. '(13) 
Korilck 582 (the Rear Area of the 9th Army) at its greatest extent 
covered a vast area of some 43,000 square miles; within this 
territory the military government was responsible for over 1,500 
villages and collective farms. (14) This was an area of forest 
interspersed by cereal and fodder crop production, although the 
introduction of a small measure of potato cultivation had encouraged 
the development of the distilling industry and even some pig farming. 
Although Rshew, and later Wjasma, were officially the military 
focus of the Korack, the most important town in the region was the 
nearby communications and trading centre of Smolensk. This ancient 
city, with its historic fortress, had around 157,000 inhabitants in 
1938. Despite its importance as a railway junction and as the 
starting point for navigation along the Dnepr river, it was 
essentially an agricultural town that reflected the true character of 
the area. Some attempt had been made to develop a machine-tool 
industry, the most important consequence of the Second Five-Year Plan 
had been the expansion of the flax, combine which utilized local 
agricultural produce to manufacture delicate linen fabric. This, 
together with the industries linked to forestry, sustained the 
town. (I 5) 
The systematic evacuation of large numbers of the inhabitants of 
the area, together with a great deal of vital material was as evident 
here as it was throughout the rest of the area of military 
government. Apparently wanton destruction by advance German troop 
units, as well as illegal requisitioning and sporadic looting, only 
exacerbated the situation. (16) Overall, at least in terms of 
available food-supply, the rear area of Army Group 9 should have been 
well placed with plentiful reserves of cereal and livestock. However, 
the Soviet evacuation tactics had meant that in certain parts of the 
region this did not hold true. Much depended on whether or not the 
German forces could extract the available resources. (17) 
Korrick 532 (to the rear of PzAOK2) was somewhat smaller in overall 
area at around 26,800 square kilometres but, as the military 
commander noted, this was still more than half the size of East 
Prussia. (18) The Army Rear Area had three reasonable sized urban 
centres either inside its sphere of influence or on the immediate 
periphery. But again, despite some non-agriculture based industrial 
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development, such as metal processing in Gomel and artificial fibre 
production in Mogilew, the produce of the land formed the main source 
of raw materials for the industries in Bryansk and Orel. Even the 
power for the developing urban factories came primarily from a 
massive expansion of peat-fired electricity stations. (19) This is not 
to say that the area and its inhabitants were exclusively rural. As a 
report of the regional military government office at Bryansk noted, 
many of the leading partisans in the area had an urban background. 
The units active around Bytosh, for instance, were composed primarily 
of workers of the glass factories at Bytosh, Dyatkovq, Ivot and Star. 
German documents indicate that one of the earlier guerrilla bands in 
the same general area was made up of young workers from the Stalin 
works at Ordzhonikidzegrad. Nonetheless, despite this caveat, the 
general description of the area as a relatively underdeveloped part 
of the Soviet Union holds good. (20) 
Much of the area was characterised by tracts of swampy lowland with 
marshy-banked rivers that hardly seemed to flow and equally marshy 
lakes. Over 2 million hectares of the BSSR consisted of such unusable 
land. Elsewhere, large tracts had been drained to provide not only 
rich peat based arable land, but also substantial areas of pasture 
with some intensive stock breeding and even market gardening and fish 
farming. However, in the Spring, certain areas of unclaimed land 
still turned into a virtual sea out of which, to use the Turgeniev 
like prose of one unknown Russian geographer, 'the few villages which 
lie on high ground loom like lighthouses'. (21) Perhaps the influence 
of the Russian author even on official report writers was no 
accident, for Turgeniev had often visited Orel and the area provided 
material for much of his work. Indeed, the setting for 'The Nest of 
Gentlefolk' housed the Turgeniev museum. (22) 
As in Korfick 582, large parts of the rear area of the 2nd Panzer 
Army, particularly to the far south-west of Korfick 532 where the 
marsh receded, gave way to forest. Nearly a quarter of the area 
(around 6,400 square kilometres) was tree covered, with wide' belts 
of woodlands surrounding Bryansk and Gomel. (23) In combination with 
easy river transport this encouraged a range of activities and 
industries based on timber products. Depending on soil type, two 
kinds of woodland existed. The dry areas with their sandy soils were 
marked by pines and fir trees (as tended to be the case in the north 
of Army Group Centre) while the more moist places to the south of the 
region had deciduous cover that included all manner of broad-leaf 
trees, such as oaks, sycamore, limetrees, alder, aspen and even 
hornbeam. (24) Overall, this was an area of contrasts with its sandy 
plains, high forest, cultivated pastures, urban centres with canals 
and causeways surrounded by extensive swamp, bare reed flats, 
luxuriant weed-covered bogs and lakes and ponds with sedge islands 
and meadow-like borders. 
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The natural beauty of the area, which the Germans were not slow to 
notice, was however fraught with dangers for the occupiers as well as 
their adversaries. (25) As specialist works on the topic have noted 
with vigour, potentially this was ideal guerrilla country. Although, 
of course it begs the argument as to whether it necessarily had to 
become an area of partisan activity. (26) According to the season, 
ground could be either firm and dry, frozen hard or a bottomless 
morass. A constantly changing maze of streams made any ventures off 
the few paved roads a hazardous undertaking, particularly given the 
risk of torrential summer storms. Even in winter, supposedly the most 
suitable seasons for the Germans to conduct anti-partisan exercises, 
other problems presented themselves, and even the partisans found 
certain areas inhospitable. The German Army continually issued units 
with warnings on the dangers of cold, snow and ice. Remarks as to the 
extremes of temperature are a feature of Korfick reports for mid 
winter. Ice on major rivers could be 80 cms. thick and with the 
ground frozen rock hard to below one metre, excavation work was 
virtually impossible. (27) 
Much has been made of the impenetrable character of the forest 
which surrounded most of the urban centres and ran contiguous with 
the pasture land and marsh. (28) At the outbreak of hostilities in 
1941 the woodland was essentially in its primeval state with 
undisturbed natural growth. Despite the endeavours of the regime to 
exploit the natural resources, roads were few and most of them had 
only local significance, connecting isolated villages or logging 
camps. Some indication of the problems this presented, even in the 
summer, is provided in the reports of Wach Battalion 508 which 
commented on the difficulties it had faced in order simply to reach 
KorOck 582's area of operations. The unit had been forced to repair 
and build as it went on a 1,300 kilometre journey that took it from 
Poland into central Russia. Priority was now being given to 
furthering this project with some 1,400 men, women and children 
deployed on additional road repair work. (29) Despite such 
endeavours, during the wet periods roads became rivers of mud that 
were virtually impassable. This was particular true in the period of 
'Tauwetter' in the spring, and the 'Schlammperiod' in the late 
autumn. (30) Vast temperature ranges added to difficulties at these 
times. Korfick 532 diary entries for February of 1942 noted thaw 
conditions in daylight hours and temperatures plummeting to minus 30 
degrees centigrade at night. (31) Life was made even more untolerable 
for Rear Area soldiers by serious transport difficulties. This was 
not the stereotyped world of German armour and rapid movement, but an 
environment reliant on vulnerable rail links and, on the basic level, 
horse-drawn vehicles such as Panjewagen. Wach-Battalion 721, while 
operating in Korfick 582, commented in reports for January 1942 that 
"wheeled vehicles would be of no use until May' ('Bis Mai werden die 
Rlder in Ruffland so-wie-so nicht zu benatzen sein'. )(32) 
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Some idea of the vastness of the area behind the front can be gained 
if one remembers that large numbers of Soviet troops, who had been 
scattered during the various military engagements at the start of the 
campaign, continued to roam the hinterland virtually undiscovered by 
the German military. Many of these Red Army soldiers were only 
rounded up by the Army when it publicised deadlines after which 
stragglers would be treated as irregulars and shot. (33) 
For most of the first winter of the war, large numbers of civilians 
in the hinterland never came into contact with German forces, simply 
because of the sheer size of the hinterland and the seasonal climatic 
conditions. However, after that interlude a combination of factors 
both prevented the establishment of trouble free German rule and saw 
the rise of a sizeable security problem. (34) Taking into account the 
earlier remarks on the scattered Red Army units in the Rear Areas, 
this all adds up to a fundamental point: vast tracts of the military 
government territory were under German Army control in name alone. 
Indeed, in many areas the partisans came to control over 45 per 
cent of the hinterland, and on this basis there is much to be said in 
support of John Armstrong's emphasised remark that Soviet 'authority 
never completely vanished from most of the German-occupied 
territory'. (35) As will also become apparent from subsequent 
material, manpower shortages accentuated this problem. The Rear Area 
troops thus found themselves faced with a disturbing contingent 
situation, for they were often isolated, lacking in regular supplies 
and in a hostile location with no guarantee of victory in the war at 
the front or in the hinterland. 
The importance of keeping open the few roads and more particularly 
the railway lines in such a hostile environment cannot be 
over- emphasised, and the attention the German army devoted to 
security reflected this necessity. (36) Once again the very scale of 
this undertaking accentuated the problem. The Military Railway unit 
(Feldeisenbahnkommando 2) operating in Army Group Centre was 
responsible for a network of over 2,000 kilometres and rolling stock 
that included 261 locomotives and 1,599 wagons. Such an undertaking 
demanded the deployment of over 11,000 German personnel and more than 
22,000 Russian officials and workers. (37) Matters were not helped by 
the fact that all tracks had to be changed to standard gauge so as to 
permit the Germans to operate their own rolling stock. (38) Various 
techniques were employed to protect the major railroads and highways, 
including the establishment of strongpoints situated at regular 
intervals along the main supply routes, as well as the deployment of 
armoured trains. Just such a system of rear area security functioned 
in Korfick 532 on the Ordzhonikidzegrad to Zhukovka line during the 
spring of 1942. (39) However, one needs to go beyond the approaches 
that concern themselves simply with the technical details of 
strongpoints (Stfitzpunkte), and neighbouring fortified villages 
(Wehrd6rfer), combined with special mobile forces (Bewegliche 
Kampfeinheiten) and Jagdkommandos. (40) 
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Since our main concern is ultimately with the social issues, rather 
than the details of military strategy, this matter of protecting 
lines of communication is an entrde to more weighty matters. The 
strongpoints set up to guard the main thoroughfares were in 
themselves often relatively small (sometimes of platoon rather than 
company strength) and isolated. As such they offer an unusual 
insight into the varied rear area activities of German soldiers. (41) 
Conventional literature creates a 'typical' picture of the German 
army and individual soldier at least fulfilling the basic task of 
securing lines of communication with a combination of expertise and 
ruthlessness. Deaggregation of the issue can produce quite 
surprising challenges to this view. (42) 
John Armstrong's work has merely alluded to the feeling of 
isolation and danger which was particularly pronounced among the 
thinly manned outposts and strongpoints which dotted the countryside. 
However, he has touched on a vital point in remarking that the 
'initial impact was greatest on the lower German ranks who came into 
physical contact with the partisans and the effects of their 
operations'. (43) This insight into the true nature of the war in the 
East has received much less serious consideration than it warrants. 
It may indeed be the baby that was discarded along with the apologist 
bathwater. (44) True, there are a number of fictional accounts which 
attempt to recreate the psychological climate in which such German 
units operated, but these have been given a noted bias. In particular 
they have been interpreted in such as way as to stress what might 
best be termed, 'terror tactics induced by fear'. Such an 
interpretation is plausible enough, but it ignores other 'strategies 
for survival'. (45) Undoubtedly, there is much evidence that 
increasing insecurity and nervousness amongst rear area forces, 
particularly in these remote outposts, prompted outward expressions 
of extreme superiority and aggressiveness. But, as will be 
demonstrated, quite the opposite reaction was evident in the case of 
some units in KorOck 532. The soldiers in these formations responded 
by virtually ignoring the war in a manner which, were it not fully 
documented, would seem almost fictional and can only be described in 
most uncontemporary terms as 'laid-back'. 
More of this in due course. What needs to be reiterated at this 
juncture is the overall assertion that harsh climatic conditions, 
vast operational distances and hostile terrain produced a daunting 
combination for the occupying forces. Moreover, given the 
multiplicity of demanding tasks that devolved upon the German 
military government, manpower limitations only served to exacerbate 
the situation. 
### 
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Organisation and Function: the German Army Rear Areas in the 
Occupied Regions of the Soviet Union: 1941-43. 
Initially, plans for the German occupation of the Soviet Union were 
based on the premise that the military campaign would be over in a 
relatively short time and, following victory, the administration of 
the captured areas would be turned over from the armed forces to 
German civilian authority. Indeed, the 'primitive conditions' 
('primitiven Verh5ltnisse') which prevailed in Russia seemed to make 
such a design an attractive solution, and to this end the military 
appeared to fully concur. (I) 
The civilian programme was implemented in certain parts of western 
Russia, where two of the planned four Reichskommissariate (Ostland 
and Ukraine) were established, and here the Germany Army was 
represented by a Wehrmachtbefehlshaber, whose powers were very much 
secondary to those of the Reich Commissar. (2) However, because of the 
failure of the invasion to maintain its initial momentum, the sheer 
vastness of the space to be controlled and the ensuing logistical 
problems, large tracts of Soviet territory remained under German Army 
jurisdiction for the duration, and these areas greatly exceeded in 
size those transferred to civilian agencies. Thus, much of the 
Ukraine and Belorussia, as well as the captured regions of the 
Russian SFSR proper, the Crimea and the northern Caucasus became the 
arena for the exercise of military government. (3) In total this 
involved an area of some 400,000 square miles and encompassed 
populations in excess of forty million. (4) 
There were no clear written guidelines on Militdrverwaltung 
comparable to those drawn up before the campaign in the West, where a 
systematic and tightly-knit military administrative organisation was 
set up. It is particularly significant to note that in the East the 
details of policy were often disseminated by word of mouth from the 
Quartermaster General's office. The German Army thus found itself 
forced to respond to an unanticipated, and in many ways undesired, 
situation as an instrument of occupation policy in the Soviet 
Union. (5) 
The territory under military control was divided into several 
distinct parts which reflected the disposition of the Wehrmacht as 
laid down by the strategic requirements of Operation Barbarossa. (6) 
Each of the Heeresgebiete (Military Zones of Administration) 
corresponded in name to the Heeresgruppe (Army Groups) in whose area 
it was located. i. e. Nord, Mitte, Sild, A, B and Don. (North, Centre, 
South, A, B& Don). Obviously, in the immediate front-line combat 
zones the exigencies of the situation precluded the establishment of 
special agencies of military administration, other than was directly 
related to the requirements of warfare. (7) Since these front-line 
combat positions were not always indicative of Army occupation 
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policies in the fullest sense, this research thesis tends to confine 
itself to those 'hinterland' areas which allowed for, and 
experienced, a more 'complete' form of military government: 
Rfickwartigte Armeegebiete - Korrick- (Army Rear Areas), and 
Rilckwartigte Heeresgebiete (Army GROUP Rear Areas). 
While the main focus of this. research is the Rilckwartigte 
Armeegebiete an awareness of the Heeresgebiete is essential because 
of the inter- relationship between these two areas of military 
rule. (8) 
The Rfickw! Irtigte Heeresgebiete which lay to the far west of the 
front (bordering the areas under German civilian rule) were around 
100 kilometres 
* 
in depth, and comprised the bulk of territory 
controlled by the military. These particular German military zones of 
administration were peculiar to the Eastern Theatre, and a departure 
from the normal structure of military government. (9) 
The Rlickwartigte Armeegebiete (Army Rear Areas) directly behind the 
fighting zone, were geographically much smaller, often no more than 
20-50 kilometres in depth, and the supposed 'norm' for German Army 
administrative practices. (10) 
Each Rfickwartiges Armeegebiet was identified by a number that 
referred to the unit rather than its geographical location or the 
Army Command to which it was attached. This system applied throughout 
occupied Europe as a whole in all those areas under military 
government. (Il) It must be emphasised that even in their 'heyday' 
these Rear Areas were never precisely defined beyond broad 
geographical terms. Indeed, not only was the designation of areas 
often changed but, even maps which appeared in contemporary German 
sources were accepted as being 'for illustrative purposes only". As 
one former officer noted: 'Das rilckwlrtige Armeegebiet war - 
verwaltungs- und wirtschaftsmässig betrachtet - ein verhältnismässig 
kleiner Raum, der durch Grenzen, die unter taktisch-militärischen 
Gesichtspunkten gezogen worden waren, von den Nachbarn getrennt 
war. '(1 2) 
The second caveat, which in many ways expands the last point, is 
that the life of these areas was relatively short; perhaps no more 
than eighteen months at most - from late 1941 until late 1943; that 
is, from the failure of the front to be advanced sufficiently to 
warrant the permanent conversion of the conquered areas to civilian 
rule, until the time when the front itself had collapsed. After this 
short period ('interlude' might be a more appropriate term) the Rear 
Areas were abandoned as a distinct administrative form. This occurred 
either through physical loss, or because by the end of 1943, 
territory as far west -as Kazatin was once again part of the 
battlefield proper. (13) The evacuation of Bryansk, for example, 
started during June 1943, and during each month until December, Orel, 
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Smolensk, Vitebsk, Gomel and Mogilew were lost as the German retreat 
continued. (14) Army Group North's area is something of an anomaly in 
this respect since it continued to exist under very strained 
conditions, and in a very loose form, until Spring 1944. (15) 
Particular confusion is evident as far as the operation of 
Militarverwaltung per se is concerned. Scholars of administrative 
history will no doubt regard this as an ill-defined area which 
demands further research simply because of that very deficiency. For 
our purposes, however, the issue requires elucidation for more 
immediate reasons. Firstly, the very choice of source material is 
determined in many ways by a clear understanding of the actual, as 
opposed to 'official', chains of command that existed in the areas of 
military government. Secondly, having established the realities of 
military administrative procedure in the East, the various hypotheses 
as to divergences in policy between various elements of the hierarchy 
can be put to the test. 
It should also be apparent that the conditions which prevailed in 
the East permitted Rear Area Commanders to exercise a great deal of 
autonomy, if they so wished. At the same time, given the scale of the 
problems which faced military administrators, any effective action 
required a concerted response on the part of larger institutional 
entities. If, as Martin van Crefeld maintains, 'the German Army was 
inclined to develop a single-minded concentration on the operational 
aspects of the war to the detriment, not to say neglect, of 
everything else', this did not bode well for the allocation of 
resources to aspects of rear area government which did not appear to 
meet immediate military needs. (16) 
Until the Commander in Chief of the Army Group took overall executive 
charge of his entire area, military command in the Army Group Rear 
Areas was the responsibility of an officer bearing the title of 
Befehlshaber des rfickwartigen Heeresgebiets. From late 1942, with the 
concentration of executive functions, the dual title was adopted of 
Kommandierender General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber im 
Heeresgebiet. (Commanding General of Security Troops and Commander in 
the Military Zone of Administration. (16) While a separate office 
continued to exist, the Military Commander in the Army Group Rear 
Area was subordinate to the commander of the respective Heeresgruppe 
(Army Group), who in turn was answerable to the Oberkommando des 
Heeres (OKH) (Army High Command). Within the OKH overall 
responsibility for military government was the province of the 
Quartiermeister General (Army Quartermaster General). A special 
section dealing with military government akin to Abteilung VII in the 
Rear Areas being the focus of command. The next and final link of the 
chain led to the supreme military organ, the Oberkommando des 
Wehrmacht (OKW). (17) 
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A similar command structure was evident in the Army Rear Areas. Here 
military administration fell to the Kommandant des RfickwArtigten 
Armeegebletes (Commanding Officer of the Army Rear Area) whose person 
and locality were usually referred to by the abbreviation of the full 
command title: Korilck. (18) The numeric designation of the Army Rear 
Area was applied to the term KorOck; thus, KorOck 532 and KorOck 582. 
The mission of each zone commander in both the KorOcks and Army 
Group Rear Areas was multifold and involved: the setting up and 
control of the local administration in order to utilize manpower and 
economic resources for the benefit of the German War effort; the 
supply of installations; the protection and maintenance of the main 
lines of communication, including railways and airfields; the 
movement and guarding of prisoners of war; the maintenance of peace 
and security by ensuring order among the indigenous populace; and the 
control of the Third Reich forces stationed in the area. (19) 
Overall, while the KorOck Commandants in the Army Rear Areas had 
responsibilities very similar to their opposite numbers in the Army 
Group Rear Areas, there was greater emphasis on security as well as 
the exploitation of the region for the direct benefit of the German 
Army itself, particularly the supply of troops with rations. (20) If 
any subdivision of tasks was evident it was between those carried out 
by purely military personnel and those that called for specialists 
who were familiar with administrative and economic affairs. (21) 
The Commanding officer (Korfick) in the Army Rear Areas was 
answerable to the Armeeoberkommando (AOK, Commanding General of the 
Army) to which it was attached, usually an Army Corps with an active 
front-line role as well as these rear area interests. The Army Corps 
(AOK) in question (in the case of this thesis: AOK9 and PzAOK2) was 
answerable directly to the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH). As with the 
Army Group Rear Areas, overall responsibility rested with the 
Quartermaster General's office. The subtle variation that should be 
noted was that this command link was not always automatically by way 
of the relevant Heeresgruppe. (22) In fact, no clear 'diagram of 
government' exists. Although a number of researchers working either 
on the topic of military rule or the peripheries of the subject have 
advanced various schema, none of these are entirely satisfactory. 
Nor, it should be added, do they always accord with the first-hand 
evidence of the files on which this thesis is based. The main issue 
relates to the chain of command, particularly with regard to the 
matter of how and where policy was formulated. 
Alexander Dallin's description of the scheme of German military 
government is far from complete and thus somewhat unclear. While his 
diagram of the chain of command includes both the Army Headquarters 
(AOKs) and the Army Group Headquarters (Heeresgruppen Hauptquartier) 
the vectors give no clear indication of command priority or the role 
of the military government (Abteilung VII, Militftrverwaltung) in the 
overall structure. Neither does it clarify the matter of the 
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relationship between the Army Rear Areas (rQckwArtiges Armeegebiet: 
Korfick) and the Army Group Rear Areas (rackwArtiges Heeres- 
gebiet). (23) 
As for the need to cross-reference material, Timothy Mulligan's 
work on anti-partisan warfare is also problematical. (24) In the 
matter of the Army Rear Areas he suggests that attention should be 
focused on the command structures linking the Army Headquarters with 
the Korilck (for example, AOK9 with Korack 582). Certainly, the KorOck 
was de jure the 'rear area of the army'. Some armies, particularly 
early in the campaign, referred to the rear area by reference to the 
army's title: thus Korfick 532 was formerly designated Korfick Pz AOK2. 
However, while military activities such as anti-partisan warfare and 
the supply of materials would have been of paramount interest to the 
Army Headquarters, other general matters of 'military government' 
such as the day-to-day running of local affairs would have been 
accorded much less priority. The Commander in Chief of the Army 
(AOK) would also have been preoccupied with the front line Corps 
Headquarters and their combat role. Therefore, de facto the most 
important links for our purposes are those from the Quartermaster 
General to the relevant sections in both the Army Group Rear Areas 
and the Army Rear Areas (Korack), and the relationship between the 
individual Army Group Rear Area and the neighbouring Army Rear Areas. 
This link has been described as 'reciprocal exchange of information 
and co-operation' (gegenseitige Unterrichtung und Zusammenarbeit) by 
Norbert Willer, whose diagram of military government (Unterstellung 
und Gliederung der militärischen Gewalt in den okkupierten 
sowjetischen Gebieten') does offer some clarification. (25) 
Within the entire structure, the status of the Military Government 
Sections (Abteilungen VII) is a particularly grey area. Until the end 
of 1942, the Army Group Rear Areas (rackwdrtigte Heeresgebiete under 
the command of a Befehlshaber) had Abteilung VII departments, as did 
the Feld- and Ortskommandanturan in these areas, which received 
orders from the Quartermaster General's office. However, the Army 
Group Headquarters themselves (under their Kommandierender General) 
had no such military government sections. Neither did the Security 
divisions, which were 'responsible' for the FKs and OKs in the Army 
Group Rear Areas, until the beginning of 1943. Similarly, the various 
armies only received Abteilung, VII sections by late 1942, while their 
Korricks were not so provided until early 1943, even though these 
military government facilities were to be found in the Feld- and 
Ortskommandanturen which made up the Army Rear Areas. (26) 
Dallin has made much of the fact that during the first months of 
the war the Army Group Rear Areas had military government sections 
(Abteilung VII) which received orders from the Quartermaster General, 
while the Army Groups themselves had no military government sections. 
Whether this produced not only confusion, but also, as Dallin 
contends, the amelioration of harsh policy is questionable. (27) 
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In the autumn of 1942, when the Commanders in Chief of Army Groups 
were vested with the executive power for their entire Army Group 
Areas, specialists were placed at their disposal in newly organised 
Chief Quartermaster staffs (Ober- Quartiermeister, O. Qu). The 
following tasks were handled within the O. Qu. branch: (28) 
Qu. 2. (a general staff officer with one special missions staff 
officer as his assistant); subdivisions of the zone of operations; 
territorial matters; executive power and military government in 
co-operation with civil government; exploitation of the area by the 
Army Group Economic Leader (Armeewirtschaftsf0hrer) and Army Group 
Intendant (Abteilung IVa); Evacuation and air-raid protection in the 
Rear Area and employment of police and security troops. 
Specialist for Military Government (Abteilung VII): military 
occupation; matters concerning the executive power and co-operation 
with the national civil government; situation reports to to Army Rear 
Areas and handling personal matters for military government 
personnel. (29) 
Army Group Economic Leader (Armeewirtschaftsfilhrer): directing the 
economy in conjunction with civilian and indigenous economic 
agencies; exploitation of the country; coordinating the requirements 
of the troops and the civilian population in conjunction with the 
Economic Armament Branch; allocation of labour for military purposes, 
and the control of Economic Teams (Wirtschaftskommandos). (30) 
By early 1943, these administrative reforms had been extended to the 
Security Divisions in the Army Rear Areas, and to the Army Rear Areas 
(Korfick) themselves. In the Korticks, the staff work for problems 
concerning military occupation government was organised along lines 
similar to those in the Army Group Rear Areas. Here again there was 
an Ober- Quartiermeister with responsibilities divided up between a 
Qu. 2 officer, an Army Economic Leader and a Specialist for Occupation 
Government (Abteilung VII). (31) The Qu. 2 was generally a reserve 
officer with special knowledge in the field of administration and, if 
possible, business. 
The first task of the Militarverwaltung Section (Abteilung VII) of 
the Army Group was to establish a uniformity of views concerning the 
administration and the economy. The task was not without 
difficulties, for the regulations and ordinances of the previous 
administrative offices had existed for over a year and had become 
working practice. The new found executive powers of the Army Group 
were, therefore, limited to issuing basic directives and only changed 
the administrative measures of the previous agencies when uniformity 
seemed essential. (32) The overall significance of this is that until 
late 1942/early 1943 (that is, before the Ober- Quartiermeister branch 
was created in the Army Group and extended to the Security Divisions 
and Korficks) military government throughout the entire army group 
area was not directed from a single office. Instead, there were 
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separate and mutually independent offices; the Commander in the Army 
Group Rear Areas, and the Commanders of the various Armies (AOK) with 
their Army Rear Areas (Korlick). 
Differences in practice between individual Army Rear Areas only 
served to complicate a structure that was already far from 
homogeneous. Specially commissioned post-war monographs on military 
administration have gone so far as to assert that, 'es konnte 
[hierbei] nicht ausbleiben, daS in den Nachbarrdumen (Nachbararmee- und 
Rfickwdrtiges Heeresgebiet) die Verwaltung nach anderen Grunds! Itzen 
aufgebaut wurde, als im eigenen Armeegebiet. '(33) Some idea of the 
overall problem can be gained by continuing the description of the 
command structure in the other direction; as it related to the 
internal administration of the rear areas. Both the Rfickwdrtige 
Heeresgebiete and the ROckwartige Armeegebiete were divided into the 
jurisdiction of military commandants: - 
Oberfeldkommandanturen (OFK) Regional Commandanturas; 
Feldkommandanturen (FK) Area Commandanturas; 
Ortskommandanturen (OK) Urban Commandanturas, and 
Standortkommandanturen (St. OK) Local Garrison Units. (34) 
The OFK as the largest sub-unit acted as regional headquarters for 
the rear areas (there were generally two or three in each Kortick) 
with the commanding officer holding a rank equivalent to that of 
Divisional Commander. 
FKs were staffed by several officers (under a Regimental Commander) 
with around 100 men under their command. The FKs in large towns, such 
as Smolensk, could be referred to as Stadtkommandanturen. 
The OKs were smaller with one officer (of Company Commander status) 
and around sixteen to twenty soldiers, while the Standort- 
kommandanturen usually only had a sergeant or NCO commanding a 
platoon size unit with five or six members. 
In the Army Group Rear Areas, the Commandanturas were grouped 
regionally initially according to the security divisions stationed in 
the rear areas, while in the Army Rear Areas they were directly under 
the Army Command (AOK). (35) The areas of the Kommandanturen were 
obliged to be self-contained territories for the purposes of 
administration and the economy and, if possible, to coincide with the 
indigenous administration. It was the task of German Army officers 
concerned to erect and supervise a system of local government using 
the forces available to them with the aid of the special expertise of 
Abtellung VII. These administrative divisions were broadly along the 
lines of the old structures left over from the pre-war Soviet 
government. The OFK approximated to the 'Oblast' and the FK/OK to the 
'Rayon'. As with the details of command and organisational structure 
this is more than a matter of administrative nicety, since this 
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expedient approach had implications for the matrix of behaviour as 
well as for 'local government'. (36) 
The priority administrative tasks of the Kommandanturen were pursuant 
to 'orders concerning organisation, competence/ jurisdiction, and 
transactions of the military administration in the occupied areas': - 
police measures; 
the care of the population in the territory; 
the utilisation of economic forces; 
the securing of supplies and installations important to the war 
effort; 
co-operation in the maintenance and restoration of inland 
navigations, railway networks and postal services. 
the surveillance of the civilian population; 
liaison with the Abwehr; 
the recruitment and mobilisation of the population for 'service"; 
the drawing up of reports (twice weekly) for the Ober- Quartiermeister 
der Heeresgruppe concerning the political, military, economic and 
administrative situation, supplemental to individual request. (37) 
The OFK and the OK/FK were also the supreme judicial authority 
which dealt with all punishable acts committed by soldiers directly 
under their command, and the punishment of the civilian population 
for acts directed against the German armed forces. 
In order to facilitate local administration, the German Army 
appointed BOrgermeister in the towns and villages, and Vorsteher in 
the districts (Rayons). (37) These appointees were usually drawn from 
local inhabitants of known anti-communist persuasion who were often 
not Greater Russians but rather members of the various 
ethnic/national groups within the Soviet Union, such as Ukranians, 
White Russians, Balts and Poles. The political reliability and 
competence of these placemen was established through the close 
co-operation of the local Abwehr officers, Sicherheitspolizei and SD. 
The whole enterprise was overseen by the Feldkommandanturen. (39) It 
was the duty of these Bargermeister (under German military 
supervision) to re-establish and maintain law and order by such means 
as the creation of local security forces (Ordnungsdienst/ 
Hilfspolizei: Auxiliary Police), the registering of the areas 
inhabitants, and the issuing of identity passes. (40) 
Some form of overall assistance for the commandanturas was 
available from the Propaganda Companies (Propagandakompanie; PK) 
which OKH assigned to the various Army Commands. In the case of Army 
Group Centre, the military propaganda department from its 
headquarters in Smolensk dispatched PK612 for duties with the 9th 
Army (AOK9/KorOck 582) and PK693 on temporary duty with the 2nd 
Panzer Army. (Pz. AOK2/Korilck 532). (41) 
71 
It should be stressed that as these commandanturas constituted the 
key network of German Army rule their inherent local nature makes 
them a focal point for research. Indeed, the FK and OK were the 
crucial point of contact where overall policy was interpreted and 
implemented. This fact should not be lost by allowing arguments to be 
abstracted into statements which regard 'ideology as simply 
collapsing into practice', with the German forces seen as mere 
vectors. Rather, it was here at grass-roots level, that the ruled 
came into contact with the ruled and that abstract theory became 
individual behaviour mediated through 'the ordinary German 
soldierl. (42) In view of the complexity of the tasks which confronted 
the military government, much depended on the quality and numbers of 
men available. It is to this issue that the following section turns. 
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Organisation and Function: the German Army Rear Areas in the 
occupied regions of the Soviet Union, 1941-1943. 
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German Army Manpower Resources in the Rear Areas. 
The forces directly allocated by the army for occupation duties were 
incredibly small, given the size of the operational area and the 
multiplicity of tasks to be undertaken. In the first instance, this 
was a consequence of over-optimistic strategic planning. In the 
expectation of a swift victory over the Red Army, the operations 
section of the OKII had, by the middle of July 1941, started planning 
the likely troop deployments and military structure for the 
occupation and securing of the Russian areas ('die Besatzung und 
Sicherung des russischen Raumes'. )(1) Accordingly, the overall number 
of units engaged in occupation duties was to be reduced, and the main 
strength of the German forces was to be concentrated in the major 
industrial ccntres and at essential communications junctions. Apart 
from 'normal' occupation tasks, these forces were also to be in a 
position to deal quickly and effectively with any possible 
small-scale outbreaks of resistance. 
The favourable assessment of the situation which lay behind these 
schemes was shattered by the reality of the operational demands 
imposed on the German army. OKII assigned three or four 
Sicherungsdivisionen (security divisions) to each Army Rear Area. 
What this in effect meant was that, although by 1943 there were some 
250,000 troops on active duty in the military governments, a single 
German security division might be responsible for 10,000 square miles 
of territory. (2) In fact, the security sector of the 201st 
Sicherungsdivision (one of the main units in Army Group Centre) 
covered some 35,000 sq. kms. (3) 
The manpower resources of the various Nazi civilian and 
paramilitary agencies, with whom the German army had a rather 
complex 'understanding". was also severely limited. The politics of 
army/SS(SD) relations will be discussed later, but the mechanics of 
the situation should be noted here. Liaison between the Army and the 
SS %%-as carried out by a 118here SS- und Polizei-Fahrer (Higher SS and 
Police Leader) attached to each of the Army Group headquarters. 
Although the SS officials could call upon a few battalions of 
Ordnungspolizei (paramilitary police), these same forces were also 
seconded to the civilian government areas west of the Army Group Rear 
Areas. (4) Even the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) had a mere 4,000 men in all 
its mobile groups on the Eastern Front. (5) Certainly. the resources 
available to the military from this source were variable, as was the 
deployment of Police regiments and bataillons on behalf of both Army 
Groups and Security Divisions. 
That most demanding of rear area duties, i. e. security and 
anti-partisan warfare, warranted special measures. In order to 
undertake this task, Army Group Centre proposed the creation of 
Jagdkommandos (rapid deployment anti-guerrilla forces) which would be 
79 
suitably armed and able to call on the assistance of the 
Baubataillone (Pioneer corps), the Feldgendarmerie and commando units 
of the Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police). Such units were 
attached to each Army Rear Area with a typical Jagdkommando made up 
of one officer and four squads (each squad including at least one 
indigenous person in civilian clothes, so called Vertrauensm. Inner 
(V-N11nner). (6) However, as will be become clear from the detailed 
discussion in the chapter on partisan warfare, while anti-guerrilla 
special units had a generally higher success rate than other forces, 
their casualty rate was also correspondingly increased. (7) 
In many ways this small unit approach was an alternative to 
transferring units of the SD from the rOckwArtigen Heeresgebiete into 
the KorOcks. While the army had suggested just such a move because of 
its need for specialists, serious doubts had been expressed. AOK2, 
operating on the the southern borders of Army Group Centre, had in 
fact stated that 'ein Einsatz der den HOheren SS- und Polizeifrjhrer 
in den rOckwArtigen Heeresgebieten unterstehenden SS- und 
PolizeiverbAnde in den Armeegebieten in keinern Falle in Frage 
komme'. (S) 
Similar manpower limitations were evident as far as economic policy 
was concerned. At the highest level a number of umbrella 
organisations operate: 
Wirtschaftsfahrungsstab Ost (WIFStab Ost) 
Wirtschafts- und R(Istungs-Amt OKW (WiROAmt) 
Wirtschaftsstab Ost (WiStab Ost) (9) 
In the field, policy was implemented by a series of under-staffed 
Wirtschafts-Inspektionen (Wiln) (economic inspectorates); one for 
each Army Area (or in the case of civilian administration, and one 
for each Reich COMMiMriat). (10) In the operational areas of the 
army nearer the front line the place of these Inspectorates was taken 
by the Armee-Wirtschaftsf0hrer (AWifD). These were operationally 
under the command of the Army, but technically subordinate to the 
Wirtschaftistab organisation. (l 1) At the lowest level, in the areas 
of the Regional Kommand3ntura -OFK- (that is, within the old Soviet 
'Oblast' divisions) economic policy was the responsibility of the 
Wirtschaftschaftskommandos (WlKdo). (12) 
From the very beginning of the C3MP3ign, one of the more important 
tasks undertaken by these economic units was the extraction of food 
resources from the occupied territories. These were to supply both 
the German army of occupation and create a surplus that could be 
shipped to the Reich itself. In order to facilitate this endeavour 
Land wi rtschaftsfO h re r (Agricultural Leaders) operated in the Army 
Rear Areas, but again the 'dearth of qualified German personnel meant 
that agriculture in the occupied territories was not effectively 
organised or controlled. "(13) In support of a similar argument, R. D. 
Mailer draws attention to the remarks of the Referent fOr Ostfragen 
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im Vierjahresplan, Dr. Friedrich Richter, who noted in 1943 that the 
Germans simply did not have the necessary military power available in 
the occupied territories to implement far reaching policy. (14) 
Reference is also made to a similar shortfall that was apparent in 
the inability of the rear areas to provide facilities for repairing 
military vehicles, agricultural machinery and so forth. Figures for 
the period to March 1942 indicate that the Wehrmacht had a mere 57 
workshops operating. (15) The true import of this limited capacity can 
be demonstrated by reference to the earlier observation that the 
Soviet Regime had successfully evacuated many of the industrial units 
from the now occupied territories. Around 1,500 reallocated armaments 
factories were supplying the Red Army with all manner of war 
materials including armour, aircraft and weapons in increasing 
numbers. (16) 
These figures need to be kept in mind when one considers whether or 
not authority, and policy in general, ums often settled according to 
the disposition of troops in a given area, rather than on the basis 
of official lines of demarcation. (17) 
In order to compensate for the manpower problem the army made 
significant use of satellite troops. In some rear areas only about 
one-half of the occupying forces were German, the remainder being 
made up of soldiers of Germany's allies (mainly Hungary and Rumania), 
recruits from amongst the Soviet Prisoner's of war (particularly 
Ukranians) or members or the local population). (18) In the general 
area of Army Group Centre, units of the 2nd Hungarian Army were 
deployed but. whereas KorOck 582 (AOK9) made virtually no use of such 
forces, KorOck 532 (PzAOK2) had a large contingent drawn from the 
102nd, 105th and 108th Royal Hungarian Divisions. As a result, less 
than 50% of KorOck 532's manpower %-as German. (19) The activities and 
attitudes of these non-German units (as with the mobilisation of the 
indigenous population and the mixed arguments as to its 
desirability) were extremely involved issues. Literature produced by 
the Russian Research Centre at Harvard has noted that the indigenous 
population viewed the allied troops, notably the Rumanians and 
Hungarians, with greater hostility than the Germans. However, this 
may not necessarily have been so because they were given to wholesale 
extermination actions but, rather, because they aroused widespread 
hostility by their wanton tooting, theft and abuse. Certainly, many 
Army Rear Area reports reinforce this observation, as is seen in the 
later discussion of the Kaminski Brigade (the Russian 
'Selbstverwaltungs-Dezirk' at Lokot in Korock 532). (20) 
These details of manpower are more than just facts and figures, 
since many of the controversial issues raised in this study are 
intrinsically bound up with the German Army's response to its limited 
resources. Indeed, as was clear from the discussion of the 
historiography of the topic, a number of authors have taken issue 
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with the idea of ideological determinism, preferring instead to view 
many contentious aspects of military policy (particularly the 
measures taken to pacify and utilize the rear areas and the treatment 
of Soviet POWs) as ad hoe solutions forced on hard-pressed German 
army units faced with 'impossible' situations. (21) 
Since the start of the campaign, 74,500 soldiers had been lost in 
action in Army Group Centre and the deployment of reserves of 23,000 
troops could not remedy the situation. The 9th Army (which was 
responsible for Korack 582, was some 15,000 men below full strength), 
and PzAOK2 (KorQck 532) had a shortfall of over 5,000. (23) As a 
result, during November and December of 1941, the troops at the 
disposal of the Rear Area Command included only one security 
division. (24) As a caveat to reading too simple a conclusion into 
this matter of numerical resources, and by inference to the idea of a 
relatively isolated Army group , it must be noted that the Rear Area Commanders were sometimes able to supplement their forces by 
requesting front-line troops for special purposes. Concerted action 
against partisans were the main exceptions to the rule of giving 
absolute priority to the front-line combat zone. For example, pleas 
from various field commanders in Army Group Centre's southern section 
resulted in the assignment of an additional security division (the 
707 S. D. ) in Spring 1942. However. even this must be qualified since 
the method was only employed for short-term and specific matters, and 
planned operations were often cancelled at short notice because of 
unanticipated changes in the situation at the front. 
The use of this technique over long periods was certainly made 
impossible by the overall strategic position. The sort of passivity 
at the front that would have made such a course of action possible 
would more probably have meant the transfer of Rear Areas to civilian 
administration. Indeed, the Soviet counter-offensive at the outskirts 
of Moscow in the Winter of 1941 had serious repercussions for the 
German Army's rear area policy, and Army units as well as Waffen SS 
and police formations had to be shifted from ROckwArtigen 
Heeresgebiet Mitte to the front. Case-study instances of such 
problems abound. For example, Armeeoberkommando 9 noted in late 
December 1941 that at least 10% of Rear Area Troops (KorOck 582) 
would have to be drafted to the front and in the event this turned 
out to be a gross underestimation. (25) In the Bryansk area, a 
regiment of regular infantry division (the 56th) was brought back 
from the front as early as the 29th October 1941. The commander of 
this formation also exercised the functions of Army Rear Area 
commander of the Second Panzer Army (Korack Pz. AOK2). On the 
l0th December 1941, shortly after the attempted Soviet counter 
offensive, the 56th Division had to be redeployed to the front. The 
security tasks then reverted to the regional military government 
detachment based at Bryansk. This Feld kommandanteur, which was the 
forerunner of the full KorOck 532 unit. had available only a guard 
and police battalion, as well as some Feldpolizei detachments. (26) 
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The particular response in Army Group Centre to the Moscow reverses 
reinforces this point. At the end of May 1942. the Kommandierende 
General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber in Heeresgebiet Mitte 
(General der Infanterie, Yon Schenckendorff) argued that as a 
consequence of manpower shortages he was 'no longer in control of the 
situation and that everything built up over the last few months had 
been destroyed'. (22) Complications naturally arose because of the 
continuous shifting of units around the rear area, and personnel 
changes within these detachments. Korack 532, in the half-year report 
for the period ending May 1942, pointed out that the constant changes 
in the composition of troops under his command severely limited his 
capacity to undertake security tasks. Not a month went by without a 
shift of railroad protection units and in one instance the temporary 
removal of an infantry division had hampered a large-scale operation. 
The commander also expressed the view that troops assigned to 
anti-guerrilla %-arfare needed to gain and maintain a familiarity with 
the terrain, and that the constant redeployment of units had a very 
negative effect on German activities. (27) It also had a damaging 
effect on the morale of many German soldiers in these units. 
The established literature on various aspects of occupation policy 
could be enlisted in support of the assertion that resources were 
continually over-stretched. Many works refer not only to the 
numerical difficulties faced by the German army, but also to the 
supposed inferior quality of many rear area units. At Headquarter's 
level in the Army Group Rear Areas, where most of the tasks were of a 
purely administrative nature, overview reports noted serious staff 
limitations with respect to both numbers and the professional 
qualifications of officers. Despite the tendency in official reviews 
to place great reliance on application as a substitute for ability, 
Toppe goes as far as to contend that the military government Section 
VII was not in the position to either set up or run an effective 
administration; 'kaum geeignet, in dem weiten Raum des Heeresgebietes 
eine Verwaltung zu leiten oder gar - wie notwendig war - neu 
aufzubauen'. (28) 
Specific field records substantiate this point with regard to the 
dearth of trained personnel, which was particularly acute at the 
local level. Feld kommandantur 184 (KorOck 532), for instance, was 
forced to employ the same staff member as both Operations (1a) and 
Intelligence (1c) officer. Such difficulties appear to have produced 
a marked reduction in both enthusiasm and efficiency on the part of 
those concerned. (29) Alexander Dallin's seminal work on German rule 
in Russia can be cited in this context. He draws attention to the 
fact that many senior officers in the Rear Areas had often been 
brought out of retirement in order to fill these positions. (30) 
Indeed, while the officer corps of the entire German army had been 
predominantly drawn from the reserve, the war imposed such increasing 
demands on manpower that the KorOck and Army Group Rear Area military 
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hierarchy became abnormally dependent on over-age officers. (31) 'They 
[the Rear Area Commanders] were largely senior officers and generals 
who might have retired or remained in retirement had it not been for 
the Second World War, men who could no longer be entrusted with 
combat missions and who could no longer look forward to promotions or 
careers'. (32) This observation was interpreted by Dallin in favour of 
the argument that the generic quality of this group made for higher 
moral standards of judgement, albeit under dire conditions, rather 
than technical inefficiency. 'Having earned their ranks in earlier 
days, they had higher standards of judgement. and while their calibre 
and their 'Zivilcourage' varied considerably, many of them, unlike a 
large number of their younger and more ambitious colleagues, did not 
mind reporting home in terms that ran counter to accepted 
stereotypes'. (33) 
While accepting that many rear area military officials were of 
advanced years, Reitlinger was much more directly critical of their 
supposed incompetence rather than their age alone. This is evident in 
his description of the "typical' rear area military official as 'an 
officer whose carrier had failed, a captain or major in late middle 
age who had been given an unpopular task because of his 
incompetence'. (34) Contemporary accounts and assessments certainly 
make it clear that at the highest levels concern was being expressed. 
Criticisms of age and ability applied as much to the officers and men 
in the rear area active security units as they did to the military 
administration. The situation with regard to these combat forces 
could only deteriorate given the overall military position of the 
Reich and by June 1942 the Befehishaber Mitte, General von 
Schenckendorff, complained that he now had only had 25 Security 
Divisions at his disposal compared to the earlier figure of 75. The 
best units had been reallocated, and in those Landesschutzbatail lone 
that remained 'over 50% were inadequately trained, poorly armed and 
led in the main by aged officers. In his opinion 'they were simply 
not up to the task of actively combating the partisans". (35) 
Such criticisms are echoed in a number of secondary sources, 
including Keith Simpson's monograph on rear area security, where he 
describes the German troops as 'makeshift units of over-age men, 
poorly equipped and trained, lacking in transportation and 
inadequately staffed". (36) Christopher Browning's comments on the 
limitations of military government in Serbia also give some 
indication of the ubiquitous character of the problem, while Werner 
Haupt (in his study of Ileeresgruppe Mitte) notes that the poor 
front-line fighting quality of units of the Hungarian forces 
resulted in them being reallocated to Rear Area duties during the 
summer of 1942. (37) 
Other sources, however, take quite a different line. It has already 
been noted in the discussion of troop numbers that front line forces 
could be used to assist with certain rear area duties. FOrster has 
developed this point and implied that the pressure to exploit the 
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captured territories, 'obliged the OKH to assign large numbers of 
troops to the task of pacifying the ever increasing area of 
occupation, and even to draw upon manpower primarily intended for 
front-line duties'. (38) Accordingly, he contends that the harshness 
of collective acts of force cannot simply be explained by reference 
to the security problems of the German rear area troops and pragmatic 
considerations of manpower resources and quality. As with Omer 
Bartov's recent work on the political indoctrination of front-line 
units, the crucial point in this argument is that ideology is 
supposed to have been the determinant of policy. (39) A rather 
different gloss is also put on the evidence by Streim (in a 
discussion on the criminal prosecution for war crimes of 'combat' 
troops: 'Angeharige 'fechtender" Truppenteile oder Sicherungs- 
truppen'). lie challenges arguments as to the significance of age and 
asserts that; 'zwar spielte bei diesen Beschuldigten das Alter in der 
Regel keine Rolle, da es sich naturgemäß um jüngere Jahrgänge 
handelte.... "(40) 
Geyer's revisionist work on the pre-1933 armed forces may, in any 
case, have made mature age neither a guarantee of greater morality, 
nor even an indicator of technical incompetence. (41) While still far 
from being the 'new orthodoxy'. at least one recent collection has 
taken the 'Entgrenzung der Gewalt' line (deregulation of violence) 
and argued that many German army officers, irrespective of any 
ideological bias, saw in National Socialism the opportunity to 
implement fully the powerful and unrestrained techniques of 
industrialised warfare that they had first introduced, but not fully 
developed during the First World War. (42) 
Overall, many of these later critical arguments tend to be 
conjectural, based as they are on pre-1939 models of the army. While 
this is not true of Streim's observations on the commandants of the 
POW camps (or, for that matter, Bartovs work on front-line units) 
further research on the period when full hostilities had broken out 
can address these issues in an empirical fashion. Arguments need to 
be evaluated which consider the influence of a variety of factors, 
such as manpower limitations and generational differences, in shaping 
the attitudes and conduct of the German troops. (43) 
A preliminary assessment of the available data for the two 
case-study KorOcks tends to reinforce the impression that inadequate 
manpower and poor resource facilities significantly determined the 
behaviour of the German troops. This argument can be reinforced by 
reference to earlier material which drew attention to the sheer 
physical size and inhospitable character of the occupied regions. 
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In KorOck 532 (Pz. AOK2) limited numbers of troops spent a great deal 
of their time protecting roads and railways some 899 kilometres in 
length. As the Kommandant himself noted, with some concern, this was 
the equivalent distance of track from Hamburg to Vienna. (45) Although 
some 30,500 troops were officially drawing rations against the Rear 
Area, only 21,400 could be regarded as capable of combat duties. 
KorOck 532. - Manpower as of 5 September 1942. 
Unit Strength 
707 JD 6,709 
Radf. Wach Batl. 143 1,241 
Sich. Datl. 304 656 
313 656 
703 849 
862 656 
Panz. Gren. Brig. 18 (st. 6) 45 
Panzer Zug 2 167 
4 167 
Rv. W. 1,047 
Frei W. Rgt. Weise 1,950 
Totak 14,143 
707 Sich. Div. 
Pol. Btl. 309/0.1 Kp (bei FK184) 
Wa. Btl 701 
102,105 & 108 Hungarian Division 
Propagandakompanie PK693 
Feld kommandantur 184 (Bryansk) 
Ortskommandantur 1/273 (Orel) 
644 (Bryansk Area) 
829 (Ordshonikidsegrad) 
+3 other OKs 
Kriegsgefangenenlager. 
Dulag 142 (Bryansk) (I. LS. 432) 
185 (Karatischew) 
+2 Kriegsgefangenensammelstelien 
Source: 
KorOck 532. Ila, Az. 13/42, dated 5 September 1942, BA/MA: RH23/26. 
(&0288/9) 
Stab. Befh. RDckw. H. Gebiete Mitte, Abt. la, Nr. 723/42, dated 
28th February 1942, DA/NIA: RI122/230 (&TJSM) 
KorOck 532, KTB Nr. 2, dated 18.04.1942, BA/MA: R1123/24. 
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Optimistic estimates put the KorOck's 'manpower-occupation density' 
(Besatzungsdichte) at around 114 men per 1000 square kilometres. At 
times it was a mere 36 soldiers per 1000 kilometres, and under 
certain extreme conditions only 30% of the troops in the Rear Area 
could be assigned to security duties. (47) Reports from the staff 
officers of this KorOck, as with others, also made frequent reference 
to the high average age of these combat forces; around 35 years, and 
even 38 years for some individual units. Concern was also expressed 
as to their insufficient training and equipment, not to mention high 
instances of physical disabilities. (48) KorOck 532's memorandum to 
its Armeeoberkommando in August of 1942 was fairly typical when it 
attributed limited success in preventing partisan attacks on the 
railways to deficiencies in both troops and equipment: Ts darf 
ferner nicht unberOcksichtigt bleiben, daB die Landessch0tzen- 
Bataillone 304 and 313 ungen0gend ausgebildet und bewaffnet sind. Sie 
weisen ein holies Durchschnittsalter auf, 25% ihrer Leute sind nur 
garnisonverwendungsfAhig und 50% Wei tkriegs teilnehme r. Der Fehl- 
bestand betrAgt beim, Radfahr-Wachtbati. 143 426 beim Wachbatl. 701, 
205 Nlannl*(49) 
Situation reports from within the KorQck took up this theme. To 
cite a typical example, in Bryansk some members of the 
Stadtkommandant's guard unit had been assigned machine guns, but the 
men had never even fired a weapon of this sort, and the same applied 
to hand grenade experience. (50) 
Korack 582 (AOK9) was in no better a position. Indeed in some ways it 
was even made up of more variable forces. A mere 1,700 men were 
available for full time duty, of which 300-350 were assigned to 
anti-partisan duties or patrol work. (44) Specific units, such as 
LandesschOtzen Bataillon 738 (Ilannoveraner), were referred to in 
official reports as badly trained. especially in the use of heavy 
weapons, which had become so vital a part of Rear Area security 
work. (51) This was hardly surprising as reports noted that the unit 
had only undertaken small scale guard duties during its previous tour 
in France. The officer corps was generally made up of men aged 
between 40-50 years of age; the exception was a younger officer of 
36. The average age even of the 'junior' officers was 38 years, and 
the Battalion commander himself was nearly 60 years old: 'Aktiv 
gedient hat ungefähr die Hälfte im Weltkrieg, der Rest ist 
kurzfristig ausgebildet und hat seine weitere Ausbildung erst beim 
Datl. erhalten. Die Ausbildung kann kaum als genügend bezeichnet 
werden. Zussamenrassend kann gesagt werden, daß das Batl. zur Zeit 
nur fOr Bewachungszwecke geeignet erscheint'. (52) Added to this, the 
general physical condition of many men in the unit was an equal cause 
for concern, with significant numbers of men suffering from sight or 
hearing impairments as well as war injuries: 'Ausserdem sind unter 
den g. v. Leuten Kurzsichtige, Schwerh6rige. Krampfadern behaftete. 
sowie durch Schussverletzungen in diesem Kriege Behinderte'. (53) 
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Another KorOck unit, Gruppe von der Mosel, was made up of men born 
in 1908 or even earlier, and the general health of many of the troops 
was a matter for official medical concern. Again, as will be 
discussed later, morale was consequently low. (54) On a superficial 
level, other units appeared to be more 'fighting fit. Landessch0tzen 
Bataillon 222 (Masuren), for instance, was regarded as somewhat 
better trained and combat-ready. due in the main to its allocation of 
German- rather than French-made weapons). However, it was led by 
senior officers whose average age was over 50 years, while the men 
themselves averaged 38 years. Moreover, only 60% of the company were 
'fit for combat' and 40% were suited merely for 'static garrison 
duties'. Only five of the staff had been "aktiv' between 1925 and 
1930, and none were newly trained. The Commander (an East Prussian 
Landwirt), although described as a 'alert and energetic' (Yrisch und 
energisch"), was nearly 61 years old. The unit was held to be up to 
general duties and static defence roles (Wachaufgaben und auch for 
Verteidigungsaufgaben'), although the caveat was expressed that this 
should be under limited conditions. (55) 
One of the better forces attached to KorOck 582, Wach-Bataillon 732 
(Schlesien und Sudetengau), which had experience of anti-partisan 
warfare in the East, was fortunate to have a relatively young 
commander aged 50 years. The officer in question (Major Kosian) was, 
however, a teacher in civilian life, and although on the basis of 
his rank he was presumably a reserve officer, he was not an 
experienced professional soldier. (56) Even this security formation 
was staffed by senior officers whose average age was over 43 years, 
and many of these, as well as the older junior officers, were 
veterans of the 1914-1918 mar. 'Die Alteren Funktionsunteroffiziere 
sind Weltkriegs Teilnehmer, von den Frontunteroffizieren haben nur 
30% aktiv gedient in den Jahren 1936-1938'. (57) 
An examination of the staff list for Korack 532 for February 1942 
confirms the impression that the senior personnel were generally 
officers who had been brought out of retirement, or even reserve 
officers who under 'normal" circumstances would have been too old for 
active service. The commanding officer, Generalleutnant Brand, was 54 
years old, and at least seven of the twelve officers listed were of 
the age to have seen active service in the 1914-1918 war. (58) As 
staff were replaced, this trend was maintained, if not accentuated. 
Certainly this was true of Brand's successor, Generalleutnant 
Bernhard (again born in 1888) who had spent time in a Russian POW 
camp during the First World War. and his operations officer (1a), 
Alexander von Seebach. who was also one of the 1914-1918 
'Frontgeneration*. (59) It is also worth noting that apart from the 
few Berufsoffiziere (professional soldiers) the rest of the staff, 
despite a First World War background, were civilians who had been 
drafted into uniform. This was even true of the KorOck's Chief of 
Staff and the company quartermaster (lb). (60) 
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It might be argued that certain of these officers brought much 
needed expertise into the day-to-day running of military government. 
To some extent this was true. However, trained specialists with 
experience of both the Russian language and conditions in the Soviet 
Union were almost completely lacking in these staffs. As a result, 
administrative tasks were often neglected in favour of purely 
military functions involving security, which, as has been noted, were 
themselves not well handled. Notwithstanding contingent pressures, 
this may not have been the best approach to the problems faced in the 
Rear Areas. There %%-as undoubtedly something of an irony in this, 
since many officers had been assigned to the rear areas because their 
duties were, in principle, regarded as administrative rather than 
combat-orientated. Yet, the realities of the military situation often 
meant that to all intents and purposes life in the hinterland was 
akin to front-line service. 
Exercises identified inadequacies, even before real-time combat, as 
seen by the poor showing during a mock alarm training session held at 
Bryansk by KorOck 532 in October 1942. The 0.1 officer (himself an 
reserve officer who in his civilian profession was a Stadtinspektor) 
attributed limitations in large measure to the age of the soldiers 
involved. Lack of up-to-date experience was reflected in the 
noticeably weak organisation with inefficient division of command and 
doubling-up of functions. Troops had been badly placed and unprepared 
for the exercise. One comment was of particular significance, since 
it says much about the attitude of at least some of these older 
officers to the war in the Rear Areas. The Abschnitts-Kommandant 
(responsible for the exercise area) lived with a Russian family in 
the town - despite the known security risk - and seemed rather 
indifferent to the potential threat this posed. (61) 
It would be incorrect to move to the standpoint which defines 
military effeciency simply in terms of youth, yet, as the tone of 
reports indicate, age was an important consideration. When Freiherr 
von Seebach was reassigned from the l8th Panzer Division to take up 
the post of intelligence officer (1c) with Korack 532 in January 
1943, he noted Bernhard's pleasure at obtaining an officer with 
combat experience. Yet, his promotion to staff-officer had in fact 
come about because his old unit was being rejuvenated by the 
relocation of older soldiers: Von Seebach was then over 42 years of 
age. (62) The extent of the problem can be brought out by a comparing 
the staff list for KorOck 532 with material which relates to POW camp 
commandants in the Rear Areas and the Abwehr officers attached to the 
Kriegsgefangeneniager. (63) A particular individual example from 
Korack 582 makes this point in a more immediate fashion. A certain 
Oberstleutnant Milentz, based at Dulag 240, requested a day off in 
January 194 in order to celebrate his birthday-, when he would be 70 
years old. This was not that atypical throughout the entire rear area 
commands- for in the revised staff lists for Korack 532, which were 
issued in the autumn of 1942, the age of the company Quartermaster 
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was given at 60 years, while the unit's medical officer was only a 
year younger. (64) 
Overall, even on the basis of crude mean figures, the average age 
of the senior officers in the Rear Area formations, including a 
number of security units, was in the upper forties. Many junior 
officers (up to the rank of captain) were at least in their late 
thirties. As such, these men differed quite markedly from the 
front-line elements of the German Army, where, to use Bartov's 
figures by way of comparison, the average age of junior battlefield 
officers was normally little more than 30 years. (65) 
As the Kodick reports clearly indicate, apart from the few 'aktiv, 
professional officers, the other First World War veterans (and the 
typical 'generation of 1908' who made up many of the static Rear Area 
rank and file) had certainly received no military training in the 
late 1930s ; the period when, as Messerschmidt has argued, 
ideological input into the German Army was intense. Even the 
post-1914-1918 cohort would probably have been the 'missing 
generation' as far as conscription was concerned. Neither, for that 
matter, would soldiers who were now, at the youngest, in their early 
thirties have been exposed to the more questionable ideological 
influences of National Socialist youth organisations and the 
educational system of the Third Reich. 
It remains an open question at this stage as to whether or not the 
files of the rear area forces confirm Bartov's arguments as to a 
direct causal link between the 'youth of the officers of the Third 
Reich... and their potential susceptibility to National Socialist 
ideology'. (66) Security units made up of relatively young men do 
appear to have been more inclined to engage in reprisal actions, but 
this may have more to do with the dynamic nature of such units and 
the tasks to which they were assigned. However, Streim's rejoinder as 
to the irrelevance of age suggests that caution should be exercised 
before one accepts too readily the idea of an older generation of 
soldiers (and here we mean not only the officers identified by 
Dallin, but also the men) less influenced by National Socialist 
ideology and more inclined to adopt policies of a less brutal 
nature. (67) Certainly there is little unequivocal evidence that would 
support a differentiation between the behaviour of formations on the 
basis of age alone. 
Clearly, there is much to be said for an analysis which considers 
not only ideological conditioning, as seems to be the trend, but 
also the way in which the concrete experiences of the German Rear 
Area soldiers shaped and influenced their behaviour. One of the most 
important roles assigned to Korfick units was the economic 
exploitation of the occupied territories, and it is to this topic 
that the following chapter addresses itself. 
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Official Exploitation and Unofficial Looting 
Food Policy and the 'Hunger Strategy': 
Many historians would regard a great deal of official German Army 
policy as criminal in nature, even if 'unlawful laws' such as the 
KriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlaB (which abrogated any rights which the 
civilian population of the occupied territories might be allowed) 
underpinned actions. (I) Criminal behaviour, or rather the definition 
of such, by higher echelons of certain activities of the lower ranks 
was based on rather different premises. Overall, the more likely the 
action of a soldier to undermine the basic fundamental principle of 
obedience of the individual to the institution, the more likely was 
the offence to be a matter for draconian punishment. The authority of 
the army was everything, with discipline as the determining factor 
which took clear precedence over any moral considerations. 
Theft, by members of the German armed forces, of the possessions of 
the civilian population in the occupied territories was a complex 
issue within this general definition. German troops were often 
engaged in grossly insensitive, indeed, brutal confiscations of the 
possessions of the local inhabitants in an official and unofficial 
capacity. Yet, there is some parallel evidence that soldiers fed 
civilians in both the towns and the countryside, and, in a somewhat 
separate context, also attempted to alleviate the conditions under 
which Soviet POWs were confined. 
'Apologists' have taken the approach which argues that dire 
shortages of even the most basic materials, particularly agricultural 
produce, presented the German army with 'unpalatable decisions' that 
were inevitable in modern large-scale warfare. (2) Coupled with the 
massive official expropriation policy that was attempted in an 
industrial and agrarian economy that was already seriously disrupted 
by the war, the end result was that crude demand from all quarters 
grossly exceeded basic supply. Recent critical literature, however, 
such as Rolf-Dieter Mraller's contribution to the MGFA collection, 
takes a very different line. (3) it is proposed that higher echelons 
of the Nazi regime, including the German Army leadership, took part 
in the calculated, ideologically- motivated planning of a 'starvation 
policy' (Hungerstrategie) directed against the inhabitants of the 
occupied territories. Under this programme the likely fate of the 
population of the occupied territories, particularly in the towns, 
was such that one can speak of a 'deliberate extermination policy'. 
('einer bewu8praktizierten Vernichtungspolitik). (4) 
This 'hunger strategy' proposed by the leadership of the Third 
Reich requires elucidation as an issue in its own right. More 
importantly, it forms the background against which to place the 
grass-roots attitudes of the rear area troops in the field, both with 
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regard to official and unofficial expropriation. As such it offers an 
unusual insight into the German army's definition and reaction to 
criminal behaviour. 
The extraction of food supplies from the occupied Eastern territories 
was from its very inception one of the more important economic aims 
of the campaign. (5) In the Spring of 1941, the Reichserndhrungs- 
ministerium and the OKW had recommended the implementation of a 
policy to maximise the supplies available to the Reich from the 
'conquered' territories. However, this was not simply to be achieved 
by the exploitation of the surpluses and reserves supposedly 
available in the Soviet Union but, more particularly, by a marked 
reduction in Russian consumption. Senior elements in the German 
military advanced the view that the Eastern Armies could live off the 
land and thus further take pressure off available resources. The 
Reichsernahrungsministerium had based calculations for improving the 
standard of living inside Germany on the premise that the 5 million 
members of the Wehrmacht (a group with the highest food requirements) 
could be excluded from total Reich calculations. (6) 
A useful comparison can be made with military government in the 
First World War. During the Brest-Litovsk era the German Armed forces 
had laid down an order of priorities for the allocation of resources: 
the German Army of occupation; the Russian civilian population and, 
lastly, the inhabitants of the Kaiserreich. (7) The Third Reich's 
pecking order was very different: the German front-line troops; the 
Rear Area forces; the Reserve Army and the German civilian 
population. No account was taken of the needs of the Soviet 
population in the occupied territories. This is abundantly clear from 
the policy decisions outlined at State Secretary Backe's conference 
of May 1941. Millions -of Russians would have to starve to death in 
order to feed both the German Armed forces and fulfil the long-term 
plans to remove an additional 10 million tonnes of grain from the 
Soviet Union during the first year and a further 7 million tonnes per 
year thereafter. In practice, while the German army of occupation and 
the civilian administration in the East consumed over 7 million 
tonnes of grain, the Reich itself received less than 2 million 
tonnes. (8) 
In devising their strategy, the National Socialist planners had 
related it to schemes for a radical deindustrialisation of the 
conquered regions, under which the population of the urban centres in 
the East appeared to be 'surplus to requirements. Hitler gave his 
full approval to these plans as advanced by Secretary of State Backe 
and the head of the Wehrwirtschafts-und-ROstungsamtes in the OKW, 
General Georg Thomas; particularly with regard to the planned 
starvation of the towns and cities. Radical racial policies 
introduced by the military Wirtschaftsstab Ost were justified in part 
by similar economic arguments of productivity, security and pressures 
on food supplies. (9) 
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Reservations, even hostility to such policies, were expressed at 
the early planning stage by officials such as Otto BrAutigam, 
Rosenberg's political advisor, but these were dismissed by the Nazi 
leadership. The regime was only interested in short-term gains and 
believed that any resistance the policy of plunder might engender 
could be easily dealt with by brutal repression. Indeed, it was 
stressed that after the expected rapid military victory there would 
be plenty of military force available for such measures. (10) 
On the expectation of a rapid victory in the East, the planned 
starvation strategy appeared relatively problem-free. The Ostheer had 
been supplied with sufficient rations for twenty days, and the likely 
availability of foodstuffs in the way of booty seemed more than 
adequate to feed the Wehrmacht for the duration of the expected short 
campaign. Moreover, it seemed entirely feasible to the pre-war 
planners that a much reduced army of occupation could be completely 
supplied from the land at the expense of the inhabitants of the large 
towns. Thus, in the earliest phase of the war, the Wirtschaftsdienst- 
stellen concentrated on seizing all the available food supplies not 
immediately required by the German forces and shipping them to the 
Reich. The expected return of the bulk of the German forces to the 
homeland seemed to make such a policy essential, given the pressures 
of the 'primacy of politics'. (l 1) Consequently, the development of a 
coherent agricultural organisation for the occupied Eastern 
territories was neglected, as was planning for the possible need to 
create a long-term and effective supply policy for the German army. 
In summary, it can be stated that the economic and military 
leadership of the Third Reich, despite individual calls for a more 
pragmatic approach, advocated a radical policy of exploitation that 
did not merely allow for but, rather, was based on the need to 
exterminate millions of people. 
The aim of using the resources of the occupied territories to supply 
both the German troops in the East and provide a significant 
contribution to the requirements of the Reich came under pressure in 
a number of ways. The unexpected duration of the main campaign 
combined with the rapacious activities of the German advance troops 
created immediate problems and did little to alleviate any future 
difficulties that now seemed likely to arise. Attempts to overcome 
the resulting shortages by subsidising Wehrmacht supplies with 
foodstuffs from the Reich were blocked politically. German troops 
were urged instead to make up deficiencies by intensifying the 
exploitation of the occupied areas. Even if the advocates of a 
triangular scheme to ship supplies from the Reich to the area of Army 
Group Centre - the overall administrative region for KorOcks 532 & 
582 - and then to replenish these materials with surpluses from the 
Ukraine had been given their way, this concept would have been 
unviable because of transport difficulties. (12) Transport was, in any 
case, at a premium for the forward movement of munitions and fuel, 
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not food supplies. Consideration of the available evidence in fact 
demonstrates that only in the Ukraine could surpluses for extraction 
be expected. In Heeresgruppe Mitte the requirements of the occupying 
forces could barely be met. 
Fulfilment of Quotas in the Period 1.9.1941 to 31.8.1942 
(Figures for GK Weil3ruthenian/ Wi in Mitte) 
Quotas Actual Amount Expected Shortfall 
Grain 450,000 243,998 177,000 
Fats 10,000 732 9,000 
Livestock 120,000 63,418 38,500 
Potatoes 360,000 343,814 16,000 
Source: WiStabOst. Landwirtschaftliche Auflagen 1941/42 
BA/MA: Wi/ID/1410: adapted from DRudZW: Bd. 4. page 998 
Difficulties were likely to be compounded even further as future 
advances would take the German army into areas which had been either 
harvested or scorched of food by the retreating Soviet forces. As a 
result of these problems, the troops of Heeresgruppe Mitte were 
forced to adopt a ruthless policy that amounted to almost total 
defoliation ('KahlfraB'), and this seriously threatened economic 
preparations for the coming winter. Even in the rear areas of 
Heeresgruppe Sild, where there were sufficient supplies of food, the 
front-line troops suffered intermittent distress, and not simply 
because of transport difficulties. The German civilian agencies paid 
little heed to the requirements of the front-line troops and 
responded to the inability of the German army to arrange sufficient 
transport by using its facilities to ship supplies to the Reich 
instead. It took a great deal of argument before the armed forces 
were given the use of a reasonable portion of the available rolling 
stock for their immediate needs. (13) 
Admittedly, in Army Group Centre (which included Kodick 532 and 
Kortick 582) the Wehrmacht was given absolute priority, but 
difficulties still arose. For example, State Secretary Backe refused 
to make available adequate feed-supplies for the large numbers of 
pack animals and horses used by the German army in the East. (14) As a 
result, the military often had no other choice but to use the straw 
off roofs in the occupied villages for this purpose. Conditions 
continued to deteriorate, and by December of 1941 reports from 
Kalinin (KorOck 582) complained that the unit's horses had not 
received any oats for over two months. (15) 
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Wirtschaftsstab Ost, for one, recognised that a dilemma existed. 
The starvation policy depended on military success, but now the 
incomplete military occupation had created its own problems. On the 
one hand, the immediate economic interests of the Wehrmacht and the 
Reich demanded continued expropriation of foodstuffs and raw 
materials. Yet, on the other, because of the size of the occupied 
area and the limited German manpower, it was essential to appease the 
local population. In practice, the ruthless exploitation by the army 
of occupation for its immediate needs, irrespective of ideological 
motives, so eroded resources that the additional burden of 
subsidising the domestic supplies of the Reich offered little hope 
for the Russian population. Rear area security and long term resource 
management considerations had to be given a lower priority as 
official requisitioning by the German military continued unabated. 
Some idea of the overall impact of the occupation can be gained from 
statistics based on the records of the main agency involved, the 
Zentralhandelsgesellschaft Ost ffir landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und 
Bedarf G. m. b. H. (ZO/ZHO). (16) 
Material in the ZHO records only refers to shipments that passed 
through the agency and exclude food requisitioned directly by the 
German troops in the operational areas. ZHO estimates put direct 
requisitioning of livestock at 40% of the tabulated figures, and that 
for other commodities - including grain - at 20%. On that basis, the 
German Army was probably involved with the first hand seizure of a 
further 810,000 tonnes of grain, and around 165,000 tonnes (slaughter 
weight equivalent) of livestock. It should also be stressed that in 
the command region of both Korfick 532 and 582 (Heeresgebiet Mitte) 
the German Army consumed most, if not all, of the agricultural 
produce, including grain, livestock, milk and fats, as well as 
potatoes. 
These figures express the overall point, but the immediate 
grass-roots impact of such policies is more evident from the detail 
available in Army Rear Area reports. Files from both KorOck 532 and 
Korrick 582 indicate that the massive expropriation policy was based 
on an 'infinite' number of rather small parts. Thus, the German 
troops directly involved in the implementation of the policy were 
bound to become immersed in such detail, that the overall strategic 
purpose of their work became rather remote. This is particularly 
evident in the way pressures to achieve short-term gain were 
detrimental to long-term planning. Guidelines for the seizure of 
cattle, for example, laid down all manner of conditions as to the 
categories of animals which could not be taken; such as breeding 
bulls, cows in calf or those with high milk yields. However, while 
such an approach was supposedly designed to ensure continuity of 
supplies, the ever increasing requirements of the armed forces 
created conflicting pressures to take animals of the highest quality. 
Requisitioning was also intended to be at the expense of the 
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Sowchoses and Kolchoses, with the private property of the peasantry 
normally regarded as exempt in order to ensure some supplies for the 
local population. (18) In reality, seizure actions regularly failed to 
observe these 'ground-rules'. Moreover, while the German Army 
stipulated minimum payment levels - an ýapproach which might seem to 
challenge the very concept of total exploitation - the sums in 
question were far, from adequate. A comparison with producer prices 
in the Reich itself, even allowing for the differing standards of 
living, gives some idea of the expropriative nature of army actions. 
Prices Paid by German Army for Agricultural Produce: 
(As compared with Reich producer prices). (a) 
Commodity Price per 100 Kilos 
Occupied Areas: Reich: 
Quality Livestock 200 Rubles 100 RM 
Potatoes 12-50 Rubles 6 RM. 
Eggs 23 Rubles per 100 12 RM. 
Grain 22-35 Rubles 9-11 RM. (b) 
(a) 10 Reichsmark (RM) = 100 Rubles $4.00). 
(b) based on pre 1940 Reichsmark prices for Baltic states. 
Source: Korfick 582, 'Festsetzung der Preise fOr landwirtschaftliche 
Erzeugnisse beim Ankauf in Russland', dated 7.8.1941, BA/MA: RH23/223 
(&0766), &9 
K Brandt (et al), Management of Agriculture and Food in the German 
Occupied and other, Areas of Fortress Europe: a study in military 
government', Stanford UP, pages 116-119. 
Since the 10 to I ratio of exchange between the Ruble and and Mark 
was extremely favourable to the Mark (in view of the official Soviet 
ratio of 2 to 1) the raised prices in real terms of farm produce were 
on average one-fifth of German levels. The overspending by individual 
soldiers, who often used funds from home, also meant that currency, 
including Reichskreditkassenscheine, was increasingly worthless in a 
wartime economy more suited to payment in kind. (19) It is also 
significant to note the extensive requirements of the German army as 
seen in the fact that nearly every conceivable item of agricultural 
produce was included in the lists. 
The behaviour of many German units engaged in this task increased 
the already inevitable and deep-seated resentment of the Soviet rural 
population. Korfick reports regularly complained that German troops 
seemed to display a marked lack of subtlety and a gross 
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misunderstanding of peasant psychology in their dealings with the 
local farming communities. The complaint that the army had removed a 
villager's 'best' or 'last cow' appeared so often in files as to be 
almost apocryphal. It is interesting to note that even where the 
retreating Soviet regime had only left a peasant the one cow, the 
German decision to take that one and only remaining animal caused 
more hostility than the original removal of the rest of the herd. (20) 
Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Mitte was even given to suggest that as 
far as the population living on the land was concerned, it was 
difficult to draw a distinction between the tribulations they faced 
from the German Army or the partisans. 
The promised, but as yet unrealised, decollectivization of 
agriculture also held little appeal when such conditions prevailed: 
'Der Bauer hat es dabei wirklich schwer. Die Wehrmacht nimmt ihm sein 
letztes Pferd und oft auch die letzte Kuh und die Partisanen berauben 
ihn andererseits bis aufs letzte. Was nützt dem Bauerm die 
Agrarordnung, wenn er kein Pferd hat, um das Land zu bestellen'. (21) 
Commanders were acutely aware that the partisans were fully 
exploiting the German army's requisitioning policies. A situation 
report from Korfick 532 for the period May to December 1942 noted the 
effectiveness of enemy propaganda. 'Eine rege Flugblatt-, Vortrags- 
und Flüsterpropaganda unter Bevölkerung und Partisanen blieb nicht 
ohne Erfolg. Dabei werden vor allem die notgedrungen rücksichtlosen 
Requirierungen der Besatzungsarmee geschickt ausgenutzt. Die 
hungernden Bewohner der Städte und Dörfer mit deutscher Besatzung, 
die aus dem unbestzten Lande Lebensmittel holten, verstärkten 
ebenfalls nicht den Eindruck einer 'Befreiung' des Landes. (22) 
Despite the scale of the German army's requisitioning actions its 
overall supply position did not significantly improve. The military 
forces continued to be dependent on supplies from the Reich, and to 
make matters worse German attempts to exploit at least the raw 
materials so necessary for the war industry also failed. 
German Army's Food Requirements from the Reich: June 1942 
Flour 14% 
Meat 32% 
Fats 50% 
Sugar 60% 
Animal Feed 50% 
Source: Ein Jahr Rußlandfeldzug. Leistungen wehrwirtschaftlicher 
Formationen des OKW/WiAmtes auf dem Rohstoffgebiet: OKW/WiAmt/ 
Ro I Ost, dated 22 June 1942. Adapted from DRudZW: Bd. 4.1025. 
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Raw Materials Obtained (Spring 1942) in Comparison with 
Pre-War Levels. 
Lignite 
Mica 
Manganese 
Oil 
Oil Schale 
Phosphorite 
Quartz 
Bituminous Coal 
Peat 
less than 1% of pre war level 
'in its first stages' 
9% 
75% 
60% 
'in its first stages' 
ditto 
less than 1% 
'in its first stages' 
Source: Ein Jahr Rußlandfeldzug. Leistungen wehrwirtschaftlicher 
Formationen des OKW/WiAmtes auf dem Rohstoffgebiet: OKW/WiAmt/ 
Ro I Ost, dated 22 June 1942. Adapted from DRudZW: Bd. 4.1026. 
Such evidence seems fairly conclusive in demonstrating that Backe's 
'Kolonialthese' simply did not work. Various factors have been put 
forward by way of explanation, including transport difficulties and 
German manpower limitations. Of even more interest for this research 
are the arguments regarding organisational - friction and the 
increasing ideological radicalisation of the war in Russia. 
R. D. Mliller has gone so far as to argue that the ambitious desire of 
General Thomas to create an economic apparatus, essentially 
independent from the military leadership, intensified the 
exploitation, but paradoxically condemned it to failure. The war 
became a colonial war of exploitation ('kolonialer Ausbeutungskrieg") 
with false economic arguments emmeshed with racist and ideological 
policies. (23) 
The highest levels of the Nazi leadership were unwilling to accept 
that unrestrained exploitation ran counter to military interests. The 
available resources in the occupied territories were not. mobilised 
for the war in the East, instead policies were advocated that only 
served to destabilise the area. Often this only served to encourage 
both passive and active resistance on the part of the indigenous 
population. The burdensome task of coping with the resulting chaos 
fell increasingly on the German army commanders and troops in the 
occupied rear areas. 
it is obviously difficult to adequately come to terms with the human 
suffering of the Soviet population, particularly in the towns where 
there was not simply hunger but the problems of disease associated 
with malnutrition. Korfick reports, which were obviously initially 
more concerned with the danger of troop infection than the immediate 
plight of the civilian popuWion, were especially alarmed by the 
marked increase in cases of typhus, spotted fever (Fleckfieber) and 
tuberculosis. The economic impact of German army requisitioning 
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policies can be gauged, however, in some measure from the black 
market prices which resulted even in the more well-favoured areas: 
Official and Actual Food Prices: Feldkommandantur Walki, 
July 1942. 
Official Unofficial (a) 
kg. bread 1.20 Rubles 150 Rubles 
egg 0.80 8 (10) 
litre milk 1.20 20 (26-34) 
litre sunflower oil 14.50 280 
(a) Figures in parenthesis from Kharkov, for comparison. 
Source: FK Walki: 'Durchfilhrung der Agrarordnung', Dated 17.07.1942. 
BA/MA RH23/20ff. 
K. Brandt et al., Management of Agriculture and Food in the German 
Occupied and other Areas of Fortress Europe: a study in military 
government., Stanford UP, pages 118ff. 
To make, matters worse, KorOck reports from throughout the region 
noted the warnings of La-Ffihrers that unless more horses or tractors 
were allocated, there would be further price rises as the amount of 
land under cultivation decreased. (24) While official requisitioning 
intensified, it is apparent, even from some of the records presented 
so far, that the original inflexible 'starvation policy' had 
undergone modification. Contingent circumstances rather than an 
ideological shift were the determining factors. The unfavourable 
situation at the front tied down most of the German forces and thus 
necessitated the reorganisation of Soviet agriculture using 
indigenous labour. At the same time, the urban population, originally 
condemned to starvation, now needed to be pacified. Thus, increasing 
numbers of the civilian population in the German Army Rear Areas 
seemed likely to be excluded from the original starvation strategy. 
The move towards a reorientation of policy was evident firstly in the 
policies of the military administration, then in Rosenberg's ministry 
and finally in the activities of the economic agencies. (25) 
Any shifts in policy were, however, far from clearly defined since 
no one, including the MilitArverwaltung des Heeres, regarded itself 
as responsible for the maintenance of the defeated Soviet population. 
The German military placed the onus on the Wirtschaftsstellen, which 
in turn looked to the civil administration; an agency that was often 
non -operational. Moreover, the issue of supplying the German army 
from the Reich itself remained both logistically and ideologically 
problematical. The increasingly ambivalent attitude of the OKH, which 
in the first instance controlled the largest part of the occupied 
territories, was expressed in its order of the 25th July 1941. 
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Parallel to the requisitioning policy, it demanded ruthless measures 
against both the civilian population (and the POWs) in order to 
secure and exploit the occupied territories. Yet, at the same time it 
was argued that the native population should return to work their 
land, since this was the surest way to pacify the rear areas. (26) By 
August, when the main concern of the military authorities' was to 
bring in the harvest, the resulting shift in military thinking was 
evident. The original directive to cut off food supplies to the towns 
and leave the urban populations to fend for themselves was not 
observed everywhere. Such actions contradicted Backe's guidelines of 
May 1941 in that supplies were being made available to the Soviet 
population before any attempt was made to meet the requirements of 
the Reich. 
Military planners realised that the overall state of affairs was 
far from satisfactory, since without concessions over food supplies, 
co-operation with the entire population would not be achieved. The 
WirtschaftsfCihrung repeated the point, and asserted that as the 
security of Reich food supplies depended on the occupied 
territories, the native population of the rear areas had to be 
encouraged to participate in the undertaking. This applied in 
particular to the 'central Russian deficiency area, including the 
large administrative centres, where the local inhabitants, on whom 
the German authorities depended to bring in the harvest, had to be 
won over by the guarantee of plentiful supplies. (27) 
These calls for a more positive approach did not, as yet, prompt 
the leadership of the Reich to ameliorate its preferred policy. 
Military commanders thus found themselves subject to conflicting 
pressures. However, it should be stressed that although those who 
decided to advocate and even take on the responsibility of feeding 
the civilian population did so for a variety of reasons, the 
predominant motive was often simple pragmatism. 'Approval' for such 
policies depended on quasi-official backing and the production of 
evidence that such an approach was of benefit to the German war 
effort. Modifications to the original starvation policy thus first 
took on something of an institutional form in the OKH's redefinition 
of the earlier orders of OKW, which had demanded that local 
inhabitants in the employ of the German armed forces should fend for 
themselves. Henceforth, Russian labour engaged in mobile support 
roles such as that undertaken by railway workers, Panjewagenf0hrer 
and road building gangs for the Organisation Todt were to be supplied 
with the most basic rations from German stores. However, the rations 
received were less than half of those issued to the Wehrmacht forces, 
and in any case very expensive: daily rations cost some 6 Rubles, 
while the hourly wage for an unskilled worker was only I Ruble. (28) 
Later on, workers engaged in static duties with the army, such as 
kitchen and laundry workers or stable hands, were to be fed in 
exchange for a deduction from their wages. 
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The head of Wirtschaftsstabes Ost, Generalleutnant Schubert, went 
even further and supported the demand of the Befehlshaber of Army 
Group Centre that provision be made to feed the entire civilian 
population. (29) The Army Group commander argued that a well-planned 
partisan campaign was developing in his area of military government 
and the support of the civilian population could now only be gained 
by ensuring an adequate food supply. ('.. deutscherseits durch 
Sicherstellung einer minimalen Ernahrung befriedet werden kann'). (30) 
Schubert envisaged a system that would provide communal kitchens for 
the urban population, but this proposal received little in the way of 
official backing from either General Thomas or State Secretary Backe. 
Nonetheless, individual commanders did not let the matter rest and 
stressed the argument that the strain on labour resources made it 
imperative to feed the civilian population. Matters were so dire in 
Heeresgruppe Mitte that it was even suggested that necessity would 
compel the German army to re-employ skilled Jewish labour. 
With the onset of the autumnal rains and the increased manpower 
demands of the Wehrmacht, individual German rear area commanders 
again pressed for more positive measures towards the civilian 
population. This time they received support from elements of the army 
leadership as the Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres, Generalfeldmarschall 
v. Brauchitsch, demanded a new set of directives regarding the use of 
agricultural produce. (31) It was proposed that priority should be 
given to the troops, then the indigenous civilian population, and 
only then should any remaining surplus be despatched to the Reich. 
However, Backe once again rejected the idea, mainly because it marked 
so major a shift away from the original pre-war policy. Almost as a 
counter- response to the requests by certain Army officers for just 
such a change, the Nazi leadership reiterated its exploitation 
policy. The full acceptance of its likely consequences was clearly 
seen in G6ring's prediction that the untold suffering would be 
comparable to that during the Thirty Years' War. ('das gr6l3te Sterben 
seit dem dreif3igjAhrigen Kriege'). (32) 
The Army was certainly aware of the overall problem. The 
Generalquartiermeister at a chiefs of staff meeting in Orsa on the 
13th November 1941 insisted that the food question for the civilian 
population was 'catastrophic', and that it seemed unlikely that very 
much could be done by the army to improve matters. (33) By way of a 
9compromise, but still very much in keeping with National Socialist 
thinking, strict guidelines were laid down regarding the feeding of 
the urban population: absolute maxima were established that allocated 
around 1,200 calories per day to those who performed useful work 
('natzliche Arbeit'); no more than 850 calories for those whose work 
did not directly benefit the German occupying forces, and around 420 
calories for children under 14 years of age and Jews. (34) Cross 
reference to the data on the treatment of the Soviet POWs and 
comparisons with rations in wartime Germany itself, will confirm that 
these were starvation rations. (35) 
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Civilian Rations in Calories-per day 
Category Calories per day- 
'Useful Work'- 1,200 
No direct benefit to 
German occupiers- 850 
Children under 14 Years- 420 
Jews- 420 (35) 
Normal Consumers Rations in 
Germany 1941 19990 
1942 1,750 
1943 10980 (36) 
Civ. ilian Rations expressed in Grammes per Weýk. 
('Erndhrung der Bev6lkerung') 
Categories: 
A: Population, not working (keine nennenwerte Arbeit) 
B: Population, performing useful work (nUtzliche Arbeit) 
C: Population, performing heavy work (dauernde schwere 
k6rperliche Arbeit) 
D: Children under 14 years and Jews. 
ABCD 
Meat and Meat Products kein 100 200 kein 
Fats 70 100 150" 35 
Bread 1 500 2,000 2,500 750 
Potatoes 2: 000 2,500 3,500 1,000 
S6urce: Befehlshaber SUd, Abteilung VIIt 
Anordnung Nr. 26 (100/41 geh. ) dated 15.11.1941 
BA/MA: RH22/9 (37) 
I. 
-' 
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The response of the military authorities to these guidelines varied 
considerably from attempted implementation of official policy, 
through resignation to desperate attempts to check the apparently 
inevitable mass starvation. Local Army commanders and individual 
German units and troops thus found themselves at the sharp-end of the 
problem. While some senior officers stressed to their troops the need 
to regard the war as a racial and ideological war of destruction, the 
very need for such 'reminders' indicated that ordinary German 
soldiers in the field were often pursuing very different policies 
from those officially sanctioned by the Nazi regime. 
The concern felt by the highest echelons of the Wehrmacht that 
'official policy' was not always being adhered to can be seen from 
Generalfeldmarschal von Reichenau's ideological 'injection' issued in 
November of 1941. Taking up the tone of similar remarks he had been 
making since the start of the campaign, he stated that measures were 
necessary in the East which would not be appropriate in the West: 
'Daß auch der letzte Mann weiß, worum es geht und weshalb im Ostraum 
Maßnahmen getroffen werden, die in kultivierten Ländern nicht zur 
Anwendung kommen'. (39) 
The attempts by Wehrmacht-Propaganda to influence the behaviour and 
attitudes of the occupying forces seem only to reinforce the 
suggestion that a strictly ideological line was not universally 
pursued. German troops were urged to remain resolute when faced with 
starving women and children ('angesichts hungernder Frauen und Kinder 
hart blieb(en)'. (40) While it was natural for them to feel 
compassion, they were cautioned as individual soldiers to remind 
themselves that 'for every gramme of bread or other foodstuffs that I 
give to the population in the occupied territories out of good 
nature, I deprive the German people and thus my own family'. ('Jedes 
Gramm Brot oder andere Lebensmittel, das ich aus Gutmütigkeit der 
Bevölkerung in den besetzten Gebieten gebe, entziehe ich dem 
deutschen Volk und damit meiner Familie). (41) 
The Army Quartermaster General reported to Halder that German 
troops were often 'very considerate' (sehr schonend) to the locals, 
and that in certain Panzer Army rear areas the civilian population 
was being fed directly by the Wehrmacht, despite orders to the 
contrary. (42) Evidence from the field reports themselves underlines 
this point. Rear area units under the command of AOK 9 (Kortick 582), 
while not directly using Wehrmacht supplies, were nonetheless 
utilizing captured materials to feed the urban Soviet population, 
rather than requisitioning the foodstuffs for either consumption by 
the Army itself or shipment to the Reich. Ortskommandantur reports 
from Witebsk for August 1941 outlined the action that was being taken 
to feed the town's inhabitants. OK had set up two communal kitchens 
to provide hot meals for the homeless and seven bread distribution 
centres. German troops were also issuing milk to infants and small 
children. (43) 
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Spontaneous compassion of this sort was not, however, officially 
permissible and the only real hope for the civilian population lay 
with the resurgence of pragmatic arguments. A number of military 
commanders did indeed justify a less harsh line on practical grounds. 
In the case of the OK in Witebsk, Korack was urged to point out to 
AOK9 that the decision to feed the urban population had been taken in 
order to avoid 'hunger-riots' ('Hungerrevolten') and prevent the 
town's citizens from moving towards the partisans. (44) There was 
certainly a noticeable tension evident between town and country and 
although the Army may not have been concerned with the moral 
implications, it did appreciate that this might lead to forms of 
passive resistance. These arguments became even more convincing by 
the following spring, when the German Army, already faced by 
guerrilla activity, emphasised the threat posed if bands of 
'Hungerpartisanen' were formed. (45) 
A growing demand for indigenous labour to repair roads and railway 
lines in the rear areas necessitated further consideration of the 
urban population's food requirements. Military government officials 
faced the additional problem when it came to the recruitment of 
labour that the towns were becoming increasingly depopulated. As 
reports from Heeresgebiet Mitte for June of 1942 indicate, Smolensk 
was a fairly typical case: 'Ausgesprochene Hungererscheinungen sind 
bisher nur deshalb vermieden worden, weil die städtische Bevölkerung 
im großen Maße zu Verwandten und Bekannten auf das Land abgewandert 
ist. Die Zahl der Abgewanderten kann z. B. in Smolensk auf etwa 12,000 
Einwohner geschätzt worden. Diese Menschen, die für die 
umfangreichen Arbeitsvorhaben der Wehrmacht dringend benötigt werden, 
müssen nun mit vieler Mühe wieder aus dem Lande herbeigeschafft 
werden'. (46) 
Higher echelons had been stressing the exploitative logic of such 
arguments for some time. This is clearly seen as early as December 
1941 in the views expressed by the ROstungsinspekteur for the 
Ukraine. In a correspondence with General Thomas he noted the 
draconian measures that had been proposed to increase the amount of 
materials available for extraction; essential the implementation of 
the starvation policy, with the Jews and the urban population as the 
primary victims. However, he added a telling caveat which indicated 
the development of a pragmatic shift in thinking: 'If we shoot dead 
all the Jews, allow the POWs to die, deliver up the large part of the 
population of the major towns to death by starvation, and also loose 
part of the rural population through hunger during the coming year; 
the question still remains: "Who shall be left to produce anything of 
economic value? "'. (47) 
Army rear area commanders had also been formulating opinions on the 
subject, and Dallin cites a, fairly representative comment on the 
overall situation which came from AOK9 (the Army responsible for 
Korfick 582) as early as December of 1941: 'If the Russian campaign 
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had turned out to be a simple Blitzkrieg, then we [the German armed 
forces] would not have needed to take any account of the civilian 
population. But an end [to the war] is not in sight... in these 
circumstances it is foolish to follow a course of action that will 
only result in making the civilian population 100% our enemies'. (48) 
The humanitarian dimension evident in the statements of many Rear 
Area commanders can, of course, be overstressed, and it is probably 
more accurate to interpret the comments on food policy as a response 
to the fact that the German army found itself unwillingly drawn into 
tasks which it regarded as outside its functional province. 
Nonetheless, the army of occupation not only indicated that it 
recognised an acute problem existed, but accordingly proposed 
solutions. (49) 
In the countryside, as the guerrilla campaign increased, army 
authorities placed increasing emphasis on guaranteeing agricultural 
supplies. The files of both KorOck 532 and 582 repeat this theme for 
the duration of the occupation, and Army commanders regularly 
described the problem of winning over the civilian population as a 
9stomach problem' ('Magenfrage'). (50) It was even suggested that the 
failure to alleviate hunger in the towns encouraged the urban 
population seriously to doubt the German claims for an eventual 
military victory: 'Die Bevblkerung leidet Hunger und hat daher den 
Drang, aufs Land zu wandern, um Lebensmittel einzutauschen. Die 
Tatsache, daß die deutsche Wehrmacht nicht für die Sicherstellung der 
Ernährung der Zivilbevölkerung sorgt, bedrückt die Stimmung und macht 
die Bevölkerung gegenüber der deutschen Siegeskraft miss- 
trauisch'. (51) 
Any such ameliorations of policy, were, however, limited by the 
military situation. That is not to say that the occupying forces were 
not compelled by these very same strategic considerations to modify 
their policies towards the civilian population in order to cope with 
problems of rear area security and labour supply. All the same, in 
the countryside, the rural population got by very much as a result of 
its own endeavours, while in the towns a number of strategies, 
including the 'Hamstern' already noted in Smolensk and the increased 
growing of food in gardens, provided some form of remedy. In fact, 
rear area reports from urban centres such as Rshew in Korfick 582 
suggested that those who still remained by the late summer of 1942 
were essentially living on potatoes - and vegetables grown in the 
town's numerous gardens. (52) This is not even to suggest that 
conditions were in any way favourable. As most of the reports cited 
prove, hardship and suffering were considerable and often extreme. 
Urban centres under German military rule fared little better than 
those under German civilian administration, as a large-scale 
comparison between Kiev and Charkov seems to indicate. (53) This does 
not, however, necessarily point to a political uniformity between the 
conduct of the German army and that of the Nazi economic agencies. 
The persistence of ideologically determined thinking on the part of 
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the Nazi civilian hierarchy (which discouraged requests to increase 
supplies from the Reich), made it extremely difficult for any Army 
commanders who felt so inclined to intervene directly by supplying 
the urban centres with foodstuffs. 
The inevitable lack of a coherent overall supply policy for the 
entire occupied territories condemned most local attempts to 
alleviate hardship to failure, whatever the underlying motives of 
such actions. Even where military commanders attemped to create 
conditions under which the population might be encouraged to fend for 
itself, all manner of secondary difficulties arose. In the towns the 
failure to involve the surrounding rural population, who had 
traditionally met urban requirements, often proved disastrous. When 
it became apparent to the farming community that the German occupiers 
had nothing in the way of incentives to offer, either material or 
political, the Kolchoses made no attempt to produce more than for 
their own needs. Themselves victims of the Army's requisitioning 
policy, they saw little point in schemes which rewarded productivity 
not with a greater share of produce, but rather with (worthless) cash 
payments. There is also a clear indication in army reports that the 
farming community preferred instead to barter with the urban 
population. Or, in some instances, to arrange with the Russian town 
authorities for the large-scale exchange of manufactured goods in 
return for supplying foodstuffs. (54) 
Rear area officers also faced conflicts of interest when some of 
the strategies devised by town dwellers to alleviate hunger 
threatened military security. 'Hamsterfahren' was a case in point, as 
the Ortskommandantur reports from Rshew (Korfick 582) for June 1942 
indicate. While the garrison commander expressed alarm at the state 
of affairs in Rshew, the threat to rail and road security posed by 
illegal expeditions into the countryside was of greater concern: 'Die 
Ernährungslage wird immer bedrohlicher; fast täglich werden auf der 
Eisenbahn und auf den Landstrassen Zivilisten ohne Ausweis 
festgenommen, die trotz scharfer Verwarnungen immer wieder versuchen, 
auf dem, Lande Lebensmittel einzutauschen". (55) 
Even where the army proposed schemes to feed the civilian 
population, as in the garden growing project in Smolensk, the clear 
onus was on the inhabitants to take on the task themselves, rather 
than rely on the military for supplies. The expertise of economic 
agencies may have been enlisted, but the army, despite its expressed 
needs to create a town-based work-force, was unwilling to do much 
more. 
The evidence regarding the official role of the army is difficult to 
weigh in such a manner as to reach firm conclusions. As with so much 
official policy in the East confusion and conflicts of interest had a 
marked impact. The differing and often contradictory decisions taken 
within the army itself provide a testamony to this. When due regard 
is given to the episodic nature of attempts to modify original 
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strategy, it might be more accurate to argue that a mass hunger of 
the civilian population did not develop to the extent originally 
planned, despite, rather than because of, any positive policies on 
the part of the German army. 
With respect to the role of the ordinary soldier in all this, an 
overall quantitative study would no doubt show that the eventual fate 
of the majority of Russian civilians lay outside the province of 
piecemeal acts of humanity by the lower ranks. To demonstrate that 
individual soldiers or even entire units went against ideologically 
determined policy is not to question the macro-view of the war in the 
East as one of brutality and extermination. But, it does raise 
questions as to the extent to which the entire German Army can be 
seen as an undifferentiated instrument of the National Socialist 
state and the degree to which ordinary soldiers were ideologically 
motivated. On the basis of much of the available evidence, including 
both high-level situation reports and those from units in the field, 
Mfiller's assertion that the individual soldier often demonstrated 
more humanity than his superiors (der einfache Soldat vielerorts 
mehr Menschlichkeit zeigte als seine Vorgesetzten') is 
convincing. (56) However, this is only one half of the story. It must 
be set against the participation of the very same troops in ruthless 
official requisitioning actions - albeit under orders- as well as the 
the more indiscriminate unofficial activities of individual soldiers. 
This is therefore a very complex issue, particularly since it is 
difficult to isolate any such behaviour from wider issues relating to 
the general and specific circumstances in which the army of 
occupation found itself. 
As for the German Army's ability to feed itself, the most recent 
studies have argued that, all-in-all, the troops were relatively well 
supplied over the first winter of the war. But this is very much a 
generalized statement. As individual field reports show, conditions 
varied from area to - area. 
Even within regions such as KorOck 582, 
which was generally regarded as favourably placed with 'plentiful 
supplies of livestock and cereals', local commanders reported dire 
shortages. (57) In this context, the removal by individual German 
soldiers of foodstuffs, heating materials and clothing might at least 
be explained, though not justified, on the grounds that the general 
resource situation was often a severe problem for the Wehrmacht. 
Official reports described such activity in a variety of ways, be it 
as pilfering, plundering, looting, illegal requisitioning, or simply 
as theft. Terminology apart, it is clear from the records of Korilcks 
and Army Group Rear Areas that all across the Eastern theatre German 
troops were to be found engaged in such activities. 
It would be naive to suppose that every recorded case of 'theft' by 
individual German soldiers was a 'strategy for survival'; simple base 
motives of greed and avarice tended to determine many instances. 
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However, many individual troops and even some entire units regarded 
such activities as permissible given the general food and fuel 
situation in the Soviet Union. This was, however, a 'grey area. 
Theft of army property was regarded as a much more serious breach of 
discipline than the illegal removal of goods from the inhabitants of 
the occupied areas. Yet, de facto, as the discussions on food policy 
have shown, the possessions of the local population had become a 
commodity under the control of the German military. The 
Oberbefehlshaber of the 4th Army, Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, 
stated that the entire occupied territories were to be regarded as a 
'deutsches Wirtschaftsland', and were to be treated accordingly. On 
the basis of this definition, acts of plunder would be punished by 
the death sentence, and military commanders who failed to restrain 
their troops from irresponsible behaviour faced court-martial 
themselves. (58) 
Such directives reflected the fact that German soldiers in the 
Eastern theatre were often far from thrifty in their use of the 
available resources. Despite appeals for moderation on the part of 
the occupying army, the troops often caused havoc and immeasurable 
damage by ruthless plunder. Less dramatic in its immediate effect 
than the KollektivmaBnahmen directed against the civilian population 
under the guise of anti-partisan warfare, it nonetheless made a 
disastrous impression on the local inhabitants. 
Frequent references to looting in the files of both KorOck 582 and 
532 indicate that this was a recurrent problem from the very 
commencement of the campaign in Russia. Indeed, the problem was not a 
new one to Army commanders, as field reports compiled in October 1939 
during the Polish campaign indicate. KorOck 582's Feldkommandantur in 
Kalisch (FK 531), for example, made reference to the shortages in 
both Poland and the Reich itself. Yet, while the German army 
protested that the 'acute shortage of foodstuffs' ('Knappheit an 
Nahrungsmitteln') reported throughout the region around Kalisch was 
not of its making, its main concern was that food shortages only 
served to increase the unpopularity of the occupation. 
The ruthless security measures adopted in Poland in order to ensure 
food-supplies (particularly the taking of hostages), tends to call 
further into question any distancing from official policy. Although 
senior officers claimed that domestic pressure inside Germany made it 
impossible to do anything else. ('Mit Rücksicht auf die gespannte 
Ernährungslage im Reich muß die Truppe noch mehr als bisher aus dem 
besetzten Gebiet leben'). (59) The situation at home caused added 
difficulties in that the available manpower was reduced as troops who 
were farmers in civilian life (and whose wives were trying to manage 
on their own) were given special leave. (60) 
If the Polish campaign already stretched resources, then one must 
call into question accounts which argue that German army supplies in 
the first few months of the war in the Soviet Union were 
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satisfactory. Were this the case, then there would have been little 
apparent justification for many of the early incidents of plunder and 
looting. However, the very scale of the problem suggests that acute 
food and resource problems did exist. Although, whether or not the 
response of individual soldiers and units was in the German Army's 
long-term interests is another matter. 
The amount of attention that senior officers in the Rear Area Units 
devoted to these episodes indicates that these were deemed to be 
serious breaches of discipline. No less interestingly, the tone of 
many reports also demonstrates that to many military commanders the 
supposed, subject status of the civilian population in no way 
detracted from the improper and dishonourable character of such 
behaviour. Heeresgruppe Mitte's correspondence with AOK9 relating to 
a particular episode which occurred in late August 1941 is fairly 
representative. Considerable concern was expressed as to the conduct 
of a number of German soldiers who had stolen the few possessions 
which belonged to some of the local population in the town of Orscha, 
including much that was clearly of no immediate value to the troops. 
The forced removal of a coat from a three-year-old child who was in 
its mother's arms was regarded as especially reprehensible, as was 
the subsequent action of the German unit which had gone on to burn 
down the woman's house: 'Die Bevölkerung sowohl in Orscha (als auch 
in Mogilew und anderen Orten) hat sich wiederholt darüber beklagt, 
daß vereinzelte deutsche Soldaten ihr Sachen abnehmen, die sie selber 
gar nicht gebrauchen können. So sagte mir u. a. eine Frau in Orscha, 
die verzweifelt weinte, es hätte ihr oben ein deutscher Soldat den 
Mantel ihres dreijährigen Kindes, das sie auf dem Arme trug, 
weggenommen. Ihr sei die ganze Wohnung verbrannt und sie hätte nie 
gedacht, daß deutsche Soldaten so unbarmherzig sein könnten, kleinen 
Kindern Sachen wegzunehmen'. (61) , 
The reporting officer regarded this as a far from isolated episode, 
and cited similar complaints to the effect that some German soldiers 
had even taken the locals' 'last cushion-cover' and 'last pair of 
shoes' ('letzten Kissen und letzten Paar Schuhe'. )(62) Other 
documents from Korfick reiterated the essential point that such 
behaviour seriously alienated the civilian population. Moreover, 
given that many of these early cases seemed little more than wanton 
destruction, or at best were difficult to comprehend, commanders were 
concerned that they markedly undermined discipline and the image of 
the German forces. The detailed reports which were filed on many 
relatively small-scale incidents clearly demonstrate the Army's 
anxiety as to the impression created and the wider significance for 
military control. 
Ortskommandantur Demidow reported an occurrence in late August 1941 
in some detail in order to make just this point: 'Am 30.08.41, kurz 
nach 11 Uhr, erschienen in der Wohnung (Strasse nach Welish) des 
stellvertr. Bürgermeisters der Stadt Demidow 2 deutsche Soldaten, 
durchwühlten in Gegenwart seiner Frau Schränke und Schubladen, 
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öffneten eine Kommode, stahlen 4m dunklen Hosenstoff und 
verschwanden. An anderen Stellen wurden Damenkleider, Mäntel, Schuhe, 
Pelze, Damenhandtaschen, Leinen, Handtücher usw. unter Waffengewalt 
in Gegenwart der Wohnungsinhaber entwendet und die Täter überführt. 
Solche Plünderungen schädigen das Ansehens der deutschen 
Wehrmacht'. (63) 
AOK invoked its full military authority when it stressed that 
'plunder and marauding' ('PlOnderer und Marodeure') of this sort 
would be most severely dealt with. (64) In some instances, however, 
activities were on a much larger scale, and consequently more 
difficult to deal with. Korack 582 received situation reports from 
its Ortskommanandantur in Witebsk for mid-August 1941 which suggested 
that the town had become something of an open city. German troops had 
been removing considerable quantities of foodstuffs either by 
presenting bogus requisition forms or, in numerous instances, by the 
threat of armed force. The scale of what the army deemed to be 
'willkilrliche Eingriffe der Truppen' can be gauged by citing the 
removal of livestock. Of the 200 cows in the town collective, only 8 
remained, all but twelve having been taken without valid receipts or 
payment. Soldiers were also raiding local factories and stores to 
remove vast quantities of materials which they then bartered with the 
local farming population for eggs and flour. Attempts by the town 
Ordnungsdienst to prevent this had been met with violence, as was the 
case in a raid on a timber yard where one million sheets of 
plyboard, with a value of over 3 million Rubles, had been taken. 
Similar events had taken place at a another storehouse, where German 
troops had forcibly removed 15 tonnes of salt, again for use in 
barter. (65) 
Much of the damage, particularly that directed against agricultural 
property, seriously handicapped early attempts to ensure food 
supplies. Ortskommandantur reports from Toropjez (KortIck 582) noted 
the unwillingness of farmers to continue to supply foodstuffs after 
local army headquarters had refused to make payments against faulty 
requisition receipts issued by German troops in order to obtain goods 
illegally. (66) Soldiers were even interfering with the two communal 
kitchens set up in Witebsk, and on a number of occasions had taken 
the cauldrons containing all the food prepared for the day. Other 
reports also noted seizures from the bread- and milk-distribution 
stations. (67) Files from local commands mentioned episodes when 
German troops had waylayed peasants on their way to markets in the 
towns. In some cases, entire wagons and horses had been stolen. (68) 
The motives behind these occurrences apart, the theft of livestock 
was of particular concern, primarily because of the subsequent health 
problems associated with the illegal slaughter of animals, including 
horses. Rear Area officers were also damning in respect of incidents 
which combined misuse of military material with the wasteful and 
illegal use of local resources; fishing with hand grenades was a good 
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case in point. (69) The overall scale of the problem throughout the 
army rear areas can be gauged from the number of situation reports 
which were filed on this topic. One Korfick, as early as the first 
week in August, referred to the 'wholesale looting of the countryside 
by troops searching for food'. (70) 
As the military campaign dragged on, the failure of the occupying 
forces to implement a coherent economic policy meant that plunder by 
certain Army units was likely to increase. By the autumn of 1941, 
fuel had become as much a target for such activities as food and 
troops began to direct their attention to military property as well 
as that of the civilian population. Ortskommandantur 1/593 at Wjasma 
noted in its October 1941 files that troops had taken to burning 
furniture, and had removed fuel that was allocated to the railway or 
carried as cargo. (71) Korfick was particularly concerned that as 
troops were redeployed to other areas they were removing all that was 
of use to them and burning valuable material: 'In unkamerad- 
schaftlichster Weise nehmen abrückende Truppenteile hauseigene Ein- 
richtungsgegenstände mit, soweit sie dieselben kurz vor dem Abrücken 
nicht als Heizmaterial benutzt und auch Nachbarhäuser abgerissen 
haben'. (72) 
Armeeoberkommando recognised that with the onset of winter the 
situation was becoming chronic, and that this had serious 
implications for both military discipline and the attitude of the 
local civilian population. In Rshew (Kor0ck 582) in November of 1941, 
German soldiers were going from house to house, and stealing food and 
all manner of clothing. Military personnel had even waylaid Russian 
farmers taking supplies to the local POW camps. There was also some 
suggestion that army NCOs had done little to control the men under 
their command: 'Die schlechte Versorgung der Truppe mit Verpflegung 
und Winterkleidung führte zu häufigen Plünderungen. Gruppen von 
Soldaten zogen von Haus zu Haus und durchwühlten die Wohnungen und 
nahmen neben Lebensmitteln und Wäsche auch alle möglichen, für 
Soldaten nutzlose Gegenstände mit. Es wurden gestohlen zum Beispiel: 
Kopftücher, Kissenbezüge, Tischtücher, Handtücher, Herrenhosen, 
Gardinenstoffe, Männerröcke, Stoffe aller Art, Männermäntel, 
Bettdecken, Samoware, Armbanduhren, Kinderwäsche und Kinderkleider, 
Trauerkleidung, Damen- und Kinderschuhe, Frauenkleider, Damen- 
unterwdsche usw'. (73) 
Korlick summed up the overall situation and emphasised its response 
in a terse report which advocated harsh punishments for both the 
officers and men who violated disciplinary codes: 'Plfinderungen und 
unbefugte Requisitionen werden nur nachlassen, wenn sie nicht als 
Schädigung der russichen Bevölkerung, sondern als Vergehen gegen die 
Disziplin aufgefaßt und dementsprechend streng bestraft, auch die 
Einheitsführer zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden'. (74) 
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Yet, despite the emphasis that KorOck commanders placed on 
punishing looting - which they now regularly described under the 
catch-all term of 'Plünderungen und wilde verbotene Beitreibungen'- 
the incidents increased. The contingent circumstances of the troops 
and the progressive deterioration in the food-supply situation seemed 
to influence behaviour more than military discipline. By the Spring 
of 1942, directives from Armeeoberkommando 9 indicated both the 
gravity of the problem and its likely repercussions. They also 
bemoaned the fact that regular admonitions had done little to curb 
such behaviour and, accordingly, ordered increasingly severe 
measures: 'Trotz wiederholter Befehle kommt es immer noch vor, daß 
Angehörige der Wehrmacht ohne Überlegung und entgegen den bestehenden 
Bestimmungen Vieh, Saatgut usw. beitreiben. Dadurch wird die 
Ernährung aus dem Lande für das laufende und nächste Jahr aufs 
schwerste gefährdet. Erfolgt die Beitreibung auch noch ohne jede 
Bezahlung oder unter Hinterlassung anonymer, sogar mit falscher 
Feldpostnummer ausgestellter Scheine, so wird das Vertrauen der zum 
großen Teil willigen Landbevölkerung untergraben. Da die Tat stärker 
wirkt als das Wort, wird dadurch die deutsche Propaganda Lügen 
gestraft und in ihrer Wirkung aufgehoben. Vor allem aber lassen diese 
Beutezüge auf eine bedenkliche Lockerung der Disziplin schliessen, 
der mit aller Entschiedenheit entgegengetreten werden muß. (75) 
By the autumn of 1942, similar threats of the most draconian 
punishments were issued against German troops who had taken to 
stealing vegetables and potatoes from gardens and allottments in the 
towns. Korfick headquarters considered the matter serious enough to 
issue a 'Sonderbefehl' which stated that each and every case be 
reported and stressed that the death sentence would be used for 
serious offences. (76) Despite such high level concern, reports which 
cover the entire period from the early summer of 1942 to the late 
Spring of 1943 have a recurrent tone of exasperation which clearly 
indicates that orders had little effect. (77) 
The degree to which this form of behaviour had become 
'institutionalised' is evident from inspection reports compiled by 
Heeresgruppe Mitte during late Autumn 1942. The investigating officer 
noted the widespread character of such practices, and stressed that 
by this stage in the war, such actions risked the complete alienation 
of the civilian population: 'Wenn nach Abzug einer Einheit z. B. noch 
sämtliche Hühner in einer Ortschaft am Leben sind, hat die Truppe für 
unsere Sache mehr getan als vielleicht eine Propaganda Kompanie, die 
stundenlang Vorträge hält'. (78) 
The problem of looting and illegal requisitioning was not peculiar 
to the forces occupying Army Group Centre, neither was it confined 
simply to German troops. Abteilung VII reports from the south of the 
Soviet Union recorded similar occurrences and also stressed the 
extreme behaviour of some elements of the Hungarian Army. 
Feldkommandantur 197 (Heeresgebiet Sfid) commented that the Hungarians 
were given to 'taking everything that was not nailed down', so much 
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so that the local civilian population referred to them as the 
'6sterreichischen Hunnen'. Along with Rumanian forces, they had even 
raided and plundered Volksdeutsch settlements, thus compelling the 
German Army to signpost these communities with warnings more usually 
thought appropriate against partisans: 'Die Volksdeutschen der 
besetzten Gebiete stehen unter dem Schutz der deutschen Wehrmacht. 
Wer sich an ihrem Leben oder Eigentum vergreift, wird 
erschossen'. (79) 
In Korfick 553, some German officers took such exception to the 
behaviour of certain Rumanian soldiers that they had taken the 
unauthorised decision to turn over the entire livestock depot of the 
battalion concerned to the local civilian population. (80) 
If both KorOck and Armeeoberkommando regarded such activities as 
highly detrimental to military discipline and damaging to the 
pacification of the occupied territories, the question must be put as 
to why such practices were allowed to continue. A detailed appraisal 
of the files of the military courts for both Kodick and Army Group 
Rear Areas produces little evidence that such offences were 
systematically punished. A number of explanations may be offered. 
Military government undoubtedly recognised that many troop units 
faced serious difficulties as far as supplies of food and fuelstuffs 
were concerned. The rear area forces themselves may have been small, 
but such manpower weakness actually worked to a disadvantage. Korock 
commanders were often simply overwhelmed by the task of barracking 
and feeding vast numbers of troops in transit to the front. 
Ortskommadantur 1/593 in Wjasma (Korack 582), for instance, 
complained to AOK that some 30,000 German troops had unexpectedly 
been quartered in the town, and the daily movement of an additional 
3-4,000 soldiers was adding to the problem. In the ten-day period 
ending 2 November 1941 over 43,500 men had been forced to billet in 
the town because only limited numbers could use the roads at any one 
time. Food was in very short supply and although the position with 
regard to supplies of bread had improved, there was virtually no 
meat. The scorched earth policy of the retreating Red Army had 
destroyed supplies, and KorOck was being forced to adopt emergency 
measures and set up special units to harvest potatoes in the 
surrounding countryside: 'Eine Ernährung aus dem Lande ist unmöglich, 
weil der Feind beim Rückzug die Lebensmittel mitgenommen oder 
vernichtet hat, soweit sie durch die starke Belegung nicht bereits 
vorher aufgebraucht waren. Sonderkommandos sind angewiesen, 
Kartoffeln in den umliegenden Feldern zu ernten. (81) 
It may have been easier to tolerate lapses of discipline which were 
really 'strategies for survival' when the German army had little to 
offer in the way of an alternative and effective resource policy. To 
have done otherwise would probably have created serious problems of 
morale. In any case, irrespective of the conduct of the troops, no 
senior officer would have put the needs of the civilian population 
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before those of his own troops. The very scale of the problem in 
itself presented army authorities with a dilemma, the more so since 
large numbers of officers, and not only junior officers and NCOs, 
seemed unwilling to condemn such practices. Many regarded illegal 
requisitioning and even looting as understandable in the 
circumstances, and such attitudes were reinforced later in the war 
when supplies to rear area forces were reduced in order to increase 
rations for front-line combat units. (82) That this did not just apply 
to foodstuffs is made clear by reports such as those from the 
Ortskommandantur at Wjasma, which noted that company leaders had 
allowed troops to use wooden snowbreaks for firewood. (83) 
When behaviour of this sort was manifested so widely amongst the 
soldiery of an army that was otherwise rigorously disciplined, it 
suggests that such offences had lost something of their initial 
criminal connotations, as far as the ordinary troops in the field 
were concerned. AOK and KorOck certainly recognised this fact when 
they cited the responsibility of unit commanders and placed the onus 
on them to curb such activities: 'Mangelnde Dienstaufsicht oder gar 
stille Duldung machen den Einheitsführer mitschuldig. Es wurde daher 
erneut allen Kommandeuren und Einheitsführern zur Pflicht gemacht, 
Verstöße dieser Art mit schärfsten Mitteln zu ahnden. (84) 
Army references to illegal requisitioning and looting made it clear 
that any attempts to combat so widespread a problem only added to the 
manpower difficulties faced by KorOck commanders. The following 
comment from Rshew was typical: 'Bei der Bekampfung dieser Misstande 
macht sich der Mangel an Wachmannschaften immer wieder 
ausserordentlich hemmend geltend'. (85) 
It might be concluded that while de jure the Army's line on illegal 
requisitioning and even plunder was apparently well defined, de facto 
its attitude was much more ambiguous. In reality such behaviour did 
not seem to have the dire consequences for overall discipline that 
some army officials feared. Nonetheless, it did seriously undermine 
relations between the German army and the civilian population of the 
occupied territories. However, given that the local inhabitants were 
the victims of military policy in a large number of other ways, the 
German army seemed willing to live with the consequences, since many 
elements of the military hierarchy regarded the issue as 
fundamentally irresolvable. 
Matters were further complicated in that the end results often made 
it difficult to discern where official 'organised' exploitation of 
the occupied rear areas differed from unofficial requisitioning and 
plunder. As Alan Milward's remarks indicate, it is not only Eastern 
bloc historians who have described the entire economic treatment of 
the Soviet Union (official policy included) as little more than a 
giant looting operation. (86) Overall, while there is some evidence to 
indicate that the actions of German troops were often determined by 
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immediate needs rather than ideological pressures, the distinction 
made by Western historians, while of considerable historical 
significance, was indeed rather irrelevant to the Russian people who 
suffered as a result. 
in other operational matters where the immediate security interests 
of the German army were involved the interplay between ideology and 
practice was even more problematical; as the following discussion of 
anti-partisan warfare demonstrates. 
### 
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The War Against the Partisans in the Rear Areas. 
Preamble. 
It would be fair to argue, simply on the basis of the amount of 
literature produced on the subject, that a major aspect of the 
Russo-German conflict was the partisan war. The armed struggle which developed in the occupied rear areas came to assume increasing 
importance for the Wehrmacht, and the response of the German forces 
has become one of the most contentious issues of occupation policy. 
Some writers would even argue that the scale of human suffering that 
this produced in the rear areas is comparable with the brutalities of 
the anti-Semitic policies, from which it cannot fully be divorced. (I) 
The current 'state of the debate' as far as it affects our 
immediate enquiry into German Army rule in the Soviet Union does not 
offer an agreed line. Mainly narrative accounts, such as the work of 
Matthew Cooper, despite their descriptive value, can largely be 
disregarded. (2) The more analytical arguments are clearly polarised. 
On the one hand, authors such as Hirgen FOrster, Christian Streit, 
Timothy Mulligan and Omer Bartov have offered a highly critical view 
of the activities of the German Army. The most damning indictment is 
probably the brutal destruction of very large numbers of the 
indigenous population under the catch-all guise of 'necessary and 
justifiable anti-partisan activities'. Such behaviour is seen not as 
a response to contingent circumstances, but rather as ideologically 
determined and legitimised in the main by two particular components 
of the so-called 'criminal orders' (verbrecherischen Befehle). (3) 
The KriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlaB (a complex directive which denied 
the civilian population access to formal military justice) not only 
allowed the German army to execute in the field insurgents and those 
suspected of lending them assistance, but also legitimised 
$collective measures' (Kollektivmaf3nahmen) against all the local 
inhabitants. The actions of the German troops themselves were not 
subject to any codes of criminal punishment if it was demonstrated 
that they were acting against those with 'Political intent'. (4) 
Richtlinien für das Verhalten der Truppe in Rußland (orders which 
laid-down guidelines for the conduct of the German troops) permitted 
9ruthless measures- to be taken (rficksichtlose und energisches 
Durchgreifen) against various elements of the Soviet populace, 
including so called 'Bolshevik-agitators' and 'irregulars' (i. e. 
partisans, 'saboteurs' and Jews. )(5) 
Other historians, such as Eric Hesse and more recently Joachim 
Hoffmann (who do not deny the internecine character of the guerrilla 
war), have offered a number of rather different explanations for the 
behaviour of the German security forces in the occupied territories. 
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These encompass a variety of positions. (6) Apologist writings at the 
extreme, take issue with the actual numbers involved, in a fashion 
reminiscent of the debate on both the treatment of the Red Army POWs 
and the Final Solution. (7) More academically sound are the arguments 
which justify German army policy as an inevitable response to an 
enemy that had either 'failed, sought or agreed' to abandon the 
accepted rules governing the conduct of war. (8) 'Traditional' 
apologist thinking can be cited in support of this line, the 
contention being that limited military resources severely restricted 
the options available to the Wehrmacht. (9) Coupled with this position 
are explanations that seek to emphasise the peripheral role of the 
Army in brutal incidents. The focus of condemnation is thus shifted 
to the units which operated within the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), or the 
Geheime Feldpolizei (GFP), which had a more formal association with 
the SS. (10) 
Documentary reference to the particular German Army Rear Areas 
(Korilck 532 and Kortick 582) reinforces the 'discrepancy' arguments, 
in that 'partisan' casualty figures seem abnormally high when 
compared to German losses. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from 
this seems to be that large numbers of bystanders were included in 
the total figures as 'guerrillas'. (Il) However, pace F6rster and 
Bartov, the arguments regarding the determinants of such end results 
are, not always as self-evident as these authors would suggest. 
Detailed evidence which relates to the specific activities of 
particular German rear area security units also offers an 
extraordinary contrast to the 'accepted' demythologising view of 
unrestrained barbarity. (12) 
Before assessing these arguments, a few general observations seem in 
order. Specialist military writers have noted that the Soviet 
partisan movement did not develop uniformly and that distinct stages 
can be identified. (13) 
The first period, from June to December 1941, was one in which the 
guerrillas gained limited support from the local population. There 
are immediate long-term reasons for this. Irregular warfare was more 
than simply a traditionally accepted practice in Russia, with 
examples to be drawn not only from the Napoleonic Wars, but also in 
campaigns against the Swedes, Poles, Tartars and even Steppes' 
peoples. Marxist-Leninist military theory held it to be axiomatic 
that national independence and wars of liberation were not the sole 
preserve of the established army, but rather a task of the entire 
people. Engels, in his writings on total war, recognised no 
distinction between front and rear areas for military operations or 
combatants and non-combatants. (14) However, the interwar years in 
the Soviet Union had seen a decline in the importance attached 
to partisan warfare and little attention was paid to it in 
theoretical writings. When the attack on Russia came it was 
difficult, in view of the rapid German advances, to develop a 
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coherent, effective and well-organised partisan movement. 
Shortages of material (particularly explosives and mines) the lack 
of trained personnel (or manpower in general for that matter) and, 
perhaps most importantly, the absence of a command structure 
handicapped concerted operations. Moreover, the Soviet Union was not 
'monolithically united' and the problems had been heightened by the 
high degree of enforced social mobility, such as had occurred with 
migration during the Five-Year Plans. (15) 
Official Soviet military histories acknowledge that the partisan 
movement made little progress in the early months of the war in the 
East, and even at the time the Red Army High Command was undoubtedly 
aware of this deficiency. Information was obtained from a range of 
sources, often first-hand. For example, the Head of the Operations 
Section of the Soviet 20th Army, Colonel Nerjanin (who later became 
Chef der Operationsabteilung im Oberkommando der Russischen 
Befreiungsarmee) spent three weeks behind the German lines without 
detecting any sign of partisan activity. (16) Soviet historians tend, 
however, to interpret such evidence by arguing that while all 
sections of Russian society, apart from a small handful of 
'renegades' opposed the German occupiers from the very beginning, 
there were deficiencies in leadership and organisation. (17) It would 
probably be more accurate to argue instead that the fundamental 
reason lay in the initial failure of the Soviet regime to obtain the 
basic prerequisite of a successful guerrilla campaign: reliable 
support from the local population of the occupied territory. This 
shortcoming was certainly explicable given the discontent expressed 
by wide sections of the population with the Soviet system and the 
undisclosed realities of the apparently unstoppable German 
'liberation'. Even if the German troops were not always greeted as 
liberators by the local population (the 'bread and salt' imagery so 
beloved of many post-war German reminiscences), the prevailing 
tendency was one of curiosity and 'wait-and-see', rather than of 
overt hatred and animosity. (18) Both the German occupiers and the 
Russian partisan movement ran the same risk of alienating and setting 
on the defensive a civilian population that desired little more than 
a quiet life. 
Following on from the lack of preparedness, the Soviet regime 
initiated emergency measures. Not only was resistance urged in the 
territories already occupied by the German troops, but the 
infrastructure of a potential underground movement was begun in areas 
threatened by the German advance. Hence, the various directives 
(including Stalin's famous radio speech of the 3rd July 1941) which 
called the entire population to engage in a 'people's war' against 
the invaders. (19) In itself such a response was perfectly 
understandable given the correct assessment by the Soviet leadership 
of the threat the invasion posed to the very existence of the 
communist state. However, apologist writers have suggested that the 
internecine character of the conflict was determined from the very 
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start by such official Soviet policy, which stipulated that the 
civilian population should resist in a terroristic fashion. (20) 
Arguments in support of this assertion make much of both theory and 
practice, that is, the failure of the Soviet regime to ratify the 
rules of irregular warfare as laid down in the Hague Convention of 
1907, and the conduct of partisan units in their dealings with both 
the German occupiers and the civilian population. (21) 
The second phase of the partisan war (from December 1941 to the 
autumn of 1942) was determined by 'external and internal' factors. 
The overall military situation at the front changed, as did the 
civilian population's perceptions of the realities of German policy. 
The onset of spring brought greater mobility and few Russian 
communities in the rear areas continued to enjoy the freedom that had 
existed over the winter. During that short-lived period the place of 
officials of the Soviet regime had not been taken by the German army. 
Now villages that previously had been isolated were 'contacted', 
often for the first time, by representatives of the occupation 
forces. There was, however, something of an irony in this. Despite 
the immediate German presence, the failure of the Wehrmacht at the 
outskirts of Moscow encouraged some Russians to consider, even at 
this early juncture, the possible return of Soviet authority. (22) 
The attitude of the civilian population thus came to be determined 
by a range of factors: their disappointment at the absence of a 
constructive occupation policy by the Germans; the retention of the 
collective farm system, which was universally despised; the dire 
conditions under which the locals were forced to live, and the many 
discriminatory measures taken against them by the occupying forces. 
The appalling living conditions of the Soviet POWs, as well as the 
atrocities committed against the Jews, also made a deep and lasting 
impression, despite a large-measure of anti-Semitism on the part of 
the local inhabitants. (23) 
Military commanders were undoubtedly aware of the impact of 
indiscriminate acts of terror. Nonetheless, reprisal executions and 
the shooting of hostages continued, as did pillage and arson, often 
with little or no distinction being made between peaceful inhabitants 
and partisans. Meanwhile, the partisans saw it as one of their-main 
objectives to provoke the German security forces into reprisal 
actions against the civilian population, even when it was in no way 
involved in any form of resistance. Carefully thought-out agitation, 
combined with pitiless terror against the members of the German 
appointed administration (the Kommunalverwaltung and Ortspolizisten) 
would make the population aware of the continued presence of the 
Soviet regime and erode any tendency on the part of the local 
inhabitants to attempt a peaceful coexistence with the occupying 
forces. (24) The population found itself torn between the occupation 
forces, who were characterised as employing draconian measures 
against those who did not fully co-operate, and the partisans, who 
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were known to punish with death the slightest support for the 
Germans (including the forced surrender of agricultural produce). The 
inhabitants often had little other choice but to side with whoever 
was the strongest. In many remote and outlying districts of the rear 
areas this inevitably meant the partisans. There was, however, little 
guarantee that the German Army would totally 'neglect' any such 
outlandish parts. (25) 
The commencement of the third phase of guerrilla activity was evident 
from the autumn of 1942 when the partisans attempted to win support 
amongst the population by launching attacks against specific German 
military objectives. However, the level of direct armed combat 
remained limited in comparison to the very large numbers of men 
involved. This was hardly surprising, for the main objective of the 
partisans was to disrupt German communications with the front. 
Similarly, the German Army, provided it could contain the partisan 
threat, was loath to engage in permanent large scale anti-guerrilla 
operations, given the more immediate difficulties. (26) There is 
something of an irony in all of this. Specialist literature from 
diverse quarters tends to agree that despite the almost incalculable 
consequences of German counter- measures, the purely military 
activities of the partisans probably had little impact on the overall 
outcome of the war. 
In summary, certain provisional aspects can be emphasised. It remains 
a matter of debate whether the methods employed by both sides in the 
partisan war helped form the character of the conflict in the East, 
or whether they simply underlined its predetermined nature as an 
'ideological war of extermination'. (27) It remains an equally 
controversial assertion that the Soviet leadership 'precipitated 
events' by unleashing a partisan war undefined by international law, 
and that the German forces were accordingly entitled to treat the 
partisans and their supporters as 'irregulars' or even 'bandits' 
(Freischarler/Banditen). (28) What is certain, is that both the German 
occupying forces and the partisans employed every method at their 
disposal in pursuit of their respective goals. As most of the 
descriptive technical literature shows, it was the civilian 
population which bore the brunt of the barbaric methods that so came 
to typify the policies of the combatants. (29) However, and this is a 
major codicil, much contentious debate surrounds the suggestion that 
the German forces were markedly less discriminating and much more 
gratuitously ruthless in the occupied areas than the partisans. (30) 
How the individual German soldiers in the field contributed and 
responded to this barbarity is our main concern and will be analysed 
in the next section. 
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The Partisan War in KorOck 532 and Korfick 582. 
Kortick and Armeeoberkommando often found themselves at variance with 
regard to the methods adopted to combat the partisan threat. For the 
Army Corps Commanders (AOK) the situation at the front always had 
priority. Provided the main lines of communication remained open, the 
rest of the interior could be given a low priority. (I) However, the 
subordinate Rear Area Commanders (rilckwartiges Armeegebiet and 
rfickwdrtiges Heeresbebiet) tended to regard partisan warfare as 
integral to more wide-ranging tasks: the secure control of territory 
(not just the main supply routes); the allegiance of the civilian 
population, and the maintenance of institutional patterns and the 
traditional social system. 
KorJAck 532 and Korfack 582 thus found themselves faced with a 
demanding problem that related to many aspects of military 
government, and to which the options available were often limited. (2) 
Difficulties were compounded in the first instance by the strains 
which irregular warfare tends to impose on conventional armies. The 
most highly trained and well-equipped military forces experience 
considerable problems in dealing with guerrilla activity. And, as has 
been noted, many authorities have described the German Rear Area 
security forces as incredibly small and of poor quality. (3) 
General guidelines issued by OKH from the autumn of 1941 onwards 
prescribed a variety of techniques for dealing with guerrilla forces. 
Both Kodicks adopted these methods in an order of priority which 
reflected available resources rather than an ideal approach. Such a 
prioritization also describes not only the most common day-to-day 
anti-partisan activities of the two Army Rear Area units, but goes a 
considerable way towards an understanding of the conditions under 
which these KorOck operated and the response of all those 
involved. (4) 
Stutzpilnkte(5) A defensive concept employed to protect all the 
(Strongpoints) localities which contained German troops, 
headquarters or depots with equipment such as 
rolling stock; chiefly along main supply and 
communication routes. (But, it should be 
stressed, often with such small-size security 
units as to tender the term 'strongpoints' 
rather ironic. ) 
Kleinunternehmungen By forces up to company strength; usually only 
(Small-scale- effective if surprise could be achieved in 
operations) attacking a specific objective such as a 
partisan camp. A great deal of 'dynamic' 
counter-guerrilla warfare was of this type. It 
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remains a controversial issue as to whether or 
not some units, failing to achieve the element 
of surprise against legitimate targets, 
indiscriminately attacked any civilian 
settlements that had only the most tenuous links 
with the partisans. Certainly, it was during 
these small-scale operations that most of the 
destruction of both isolated houses and entire 
villages took place; often with the accompanied 
liquidation of the inhabitants, including women 
and children. (6) 
Grossunternehmungen By army special task forces, often up to 
(Large-scale- divisional strength and usually supplied by 
operations) front line forces. Operations Dreieck and 
Viereck in the Spring of 1942 were examples of 
such operations. (7) Once again, this was a 
highly controversial method because of its 
questionable effectiveness and the massive 
concentration of German military power; with 
apparently little precision or control. 
Pacification- Troop detachments would occupy all the 
Operations localities of specific areas. This was an 
effective, though time-consuming approach; 
usually beyond the capability of the German Army 
for anything but very short periods of time. (8) 
In response to the resource situation many of these approaches to rear 
area security forced the German Army to utilize local manpower drawn 
from the villages (or even the POW camps). However, the formation of 
indigenous units (Ordnungsdienst) often gave rise to unanticipated 
problems. The insecurity manifested by the members of the ODs and the 
Miliz often compelled the military government to create fortified 
villages (Wehrd6rfer) to protect their homes and families. (9) Such 
measures limited the opportunity to use auxiliary units in a dynamic 
role and also served to emphasise the inability of the German 
occupiers fully to control the hinterland. Accordingly, a coherent 
overall system of effective rear area rule was never achieved; instead 
resources were allocated to specific areas of immediate concern. 
Special measures were introduced to protect the main railway lines, 
which, in the absence of a reliable and uniform road system, were 
vital to all strategic and logisitical tasks undertaken by the German 
Army. On one level, the security of the railway was a development of 
the Statzpunkte method, with blockhouses at key intervals and armoured 
trains performing a 'fire-brigade' role in response to local 
incidents. Added to this, the Rear Area units cleared wide strips - up 
to 50 metres each side of the tracks - which were designated a 
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no-man's-land for unauthorised personnel. (10) However, so essential 
was it to safeguard the rail-links that the German Army operated on 
another more sinister level and adopted a policy of hostage-taking 
(usually from local villages). Lives were forfeit in the event of any 
attacks on particular sections of line. This tactic inevitably raises 
a number of fundamental issues for later discussion. (Il) 
Local Wehrmacht commanders were certainly aware of the practical 
difficulties in dealing with the partisans. KorOck 532 noted in 
conversations with a representative of the Reichsministerium ffir die 
besetzten Ostgebiet (RMfdbO) that a 9permanent garrison tactic9 was 
required if the military was to have any chance of success. As matters 
stood, German Army units in the Rear Areas could only operate 
effectively over distances around 10 kilometres and even then 
cooperation between individual groups (taktische Zusammenwirken) was 
not always possible. (12) Pz. AOK2 was inclined to take an even more 
pessimistic view, and argued that only the long-term occupation of the 
entire region would resolve matters. In the meantime, the destruction 
of isolated houses and the development of local defence units (ODs) 
was no more than a short-term expedient. (13) A perverse logic was 
adopted by which all villages left deserted in response to German Army 
visits were to be considered pro-partisan and destroyed. (14) 
As typical period reports from KortIck 532 indicate, the principle 
anti-partisan tactics employed by the Rear Area units consisted of 
the maintenance of strongpoints to guard vital roads and railways, 
combined with regular small-scale efforts to reduce the partisan 
forces by combing the forests and selecting villages for 'special 
treatment' (SondermaDnahmen). Both Korfick 532 and 582 had a number of 
Jagdkommandos - anti-partisan commando units - the activities of which 
were complemented by attempts to establish an effective intelligence 
network. (15) However, even in other 'hinterland' wars where the 
favoured method of combatting insurgents by the use of special units 
has, unlike the German experience, been a success, victory has proved 
to be a slow and often costly process. German military appraisal 
reports certainly stressed the harsh conditions under which the squads 
operated as well as their high loss rates. (16) Given that the war in 
the Soviet Union was influenced by the precarious situation at the 
front (and taking into account arguments as to ideological pressures), 
these factors, coupled with constraints of both available time and 
insufficient manpower and expertise, gave the German Army little 
opportunity to engage in a concerted policy of special-unit warfare. 
Too often 'the ways of the tiger gave way to those of the elephant' 
with large scale, clumsy and often counter- productive approaches 
substituting for small, rapid and selective methods. (17) 
Leaving aside for a moment the problematical issue of ideological 
determinancy, detailed reference to the files of both KortIck 532 and 
KorOck 582 make it apparent that the German forces used the most 
barbarous methods in the Rear Areas. Two features of Army policy 
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substantiate this assertion: the marked discrepancy between the 
numbers of partisans killed (variously listed as 'Partisanen', 
'Banditen', 'Freischdrler' or even 'Rotarmisten') as compared with the 
German forces' own losses, and the wholesale and apparently 
indiscriminate destruction of peasant village after peasant village. 
These characteristic features of Army rear area activity indicate that 
very large numbers of Soviet citizens were innocent victims of German 
Army brutality. There were exceptions, but the significance of these 
should not detract from the basic premise. Gerald Reitlinger, writing 
in the late 1950s, had already noted both these features and come to 
the conclusion that 'some of the Kortick despatches on anti-partisan 
warfare, which were produced at the Nuremberg 'High Command, Trial 
were absolutely indistinguishable in their cold-blooded horror from 
the Einsatzgruppen despatches'. (18) 
Recent writings, including those of Jrargen Mster, argue that these 
and other acts of inhumanity - especially the summary execution of 
hostages or civilians detained on ill-defined charges of sabotage - 
cannot adequately be explained by reference to the security needs of 
the Rear Area Troops or pragmatic considerations. To reinforce this 
assertion much emphasis is placed on military reports which record 
only small differences between the numbers of prisoners detained on 
'security grounds' and those subsequently shot. On this premise, 
'collective reprisal measures' (Kollektive Gewaltmal3nahmen) are seen 
as ideologically determined. (19) 
In order to evaluate this matter of the discrepancy between the 
casualty figures for both sides, two approaches suggest themselves. 
One is to consider losses for the Korilcks over a long recorded period. 
The other approach is to deal with individual documented cases, 
especially those which even at the time caused controversy (as 
demonstrated in the first instance in the amount of paper work they 
generated). The reports from Ortskommandanturen 11/930 (Kortick 582) 
which' relate to events that took place in mid-September 1941 are a 
case in point. (20) 
In the first instance, use may be made of the overall findings of 
Timothy Mulligan's quantitative analysis of partisan warfare in the 
East; which fortunately contains data for Korfick 532 for the period 
April to December 1942. Cross references can then be included by the 
introduction of similar material taken directly from selected rear 
area files. (See Tables I and 2: pages 139 & 140). 
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Material based on the Anlage zum Kriegstagebuch for KorOck 532 
(Table 1) indicates that German losses for the last three quarters of 
1942 in Rear Area 'Security Operations' amounted to less than 6% of 
9partisan' losses. Even if casualty figures for wounded and missing 
are included (and this is certainly a contentious approach) German 
losses still do not exceed 14% of partisan figures. (22) On the basis 
of Mulligan's analysis for the entire Army Group Centre Rear Area for 
the period July 1941 to May 1942, which puts the comparative figure 
for German, losses at under 7% of those of the partisans, these 
figures do not seem in any way unrepresentative. (23) Even if some 
account is taken of the number of pro-German Soviet citizens (Le 
BOrgermeister and Ordnungsdienst members) who were killed or 
kidnapped by the partisans, this had barely reached 500 by the spring 
of 1942, and thus cannot be seen to have warranted the scale of 
German reprisals. (24) This is not to say that partisan attacks on the 
civilian administration were not of grave concern to the military, 
but the reflex response of engaging in some form of indiscriminate 
'Sduberungsaktion' did little to solve the problem. (25) 
Higher military authorities were certainly aware of what was taking 
place, even before the escalation of the partisan menace. As early 
as August 1941, Army Group Centre had noted that acts of reprisal 
were exceeding the limits of necessity: 'While it was understandable 
that German troops should be exasperated by attacks from armed 
civilians, this should not lead to punitive measures against villages 
that just happened to be in the vicinity of the incident. (26) 
Inhabitants of such villages were only to be shot when the troops 
were absolutely certain that they were either the perpetrators of 
partisan activities or in league with such elements. It was added as 
a caveat that experience indicated that the mass of the population 
did not support the partisans, whom this report described as a small 
group of communists who had been left in place by the retreating 
Soviet regime. 
On the other hand, some directives positively recommended that 
suspected persons be shot, even those only indirectly associated with 
hostile acts. (27) Rather than imposing a moratorium on such 
behaviour, certain of the Army corps operating within the 
Heeresgruppe, including AOK9 (Korack 582), argued that experienced 
9specialists' were needed to deal with the partisans. Accordingly, 
despite the serious reservations expressed by elements within the 
armed forces, it was recommended that strong units of the SD should 
be redeployed into the rfickwartiges Armeegebiet. (28) As Fbrster 
reminds us in his balanced record of various contradictory 
directives, the problem is to decide which of these conflicting 
recommendations should be taken as 'representative'. (29) 
As will become apparent when other field records are consulted, 
many high-level directives appear to have lost much of their 
ideological character by the timeýthey reached the operational level. 
At the same time, while this 'filtering' process was taking place, 
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higher echelons regularly 'injected' ideological commands directly 
into the system. (30) There is more to this than simply pragmatic 
considerations of time and space which encouraged the removal of 
'excess' wordage from military commands. With Armeeoberkommando 
advocating the ambiguous policy of 'severity and justice' ('Harte und 
Gerechtigkeit') it was hardly surprising that Korfick found itself in 
an unenviable position with any calls for moderation more than offset 
by the superior demand for positive results. All of this encouraged 
a rather utilitarian approach by which AOK directives were passed on 
simply because of obligations of military procedure rather than 
because such views were readily accepted. (31) 
Some crude quantitative idea of the scale of the German response to 
the partisan threat can be gauged from information in tabulated form, 
but the human dimension - as it related to both the German troops and 
the civilian population - is inclined to be lost when subsumed in 
bland statistics. Certainly, a more specific approach indicates a 
great deal of ambiguity. Many units developed a notoriety for the 
excesses in which they engaged, others operated at a much less 
frantic pace, and a few even abandoned all pretence that they were 
engaged in an ideologically determined war, preferring instead to 
topt out' as a strategy for survival. Some of the flavour of the 
range of behaviour can be obtained by looking at a number of 
particular examples. 
The discrepancy between partisan and German losses, and the 
accompanying evidence of wanton, large-scale destruction is seen 
clearly in the files from OKII/930, one of the Ortskommandanturen in 
the area of KorOck 582. (32) The Kommandant, Major Graf Yrsch, in his 
situation report for the period 18 July 1941 to 31 December 1941, 
which mainly covered Kleinunternehmungen, noted that 627 partisans 
had been shot for the loss of only two members of the German- 
supported Ordnungsdienst. Major Yrsch attributed this phenomenal 
record of success to 'responsible and decent' methods: 'Heranziehung 
von anständigen russischen Vertrauensmännern, anständigste Behandlung 
der anständigen russischen Vertrauensmänner, anständigste Behandlung 
des anständigen Teils der russischen Bevölkerung und (den) 
konsequenten Aufbau einer zu sauberer Arbeit angehaltenen Zivil- 
verwaltung'. (33) However, his preferred approach to the problem of 
partisan incursions was clearly indicated by remarks he had made in 
an earlier situation report. Commenting on a particular incident, he 
noted that it was hardly possible 'to maintain decent and soldierly 
values when involved in the execution of partisans'. ('bei Exekutionen 
sauberer und soldatisch würdiger zu verfahren'. )(34) While certain 
officers may have sympathised with Major Yrsch's attitude and 
approach, others were far from content. A dispute had arisen because 
a Platoon Leader (Zugfilhrer), Oberleutnant Junginger, of the 3rd 
Kompanie des Radfahr-Wach-Bataillons 50 was led to submit a formal 
complaint in writing that the Adjutant of the same Ortskommandant 
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(11/930), Oberleutnant Stern, had personally shot three partisans in 
rather unsavoury circumstances. (35) 
The large volume of correspondence that this incident and others 
which involved OKII/930 produced is of considerable interest. The 
dialogue went beyond the Kommandant des rfickwdrtigen Armeegebiet 582 
(Generalleutnant Oskar Schellbach) and involved Armeeoberkommando 9 
(General StrauB) in whose area the Korack and its subordinate units 
operated. Korfick instigated an enquiry into the episode, but it is 
clear from the final outcome that the main concern was that the 
matter had been handled clumsily and with a marked lack of finesse, 
not that the shooting was unjustified. Indeed, it was described as 
'correct' ('richtig anerkannt'). The reports from KorOck to both the 
Ortskommandanturen (11/930) and Armeeoberkommando 9 made the same 
point that it was undesirable for officers actively to participate in 
the shooting of partisans. ('zurück mit den Ergebnissen der 
angestellten Untersuchung: Korück ist der Auffassung, daß die aktive 
Beteilung eines Offiziers an der Erschiessung von Partisanen 
unangebracht und eines Offiziers unwürdig ist, es sei denn bei Gefahr 
im Verzug. ')(36) The impact of the incident on the ordinary German 
soldiers present at the scene can be gauged by noting Oberleutnant 
Junginger's observation that after the departure of the execution 
squad Oberleutnant Stern called the men together and told them to say 
nothing about the incident. ('Nach der Rfickkehr des Erschiessungs- 
kommandos versammelte Obltn. Stern die Manner um sich und erklarte 
ihnen: "Manner, man schweigt""). (37) 
Critical attention of this sort on particular incidents was, however, 
very much the exception. Numerous other references in the files of 
Korrack 582 to all manner of brutalities, including reprisal shootings 
and hangings, are significant as much for the neutral matter-of-fact 
tone as they are for their frequency. (38) The argument might even be 
advanced that the general behaviour adopted by the Korfick as a whole 
simply reflected an intensification of similar methods which the unit 
had previously adopted during its tour of duty in occupied Poland. 
Certainly, the military records for 1939 contain instructions, with 
the reports from Kalisch (Posen) being fairly representative, which 
clearly parallel those later introduced in the rear areas of the 
Soviet Union: 'Auf Anordnung des Mbfh. Posen sind in allen von der 
Truppe belegten Ortschaften Geiseln aus der polnischen Zivil- 
bevölkerung festzusetzen, die verschiedenen Berufsklassen und 
Lebensaltern sowie besonders unruhigen Elemente wie Studenten 
angehören. Die Geiseln sind täglich zu wechseln. Im Falle von 
Angriffen auf Wehrmachtsangehörige oder Volksdeutsche sind Geiseln zu 
erschie]3en'. (39) 
Korfick 532 (Pz. AOK2), although it had no previous occupation 
experience as a unit before its period in Russia, soon appeared to 
establish an equally dramatic track record. Its anti-partisan 
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activities manifested draconian features, that serve to underpin the 
impression to be derived from rather more quantitative analysis. (40) 
Indeed, the situation reports from individual units under the command 
of the KorOck for the period February to March 1942 describe numerous 
instances in which large numbers of partisans were shot, and 
'sympathiser' villages razed to the ground. (41) A cruel pessimism as 
to the task facing the security forces was evident in the assertion 
that no-one not 'even apparently harmless children and the elderly, 
was to be trusted. German security could only be ensured by the 
ruthless shooting of all suspicious persons and the rigorous 
interrogation of suspects. A most telling phrase in one report was 
that 'a cudgel was in order during interrogations' ('bei Verh6ren ist 
prinzipiell Prügel am Platze'. (42) 
Another Korfick security unit, Gruppe II, certainly took this advice 
at face value. In consecutive actions against two villages in March 
1942, during which it came under partisan attack (one German officer 
and 5 men were killed), reprisals resulted in the burning of the 
village (Ugol) and the immediate execution of the remaining 
inhabitants who refused to respond to interrogation. (43) Similar 
reports are a regular feature of all the KTBs and Anlage for the 
Korfick. Kampfgruppe 3, while on patrol in March 1942, acted on an 
informant's report (which had identified those peasants in the 
village of Faschina who were partisans) and entered the village to 
find that it had been deserted by most of its male inhabitants. The 
unit summarily executed the men who did remain, and then burnt down 
the neighbouring hamlets; shooting any men they captured in the 
process as 'possible partisans'. The women and children were locked 
in the village church while this took place. At least 45 civilians 
were shot in the brief operation. (44) 
Korack 532's official response to incidents of this sort was, 
however, often extremely ambiguous. It declared that the situation 
had deteriorated as a result of the behaviour of the partisans and 
thus a brutal response was necessary, but at the same time concern 
was expressed over individual episodes which were seen as both 
extreme and, perhaps more seriously, counter- productive. As far as 
the character of the enemy was concerned, KorOck saw them not as an 
enemy which fought according to conventional rules ('offen kampfenden 
Gegner'), but as units made up of ruthless and fanatical scoundrels 
who would use every means to force the local population to lend them 
support. ('verschlagenen, fanatischen Kerlen, denen jedes Mittel 
recht ist, und die Bevölkerung rücksichtlos in ihren Dienst 
zwingen'. )(45) In support of this viewpoint, ý wounded German soldiers 
who had survived guerrilla attacks claimed that they had overheard 
conversations in which the partisans, when discussing what to do with 
the wounded, had replied, 'smash in his skull' (Dem schlagen wir der 
Schadel ein') There were also reports, not only that partisans had 
mutilated their victims, but even of suspected cannibalism. (46) 
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German losses in many encounters with the partisans were certainly 
not quite so abnormally low as those for Korfick 582. The areas around 
Bryansk was, after all, classic 'bandit territory' and it would be a 
distortion to imagine that every recorded shooting was of innocent 
civilians. Some indication of the scale of the partisan threat can be 
gauged from army situation maps (see page 148) and from the fact 
that the KortIck had semi-permanent call on 2,000 regular troops for 
anti-guerrilla work. (47) (See also, Table 2: page 140). 
The realisation that draconian measures could prove of limited value 
is reflected in the general orders which Korfick passed on from the 
Army Oberbefehlshaber at Pz. AOK2. It was stressed that even in 
circumstances where it was necessary to evacuate the local population 
and destroy their houses, such actions were to be conducted in a 
humane fashion. Any other approach would only drive the locals into 
the hands of the partisans ('Auch, da wo es erforderlich ist, die 
Bevölkerung zu evakuieren und ihre Wohnstätten zu zerstören, ist 
menschlich zu verfahren. Jede andere Handlungsweise treibt die 
Bevölkerung den Partisanen geradezu in die Hände". )(48) 
Complaints from officers in the field also increased, especially 
with regard to this matter of the apparently wanton destruction of 
numerous villages. The obvious point was made that such behaviour 
served to alienate further the inhabitants, and thus aggrevated the 
already acute problems faced by the German military government. KTB 
Nr. 2, for example, contained a number of critical references to the 
activities of the rear area security unit Luftwaffen 
Infanterie- Regiment Moskau, whose mopping-up operations ('SAuberungs 
Aktionen') in late July 1942 had left around 5,000 villagers without 
roofs over their heads. (49) As the number of such incidents 
increased, Pz. AOK2 was prompted to comment on individual episodes. 
The execution of 76 people, who were merely suspected of being 
partisans, in the village of Karbowka (25 kilometres north-west of 
Trutschusk) was deemed to have been particularly excessive: (50) 
"PzAOK2 billigt die Erschiessung von 76 verdAchtigen Landes- 
einwohnern in Karbowka nicht und weist die Korps, Korilck and Gruppe 
Gilsa daraufhin, daB Russen, gegen die nur der Verdacht einer 
Betatigung im Bandenwesen besteht, nicht zu erschiessen, sondern in 
ein Gefangenlager zu stecken sind'. (51) 
At the same time, orders from Armeeoberkommando (Pz. AOK2) continued 
to reflect the ambiguity of attitudes and approaches. While AOK was 
quick to stress that the support of the civilian population was an 
essential requirement in order to combat the insurgents, Korfick was 
also instructed to escalate its response to the menace. Even the very 
language of reports was to be altered: thenceforth these were to use 
the term 'Banditen', rather than 'partisan' (which had connotations 
of freedom fighter. )(52) A paradox thus became apparent with 
contradictory orders from Armeeoberkommando which advised Korack 
either to increase the already draconian measures it was taking, or 
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else adopt more subtle policies. The units in the field thus found 
themselves to be both the recipients of this dilemma and in some ways 
the architects of the problem in the first instance. 
Some idea of the complexity of the situation can be gauged from a 
more detailed consideration of two problems, in response to which 
harsh measures were generally deemed to be essential: the growing 
numbers of German- appointed BOrgermeister who were being murdered by 
the partisans, and the threat posed to the vital railway lines that 
ran through the Rear Areas, to and from the front-line fighting 
zone. (53) 
On the first issue, the gravity of the situation was reflected in 
Korfick records which contained the interrogation notes on captured 
partisans, that were collated by the Geheime Feldpolizei at Bryansk. 
Prisoners painted a grim picture of partisan coercion and terror in 
which peasants were forced to participate in brutal activities, such 
as the murder of German-appointed BUrgermeister, or else face death 
themselves along with their entire families. (54) These reports from 
Korfick were rapidly passed on from Armeeoberkommando to OKH. 
Appended comments stressed that the failure to appease the local 
population (by policies such as de-collectivisation) meant that there 
was so little inclination to aid the German forces or their 
representat- ives that a 'third front' had been allowed to open-up in 
the rear areas. (55) The implications of this for an Army already 
over-stretched were ominous, and it was against this background that 
the measures to protect the main rail links took on an even more 
ruthless character. 
Directives from AOK which recommended the creation of a 
no-man's-land along the main supply routes, by forcibly removing the 
local population and ruthlessly destroying their villages, had long 
been established. Related instructions had also been issued to the 
troops which advocated, a shoot-on-sight policy against any 
unauthorised persons who ignored the warning signs and approached the 
rail lines. (56) Admittedly, even at an early juncture, certain 
officers had expressed doubts as to the wisdom of fully implementing 
the no-man's-land programme. In KorOck 532, for example, Oberleutnant 
K6hler's Kriegstagesbuch entries during February of 1942 recommended 
the 'ruthless destruction of isolated buildings and forest huts' 
(Irestloses Vernichten von Einzelgeh6ften and Waldhdusern') as part 
of the policy to secure the railway, but were equally adamant in 
proscribing the indiscriminate razing of villages. As K6hler saw 
matters, co-operation with the local population was not only 
possible, but essential if the German Army was to achieve any of its 
security objectives. (57) However, during the course of 1942, as a 
response to increased attacks and the realisation that the German 
forces could not secure railway lines by weight of numbers alone (in 
some areas the army could only assign 1-2 soldiers to guard each and 
every kilometre of track), the military intensified its methods. (58) 
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Disruption of Lines of Communication in KorUck 532: A ttacks 
on Roads and Railways for the period May 1942 to June 1943. 
Ma. Ju. Jl. Au. Se. Oc. No. De. Ja. Fe. Mr. Ap. M a. Ju. 
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85 86 76 
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63 
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1 12 1 
Major Anti-Partisan Operations in KorUck 532: 
'Vogelsang' 5-30 June 1942 
: Dreieck und Viereck' -, 16-30 September 1942 
Kle tte IV 12-15 October 1942 
Freischutz' 21-30 May 1943 
Zigeneurbaron' 16 May to 6 June 1943 
'Nachbarhilfe' 19 May to 19 June 1943- 
units from. KorUck 559) 
Source: John A. Armstrong, Soviet Par tisans in World War II, 
(K DeWitt & 11 Moll, 'The Bryansk Area')l 
Wisconsin, 1964, page 5111f. 
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KorOck 532, for one, instructed its subordinate units in July 1942 to 
make the local population answerable for the integrity of the 
railway, particularly in areas where attacks were commonplace. This 
was to be achieved not simply by forcing the locals to organise dawn 
and dusk guard-patrols but, on a more sinister level, by the taking 
of hostages from the nearby villages, a number of whom were to be 
shot in the event of raids on the line: 'AuBerdem sind Geiseln 
festzusetzen und den Einwohnern ist bekannt zugeben, daß bei jedem 
Ansschlag auf die Bahn ein Teil der Geiseln erschossen wird. Diese 
Mal3nahme ist rficksichtlos durchzuffihren'. (59) Two months later, in 
September of 1942, the hostage system was yet further intensified. 
Instructions were issued to shoot at least five hostages for every 
attack. In a manner reminiscent of the policies adopted by Korrick 582 
in Poland, at least ten civilians (irrespective of gender) were to be 
hanged for every German who was killed or severely wounded. (60) 
Ambiguities again made themselves apparent. Certain German units in 
KortIck 532 carried out orders with such enthusiasm that they were 
reported to have shot and killed (albeit inadvertently) the Russian 
patrols assigned to the railway lines. At the same time, the 
reluctance of other troops to implement draconian policies caused the 
military authorities much concern. (61) For example, other soldiers in 
the same rear area had been reluctant to carry out orders on reprisal 
hostage-taking, and Korrick felt compelled to issue an admonition that 
such 'misplaced softness' (Weichheit) was a dereliction of duty and a 
9sin against German blood' (eine Versündigung am deutschen Blute): 
'Seitens einer Einheit sind Bedenken geäußert worden gegenüber 
Durchführung des Befehls Korück vom 6.9.42 betr. Vergeltungsmaßnahmen 
bei Schienensprengungen. Nach ihrem Bericht zu urteilen, ist die 
Bevölkerung 'glücklich, unter deutschem Schutz zu stehen' und es sind 
'keinerlei Anhaltspunkte festgestellt, daß sie mit Partisanen in 
irgendwelcher Beziehung steht. Wir die Aufgabe haben, deutsches Leben 
zu schützen, und da ist jede Weichheit völlig fehl am Platze und eine 
Versündigung am deutschen Blute'. (62) 
Whether official policy was in any way modified by the manner in 
which the German troops on the ground interpreted orders is difficult 
to assess, but a marked readjustment in directives was subsequently 
discernible. A paradox again emerged, with Korfick urging units in the 
field to spare no effort to guarantee the supply lines, but at the 
same time remaining adamant that wholesale, indiscriminate and wanton 
destruction was counter- productive. Even the KorOck directive, 
referred to above, which insisted that hostages were still to be 
taken, accepted that the decision as to whether or not they should be 
executed was now a matter for discretion. (63) 
By the winter of 1942, KorOck 532 was citing the authority of 
Pz. AOK2 in its attempts to modify policy, with much emphasis being 
placed on the negative impact of German behaviour on the mood of the 
local civilian population. Some indication of the shift can be gauged 
from the fact that the Army authorities also insisted that all 
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collective reprisal measures ('KollektivmaBnahmen') should be both 
reported to, and approved of, by higher command. (64) It should be 
stressed, - however, that the new official directives were often influenced not by the earlier reports as to the unwillingness of some 
German units to implement draconian methods, but by the view that 
hostage-taking was not effective in the East: 'Auf Befehl der Armee 
habe ich das Erschießen und Erhängen von Geiseln verbieten müssen, 
weil zwischen den Sabotagetrupps, die gewöhnlich auf dem Luftwege 
abgesetzt werden, und den aus der ortsansässigen Einwohnerschaft 
festgesetzten Geiseln meist kein Zusammenhang besteht und das in 
westeuropäischen Verhältnissen gegebene seelische Druckmittel des 
Geiselsystems in den Ostgebieten seine Wirkung verfehlt, wohl aber 
die erwünschte Befriedung des Landes erschwert'. (65) 
As a general observation it appears that the Oberbefehlshaber (in 
this case General StrauB at PzAOK2) was insistent that tough measures 
against the partisan menace should not be allowed to degenerate into 
a policy of generalized terror against the civilian population. 
Marked concern was expressed about the reported ill-treatment of 
women and children: 'Auch da, wo es erf6rderlich ist, die Bev6lkerung 
zu evakuieren und ihre Wohnstätten zu zerstören, ist menschlich zu 
verfahren. Auch im Partisanenkampf bleiben wir Soldaten und führen 
nicht den Kampf gegen Frauen und Kinder. (66) 
Korfick, as it was militarily obliged to do, passed these orders on 
to the various formations under its command,. In some cases it may 
even have taken the lead in urging such an approach. (67) In practice, 
however, Kortick seemed to tolerate a great deal of wanton killing and 
destruction by some of the subordinate German units in its area of 
military government. Where hostage-taking methods were used to 
protect rail-lines, ruthless and indiscriminate behaviour was 
condoned, if not actively encouraged. (68) Yet, at the same time, 
Korfick also appeared to be somewhat responsive to those units which 
were less inclined to pursue each and every draconian order with 
vigour. 
Explanations for this discrepancy in policy vary. On the one hand, 
it can be argued that Armeeoberkommando, as an essentially front-line 
unit, saw the war in clear manichean terms, with soldier clearly 
matched against enemy soldier. It may well have been, as Bartov 
insists, a barbaric form of warfare, but (and Dallin's 'survey' has 
long made this point) the protagonists were clearly delineated. (69) 
Rear Area forces were presented with a much greyer view of the world, 
with considerable uncertainty as to the objectives they were aiming 
at, or the very nature of the enemy confronting them. Reports from 
Feldkommandanturen often noted that theirs was a difficult, 
unrewarding and problematic occupation. (70) Add to this the problems 
of manpower and resources and the end result, while certainly not 
morally defensible, seems much more comprehensible. Any 'explanation' 
of behaviour thus needs to take account of the influence of such 
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factors in determining the attitude and mentality of those involved, 
as much as it does the ideological component. Recourse to the 
generational argument is also relevant. Many of those who urged 
restraint were former officers of the Reichswehr, in some instances 
those who had served during the the old Imperial Army phase rather 
than the Weimar Republic. (71) Their behaviour tended to contrast 
markedly with that of some of the younger junior officers who 
conducted policy on the ground, though not with all of the junior 
officers, as the disagreements over matters in OKII/930 
indicated. (72) 
The generational 'model' must, however, be applied with some 
caution. General evidence does indicate that many of the atrocities 
were committed by the more dynamic units (particularly specialist 
Police Battalions and Kampfgruppen) rather than the less able and 
generally older Landesschutzbataillone. (73) This 'discrepancy' might 
well reflect differences in attitude as much as opportunity. All the 
same, as later discussions on morale and fighting power will indicate 
less able German rear area units may well have compensated for their 
combat deficiencies by resorting to indiscriminate brutality. 
At the opposite end of the behavioural spectrum, however, a quite 
extraordinary contrast can be found. Isolated German rear area units 
appear virtually to have abandoned the war; in some cases to such an 
extent that they might be said to have developed some form of 
symbiotic relationship with the local population and, more 
surprisingly, with the partisans. The Rear Area files provide a 
number of examples of what be termed 'strategies for survival', and 
these offer valuable insights into the impact of National Socialism 
and military discipline on individual soldiers. 
The office of the Befehlshaber in Heeresgruppe Mitte regularly 
undertook tours of inspection into the Army Rear Areas in order to 
supplement the information it gained of the overall situation from 
the reports of subordinate units. (75) A similar system was also 
operated by the Reichsministerium for die besetzten Ostgebiete. (76) 
In the late autumn of 1942, on such a reconnaissance trip, an 
investigating officer, Hauptmann F6rster, inspected the security 
facilities (mainly isolated blockhouses) which were responsible for 
guarding the main railway line from Mogilew to Rojatschew and 
beyond. (77) F6rster travelled around by motor vehicle which enabled 
him to bypass the railway routes and thus make unexpected visits to 
rear area units. His reports on the stretch of track from Mogilew to 
Smolensk painted a picture of German Rear Area units who had 
virtually ceased to function in an accepted military fashion. The 
$slipper soldiers' (Pantoffel Soldaten), as he termed them, confined 
themselves to their guard-houses, inside which all vestiges of 
hierarchical discipline, including acknowledgement of rank, had 
broken down. Meanwhile, in the surrounding area Russian civilians 
ignored both curfew and military no-go-area regulations and came and 
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went as they pleased. In some instances, local women appeared to be 
keeping kitchen for the German soldiers: 'Meine EindriAcke bei der 
Kontrolle dieser Stutzpünkte waren folgende: Die Leute hocken den 
ganzen Tag in ihren Feldwache und Stützpunkten. Durch diese 
Untätigkeit werden die Soldaten lahm und unsoldatisch. Ich habe 
Wachhabende angetroffen, die Hausschuhe anhatten und, als sie mich 
sahen, gemütlich aufsetzten, sondern wie die Zivilisten ihre Meldung 
abgaben. Betritt man einen Stützpunkte, wird in den meisten Fällen 
überhaupt keine Notiz von einem genommen. Achtungrufen oder stumme 
Haltung einnehmen kommt kaum in Frage. Die Leute bleiben ruhig auf 
ihren Bette liegen oder auf dem Schemel sitzen. Ich möchte erwähnen, 
daß dies nicht überall der Fall ist, aber als Durchschnitt gelten 
kann. '(78) 
The collapse of discipline was attributed in the main to the 
unwillingness of the NCOs to 'bawl out the troops', and F6rster 
expressed the opinion that such false camarederie ('falschverstandene 
Kameradschaft') endangered the German presence in the rear areas. (79) 
He was particularly concerned that the 'breakdown of army government' 
was a far from isolated phenomenon, since similar behaviour had 
manifested itself elsewhere along the rail line. Indeed, in many 
areas little in the way of military activity could be detected; there 
was no patrol work (Streifendienst) being undertaken to prevent 
mine-laying by the partisans, and the blockhouses (Stlitzpunkte) 
themselves were virtually unfortified and lacked even barbed-wire 
fencing. Often a form of truce was in operation with the local 
population (and by inference, the partisans). As in the other 
recorded cases, German units were failing to enforce the 
no-man's-land regulations on the railway line, and little was being 
done to prevent civilians wandering around as they pleased. (80) 
F6rster's ironic comment that the most proficient security forces 
he encountered were Russian volunteer army units, reinforced his 
other observations. He was particularly full of praise in his 
remarks on the SS Russian company, responsible for the stretch of 
track between Gorjatschina and Torschtschza. Far from taking a 
passive role, they regularly made forays in the neighbouring area and 
were generally regarded as alert and prepared: 'Die Russen machten 
einen strammen, militArischen Eindruck und gaben gute 
Ehrenbezeigungen ab. '(81) 
it is somewhat problematical to offer any explanation for this 
anomaly. It may be, however, that the Russian volunteer units, by 
virtue of their commitment to the German cause, found themselves in 
an unenviable position. As subsequent material on such units and the 
local defence forces demonstrates their loyalty seemed to be almost 
Boolean, either it was in operation or it was not. The 
'half- way- house' strategy manifested in the behaviour of certain 
German Rear Area units was thus simply not an available option. 
Consideration of the large number of KorOck reports and Army Group 
Rear Area documents available to this research makes it abundantly 
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clear that there is substance to F6rster's insistence that delinquent 
behaviour was far from unique. The argument can be pursued by a 
consideration of other cases where the rejection of army values was 
carried to more active extremes. 
Special reports, compiled after the war by former officers of the 
Wehrmacht for the United States Army historical department, contend 
that relations between some Ortskommandanturen and local partisans 
'assumed very strange forms'. (82) It is argued that in a number of 
instances, the German Rear Area local forces concluded verbal 
arrangements with the partisans to leave each other alone. The 
partisans supposedly informed the Kommandanturen of the arrival in 
the district of 'foreign' guerrilla bands, while the German commander 
reciprocated by informing the 'indigenous' partisans of possible 
forthcoming large-scale pacification operations . (83) In an account of German army counter- intelligence activities in 
occupied Russia, a former official, Wladimir Posdnjakoff, suggests 
that such arrangements extended to the point where the villages in 
certain Ortskommandanturen districts were divided up between the army 
and the partisans for the purposes of collecting taxes and so 
forth. (84) Certain other episodes are so incredible that their 
implications only serve to challenge their authenticity. Nonetheless, 
they are certainly worth noting, even if with reservations. For 
instance, the German commanding officer of the OK at Yanovichi was 
described as having close personal contact with the partisans. 
Apparently, he often drank vodka with the group leader and was 
engaged to the sister of the partisan chief and intended to marry her 
after the war. (85) Elsewhere, the Ortskommandanturen based at 
Kilyshki, in the Lioana District, uncovered a strange case of 
desertion combined with fraternisation when it called in the 83 
infantry Division on the pretext that large partisan groups were 
operating in the area. The results of the units endeavours were quite 
extraordinary. The German security forces eventually tracked down a 
gang of twelve men, made up in equal numbers of deserters from both 
the German Wehrmacht and the Soviet Red Army. Armed with only six 
rifles and a single pistol they had been engaged in acts of 
petty-crime in obscure villages throughout the district. (86) The 
episode also gave some indication of the unwillingness of isolated 
rear units to engage in any serious attempt to pacify their immediate 
areas. Instead, they preferred to exaggerate losses in order to 
qualify for outside assistance. 
Material of this kind, particularly that which can be precisely 
documented, obviously raises a whole range of questions. (87) No claim 
is made that it demolishes the 'new orthodoxy' which sees the German 
army in its treatment of partisans (and those labelled 'partisans') 
as both brutal and indiscriminate. Undoubtedly, these isolated 
episodes are not representative. The overall quantitative analysis 
clearly indicates that the brutal whole was the sum of equally brutal 
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parts. Neither, for that matter, is there much to be said for the 
argument that the barbarity of the partisans themselves was the 
trigger. Although, due regard should be given to the weight of 
evidence which indicates the determination of the partisans to thwart 
any attempts by the German military to encourage colloboration or 
even co-existence. (88) 
Episodes in which 'normal' patterns of behaviour were abandoned do, 
however, challenge the stereotyped view of the German Army as a 
ruthless and disciplined homogeneous entity and, by inference, the 
already dubious notion of any form of monolithic totalitarian state. 
More immediately, such material draws attention to the contingent 
conditions and circumstances in which many German Rear Area soldiers 
found themselves. In this context the continual references in reports 
to dire isolation and anxiety accentuated by chronic manpower 
shortages must be reintroduced into the analysis. (89) Normally, 
traditional patterns of authority and military control prevailed, but 
German troops in Rear Area units, left to their own devices, often 
engaged in a variety of responses to the situation. Lethargy, 
indifference and in some cases even contempt for military discipline 
are thus best seen as 'strategies for survival' which indicate that 
ideology was not always the universal determinant of behaviour. 
The complexities of this issue can be considered further by 
examining the relationship between the German Army and the civilian 
population as a whole. 
### 
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Army Relations with the Civilian Population. 
A great deal of recent literature on German army relations with the 
indigenous population of the occupied areas defines military 
government in terms of its inflexible rigidity and frequent 
brutality. Pre-war planning had in fact made much of the need to 
employ the harshest methods to eradicate any vestige of an 
administrative or social leadership in the occupied territories. (I) 
Documents from the highest level impressed on the German troops that 
they were engaged in an ideologically based racial war of 
extermination ('rassenideologischen Vernichtungskrieg') that was by 
its very nature qualitatively different from the conventional war 
('Normalkrieg') conducted in the West. Accordingly, the Wehrmacht 
forces were seen as the embodiment of German honour and racial 
feeling ('deutsches Ehr- und RassegefOhl') locked in a conflict to 
destroy the Soviet Union with its 'asiatic methods' and 'primitive 
instincts' (asiatische Dekungsart und primitiven Instinkte). At stake 
was the very existence of the German Volk whose task it was to defend 
European 'Kultur' against the barbarian hordes. 
The dissemination of such ideological maxims, with their somewhat 
contradictory emphasis on both the menace and the worthlessness of 
the Soviet system and peoples, is evident from the many directives to 
be found in both KorOck and Heeresgebiet field records. Indeed, the 
KriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlaB (which abrogated any rights which the 
civilian population might be allowed, even vis-a-vis a foreign army 
of occupation) was clearly formulated in order to emphasise just this 
point. (2) Material, including Hitler's appeal to the 'Soldaten der 
Ostfront', or the Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia 
('Richtlinien für das Verhalten der Truppe in Rußland) also made 
much of the dangers which faced the German forces if they failed to 
adopt a cynical approach to the Soviet inhabitants. Pamphlets and 
leaflets, such as 'Kennt ihr den Feind' ('Know the Enemy) which were 
regularly issued to Rear Area forces, reiterated this theme. (3) 
The weight of criticism was obviously directed against the elites 
within the Soviet Union, particularly since this reinforced National 
Socialist stereotypes of the Judeo-Bolshevik menace. (4) The brutal 
eradication of Red Army commissars was thus the logical expression of 
such a racially determined Weltanschauung, as was the related attempt 
to label members of the Soviet intelligentsia and state apparatus as 
Jews, and then to treat them accordingly. However, even with regard 
to the lower levels of Soviet society, the idea of a threat was 
seldom absent from official German material. Thus, while the ordinary 
Russian peasant was more often than not presented as a sort of 
simpleton, there was seldom an associated romantic rural idyll 
implied by such notions. Even towards the end of the occupation 
period when necessity demanded a new, positive approach to the 
Russian population xenophobic racially based stereotypes continued to 
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be expounded in guidelines issued to the troops: 'Der russische 
Mensch ist "anders" als wir! Nicht nur dem Aussehen nach. Er 
entstammt einem Raum, einer Rasse und einem Volkstum, die ihn zu 
einer gänzlich anderen Daseinsauffassung und damit auch zu einer 
anderen Lebenshaltung geführt haben, als sie für uns oder die anderen 
Völker der europäischen Mitte oder Westens typisch sind'. (5) 
The same official material went so far as to contend that neither 
Bolshevism nor industrialisation had produced any significant 
alteration to the essential Russian character. Although such a priori 
assertions were mere propaganda, it can be argued that the backward 
nature of a great deal of Soviet society, particularly the rural 
environment, not only reinforced ideologically based stereotypes, but 
also acted as the base from which subsequent opinions were derived. 
It would be naive to suppose that such stereotyping was totally 
without impact on the ordinary German soldier. Indeed, entire 
research works have been constructed on the premise that the actions 
of the armed forces of the Third Reich were the inevitable result of 
just such an indoctrination process. Ideological conditioning was 
seen as particularly significant in view of its supposed pre-war, and 
even pre-regime, beginnings, and the process was seen as not confined 
simply to higher echelons, but also markedly evident in the lower 
ranks. (6) The early discussion on specific aspects of policy 
certainly gives substance to Bartov's assertion that 'the (German 
Army) unit, be it squad, platoon, pompany or bataillon, does not seem 
to have had any difficulty in identifying the mass of Russians be 
they in the form of a village, refugees or POWs as sub humans worthy 
of the most brutal treatment'. 
Nontheless, It remains unclear as to why, given the importance 
assigned to indoctrination and group consensus based on National 
Socialist principles, 'the individual German soldier may well have 
refused to view the individual Russian man, woman or child as an 
'Untermensch'. (7) Given that it is one of the cardinal principles 
of informed social history to see individuals at the grass-roots 
level as more than mere cyphers of opinions and ideas originating 
from above, further elucidation is required. The point has been made 
by Manfred Messerschmidt that policy looked very different to the 
troops on the ground when it came to put theory into practice: '.. in 
der Truppe sah tatsächlich vieles anders aus, als es oben geplant und 
erfunden worden war. Zur Umsetzung der Theorie in die Praxis ist es 
vielfach nicht gekommen'. (8) Even advocates of theories of 
ideological determinism have been forced to ask whether 'we (can) 
really say that the individual soldier on the Eastern Front was 
influenced by the barrage of propaganda directed at him from above'. 
Indeed, they have been forced to admit that it is 'impossible to 
quantify precisely the extent and depth of ideological commitment of 
the troops. '(9) Clearly there is a need to reintroduce the missing 
ingredient; an acknowledgement of the way in which the experience of 
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the war in the East shaped the attitude and behaviour of individual 
German soldiers. Such a history would take into account the social 
context as well as the concrete actions of individuals. (10) 
For an army that was composed of troops essentially Western European 
in their social and cultural background the immediate impression on 
the Germans was of the 'primitive' character of the occupied regions. 
Certainly, the earlier systematic evacuation by the retreating Soviet 
regime of key personnel and administrators had distorted the 
situation to start with, but a combination of factors all served to 
reinforce the view that the Russians were generally a rather 
unintelligent amorphous mass. Field reports continually noted with 
surprise the extent to which many fairly large urban centres enjoyed 
few of the amenities which the soldiers regarded as the norm at home 
in the Reich; particularly gas, electricity and sanitation. (I 1) 
It was the rural population, however, which created the most 
unfavourable impression. The supposed limitations of hygiene were of 
special concern because of the disease risk, and military 
administrators were quick to ascribe this to unsophisticated 
attitudes of mind on the part of the population. 'Die deutschen 
Massnahmen (to combat disease) stiessen nicht nur auf v6lliges 
Unverständnis, sondern auch auf Widerstand seitens der Bevölkerung. 
Der Russe fasste die bestehenden Verhältnisse als von Gott gegeben 
auf. Seit altersher waren die Wohnungen und ihre Bewohner verlaust 
und seit Generationen holten sich die Einwohner das Wasser aus dem 
Bach oder aus dem Dorfbrunnen, der unmittelbar neben der Jauchegrube 
eines Hauses lag und doch war die Einwohnerschaft lebenstüchtig 
geblieben und hatte sich fortgepflanzt. Warum also einen Zustand, 
dazu noch unter Unbequemlichkeiten, ändern, den anscheinend Gott so 
eingerichtet hatte und guthiess? Das war die Auffassung der Masse der 
Bevölkerung. Hygiene und vorbeugende Massnahmen waren ihr unbekannt, 
ja zuwider. Dieses Unverständnis zu besiegen, war besonders schwer, 
weil es in tiefer Religiosität und Gläubigkeit wurzeltel. (12) 
Ironically, the German army's tendency in the course of 
anti-partisan operations to destroy established and developed 
settlements and relegate the inhabitants to earth-huts, only served 
to reinforce the military's sense of superiority. (13) Some Rear Area 
commanders seemed to have regarded this backward character as a 
positive benefit. They saw the rural population as 'slow' rather than 
deliberately obstructive, and asserted with marked arrogance that, 
provided account was taken of certain features of Russian mentality, 
the inhabitants could be used effectively for purposes such as the 
supply of essential labour for the occupation forces. Indeed, in a 
manner very reminiscent of the approach adopted by AOK9 to POWs, 
Korfick army officers argued that the local inhabitants could gain 
considerable social, cultural and economic benefit from contact with 
their German occupiers. (14) Such attitudes derived many of their 
maxims from the supposed childlike quality of the Russian peasant, a 
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view that was something of a leitmotiv in both orders from above and 
reports from the field: 'Der russische Mensch ist kindlich! Das 
heisst, er lebt nicht vom Verstande her, sondern aus seinem Gefühl 
heraus. Er folgt nicht seinem Verstand, sondern seinem Herzen'. (15) 
Rear Area troops were urged to adopt an approach based on the 
patriarchal quality of care combined with discipline. Material issued 
to subordinate units operating in KorOck 532 made much of this theme, 
and laid great stress on the supposed abundance of such attributes 
amongst the ordinary German soldiers: 'imponiert den Russen immer 
wieder die deutsche Gründlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit. Im Russischen 
Volk wurzelt noch das alte patriachalische Denken. Ein anständiger 
väterlich sorgender Vorgesetzter mit klaren Gerechtigkeitsempfanden 
wird den Russen daher leicht für sich gewinnen. Der Russe erkennt im 
deutschen Soldaten vorausgesetzt, daß er Führerfähigkeiten und 
Gerechtigkeitssin hat, gewissermaßen seinen Patriarchen'. (16) 
This tendency was clearly evident in the opinion that the Russian 
peasantry could best be motivated by a system of rewards, either in 
the form of public praise or more specifically by gifts such as 
simple consumer goods: 'ferner wurden Prämien für besonders gute 
Erfolge gegeben. Da das Land an den einfachsten Gebrauchsgütern 
Mangel litt, so war es nicht schwer, die öffentlichen Belobigungen 
durch Zuwendungen aller Art zu unterstreichen. Z. B. war Salz in der 
ersten Zeit der deutschen Besatzungszeit ein rarer Artikel, daher 
eine willkommene Prämie ebenso wie die einfachsten Werkzeuge, Hämmer, 
Beile, Nägel und dergl. '(17) 
However, although Army Group Rear Area command saw it as desirable 
to maintain the semi-colonial status of the occupied territories in 
this way, it was adamant that soldiers should not use such cheap 
goods (billige Waren) to engage in any form of barter (Tauschhandel) 
with the civilian population. Scrutiny of letters sent home to the 
Reich by German soldiers had in fact revealed requests for these sort 
of items, and the authorities were highly critical of the damage done 
to the image of the military by such activities: 'In letzter Zeit 
mehren sich die Fälle, daß Wehrmachtangehörige... in zunehmendem Maße 
schwunghaften Handel zur persönlichen Bereicherung mit der russischen 
Bevölkerung treiben. Die Kontrolle einiger Feldpostbriefe hat 
ergeben, daß die Heimat gebeten wird, weiter in großem Umfange 
billige Waren... den Absendern ins Feld zu schicken. Durch dieses 
unverantwortlichen Handlungen wird das Ansehen der deutschen 
Wehrmacht erheblich geschädigt'. (18) 
Propaganda specialists amongst the senior military authorities in the 
Rear Areas also advised an approach that both reflected and 
reinforced propositions as to the underdeveloped character of the 
indigenous population. Emphasis was placed on pictorial rather than 
literary presentation of directives and guidelines: 'Der primitiven 
Wesensart der Bevölkerung entsprach es, dass ihr eine bildliche 
Darstellung mehr Eindruck machte, als gedruckte Ausführungen und 
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Zahlentabellen. Aus diesem Grunde wurde von Photographie und Film 
reichlich Gebrauch gemacht. Die Vorführungen fesselten die 
Bevölkerung, wirkten anregend und belehrten'. (19) 
The limitations of the written word had already been noted by the 
military when the Rear Area propaganda corps had attempted to create 
a more profound impression through motorised loudspeaker units (which 
played music interspersed with information bulletins), and the 
selective use of radio, but cine film marked a further stage of 
development. (20) The extent of German army commitment to this 
approach was reflected in the interest taken by General von 
Schenckendorff, Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Mitte. Authorisation had 
been given not only for the construction of a number of new cinemas 
in urban centres such as Mogilew and Orscha, but also the 
establishment of a mobile film unit to visit outlying rural areas. 
The Army Group Rear Area commander was, however, eager to do more 
than simply entertain the native population, and suggested a number 
of categories for films, all of which - including feature films - 
were intended to be of a serious educative character, especially by 
way of the insights such material was intended to offer into German 
cultural life: 
'Die zur Verfügung stehenden Filme - deutsche Filme russisch 
synchronisiert oder untertitelt - kann man in vier Klassen einteilen: 
1. Deutsche Wochenschau in russischer Sprache 
2. Kulturfilme 
3. Filme, die das Leben des deutschen Volkes im neuen 
Deutschland zeigen: 
z. B. "Der Tag des deutschen Arbeiters% "Bauernfilm", 
"Der Führer und sein Volk". 
4. Spielfilme mit russischen Untertiteln. 
Die Spielfilme waren zumeist auf einen heiteren Ton 
abgestimmt, mit Filmen ernsten Charakters soll in Kürze ein 
Versuch mit "Robert Koch" gemacht werden'. (21) 
An awareness of the limitations of written material directed towards 
the Soviet population and the need to use film as propaganda (yet 
avoid trivialisation) was reflected at the local level. The monthly 
reports from Ortskommandanturl/302 in KorOck 582, for example, noted 
the need for regular screenings of both newsreels and 'cultural 
material': 'Es wird allerdings häufig darauf hingewiesen, das nicht 
alle Versprechungen der Flugblattpropaganda erfüllt werden. Bei der 
grossen Empfänglichkeit der russische Bevölkerung für die Propaganda 
überhaupt und der starken Wirkung des Bildes wird empfohlen, mehr 
noch als bisher auch den Film in der Dienst der Propaganda zu 
stellen. Es besteht für Duchowschtschina (OKI/302) das Bedürfnis, 
wenigstens einmal in der Woche eine Filmvorführung moglichst in 
russischer Sprache zu bringen und dort eine geeignete Wochenschau 
einen Kulturfilm u. ä. zu zeigen, um der Bevölkerung einen Einblick in 
das deutsche Kulturschaffen zu gebenI. (22) 
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It must be stressed, however, that some commanders in the field 
were often considerably less arrogant in their assertions as to the 
supposed cultural inferiority of the local population in comparison 
to their German army occupiers. Thus, while higher command may have 
advocated the showing of intellectually uplifting and serious films 
such as Robert Koch, KorOck officers noted that cinematic works of a 
similar nature, including Rembrandt, were probably far too 
sophisticated for the ordinary German soldiers, who preferred popular 
musicals like Hello Janine: 'Der Film "Rembrandt" stand weit fiber dem 
Durschnitt, ob er jedoch von der Masse der Truppe richtig verstanden 
wurde, muss bezweifelt werden. '(23) 
The challenge implied by all this to National Socialist stereotypes 
was further demonstrated at local level in the Army Rear Areas by the 
emphasis placed on the restoration of some sort of cultural life 
amongst the native population. Policy went beyond the major urban 
centres (where the earliest military occupiers had been quick to note 
the level of intellectual activity as exemplified by library and 
museum holdings) and extended to the countryside. (24) 
KorDck 532 was especially concerned with the need to publish and 
distribute Russian language newspapers in the rural area around 
Bryansk. This approach, while ostensibly determined by pragmatic 
needs to manufacture support for the military government, extended 
beyond the dissemination of mere propaganda material and advocated 
the revival of both satirical and educational literature. 'Propaganda 
unter der Zivilbevölkerung wurde durch Verteilung der vielgefragten 
"Retsch", grössere Mengen von Wandzeitungen, Broschüren und Plakaten 
betrieben. Bei der russ. Zivilverwaltung ist eine Zeitungs- 
verteilstelle eingerichtet, die je Erscheinungstag durchschnittlich 
11,000 Stück "Retsch" verteilt. Mit der Propagandaabteilung W für das 
Heeresgebiet Mitte wurde Verbindung aufgenommen, um die in Smolensk 
erscheinenden russischen Zeitschriften und Zeitungen für das 
Korückgebiet flüssig zu machen. Es wurden angefordert die satyrische 
Zeitschrift "Bitsch", ferner "Kolokol", eine gern gelesene 
Bauernzeitung, "Nowy Putj", die Bilderzeitung "Neues Leben", die 
einmal im Monat erscheint und der "Schüler", eine Schülerzeitung, die 
als Ersatz für noch fehlende geeignete Lehrbücher gedacht ist. '(25) 
Proposals to offer the local population a valuable insight into 
what was seen as the superior qualities and tone of German life were 
taken an important stage further by a number of schemes implemented 
by way of the Army Rear Area Command in PzAOK2. In the first 
instance, local Russian teachers from the KorOck area were sent on a 
political education course run by the German military at Orel. The 
intention was to assign the most able participants to the task of 
public speaking in the region's main centres, the remainder being 
placed in posts in their home villages. This concept was applied on a 
much more extensive level, when Korfick 532 co-operated with OKH, the 
Ministry of Propaganda, and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern 
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Territories and arranged cultural visits to the Reich by selected 
local inhabitants drawn from various occupational groups in the 
Bryansk and Lokot regions. As with the training course for teachers, 
the returnees were to be deployed in professional duties thus 
propagating the officially approved view of German society. (26) At 
the local level, Rear Area Commanders were not without scepticism as 
to the effectiveness of such projects, and with regard to the 
immediate benefit of cultural visits to the Reich by selected local 
inhabitants, Korück 532 noted: 'Daneben darf aber nicht übersehen 
werden, dass die stille Propaganda der Deutschlandfahrer im 
persönlichen Gespräch mindestens die gleichen Erfolge aufzuweisen 
hat, wie der öffentliche Vortrag über Reiseeindrücke'. (27) 
Despite the continuation of higher level official backing the 
visitation programme remained essentially cosmetic, for the limited 
numbers of privileged individuals involved (a mere 200 by the end of 
1943) could not detract from the plight of the thousands of Russians 
deported to the Reich in order to provide slave-workers for the 
National Socialist war economy. (28) It could be argued that Army 
Group Centre was relatively less affected by the forced labour scheme 
than other regions. This was due in part to the initial success of 
voluntary schemes to recruit labour, but also reflected the 
population structure of the area. (29) However, the end result was 
very much the same for all the families involved experienced both 
financial and emotional hardship with the loss of so many 
breadwinners. Moreover, the detrimental effect on the already 
suppressed economy of the region was considerable for the Germans 
tended to give priority to the selection of skilled workers. (30) 
Even those military governors who preached, if not practised, a 
positive approach questioned whether or not any attempts to win over 
the local population could really be effective given what they termed 
the inability of the German army to guarantee adequate food supplies 
or protection against partisan incursions: 'Das Problem der Gewinnung 
der Bevölkerung ist eine Magenfrage und eine Schutzfrage. Solange die 
Bevölkerung Ernährungsschwierigkeiten hat und dazu von den deutschen 
Truppen gegen der Terror der Partisanen nicht geschützt oder nicht 
genügend geschützt werden kann, erscheint jegliche Propaganda 
zwecklos'. (31) 
Korack 582 was compelled to admit that it could not guarantee the 
security of the Russian work units which were formed to help 
construct or repair roads and railways. The situation was such that 
in some parts of the Rear Area the civilian labourers were so 
frightened at the prospect of returning to their villages at night 
that they attempted to camp with their German guard units. (32) 
Similar problems were evident in the running of the railways, where 
manpower shortages forced the Germans, albeit reluctantly, to 
reemploy large numbers of experienced Russians. KortIck reports noted 
with some concern that employees were unwilling to move outside the 
safety of closed surroundings and that fear of partisan reprisals 
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encouraged many workers to remove their distinguishing armbands, 
which they hid in their pockets. (33) 
Given the relative lack of success, situation reports by Army Rear 
Area officers were naturally inclined to attempt to derive maximum 
benefit from any favourable developments regarding the attitude of 
the local Soviet population, almost in the form of wish fulfilment. 
Kodick 532, for example, made much of the celebrations to commemorate 
the first anniversary of the German occupation of Bryansk in October 
of 1942. A similar attitude was also adopted towards the festivities 
which marked the abolition of collectivised agriculture in an area 
near the town and the return of the land to peasant control. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the positive mood of the 
proceedings in the countryside and the 'beneficial implications' of 
the event-(34) 'Am 28.6. (1942) fand in Dobrunj bei Bryansk in 
feierlicher Form die Aufteilung der Kolchoswirtschaft und die 
Übereignung des Landes an die ortsansässigen Bauern statt.... Die 
Beteiligung der Bevölkerung war rege, die Stimmung konnte als 
ausgezeichnet bezeichnet werden. Von Korück nahmen feierlichen Akt 
der Uberreichung von Brot und Salz durch eine Dorfabordnung an den 
Kommandanten schlossen sich mehrere Reden über die Bedeutung des 
Tages für das Leben der Dorfes. Den äusseren Rahmen bildeten 
musikalische Darbietungen des Musikkorps der 707 J. D. und 
Unterhaltungen der russ. Bühne. Im Anschluss fand eine Besichtigung 
von "Musterwirtschaften" durch den Kommandanten unter 
sachverständiger Führung des Kreislandwirtes statt. Daran schloss 
sich die Einnahme eines sogenannten 'einfachen Imbisses'. Er war 
qualitativ und quantitativ so ausgezeichnet, dass er es wert ist, ihm 
in der Geschichte des Korück ein Denkmal zu setzen. Man möchte 
wünschen, dass möglichst oft Kolchoswirtschaften feierlich ins 
Privateigentum überführt werden'. (35) 
In its attempt to emphasise the achievements of Rear Area policy in 
winning the population away from Bolshevism, the German army was 
prepared to exploit even the most trivial indications of popular 
opinion. For example, a great deal of time and attention was given 
to a request from the inhabitants of a small village in OK 1/593 
(Wjasma region) to revive the old name of the settlement 
(Wossknessenskoje) which the Soviet Regime had forcibly changed to 
Andrejewskoje in 1936. (36) 
The mood of success in both towns and countryside was, however, 
illusory. KorOck was forced to accept that food-supply difficulties 
and the continued reluctance of the urban population to accept German 
assurances that the Red Army would not return undermined propaganda 
activities. (37) Outside the urban centres, even in areas relatively 
untroubled by the partisans, the same issues were aggravated by the 
fact that de-collectivisation was a rare occurrence, despite German 
promises throughout the occupation period to undertake a fundamental 
restructuring of peasant agriculture. (38) The reportedly idyllic 
events which so impressed KortIck 532 as to warrant the erection of a 
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monument commemorating the eradication of the Kolchos system in part 
of its command area were isolated phenomena. Overall, military 
attitudes towards the rural inhabitants continued to be exploitative 
rather than co-operative, and the idea of a free peasant society 
remained unrealised by an army of occupation more concerned with 
immediate military ends. 
The process of introducing some form of indigenous Russian 
administration must be seen in this context, with any local benefits 
granted as means to an end or simply a by-product of schemes 
motivated essentially by German Army needs. Directives from Army 
Command laid particular emphasis on the strict limits (beschränkte 
Umfang) within which local government was to operate: 'Die 
Notwendigkeit, die Landeseinwohner zu erfassen und zur Ordnung des 
Raumes für militärische Aufgaben bereitzustellen, erforderte jedoch 
die Einrichtung einer Organisation, die sich vordringlich mit 
folgenden im militärischen Interesse liegenden Aufgaben zu befassen 
hatte. '(39) 
It was also made abundantly clear that self-administration 
(Selbstverwaltung) did not imply any rights of autonomy or 
self-determination (Selbstverwaltungskbrperschaft mit eigenen 
Rechten). Financial resources were to be used exclusively for 
purposes deemed to be in the interests of the German war effort. 
Depending on the issue in question, ultimate political authority lay 
with one of the various agencies which operated in the occupied 
territories. Even when the German army stressed its desire for single 
and unified control (einheitliche Lenkung) this was prompted by 
institutional power politics and not the desire to grant any special 
privileges to the Russian administration. (40) KorOck also applied 
similar caveats to the para-military formations (Ordnungsdienst) 
which army rear-area government had created for anti-partisan work: 
'Bei der Errichtung der Miliz (früher Ordnungsdienst) war nicht 
beabsichtigt, eine neue selbständige Behörde zu schaffen. Es handelte 
sich vielmehr darum, die Kräfte des Landes für die deutsche 
Wehrmacht... nutzbar zu machen'. (41) 
Reasons of organisational control, coupled with the realisation as 
to the potential risk posed by arming certain elements of the 
civilian population, also prompted directives which insisted that the 
local defence forces should only be allowed to operate in restricted 
geographical areas. (42) Military administrators were, in any case, 
inclined to stress the difficulties in finding suitable Russian 
personnel, with recruitment of local government officials - 
particularly BOrgermeister for the towns or villages -a matter of 
special concern because of the dearth of qualified individuals. Army 
command argued that the available candidates tended to fall into a 
number of unsuitable categories: be they returning emigres who had 
lost all feel for the country and its people; willing, but generally 
unable, non-specialists; individuals who were attracted by the 
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supposedly traditional corruption of Russian local administration 
with its opportunities for personal gain; or in some instances, 
politically suspect individuals, who may have been Soviet agents. (43) 
Even when apparently suitable persons were found, there was no 
guarantee that they would maintain any vestiges of enthusiasm for 
their appointed role in the face of German Army unwillingness to give 
priority to local needs, or more seriously, the threat of reprisal 
actions by the partisans. Inevitably, the end-result was that both 
the quality and effectiveness of German- appointed administrators 
varied considerably from one district to another. 
Field Reports from the Ortskommandanturen in KorOck 582 illustrate 
that the ordinary German soldiers who operated in these local 
communities were much influenced by this fact. The OberbOrgermeister 
in OK 1/302 (Kalinin), who was a former Tsarist officer, received 
considerable praise for the facilities he had made available for the 
occupying forces, including the opening of a bath house for the 
troops which was a considerable boost to morale. (44) Elsewhere, as in 
OK 11/930 (Wjasma/Subtzow), comments were less favourable, for it 
seemed that the local official was a rather easy-going fellow of whom 
the German troops were inclined to take advantage: 'Der von der OK 
eingesetzte russ. Bürgermeister zeigt sich bisher seinen Aufgaben 
nicht gewachsen ist leider ein gutmütiger Mensch, der oft von der 
Truppe in unverständliche Weise ausgenutzt worden ist. '(45) 
The situation was not that dissimilar in another part of the same 
Ortskommandant (Rayon Rudnja), except here the character of the 
individual concerned gave rise to somewhat different problems with 
the local soldiery. The military, faced with the general 
unwillingness on the part of anyone from the local community to 
accept the post of BOrgermeister, were compelled to appoint a 
23-year-old whom they regarded as somewhat cantankerous 
(Stankerfritze). (46) Some indication of the overall scale of the 
problem throughout the rear areas can be derived from noting that the 
German Army was obliged to arrange training courses for suitable 
candidates in order to prepare them for their role as local 
administrators. (47) 
As with recruitment for administrative posts, the military government 
found it increasingly difficult, in view of the shortage of men in 
the rear areas and their fear of reprisals if they collaborated, to 
enlist enough willing or able civilians to serve in the 
Ordnungsdienst defence units. Consequently, the types of individual 
who were available only reinforced German prejudices as to the 
unreliability of the local population. (48) Concern on the part of 
the military to derive maximum benefit for the least possible outlay 
of resources also shaped opinions. Rear Area Quartermasters gave a 
very low priority to equipping the Ordnungsdienst and while weaponry 
may well have been adequate (they were usually issued with captured 
Russian arms or those of French manufacture), little attention was 
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paid to uniforms or general supplies. Rates of pay reflected this 
exploitative attitude, despite the elevated ranks later assigned to 
OD members and the decision to issue Reichsmarks. Reference to the 
figures given in the section on food policy give some indication of 
the real purchasing power of the sums in question. (49) 
Daily Rates of Pay for Ordnungsdienst Members 
a) Period c. 6.11.1941 
Single Men Family Men 
Leader 10.00 Rubles 15.00 Rubles 
Deputy 7.50 Rubles 12.50 Rubles 
OD Man 5.00 Rubles 5.00 Rubles 
b) Period c. 12.11.1942 
Batallion Leader 3.30 RM 4.80 RM 
Company Leader 1.50 RM 3.00 RM 
Troops . 80 RM 1.80 RM 
Source: Korfick 582: Report for Period 9.5.41 - 31-12-1941; 
, BA/MA: RH23/228 (&0462) 
KorOck 582 (AOK9) Auszug aus Anlage 5, Nr. 8000/42; 
BA/MA: RH23/251 (&0504) 
As Korrick reports indicate, the end result was to produce a sort of 
ragamuffin army of conscripts which the German soldiers tended to 
regard with derision as little different from the partisan: 'fahren 
Sie die Rollbahn entlang und sehen Sie einen bewaffneten 
Zivilbekleideten auf der Brücke stehen. Wer ist das? Ein Partisan? 
Nein, ist ein OD-Mann, der zur einer Brückenwache gehört'. (50) 
Comments did not stop, however, with bitter irony for the refusal 
by Rear Area Command to issue food rations compelled the local 
defence forces to feed themselves at the expense of the district in 
which they were based. Ironically, while the members of an OD would 
naturally have operated in their home area, such behaviour made them 
increasingly unpopular with the other inhabitants, who already 
regarded the very existence of such units as an incitement to the 
partisans. Moreover, it was not uncommon for an Ordnungsdienst to 
launch punitive raids on neighbouring villages in order to obtain 
supplies out of motives of traditional communal rivalry, rather than 
military necessity. The corruption of minor officials installed by 
the military government added to the unfavourable impression, and 
the apparent failure of the German Army authorities to respond to all 
such excesses of behaviour only served further to estrange the 
civilian population. (51) With the situation already tense because of 
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German policy on other issues, such as requisitioning and 
anti-partisan operations, problems of this sort only served to harden 
opinions on all sides. 
The often ambivalent attitude adopted by the German troops to the 
civilian population, both as groups and individuals, was particularly 
marked in relation to the Russian women. This was almost inevitable 
since the character of the war had created an anomalous situation. 
With the vast majority of Soviet men confined to the POW camps, or 
else having fled to the forests (often to join the partisans), most 
of the inhabitants of the occupied regions were female. In KortIck 
582 (especially in the rural districts) over 75% of the population 
was female, and in certain parts of the Rear Area the figure was over 
90%. The situation was compounded in that many of the males who did 
remain were mere children or youths. (52) 
In view of the lack of able-bodied men in the occupied areas, the 
German army attempted to solve its manpower shortages by the 
employing women and girls. Initially, there was some suggestion that 
whereas the few available men would be press-ganged into performing 
work for the German occupiers, a volunteer system would be operated 
for women. (53) However, when sufficient numbers were not forthcoming, 
directives - such as those issued by Korfick 582 (AOK9) - demanded 
that as a matter of principle groups of women should be used to 
perform heavy labour in order to release the available men for other 
tasks, including security duties in the Ordungsdienst . (54) 
Guidelines were drawn up for special 'all female' labour units (as 
well as those made up of youths). This tactic necessitated little in 
the way of back-up from German army personnel, and as a result many 
German soldiers had little direct contact with the immediate 
hardships endured by the women involved. 
Deployment of Civilian Labour 
Female Work Units: 
I 'elderly' German NCO or Soldier as Company Leader 
I 'elderly" German Soldier as Deputy 
2 Russian female Translators (Teachers or old women) 
4 Female teachers or old women (Organisational Role) 
I Female Doctor or paramedic 
200 Female Workers 
10 Women for domestic duties and cooking 
6 OD Men (Guard Duties) 
4 Panje Wagons (each with one driver and one horse) 
Source: Korück 582, Bezug: A0K9 0. Qu. /Qu. 2. Nr 3660/42 
'Einsatz ziviler Arbeitskräfte' (29.09.1942) 
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High work loads were imposed on these female units by the military 
government, not only in terms of the tasks to be performed but also 
by the setting of a minimum labouring week of 54 hours. By the winter 
of 1942, the problems of maintaining lines of communication led to 
the increased utilization of female labour, with the insistence by 
KorOck 582 that all mothers with young children, even those still 
suckling, were to be deployed in snow clearing operations. In order 
to facilitate this endeavour, the Army authorities planned to 
organise Kindergftrten with elderly females acting as nurse maids. (54) 
These schemes were unquestionably highly exploitative of women, and 
extremely low wages were paid simply as a crude economic inducement 
rather than to meet social need. However, the use of women ironically 
depended very much on the opinion held by a number of German officers 
that the typical Russian female was morally upright, and in may ways 
more reliable and diligent than her male counterpart: 'Die Russische 
Frau ist ein kräftiges, leistungsfähiges Geschöpf, von Haus aus an 
schwere Arbeit und ein entsagungsvolles Leben gewöhnt; an Intelligenz 
ist sie dem Mann mindestens ebenbürtig, an Arbeitsamkeit und Fleiss 
übertrifft sie ihn bei weitem. Sie ist aufgeschlossen, lebensmutig 
und - was besonders anerkannt werden muss - führt einen moralisch 
einwandfreien Lebenswandel. Die Kriegsverwaltung hat mit der 
Beschäftigung von Frauen und Mädchen in ihren Diensten gute 
Erfahrungen gemacht'. (55) 
Such a standpoint justified the use of Russian women in areas 
somewhat less onerous than work gangs, such as military field 
hospitals, albeit in an auxiliary rather than directly medical 
role. (56) Thus, while certain Rear Area Army units adopted harsh 
policies towards the female inhabitants of the region, other Korfick 
commanders urged troops to demonstrate consideration towards Russian 
women, in order to maintain what was seen as their essential 
reliability. Stress was placed on the need to adopt a sensitive 
approach to innocent village communities during the course of 
anti-partisan operations, and more generally soldiers were urged to 
avoid the sort of behaviour that could be interpreted as sexually 
offensive. (57) As a result directives to the troops instructed them 
to remove pin-up photographs from barracks where they might be seen 
by members of the local population engaged in work for the army of 
occupation. Particular emphasis was placed on the negative image that 
was created of German family life and national values: 'HAnge in 
Deinem Quartier nicht allerorts die Bilder nackter Frauen auf. Die 
sittenstrenge russische Landbevölkerung zieht auf Grund eines solchen 
"Wandschmuckes" sehr leicht Schlüsse, die weder für Dich und Dein 
Familienleben noch für das deutsche Volk im allgemeinen 
schmeichelhaft sind'. (58) 
It was even suggested in administrative guidelines which emanated 
from the military government section of Heeresgebiet Mitte that an 
improvement in the position of women could be a powerful agent of 
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social reform capable of eroding undesirable practices associated 
with the Soviet regime: 'Weiterhin ist besonders auf die 
Berücksichtigung der alleinstehenden Frauen hingewiesen als eine 
wahrhaft soziale Massnahme im Gegensatz zur Knechtschaft unter den 
Bolschewisten'. (59) 
Overall, the extent and effectiveness of this more positive and 
generous approach must remain open to considerable question. As the 
more well documented evidence indicates, the German Army 
demonstrated a marked tendency in its occupation policies to reduce 
women to mere commodities. Nonetheless, despite the economic 
exploitation of women there seems little to support assertions that 
German troops in general sexually misused the female population of 
the occupied territories to the same degree. While it would be 
equally nalve to deny that many German soldiers, both officers and 
men, regarded the female inhabitants of the Rear Areas with deep 
suspicion, questions must be raised with regard to unsubstantiated 
views of the sort put forward by Bartov that soldiers manifested a 
'MAnnerphantasien' attitude to women derived from the perverse values 
of the Freikorps. (60) The argument that Russian women were described 
as 'degenerate' in official documentation because of their supposed 
role in the transmission of venereal disease, does not accord with 
documentary evidence from either higher command or field reports. 
Reinforcing the theme of moral sobriety, already evident in 
discussions as to the reliability of the female work force, the 
office of Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Mitte went so far as to assert 
that high moral standards prevailed amongst the female population, 
and venereal disease was not evident 'Bei der Weiblichkeit herrsche 
eine hoher Moralbegriff. Geschlechtskrankheiten seien bisher nahezu 
nicht bekannt. (61) Such pronouncements serve to confirm the fact 
that pre-war levels of indigenous prostitution in the Soviet Union 
were extremely low as compared with Western European, in part as a 
result of the strict outlawrying of such activities by Stalin. (62) 
Officers more directly familiar with the situation on the ground in 
the Rear Areas, qualified this general view and noted the number of 
women who were now becoming involved in prostitution. However, they 
added weight to the basic premise when they acknowledged that the 
army medical staff were faced with a 'totally new problem' since most 
of the women were often no more than mere vectors of infection 
introduced by the troops themselves from liaisons in either Poland or 
France. Certainly, KorQck records on the incidence of sexually 
transmitted disease frequently referred back to the pre 1941 period, 
while the post invasion figures are often linked with the 
establishment of Wehrmacht bordellos in the West. (63) 
This is not to say that the marked increase in the number of cases 
of venereal disease amongst the troops in the occupied territories 
(often in excess of 10% of the entire armed forces) was not a matter 
of grave concern to the military authorities, or that the role of the 
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native female population was seen as irrelevant to the problem. (64) 
OKH was particularly aware of the need to control illegal and 
unregulated (heimliche) prostitution, which it argued had arisen as a 
strategy for survival on the part of a local female population faced 
with desperate food shortages: 'Die starke Verbreitung von 
Geschlechtskrankheiten in vieln Teilen des besetzten sowjetrussischen 
Gebietes macht es erforderlich, das Umsichgreifen des 
Geschlechtsverkehrs mit nicht kontrollierten weiblichen Personen zu 
unterbinden. Während in den ersten Monaten des Ostfeldzuges eine 
geheime oder freie Prostitution in den besetzten sowjetrussischen 
Gebieten keine Rolle spielte - eine staatlich geduldete Prostitution 
gab es in Sowjetrußland ohnehin nicht - wird sie in letzter Zeit 
recht häufig beobachtet. In größeren Orten hat sich an vielen Stellen 
ein heimlicher, völlig unkontrollierter Bordellbetrieb entwickelt. 
Die fortschreitenden Ernährungsschwierigkeiten bei der Zivil- 
bevölkerung müssen weiterhin zur Ausbreitung dieser heimlichen oder 
Gelegenheitsprostitution führen. Schon jetzt ist zu erkennen, daß 
sehr häufig Lebensmittel als Gegenleistung dienen'. (65) 
There is some evidence that certain army units responded to the 
problem of uncontrolled prostitution by launching raids (Razzien) 
directed against women supposedly engaged in soliciting 
('herumiungernde und an ber0chtigten Treffpunkt auftauchende 
Frauen'). Those detained were then examined by Russian doctors under 
German control who would confine any female with the slightest 
indication (geringsten Anzeichen) of venereal disease to a 
hospital. (66) Local commanders, whose task it was in conjunction with 
their medical officers to deal with all infectious diseases, 
including those of a venereal nature, were more concerned, however, 
with the impact that any such introduced diseases would have on 
fighting performance and military discipline, rather than on seeking 
to confirm supposed racial and sexual stereotypes by assigning the 
root cause of the problem to the local female population. Korack 
582 informed its subordinate field units that the forcible detention 
and hospitalisation of suspected females was not called for and made 
its standpoint equally clear in the way it attempted to deal with a 
secret bordello that was discovered in Wjasma. (67) Although the 
Feldgendarmerie arrested a number of suspected females in order to 
try to identify the location of the brothel, the women were soon 
released. The military authorities noted that since a number of the 
women in question were wearing German military dress boots the most 
effective approach would be to deal with the individual soldiers who 
were encouraging the illicit activity by payment in kind. In the 
circumstances, Rear Area Command thought that the best solution, in 
keeping with official directives, was to establish an official 
brothel. (68) 
Concern for the moral and physical well-being of the female 
population was not, as Franz Seidler notes in his specialist study, 
the guiding principle when decisions of this sort were made. The 
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decision to establish Wehrmacht bordellos in the East had been forced 
on the military authorities. (69) Any attempts to enforce severe 
punishments on soldiers who engaged in clandestine sexual relations 
with members of the local female population would probably only have 
driven the problem further underground and made control even more 
difficult, and therefore some attempt was made to appeal to National 
Socialist racial values. When this approach failed to make very much 
impact in modifying basic sexual impulses, even opponents were forced 
to accept the concept of bordellos operated under strict medical 
supervision. 
It remains open to doubt whether the channelling of the sexual 
requirements of the troops into official brothels actually reduced 
the incidence of disease. Specialist medical studies have suggested 
that it may have increased transmission rates. (70) Nonetheless, as 
the KorOck reports from Wjasma indicated the move was designed not 
only to deal with the health issue, but perhaps more importantly, the 
security risk which OKH attached to uncontrolled prostitution: "Die 
Gefahren einer solchen versteckten Prostitution bestehen nicht allein 
in der stark vermehrten Möglichkeit der Ansteckung, sondern eröffnen 
erfahrungsgemäß auch dem fahrlässigen Verrat militärischer 
Geheimnisse viele Wege'. (71) 
The view that Russian women (and young children for that matter) 
could be a security menace probably had more impact in shaping German 
attitudes than socio-sexual issues. This was hardly surprising given 
the few men in the towns and villages, and the well-founded German 
suspicion that the partisan movement only functioned as a result of 
support from the female members of the population. Rear Area units, 
such as KorOck 582, were no doubt influenced in part by occupation 
experiences in Poland, when officers had noted that women could pose 
a serious menace that warranted drastic measures. 'Die Bev6lkerung, 
namentlich auch die polnischen Frauen waren fanatisch, 
vaterlandsliebend und masslos verhetzt. Es bedurfte daher stärksten 
Druckes und des Einsatzes erheblicher Kräfte, um sie in Ruhe zu 
erhalten'. (72) 
While there is little evidence of such pronouncements from Korilck 
582 during its posting in the occupied Soviet Union, the security 
units under its control did take the most ruthless measures against 
women who were thought to be involved with the partisans. The only 
Oconcession' was to prescribe the execution of female guerrillas by 
firing squad rather than hanging. (73) Even those females who were 
clearly not active supporters of the partisans were regarded with 
some caution, since many officers in the army of occupation were 
prone to the prejudice that women tended to gossip. (74) The military 
authorities warned units that there was evidence that Russian girls 
had been eavesdropping on conversations between soldiers, and 
subsequently a ban was imposed on any form of fraternization. (75) 
Opportunities for contact - which by all accounts do not seem to have 
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been that well developed - were further reduced by restrictions which forbade soldiers in certain locations to be billeted with the local 
population. (76) The separation of army and civilians was increased by 
additional orders which refused soldiers the opportunity to use 
Russian shops, and more vigorously warned soldiers not to give 
Russian civilians lifts in German vehicles, or (as was noted earlier) 
engage in any form of barter. Korfick even proscribed contact between 
members of the armed forces and the civilian administration to the 
extent that soldiers were forbidden, except under orders, to enter 
buildings used by the local government. (77) 
Anxiety on the part of the military as to the security risks which 
arose from contact with the local population was not simply directed 
against women, but also extended to children and youths. Observers 
such as Toppe believed that there had been a breakdown of social 
controls. The lack of parental control (exacerbated by the large 
numbers of absentee fathers) and the collapse of the school system 
had led to a form of juvenile delinquency. In itself this phenomenon 
did not present a direct political threat to the German occupiers, 
but Toppe warned that the partisans were exploiting the bands of 
'vagabond marauders' for their own end. '... so war die Jugend 
grösstenteils sich selbst überlassen. Ihr Vagabundieren, verbunden 
mit Raubzeugen, wurde bald zur Plage und zu einer Gefahr, denn die 
Partisanen nutzten die jugendlichen Stromerelemente - selbst 10-12 
jahrige Kinder - for Kundschafterdienste und Nachtrichtenfiber- 
mittlung aus'. (78) 
Solutions to the problem, however, varied a great deal. Certain 
military personnel, be it because of genuine sympathy or mere 
pragmatism, urged the re- establishment of an orderly school system 
and noted the long-term impact of the lack of opportunities for 
'intelligent youth' to prepare for some sort of career. (79) Such 
concessions normally applied only to the children of those who 
rendered service to the German occupiers, such as the Army-appointed 
Borgermeister or members of the Ordnungsdienst units. (80) Others in 
the Rear Areas manifested much less concern for such a pedagogic 
approach, and urged the need to maintain the security of the German 
forces by more direct means. KorOck 582 contended that all of the 
local inhabitants over the age of ten years should be treated with 
caution and, while it supported measures to re-open schools, insisted 
that a great deal of time was set aside for work duties such as 
street cleaning rather than educational activity. (Sl) 
If the reintroduction of some sort of school system was primarily a 
means of social control, then very much the same applied to the the 
revival of the Christian Churches in the Rear Areas. However, while 
the Military Government had considered the idea it eventually came to 
the conclusion, albeit towards the end of the period, that the 
political traditions of the Orthodox Church and its often hostile 
attitude to the occupiers ruled out this attempt to find a 
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replacement ideology for Bolshevism. 'Vielmehr wurde es ein immer 
dringenderes Erfordernis, dem Bisher die Menschen beherrschenden 
Gedankengut des Bolschewismus eine andere Idee entgegenzusetzen. Die 
russich-orthodoxe Kirche konnte für den Zweck nicht eingeschaltet 
werden, da sie einmal die panslawistische Tendenz in ihrer Lehre 
besitzt, zum anderen ihr jede kaämpferische Tendenz Haltung 
abgeht'. (82) 
Even at the very start of the occupation period, when the concept 
of allowing the local population to revive open religious practices 
seemed to be tolerated, the German Army had imposed strict limits on 
any contact between the ordinary German troops and the indigenous 
population. KorOck 583, for instance, had insisted that all Army 
religious services where to be conducted in the field and not former 
church buildings. Furthermore, it was strictly forbidden for the 
civilian population to attend these military services, or for German 
troops to assist the locals with the repair of churches. (83) 
Overall, official Army policy reduced the opportunity for any form of 
personal social contact between the majority of the rear area 
soldiers and the local people to a merely functional relationship 
between occupier and occupied. Rigorous curfew enforcement and 
restrictions on the movement of civilians - with hostage-taking 
schemes that allowed for the deportation to distant labour camps of 
selected youths from villages in which inhabitants went missing - 
exacerbated the situation. (84) In circumstances were some form of 
limited coexistence seemed likely to occur the unpredictability of a 
great deal of German policy' encouraged series reservations on the 
part of the civilian population. Moreover, the partisans saw it as 
one of their main tasks to isolate the inhabitants of the rear areas 
from the German occupiers. Although this should by no means be 
equated with willing support for the partisans, many villagers came 
to regard them as the lesser of two evils. (85) 
Within this overall context it might appear inappropriate to 
introduce concepts of administrative autonomy on the part of some of 
the civilian population. However, while a broad brush approach to 
Army-civilian relations remains highly representative, documentation 
from the files of KorOck 532 offers an interesting insight into the 
circumstances under which strictly orthodox methods could be 
modified. 
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The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Indigenous 
Selfgovernment in KorOck 532: 
Under normal circumstances, the indigenous population of the 
territories controlled by the German military were allowed at best no 
more than a subservient role. Overall economic and political designs 
for the occupied territories reinforced the army's propensity to 
adopt this approach. Accordingly, there is little material available 
that might be used to support contra-factual models as to the 
alternative policies which the Germans might have pursued in the 
East. Some idea of the freedom of manoeuvre available to army 
commanders and, perhaps more importantly, the uses to which this 
could be put, can be gained, however, by considering an 'experiment' 
in military government that was conducted in KorOck 532. The Army 
corps created an area of 'native' local government 
(Selbstverwaltungs-Bezirk) which enjoyed relative autonomy from the 
occupying power in the rear of PzAOK2 around the Rayon of Lokot: a 
district to the south of Bryansk and Orel with a pre-war population 
of some 41,000 inhabitants. The town of Lokot itself was the only 
real centre and the rest of the area consisted of isolated 
villages. (86) 
At the outset it must be noted that the Kaminsky Brigade, as the 
phenomenon is often referred to, is not the discovery of this 
research project. Work more concerned with the rather different 
matter of Soviet disaffection, such at that by Alexander Dallin, has 
the prior claim. It should be stressed, however, the use of Wehrmacht 
documentation is rather different and thus little concerned with the 
implications of the event from the perspective of the German 
military. (87) Neither is there any attempt to argue that in the 
context of the entire war in the East, Lokot was fundamentally 
influential. The YormulaO was localized, although not completely 
unique, and worked only under certain conditions. (88) However, while 
there may have been, to quote Dallin, 'no logic in the fortuitous 
toleration of a measure of indigenous self-government which one 
German officer proffered while another forbade it', it is this very 
lack of rationale that challenges received wisdom with its homogenous 
view of the German military. (89) 
Under its first German appointed BOrgermeister, Konstantin 
Voskoboinikov and his more notorious successor, Bronislav Kaminsky, 
an experiment in rear area military administration took place from 
1941-1943, with the army content to grant a large measure of 
independence to the local "authorities'. With the patronage of the 
Korack the economic and political life of the district and its 
security became the immediate concern of the indigenous population, 
rather than that of the German military forces. (90) 
The very existence of a system of quas i- independent Russian 
administration sponsored by the German army conflicted with declared 
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National Socialist principles on the worthlessness of both society 
and individuals within that system. Dallin goes so far as to argue 
that Lokot was, 'virtually the only area were the Germans agreed to 
place administration in indigenous hands'. (91) An extreme analysis 
might even regard the KorQck commander's patronage of a 
self-governing region as 'illegal' given official National Socialist 
policy for the occupied territories. In fact, there is no suggestion 
that KorQck 532, or even PzAOK2 for that matter, were engaged in a 
fundamental challenge to official Nazi policy. Indeed, not only the 
existence, but more importantly the role and significance of the 
Kaminsky Brigade, was a matter of common knowledge (and official 
sanction) that reached all the way from the relevant Army Group Rear 
Area to the FQhrer Headquarters itself. (92) 
Official tolerance and the role of the local rank-and-file German 
troops was more significant for the Kaminsky Brigade than distant 
Headquarters in allowing such a degree of autonomy. There was no 
German army of occupation inside the district itself, instead the 
German troops who entered Lokot performed what in modern parlance is 
usually referred to as the role of 'military advisors'. Most of the 
German military's dealings with Kaminsky were the responsibility of a 
limited number of Army staff, mainly a Korfick liaison officer, Major 
von Veltheim, and a tactics expert, Colonel RObsam. (93) This fact, 
coupled with the fairly isolated location of Lokot itself, makes this 
'local curiosity' an invaluable portal into the subtleties of Army 
Rear Area occupation policies. 
Although some form of indigenous administration had operated in Lokot 
since the early winter of 1941, Korfick 532 records first make 
reference to the Selbstverwaltungsbezirk in the summer of 1942. (94) 
Faced with increasing security difficulties, the KorOck commander, 
General Bernhard, had convened a meeting of all the BOrgermeister who 
had been appointed by the Germans in the rear area, in order to 
stress the mutuality of interest which he argued existed between the 
occupying forces and the local population. The gathering in August 
1942 was the first that Kaminski attended and the event marked the 
start of increasing KorOck support for his brigade and the expression 
of the underlying concept that some form of indigenous administration 
was integral to anti-partisan operations. 
Kaminsky's district of Lokot was, however, much more than simply a 
collection of fortified villages (Wehrdarfer). In addition to 
combatting the partisan threat, it also fulfilled the food and 
resource requirements of the local German troops. Indeed, a major 
attraction of the system for the military government was the 
effectiveness of this indigenous levying system. Collective farms 
were not looted, as was common elsewhere in the Rear Areas, but 
rather co-operatives were formed with German consent. The local 
peasantry were encouraged to turn over food levies to Kaminsky since 
the scheme allowed for the sale of surplus production either on the 
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open market, or to the Germans who purchased through the regional 
administration. The system had an underlying attraction for the local 
population that it provided some measure of security against partisan 
raids. Reports to Befehlshaber Mitte were not slow to point out that 
this was a highly successful method, far superior to the direct 
military levy system imposed elsewhere. (95) As a result of a further 
escalation in partisan activity Kaminski's military role was 
expanded. By the end of 1942 the 'Brigade' had grown from a mere 
twelve men to a force of over 10,000 equipped with many of the 
trappings of a conventional army. Now officially referred to as the 
Russkaia Osvoboditel'naia Narodnaia Armiia (RONA - Russian Popular 
Army of Liberation), the expanded self-defence unit was in a position 
to participate in large-scale anti-partisan operations in the Army 
Rear Area. (96) 
While there is conflicting evidence on the overall quality of the 
resources made available to the RONA, it does appear that in 
comparison with various Ordnungsdienst (OD) formations in the Rear 
Area, the Lokot unit received a great deal more attention from the 
Korlick Quartermaster. (97) Some idea of the level of German Army 
commitment to the Bezirk can in fact be gauged from a military 
inspectorate report compiled in the Spring of 1943 which estimated 
expenditure at some 3-4,000,000 Rubles per month! (98) Such expansion 
naturally created manpower problems, and unlike other ODs who often 
had to come to terms with this restriction, Kaminski was allowed to 
recruit officers from nearby POW camps, although the force retained 
its original indigenous character, with some 85% of its members 
local villagers. (99) In fact, the increase in fire-power and 
composition had other more significant and far-reaching consequences, 
for there was now an intensification of the Brigade's inclination to 
loot and pillage areas of the Bezirk merely suspected of being 
sympathetic to the partisans. Accordingly, the more remote villages 
in the district were often crudely divided on a 'pro-Kaminski' and 
'pro-partisan' basis, and it was not uncommon for almost fratricidal 
action to ensue with the RONA killing entire families in one 
location, while the guerrillas adopted a similar attitude elsewhere. 
It was also taken for granted that a form of 'warlord' system of 
punishment existed within the Brigade, with fear acting as an 
integrating factor for the cohesion of unit. Hermann Teske, a general 
staff officer who visited Lokot in March 1943, related in his memoirs 
that on arrival at Kaminski's headquarters he found four members of 
the brigade hanged outside the building. Despite Teske's surprise he 
registered little in the way of disquiet at such goings on, which 
reinforces the assertion that the German army tended to regard such 
behaviour as acceptable. 'Bei dem Besuch hingen vor seinem 
(Kaminskis) Stabsquartier vier Gehenkte. Es waren - wie er erklärte, 
sein Stabschef und dessen Gehilfen, denen er nicht mehr getraut 
hatte'. 0 00) 
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In many ways, the Korfick indulged Kaminski, and gifts - including 
hampers containing cigars, wine, spirits and perfume - were supplied 
on a regular basis. He was also accorded some not inconsiderable 
status, as seen in the invitation to the German military 
celebrations held in October/November 1942 on the first anniversary 
of the German occupation of Bryansk. (101) It would seem that provided 
the brigade contained the partisan menace and continued to meet the 
levy requirements, both Army Corps and Rear Area were prepared not 
only to tolerate but actually endorse Kaminski's rule in this 
quasi-civil war. 
This is not to say that all the Rear Area officers were fully in 
approval of the Brigade's increasing use of violence or prepared to 
offer total licence. The critical tone was exemplified in the reports 
of the Army liaison officer which likened Kaminski's behaviour to 
that of an African despot chieftain, and noted with concern his 
rather arrogant manner 'Major v. Veltheim berichtet, daß das von 
Kaminski errichtete Willkürregiment dem eines afrikanischen 
Häuptlings ähnele, dem jedes Mittel recht sei, das dazu dient, alle 
in irgendeiner Weise in mehr oder minder große Abhängigkeit zu 
bringen'. Jede unmittelbare Beschaffung bleibt offensichtlich auf 
Weisung Kaminski's erfolglos. Major von Veltheim berichtet das ihm 
dauernd, auch in den belanglosesten Angelegenheiten Knüppel zwischen 
die Beine geworfen werden, um immer von Neuem die Unabhängigkeit und 
dessen Unentbehrlichkeit darzutun'. (102) 
Wehrmacht personnel in general reinforced this view, and frequently 
expressed their resentment at the tendency of members of the Brigade 
to show a marked lack of respect for their German 'superiors', 
particularly when on active service. (103) Disagreements also arose 
because of what many Army officers regarded as the misappropriation 
of precious supplies. This theme was evident from the regular 
complaints as to the social use to which Kaminski put the Brigade's 
staff cars. Criticism which, it should be noted, also contained 
references to the tendency of some German officers to accord him and 
his "entourage' respect and status: 'WAhrend der Kommandeur der kgl. 
ung. Division, sowie die übrigen deutschen und ungarischen Offiziere 
in Lokot zu Fuß gehen, ist unangenehm aufgefallen, daß Kaminski und 
eine weibliche Begleiterin (die von deutschen Offizieren bereits als 
"Gnädige Frau" angeredet worden ist) trotz geringer Entfernung zum 
Theater, Kino usw. einen Kraftwagen benutzen mit großer Aufschrift 
'Im Dienst der Deutschen Wehrmacht' sehr viel in Lokot 
hin-und-her-fahren. Vielfach ließen die Fahrgäste (Frauen) deutlich 
erkennen, daß es sich keinesfalls um dienstliche oder kriegswichtige 
Fahrten handele. '(104) 
The Hungarian Army units that operated in the KorOck were 
especially inclined to express disdain at the very notion of a 
Russian enjoying such privileges, and this was made clear in their 
remarks as to Kaminski's 'Hurenfahrten. It required some careful 
management on the part of Korack to placate those concerned. (105) 
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Given the doubts expressed in KorOck assessment reports that the 
'experiment' had endowed Kaminski with too much power, and German 
unwillingness to extend the model to other parts of the occupied 
territories (since this might have produced a tendency towards 
feudalism), the question must be posed as to why the Korfick saw fit 
to maintain the system. (106) Certainly, it would be incorrect to 
approach the episode from the perspective of collaboration based on 
anti -Bolshevism. As the German forces themselves realised, Kaminski 
may have been a critic of Soviet Communism but, unlike his, more 
ideologically motivated predecessor Voskoboinikov, he was essentially 
an opportunist. The local German army corps recognised this fact and 
while the military gave Kaminski very much of a free hand, both 
PzAOK2 and KorOck 532 continued their support only as long as the 
Brigade remained apolitical. In this respect it should be stressed 
that the decision of the German army liaison staff to increase the 
combat strength of the Brigade reflected its usefulness in the 
specific area of counter-guerrilla warfare; there was no intention to 
legitimise the principle of local Russian self-rule. 
Kaminski's brutal military techniques, in fact, undermined any hope 
of long-term solutions to the matter of Rear Area stability and 
indicated that the German Army, bereft itself of anything more than 
immediate short-term policies, had an underlying lack of concern for 
the indigenous population. This point is emphasised by Dallin who 
contends that Kaminski never 'recommended to the German army measures 
to improve the lot of the Russian population. Indeed, this was one 
reason why the Germans, or at least some Germans would confidently 
entrust a district and a (military) brigade to him. (107) 
Concern over Kaminski's neglect of administrative matters 
reinforces this assessment and is well brought out in the Military 
Government (Section VII) report which Heeresgruppe Mitte issued in 
May of 1943. Much stress was placed on a range of areas in which the 
Lokot system was defective, be it the over-bureaucratic nature of 
local government, the limitations of the school system, or the 
inadequacies of the hospital facilities. Even the move to 
re-establish some cultural activities in the district, including the 
revival of conventional theatre seemed rather cosmetic. With the 
exception of attempts to revive district newspapers such schemes were 
clearly not for popular consumption. (108) It could be argued that 
many of these problems derived from difficulties common to the entire 
KorOck, such as the lack of qualified personnel to oversee activities 
or supply and resource shortages. Yet, while the 1943 report 
highlighted these areas, it also made it quite clear that Army 
Command had done little to help alleviate the problems, and 
ultimately the subsequent and drastic decline in even utilitarian 
support for Kaminski amongst the local peasantry was to prove 
disastrous. (109) By September of 1943 Lokot was once again under 
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official Soviet rule and although the Brigade was transferred 
westward as part of the Trek, the 'experiment' was to all intents and 
purposes at an end. (110) 
The Self-Governing Area of Lokot can be seen as having arisen almost 
by accident as a result of the realisation by some army officers that 
effective occupation of the the vast rear areas was not viable 
without some reliance on the local population. German forces simply 
could not cope, especially while front-line military operations were 
in progress. It was not those whom Dallin calls the 'men of good 
will' in Berlin - the advocates of a more generous policy towards 
Russia and its peoples, like Schulenburg or Strikfeld - who backed 
the Kaminsky venture on humanitarian grounds. (I 11) Instead, it was 
primarily German military commanders in the field such as General 
Schmidt (PzAOK2) and General Bernhard (KorOck 532) and even Field 
Marshal von Kluge (the Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet Mitte) who 
adopted an approach based mainly on pragmatism. 
Overall, experiments such as the creation of the Kaminski Brigade 
demonstrate how little substance there is to arguments which suppose 
that the German occupation of the Soviet Union could have had a very 
different outcome, if only different policies had been pursued. 
KorOck 532, and its immediate army command was content to pursue a 
'live and let live' policy - by which the area and its inhabitants 
were left alone - only as long as they served immediate German 
military interests. In the long term, National Socialist planning 
made any such schemes untenable. 
These caveats accepted, the very existence of this so called 
'Selbstverwaltungs Bezirk' does offer an insight into the freedom of 
manoeuvre available to individual Rear Area Commanders. As the 
following discussions on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war 
demonstrate, the use to which KorOck put this quasi- independence 
varied considerably. 
### 
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Army Relations with the Civilian Population. 
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Soviet Prisoners of War in the German Army Rear Areas. 
The debate on 'Intention or Necessity. 
The Lebensraum- and Vernichtungskrieg waged by the Third Reich in the 
East has been described as marking the final radicalisation of 
Hitler's racial revolution. (I) Yet, while the unlimited licence to 
kill is conventionally associated with the brutal eradication of 
millions of European Jews, the systematic starvation and murder of at 
least two million Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) in German Army hands 
remains the 'forgotten holocaust'. (2) 
Estimates as to Death Rates of Soviet POWs 1941-1945. 
Author Number Captured Deaths As % 
Jacobsen & 
Streit 5,734,000 3,300,000 57.5% 
(600,000 killed in 
action) 
Period Autumn 1941 to Spring 1942: 85% 
Streim 5,163,381 2,530,000 49% 
Hoffmanný 5,245,882 2,000,000 38% 
Roschmann 1,680,000 c. 33.6% 
N Müller 3,222,000 c. 60% 
German POWs in Soviet Hands: 
B6hme 3,155,000 C. 1,000,000 c. 31.6% 
Mortality Rates for Western Allied POWs 1939-45 c. 3.5% 
Mortality Rates for Russian POWs 1914-1918 (3) c. 5.4% 
The literature survey which opened this thesis has already indicated 
that the full implications of events should not have been neglected. 
Indeed, the mistreatment of captured Red Army soldiers had been a 
central issue at the NOrnberg war trials. The theme was also taken-up 
by the earliest specialist accounts of German rule in Russia, 
including the works of Alexander Dallin and Gerald Reitlinger, both 
of which had identified the quantitative scale of the problem. (4) 
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Other historians, such as Alexander Werth, had gone further and 
elaborated on the human qualitative dimension with graphic and 
disturbing accounts of conditions in the camps. (5) 
Despite the awareness that death had taken place on an 
unprecedented scale, the tendency remained to attribute the fate of 
the Soviet POWs to either the action of Nazi agencies such as the 
SS/SD, or contingent circumstances, in particular the dire shortages 
of food, fuel and building materials. Given that the German Army was 
almost entirely responsible for the management of the captured Red 
Army troops, the apologist literature (often based on the accounts of 
former officers) took it as an a priori assumption that ideological 
motivation was not a determinant of military policy. (6) 
Investigations by historians including Hans Adolf Jacobsen and 
Helmut Krausnick challenged such assumptions. They discerned a 
willingness on the part of the Wehrmacht to cooperate with the SD, 
and in some instances actually initiate barbarous measures normally 
associated with the Einsatzgruppen, including the notorious 
Kommissarbefehl (which laid down guidelines for the eradication of 
political officers in the Red Army. )(7) The erosion of the belief 
that the traditional German armed forces had kept their uniform clean 
('ihren Waffenrock sauber gehalten') took a quantum leap forward with 
Christian Streit's 'Keine Kameraden. (S) The work systematically 
analysed the entire complex of so-called 'criminal orders' of which 
the Kommissarbefehl was only a component. Streit's most damning 
argument was the revelation that the Army leadership had not only put 
itself instrumentally at the disposal of the war of annihilation, but 
that the Wehrmacht and Army leadership (OKW and OKH) had actively 
participated in the formulation of policy. Moreover, from the very 
start of the campaign, the German army leadership had commenced 
liquidation measures in certain sections of the field of operations, 
which further served to radicalise policy. Clear parallels and 
interactions were evident with the role the higher echelons of the 
armed forces had taken in co-formulating Backe's hunger strategy for 
the occupied Eastern areas. (9) Subsequent work, such as that by 
Krausnick and Wilhelm on the working relationship between the 
military and the Einsatzgruppen, added to the thesis that the 
military leadership had more or less unreservedly agreed to conduct 
an ideologically determined war of annihilation in the East. (10) 
At an even more sinister - level, it could be argued that the 
destruction of millions of Soviet POWs had partly shaped the 
subsequent escalation of overall annihilation policies. The measures 
taken to liquidate the captured soldiers had not only established 
certain techniques of extermination, but had created a value system 
which facilitated, clarified and formularized implementation of the 
'Final Solution'. The radicalisation of policy both by and through 
the actions of the German army thus produced an extension of 
categories for extermination, in what Hans Mommsen has called an 
9almost geometrical progression' from the Bolshevik leadership down 
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through the mass of Soviet POWs to the Jewish population. (I 1) On 
these premises, the death in German Army hands of some 60% of the 
Soviet POWs had very little to do with the vast numbers involved and 
associated supply problems. It can be seen as the direct consequence 
of active collaboration on the part of the military leadership with 
the ideological maxims of the National Socialist regime. The captured 
Soviet troops were subjected to systematic and exploitative actions 
which treated them according to ethnic and racist criteria. in 
comparison with the German Army's handling of Western European POWs, 
no regard whatsoever was given to international agreements which 
related to procedures for the treatment of captured enemy 
soldiers. (12) 
From the perspective of 'history from above', studies of the Army 
leadership's attitude to the POW problem offer a powerful demolition 
of the myth that the military elites remained aloof from annihilation 
policies. At the highest levels the traditional military value system 
had given way to a group consensus dominated by true National 
Socialists ('echten Nationalsozialisten'). (13) Despite the special 
pleading of apologist literature, there seems to be little evidence 
of a 'silent agreement' within the higher officer corps 
systematically to sabotage the 'criminal orders'. On this basis, 
those members of the army leadership, such as von Brauchitsch, who 
questioned the participation of the Army in measures such as the 
implementation of the Kommissarbefehl did so not on moral grounds, 
but only to limit the negative repercussions of the directives on 
troop discipline. (14) Evidence of opposition to these measures from 
individual troop commanders can thus in no way detract from the hard 
facts of the final outcome. (15) Millions of Soviet POWs were 
indirectly eliminated by mass starvation and ill-treatment, and 
600,000 died as a direct result of the Army's active co-operation 
with the SD Einsatzgruppen. (16) 
Recent research has thus advanced a powerful case in support of the 
argument that the most senior elements of the officer corps were 
implicated in the racial and ideological war. However, while the line 
of dispute may not have run between the OKW and the OKH (as the 
apologists claimed), the disagreements between the higher echelons 
and troops in the field should not be ignored. Admittedly, no attempt 
is being made here to suggest that protest was the order of the day, 
or that it was effective. All the same, provided the overall critical, 
case is clearly stated, a further consideration of the exceptions to 
the rule offers some insight, into the extent to which the ideological 
indoctrination of the traditional elite had permeated the mass of 
German society. Moreover, there is a need to move the frame of 
reference away from the complicity of the army leadership in the 
formulation and direction of policy. Attention should now be focused 
instead on implementation at grass-ropts level and the reaction of 
the rank-and-file to the component parts of policy. 
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Soviet Prisoners of War in the German Army Rear Areas. 
To approach the issue of German Army policy towards captured enemy 
soldiers a description of the organisational structure of POW 
management in the East might be regarded as the very negation of a 
'history from below' that attempts to deinstitutionalize and thereby 
'humanise' the debate. However, this is certainly not the case, for 
an understanding of the administrative practices involved indicates 
the role and degree of potential autonomy which the German Army 
exercised in handling the millions of captured Soviet soldiers. 
As with many aspects of military government in the occupied Eastern 
territories, the channels of communication and chains of authority 
were far from consistent or uniform. (I) The debate on the role of the 
OKH in the formulation of ideologically determined directives brings 
into question the very notion of centrally derived policy. 
Consequently, the dissemination of orders and the complimentary 
feedback varied not only between the areas under OKW control and 
those under the OKH, but within the OKH territories themselves, 
particularly between Army Group Rear Areas and KorOck. 
The POW 'installations' (and the use of this vague term is 
deliberate) fell into three broad categories which marked various 
stages in the capture and subsequent movement of the captured enemy 
soldiers. In the front-line areas and the immediate Army Rear Area 
(AOK and Korfick), the POWs were detained in so called Armee- 
Gefangenensammelstellen (AGSSt). In the Army Group Rear Areas 
(Rilckwftrtiges Heeresgebiet) the various subordinate Security 
Divisions (Sicherungs-Divisionen) concentrated the captured soldiers 
in Durchgangslagern (Dulags). In all the civilian administered/OKW 
regions prisoners were kept in Kriegsgefangenen-Mannschaftsstammlager 
(Stalags). (2) 
Overall responsibility for the POWs in the army operational areas 
(OKH Bereich) was a matter for the Army Quartermaster General's 
office. (OKH/Gen. Qu. /Abt. KV). This office controlled the POW Regional 
Commander (Kriegsgefangenen-Bezirks-Kommandant) who in turn acted as 
the administrative body for the commanders of both the Dulags and the 
Armee-Gefangenensammelstellen (AGSSt). However, militarily the Dulags 
were controlled by, and responsible to, the Army Group Rear Area 
Commander (Befehlshaber des rilckwArtigen Heeresgebiets) via the 
relevant security divisions, while the AGSSt were the responsibilty 
of the appropriate Army Corps (AOK) by way of its Rear Area (Kortick). 
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The Organisation of POWs in the Army Rear Areas 
OKII 
Quartermaster General 
(Abt. KV: POW admin) 
Army Group 
----------------------- --------------------- 
Army Group Army Corps 
Rear Area (AOK) 
------------------ POW Area Command 
Korock 
Security Divs. 4 
------------------------ ------------ 
Dulags ArmeeGefangenSSt. 
Based on: 
Anlage 1 zum Erlaß des OKW/Abt. Kriegsgef. dated 16.6.1941 
A. Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener 
im Tall Barbarossa", Karlsruhe 1981 
C. Streit, Keine Kam'eraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjet. 
Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, Stuttgart 1978. (3) 
The administrative complexity which the system gýve rise to is 
something of a conceptual leitmotiv in this overall project, and an 
awareness of this is crucial in any consideration of policy in 
action. Leaving aside for a moment the overall constraints within 
which the individual military commanders were compelled to operate, 
those officers responsible for POW camp administration within Korcick 
military jurisdiction (AGSSt) enjoyed considerable freedom of 
expression, if nbt action. Official policy, emanating from OKH 
demanded harsh treatment of Soviet POWs, and in keeping with this 
objective had allocated food, heating and construction materials 
accordingly. However, AGSSt commandants while officially dependent 
-S 
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on the Quartermaster General's office, would have tended to derive 
military guidance and resource allocation by way of Korfick and AOK. 
Consideration of this relationship is prompted by more than 
administrative curiosity, for AGSSt commanders shared much in common 
with Kodick commanders in that they tended to be 'officers of the old 
school'. Many of the POW camp officials were also elderly reserve 
officers, often with experience of the 1914-1918 war, who had been 
brought out of retirement to meet the unanticipated manpower 
shortages which now faced the German Army in the East: I... im 
Kriegsgefangenenwesen im allgemeinen nicht junge und fronttaugliche 
Soldaten verwendet wurden, sondern ältere Jahrgänge, die für einen 
Fronteinsatz nicht mehr in Frage kamen. Die Lagerkommandanten und 
deren Staboffiziere waren zum Beispiel durchweg Teilnehmer des 1. 
Weltkrieges, die bei Kriegsbeginn oder während des Kriegs aus 
Personalmangel als Reserveoffiziere wieder eingezogen und im 
Kriegsgefangenenwesen eingesetzt werden. Einige dieser Offiziere 
starben aus Altersgründen noch während des Krieges im Einsatz... '. 
(4) 
The great majority of POW camp commandants in the Army Rear Areas 
had been born in the period between 1870 and 1890. They had retired 
in the 1920s or, at the latest, the early 1930s and could not clearly 
be identified with any Nazification process that had taken place 
within the German Army. (5) Very much the same caveat applied to the 
Army regional commanders responsible for POW management. The youngest 
of the nine had been born in 1890, while the oldest was ten years his 
senior. (6) 
As will become apparent from a more detailed consideration of the 
situation in both Korilck 532 (Pz. AOK2) and KorUck 582 (AOK9), much 
depended on the application, ingenuity and ability of these camp 
commanders. The task fell to them on an almost individual basis to 
obtain not only construction materials, tools and food-supplies but 
often, and more importantly, the assistance of other Army units. If, 
however, the condition of the POWs was a matter of indifference to 
the camp commanders, then the tragic fate of the inmates was 
inevitable. Certainly they received little automatic support from the 
Army Commanders in the field, who regarded the organisation and 
management of the POWs as a very secondary issue in the context of 
the Army's overall military role. Any disagreement over priorities 
was thus bound up with the fact that in the early stages of the war 
the treatment of the POWs was at the discretion of the individual 
Armeeoberkommandos. There is considerable evidence to indicate that 
the rations allocated to these AOKs were far too small to allow the 
POWs to survive for very long. (7) Moreover, the front-line troops 
showed very little interest in assisting with the construction of POW 
facilities. A case in point relates to the experiences of the new 
commander of Dulag 240/AGSSt. 7 in Rshew (Korfick 582), who took over 
some 5,000 POWs from AOK9 at the end of November 1941, and then had 
to build most of the camp facilities. (8) Even where the POW camp 
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commander applied himself to the improvement of facilities, there was 
no guarantee that the end-result would be significant. Energetic 
officers might present convincing arguments to AOK for increased 
supplies, but they could not significantly influence overall 
political/military thinking, which had as its basic premise the 
ideologically motivated concept of exposing large numbers of the 
Soviet population to a starvation strategy. (9) 
As for the conditions under which the Soviet POWs were kept, it 
should be noted that the theoretical provision of facilities was 
seldom, if ever, realised in practice. During the first three weeks 
of the campaign in the East the German Army captured some 323,000 Red 
Army soldiers, including a large number of deserters. Within five 
months the number had increased over ten-fold so that by the end of 
December 1941 over 3 million Soviet troops were in German hands. (10) 
Yet, while the military planners in both OKW and OKH had anticipated 
vast numbers of this sort, the construction and supply of even 
partially suitable camps was at the very bottom of German army 
priority lists. Less than a month before the outbreak of the war 
against the Soviet Union, the OKW had built a mere six Dulags in the 
areas of Poland annexed by the Third Reich. (I 1) The result of this 
was that from the very start of military operations when, as the 
figures indicate, the number of captured POWs already ran into 
hundreds of thousands all that was available were so called 'summer 
camps' (Sommerlager). (12) 
Although considerable historical insight is to be derived from the 
detailed material that will be presented on this disturbing topic, 
some general statement needs to be made. No account of the German 
Army's actions in the East should underplay the scale and 
significance of events by 'legitimising' them through a form of 
analysis that fails to recognise the enormous and horrific whole 
which the individual parts constituted. (13) 
These 'summer camps' were invariably little more than vast open 
tracts where the Red Army soldiers attempted to maintain an existence 
in either dugouts or at best mud-huts. The distinctive constructed 
feature of these installations was the miles of barbed-wire fencing 
which marked out the perimeter and the 'supply area'. Even here there 
were only the most basic facilities such as cooking pots, crude 
implements and limited quantities of quick-lime. There was certainly 
no provision for barracks, latrines or even basic protection against 
the elements. (14) The onus was entirely on the prisoners themselves 
to construct shelters, and given the lack of even crude implements, 
let alone building materials, the great majority of the POWs existed 
under open skies in earth holes or mud-huts roofed with leaves. 
With the first snowfalls and frost in October of 1941 many camps in 
Army Group Centre could not provide adequate shelter for all the 
POWs, and it was not until the end of November that the great 
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majority were brought under some sort of cover. Even then the 
barracks were almost inevitably unheated and the prisoners were 
forced to sleep on bare earth floors without any bedding. (15) Dulag 
240 in Korfick 582 was fairly typical in the matter of shelter, with a 
range of single storey huts which measured no more than 12 metres by 
24 metres, each holding some 450 POWs. (16) The food situation was so 
dire that the camp inmates usually resorted to the defoliation of the 
area, stripping any trees of both leaves and bark, and even eating 
the grass and nettles. In some instances there was a resort to 
cannibalism. 
If some consideration had been given to systematically and 
adequately feeding the captured soldiers, any schemes would have been 
unviable because no provision had been made to allocate transport 
facilities to the camps. It has been calculated that even on the most 
basic supply figures a fairly typical POW installation with some 
10,000 inmates had a daily requirement of five tonnes of potatoes, 
three tonnes of bread and 60 metres of timber for firewood. (17) At 
least 30 panjewagens would have been required per day to supply these 
materials, and even where the German forces had shown some 
willingness or, for that matter, the local Soviet population had been 
able to fulfil such demands, the dreadful state of the roads tended 
to be an insurmountable problem. (18) As the detailed accounts from 
AGSSt. and Dulags in the Koracks: will demonstrate, this state of 
affairs tended to be the norm, and certainly should be regarded as 
the basis from which any remedial action had to be taken. 
Military planners envisaged a situation in which the captured POWs 
would subsequently be moved from the front-line camps (AGSSt) in the 
Army Rear Areas to the larger facilities offered by the Dulags in the 
Army Group Rear Areas. Indeed, the divisions which captured the POWs 
often felt no more responsible for their welfare than did the German 
units whose task it was to move them to camps in the Rear, and the 
AOKs were often just as eager to pass on the POW problem. 
The Oberquartiermeister of AOK9 (Korrack 582) noted in his KTB entry 
for 17 July 1941 that the feeding of captured POWs was causing great 
difficulties, particularly because of the shortage of field-kitchen 
facilities. By mid August, his reports suggested that with numbers in 
the individual front-line camps often in excess of 5-6,000 men it 
was imperative to move -large numbers of POWs to other installations 
further to the rear. The lack of cooking facilities had became so 
acute by then that it was necessary to operate the limited field 
kitchens on a continuous basis: 'An Verpflegung erhielten die 
Gefangenen aus BeutebestAnden hauptsAchlich Hirse oder Graupen oder 
Buchweizensuppe und, soweit m6glich, AbfAlle aus SchlAchtereien sowie 
Pferdefleisch. Brot steht nattirlich nicht zur Verfagung. Aber bei der 
angespannten Versorgungslage erschient die Gefangenenverpflegung 
(eins-bis-zweimal taglich warme Suppe) angemessen. (19) 
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The immediate relocation of the POWs did nothing to alleviate the 
dire conditions under which they existed. Ortskommandantur reports 
from AOK9's Rear Area for November of 1941 suggested the problem had 
indeed simply been transferred. Particular attention was drawn to the 
plight of the Soviet wounded, although often with more regard to the 
threat of disease which they posed for the German troops. A repeated 
complaint related to the unwillingness of the various German Army 
elements to cooperate with each other in attempts to deal with the 
overall issue: 'Dulag 231 (Wjasma) ist infolge der noch täglich 
eingelieferten Gefangenen und schlechten Abtransportmöglichkeiten 
meist überfüllt. Gegenwärtig sind dort 34,000 Kriegsgefangener, die 
jedoch jetzt laufend abtransportiert werden sollen. In dem russischen 
Verwundetenlazarett, das zur Zeit 9,200 russische Verwundete enthält, 
herrschen unhaltbare Zustände. Neben ungenügender Unterbringungs- 
möglichkeit und Beaufsichtigung besteht Seuchengefahr auch für die 
deutsche Wehrmacht. Meldungen an höhere Dienstellen sind wiederholt 
erfolgt, blieben aber erfolglos.. ' (20) 
By the winter of 1941 so many POWs still remained in camps under OKH 
control that AOK9, for one, imposed a moratorium on the use of these 
facilities to intern civilians, including women and children, 
suspected of partisan activities. (21) When individual German soldiers 
removed large numbers of POWs from the camps in order to set them to 
work, OK reports noted with some alarm that a significant proportion 
often failed to return, the men having decided the risks of escape 
were preferable to the misery of the Dulags: 'Wieder eingefangene 
Rotarmisten sagen aus, dass sie in den Lagern doch verhungern, 
schlecht behandelt oder erschossen würden und deshalb sich lieber in 
der Freiheit hungernd umhertreiben mit mehr Aussicht, ihr Leben zu 
retten'. (22) 
The movement of the POWs even further to the rear only aggravated 
the problem. With the refusal of the transport authorities to allow 
empty rolling stock on it return journey from the front to be 
utilized to move the POWs (because of the supposed risk of disease) 
hundreds of thousands of ragged and underfed Soviet soldiers were 
subjected to the added rigours of long marches on foot, often over 
distances of more than 400 kms. Reports from the Army Rear Areas 
noted that starving POWs often broke away from the march colonies to 
scavenge in the nearby, fields and hedgerows: 'Bldtter und 
weggeworfene Strünke der Rüben würden mit wilder Gier vom Felde 
aufgegriffen und verzehrt'. (23) When the ill-clothed and hungry POWs 
were occasionally moved by train, a large proportion - often more 
than a fifth in winter - perished in the open goods-trucks into which 
they were herded. (24) Vast numbers of those who originally set-out 
thus never reached their intended destination, simply as a result of 
their physical inability to complete the journey. 
Korack 582, on the basis of information provided by its subordinate 
units, was quick to point out both the scale and potential 
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repercussions of the problem, especially the damage to the image of 
the Wehrmacht: 'Bei grösseren Gefangenentransporten sind viele 
Gefangene in die Wälder entwichen und die Strassen mit Toten gesäumt, 
die nicht nur aus Gesundheitsgründen gleich beerdigt werden müssten, 
sondern auch um den nachfolgenden Gefangenkolonnen den Anblick zu 
ersparen und der Feindpropaganda keinen Vorschub zu leisten'. (25) 
On a more sinister level, many of those who died did so directly at 
the hands of their German captors who indiscriminately and summarily 
executed large numbers of the 'stragglers'. Such action was not 
simply tolerated but in many instances recommended by higher 
authorities. Thus, it was often the order of the day for the mere 
handfuls of German soldiers who guarded the seemingly endless columns 
of dejected POWs to receive instructions urging harsh and brutal 
measures. The quasi-open letter issued to the German guard units in 
September of 1941 by the Chef des Allgemeinen Wehrmachts-Amtes, 
Generalmajor Hermann Reinecke, was very representative of this 
approach. Stress was placed on the need to respond to all acts of 
minor defiance or escape attempts with the utmost brutality: 
'Waffengebrauch gegenfiber sowjet. Kr. Gef. gilt in der Regel als 
rechtmaBjig'. (26) 
This instruction clearly ran counter to the guidelines 
conventionally applied to POWs which stressed the need to avoid the 
use of any kind of excessive force except under dire conditions. in 
many ways, such directives only mirrored the expressions of the very 
highest authorities in the Reich, for Hitler himself had urged the 
troops in his open letter 'Soldaten der Ostfront' (issued in October 
1941) to remember that the enemy was not composed of soldiers, but of 
animals: 'Dieser Feind besteht nicht aus Soldaten, sondern zum großen 
Teil nur aus Bestien'. (27) A further expression of this approach was 
also to be found in General Franz Halder's much quoted remark, where 
the Army Chief of Staff stressed that 'the communist (soldiers) were 
and never should be regarded as comrades in arms' ('Der Kommunist ist 
vorher kein Kamerad und nacher kein Kamerad'. )(28) 
The tone of the war had already been clearly set by both the 
KriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlaB and the Kommissarbefehl which, according 
to Christian Streit, made it abundantly clear to the German soldiers 
that the Nazi leadership attached no value whatsoever to the lives of 
Soviet soldiers and citizens alike. (29) Drawing on Kortick reports, it 
might even be argued that any tendency to express compassion towards 
captured enemy soldiers had already been eroded by the experiences of 
the German troops in Poland, especially as initial revulsion at the 
barbarity of the war gave way to increased participation in such 
measures. (30) 
Individual commanders at all levels in the Soviet Union did 
continue, however, to register repeated protests and admonitions 
against such practices, and urged the troops under their control to 
observe certain basic values with regard to the treatment of the 
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Russian POWs. Clearly such responses ran counter to 'official' policy 
and indicated that at least some officers had distanced themselves 
from the ideologically determined line. Yet, in practice the killings 
continued unabated, for the real solution to the issue required a 
fiindamental rethink on priorities and resource allocation, which even 
the protesting officers were either unwilling or unable to make. Both 
the tone and urgency of the calls for restraint might even be taken 
as a measure of the extent of the problem. (31) 
Documents from the files of Korfick 582 indicate that certain 
commanders were particularly concerned at the impact the brutal 
treatment of POWs was having on the German soldiers who implemented 
policy and the local civilian population who witnessed such 
activities: 'Sehr ungünstig wird die Stimmung beeinflusst durch 
angeblich unmenschliches Prügeln von sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 
die wegen Hunger und körperlicher Schwäche am Ende der Züge nicht 
mehr mitkommen konnten. Es sollen sich in Orscha in der Zeit vom 18- 
20.8. vor den Augen der Zivilbevölkerung wiederholt Fälle dieser Art 
abgespielt haben. Die Weissrussen, die mir davon erzählten, 
erklärten, es sei gar nicht schlimm, wenn ein gesunder, fauler 
Kriegsgefangner Prügel bezöge, aber das Prügeln halbtoter 
Erschoepfter errege in der ganzen Bevölkerung Verbitterung und Hass. 
Bei dem mir bisher als deutschfreundlich bekannten Weissruthenen, von 
denen ich diese Dinge hörte, war ein deutlicher Stimmungsumschwung 
festzustellen'. (32) 
Numerous directives were issued which stressed that all means 
should be employed to prevent the mistreatment of POWs by their 
German captors while in transit: 'UnwOrdige Behandlung von 
Kriegsgefangenen durch die Bewachungskräfte ... mit allen Mitteln bekampft werden (mDsse)'. (33) However, Streit argues that the same 
instructions also impressed on the German troops the need to use as 
much force as necessary ('schArfstens durchzugreifen') in the event 
of resistance or attempts to escape, and thus this catch-all clause 
allowed troops to continue the mistreatment and shooting of POWs. (34) 
Even those orders which emphasised the need for restraint were based 
on the a priori premise that the German troops would naturally be 
inclined to seek revenge for the bestial actions perpetrated by the 
Red Army during the campaign: 'Es entspricht dem Ansehen und der 
Würde des deutschen Heeres, dass jeder deutsche Soldat den russischen 
Gefangenen gegenüber den Abstand und die Haltung bewahrt, die der 
Erbitterung und unmenschlicher Roheit der Russen während der Kämpfe 
Rechnung tragen. (35) 
Guidelines issued to K6ruck which stressed that the manner in which 
the POWs were treated reflected on the honour of the German Army, 
also insisted that the lack of troops for guard duties necessitated 
harsh measure: 'Willkür und Rohheit müssen aber unter allen Umständen 
ausgeschlossen bleiben. Sie sind eines deutschen Soldaten unwürdig 
und schädigen aufs schwerste die Manneszucht'. 'Die Bewachung größer 
Gefangenenmassen in Lagern und beim Transport ist bei dem meist nur 
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in geringer Zahl zur Verfügung stehenden Wachpersonal schwierig. 
Strenge ist nötig, Härten sind oft unvermeidlich. '. (36) Later in the 
war, when the POW situation had stabilised somewhat and an 
improvement, albeit relative, in conditions was discernible, some 
Army commanders expressed the view that a more considerate approach 
had actually created problems. They also reiterated the line that 
severe punishments would be imposed on members of the German army who 
allowed POWs to escape. (37) 
The subsequent reaction of the ordinary German soldiers to a 
situation which on the one hand emphasised the worthlessness of the 
captured enemy soldiers - and the repercussions of failure to deal 
effectively with any security threats - yet, at the same time, 
suggested the adoption of a less brutal approach, is highly complex. 
Evidence from military courts indicates that draconian measures were 
seldom employed against guard units which had allowed prisoners to 
escape, and this might be taken to indicate that the behaviour of 
German troops was not rigidly determined by military discipline 
alone. Literature eager to take the German army to task by 
challenging the post-war legend of an honourable war interprets the 
attitudes of the troops in a rather different light. Individual 
soldiers assigned guard duties probably regarded it as a waste of 
effort to prevent the escape of prisoners who were likely to starve 
within a few days anyway, and it was a short step from this view to 
the belief that it was permissible to execute prisoners: 'Was sollte 
ein Wachsoldat mühen, einen Gefangenen am Laufen zu halten, der zwei 
Tage später doch verhungert sein würde? Und von da war es nicht weit 
zu dem Schluß, daß Töten der Gefangenen erlaubt sei'. (39) 
Recent research has certainly added weight to the argument that the 
German front-line troops - who initially received the POWs - treated 
the captured Soviet troops with barbarity, and it would seem almost 
logical that the process continued as the captives were moved further 
to the rear. (40) In absolute terms this is undeniable, but at the 
same time Rear Area troops, perhaps less familiar with the brutal 
character of the 'sharp-end' of the war, often seem to have been at 
least instructed to pursue a somewhat different line. Certainly 
there is much more emphasis in Rear Area files on the attitude and 
behaviour of the German soldiers. A controversial assertion might 
even be made that much of Christian Streit's evidence in support of 
the arguments regarding the brutal treatment of the POWs is actually 
drawn from Kor0ck field reports which expressed concern at the 
gravity of the situation. In some instances, requests for information 
on the policies being pursued by subordinate units even assumed an 
urgent quality that goes beyond the mere bureaucratic need for 
information. The insistence of Korfick 582 on telegraphic responses to 
enquiries on death rates in the camps within its area of command was 
just such a case in point. (41) 
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Korfick files often indicate that a marked divergence existed between 
officers at the front (AOK9) and those in the rear, as well as 
between one POW camp and another, with regard to the approach that 
should be adopted to the captured enemy troops. The findings of a 
tour of inspection made by a senior Kriegsverwaltungsrat to various 
parts of Korfick 582 in August of 1941 made for disturbing reading, 
and emphasised the extent to which the failure of a POW commandant to 
take a positive interest in his task could result in the most 
appalling conditions. (42) The situation in AGSS0 was particularly 
acute, not simply because of a lack of food and cooking facilities, 
but because difficulties were compounded by the apparent total lack 
of organisation in the camp. Brutality seemed to be the main control 
technique in use, and the situation was made all the worse by the 
camp commandant's unexplained absence, and his subsequent inclination 
to shift responsibility on to the officer in charge of the guard 
unit: 'Zudem ist das Kochgut zu dünn, weil keinerlei Kontrolle, Die 
Masse der Gefangenen ist nicht in Gruppen eingeteilt, auch sind keine 
russischen Chargen bestimmt, demzufolge werden die Gefangenen morgens 
mit Stockschlägen in die eine Lagerseite getrieben und dann nach und 
nach an der Kochanlage vorbei auf die andere Seite geschleust. '(43) 
Added to this, the lack of drinking water and washing facilities 
also resulted in wild behaviour of a sort which, so the inspecting 
officer argued, compelled the German guards regularly to use a large 
measure of force to restore order 'Zu Trinken erhalten die 
Gefangenen nichts, Waschmöglichkeit besteht auch nicht. Wenn die 
Wasserträger das Wasser für die Küche bringen, entsteht immer eine 
wilde Schlägerei, die oft nur durch Schüsse beendet werden kann. Auch 
sind Hungerrevolten mit Schießerein an der Tagesordnung'. (44) 
The degradation of the camp inmates was further increased by the 
virtual absence of sanitary facilities, with only two latrines for 
the 11,000 POWs: 'Im Lager, das mit etwa 11,000 Kriegsgefangenen 
belegt ist, sind die Latrinenanlagen völlig unzureichend; es sind nur 
2 kleine Latrinenanlagen vorhanden, sodaß die Gefangenen gezwungen 
sind, ihre Notdurft an beliebigen Stellen des Platzes zu 
verrichten'. (45) Facilities for the Russian wounded were even more 
horrific with large numbers of POWs crowded in two insanitary huts; 
while many others were compelled to remain in the open without any 
sort of cover against the elements. An additional nights stay in an 
army vehicle outside AGSST. 7, during which a great deal of shooting 
was heard, confirmed the impression that the camp was as rowdy and 
undisciplined during the hours of darkness as it was by day. 
The Kriegsverwaltungsrat's report was all the more damning because 
his opening remarks suggested that the area around the camp offered a 
range of facilities including accommodation, cooking implements and 
clean running water, which had been left unexploited by the camp 
commander. Certainly, in recommending far reaching changes in both 
organisation and resource allocation, the inspecting officer was 
highly critical of the Lagerkommandant. However, despite the critical 
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tone of the document there is no evidence to suggest that the report, 
proposed, never mind resulted in, any form of official rebuke to be 
administered against the officer in question. (46) Conditions were 
still appalling in November of 1941 when the AGSSt. was transferred 
from AOK to Korfick 582, and an attempt was at least started to put 
the camp into some sort of order. (47) 
An insight into the impact that service in such camps had on the 
German soldiers assigned to them can be gauged from reports referred 
to by Streit. Files from the Generalgouvernement for the December of 
1941 noted that the dreadful conditions in the Stalags had forced the 
military to take measures to try to improve the morale of the guard 
units, including an increase in alcohol rations. (48) In Korrick 582 
itself the tendency of troops to cope with the disorder by violent 
means did not, however, go unnoticed. AOK9 issued clear instructions 
to its Rear Area that certain practices regarding the treatment of 
the POWs were not to be continued, and particular attention was drawn 
to the 'unsoldierly' impression created by troops carrying clubs: 
'Jede Willkfir is verboten. Obergriffe der Bewachungsmannschaften 
sind zu bestrafen. St6cke in der Hand der Wachmannschaften sind 
unsoldatisch und zu verbieten'. (49) 
How representative or, for that matter, effective such directives 
were, given both the ideological pressures on the troops and the 
force of circumstances, is highly debateable. Indeed, material drawn 
from other reports from Army Group Centre confirms the early 
assertion that there had, if anything, been a deterioration in 
conditions since the opening of the campaign. The Area Commander 
responsible for POW matters (Kriegsgefangenen-Bezirkskommandant) 
following an inspection of Dulag 142 at Bryansk in November of 1941 
commented that almost no provision had - been made for the coming 
winter. There were no washing facilities, sleeping boards or food 
stores. Some idea of the hunger of the captured soldiers can be 
gauged from the fact that six prisoners had already been shot for 
acts of cannibalism, and a further five were due to be executed on 
similar grounds. (50) 
In theory the POWs were allocated basic rations, but in practice the 
amounts were far below the bare minimum required for mere survival. 
Even the food value figures cited by Streim, which are based on 
$official' guidelines, fall well below the bare minimum required for 
mere physical survival. When the rather obscure amounts are converted 
into calorie equivalents the differential is even more apparent. 
Measured against real requirements, the 'improvement' proposed by the 
Quartermaster General's decree of 21 October 1941 which specified 
1,490 calories per day was still less than 2/3rds of the minimum. 
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Daily Rations for Soviet POWs undertaking negligible Labour 
(In grammes per day) 
Commodity 6.8.1941 21.10.1941 26.11.1941 23.10.42 
Meat 14 none 28 35 
Bread 215 215 321 371 
Fats 16 10 18 18 
Potatoes 1,285 714 1,214 1,000 
Cereal 14 14 21 21 
Vegetables 175 160 160 n/a 
Wey Cheese 6.6 9 9 n/a 
Sugar 21 21 32 16 
Preserve 21 21 25 n/a 
(Total calorie 
equivalent: 1,895 1,069 2278 n/a 
'Norm' for German Civilians 
inside the Reich: 2,400 calories per day 
Source: Adapted from Streim, page 182 
J&AM. Calorie Tables. / Hubert Schmitz (51) 
Material drawn from POW camp records offers a direct insight into the 
horrors of the situation. These details more accurately reveal the 
underlying causes for the extreme mortality rates in the camps and 
the repeated breakdown of any sort of order, which often manifested 
itself, as was noted earlier, in hunger-riots or desperate acts of 
cannibalism. 
POW Food Intake for Dulag Mogilew as of 18.11.1941 
Bread 340 grammes per day 
Horse Meat 10 grammes per three days 
Potatoes 700 grammes (1200 for those working) 
Millet gruel unspecified 
Potato flour U. 
salt U. 
vegetables 70 grammes (120 for those working) 
Source: BA/MA: RH23/223-267ff. 
215 
Dulag 240 Rshew (Korfick 582) 
Rations for December 1941 
Bread 300 grammes 
Horsemeat 30 grammes 
Cereals 175 grammes 
Total Calories 1,435 
Source: BA/MA: RH23//223-267ff. (52) 
These figures represent favourable averaging of amounts, and in some 
instances daily rations fell as low as 20 grammes of millet gruel 
(without meat) and 100 grammes bread. Such food levels barely 
represented one-quarter of the basic minimum required by men engaged 
in light work. The full human dimension of the tragedy can be gained 
by a comparison of food intake by the POWs with guidelines drawn from 
the same Korfick files which specified the absolute minima required 
for the German guard dogs employed on perimeter work. 
Feed Requirement for POW Camp Guard Dogs in Korfick 582 
Daily Requirement as of 20.10.1942 
Meat as Offal (fresh) 1,500 grammes 
Dog Meat (cereal etc) 200 grammes 
Sorgum (Whren) 20 grammes 
Salt 5 grammes 
Bone (Marrow) unspecified 
Source: Korfick 582, Abt. Qu. 'Besondere Anodordnungen Nr. 67', 
dated 20.10.1942, BA/MA: RH23/267 (&0528)(53) 
Disease, much of it related to undernourishment, cold, or the 
insanitary conditions under which the POWs were kept, only served to 
aggravate the situation. Typhus, in particular, was at epidemic 
proportions and the lack of basics such as soap, let alone any 
de-lousing facilities, guaranteed that the problem would remain. 
Matters were not helped by the types of material used in what little 
bedding was available. Although Korfick 582 supplied sacks stuffed 
with paper and straw for the inmates, this measure only served to 
increase the risk of lice-borne disease. (54) Even prophylactic 
measures used by the Wehrmacht troops themselves were not totally 
adequate, and the threat of contamination from the POWs thereby 
encouraged German soldiers further to distance themselves from any 
form of personal contact with the camp inmates. The disease problem 
was not really contained until late Spring 1942, by which time the 
vast majority of the POWs had died. In any case, the rigours and 
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deprivations of the often long forced marches to the camps meant that 
the POWs generally arrived in such a dreadful state that the quickly 
succumbed to all manner of what were normally trivial infections. 
As the earlier observations demonstrated, the wounded amongst the 
POWs suffered the greatest hardship, not least because many camp 
commanders regarded all POWs who could not perform useful work as an 
unnecessary drain on the already limited resources. To compound the 
problem, a large proportion of the inmates in most camps were 
invalided in some way or another. Of the 34,000 POWs confined in 
Dulag 231 (KorOck 582) over 9,000 were classified as wounded, while 
in AGSSt. 8 only 500 of the 1,500 prisoners were regarded as fit: (55) 
'Die restlichen Verwundeten (zu Tode erschöpft, ausgehungert und 
frierend), die Amputierten teilweise ohne Verbände, wurden in offene 
Sammellager (gebracht), wo sie in der Kälte bald zugrunde gehen 
muBten'. (56) 
Some Rear Area units attempted to 'solve' the problem by releasing 
wounded and invalided inmates to the care of the local civilian 
population. Korfick 582 in mid December 1941 suggested just such a 
course of action for the POWs in the prison hospital at Smolensk. 
Later that same month, many AOKs ordered the release into the care of 
the local inhabitants of all the long-term unfit POWs ('dauerend 
wehrunfithig') who had been cleared of any partisan risk by the 
Abwehr, in order to take the strain off food supplies in the camps. 
However, this apparently humane gesture must be seen in context. 
Those released were classified as 'non-workers' (Nichtarbeitende) -a 
group which received no rations - and thus they would have been 
dependent entirely on charity. (57) It remains unlikely, despite 
individual acts of generosity to the POWs by Soviet civilians, that 
the already hard pressed locals would have been either willing or 
able to offer much in the way of support. In any case, the security 
risk, as perceived by the SS, was such that the scheme never really 
became fully operational, and military officials often preferred to 
hand over such POWs to the nearest concentration camp. (58) 
Overall, the death rates amongst the POWs reached horrifying 
proportions. Throughout Rear Area Mitte the mortality rate during the 
late summer averaged 0.3%, but the large numbers of Red Army soldiers 
taken in the encirclement battles at Vjasma and Bryansk were in such 
a poor condition that the death rates between October and November of 
1941 ranged from 0.6 to 2.2 percent. (59) The variation between camps 
was considerable. Dulag 220 at Gomel (K532) with some 12,800 inmates 
reported that by the end of 1941 the daily rate of loss was around 
400 men. (60) Figures for all the installations under the control of 
Korrick 582 (including the infamous AGSSt. 7, with its absentee 
commandant, and the better placed AGSSt. 8) reinforce the discrepancy. 
217 
POW Losses in Installations Controlled by KorOck 582 
Period: 22.06. -1.10.1941, & (2.10. -15.11.1941) 
Died Shot Escaped 
as Partisan 
AGSSO 342(580) 0(0) 37 (62) 
AGSSL8 16(2) 187 (0) 6(3) 
Wach. B. 508 0(0) 75 (0) 7 (7) 
Wach. B. 720 74(123) 4(6) 22(10) 
Dulag 240 18 (91) 0(l) 0(l) 
Totals: 450(796) 266(7) 72 (83) 
Source: Korfick 582: Bezug: AOK9,0. Qu. /Qu. 2, dated 26.11.1941, 
'AbgAnge von Kriegsgefangen', BA/MA: RH23/22 (61) 
The marked increase in mortality rates which occurred with the onset 
of winter is clearly seen in the figures from Dulag 240 in Rshew. Up 
to early November, the death rate was around 2% per day, but in the 
period to mid December an inverse ratio increase took place as 
temperatures fell rapidly and the number of deaths rose to over 
20%. (62) Reports from KorOck 582 for November 1941 indicate just how 
intertwined were many of the problems and also point to the degree 
to which positive action on the part of camp commanders could at 
least ameliorate, if in no way solve, some of the difficulties. In 
Armee-Gefangenen-Sammelstelle 8 over half the POWs were ill as a 
result of frostbite and stomach disorders, aggravated in large 
measure by the unwillingness of front-line units to feed the POW 
labour they drew from the camp. The AGSSt. commander was so concerned 
that he imposed an embargo on the allocation of additional labour to 
these units. Some attempt was also made to improve the lot of those 
still working by making gloves out of old coats and clogs from waste 
timber; the leather boots which most of the Russian soldiers had worn 
when captured had been confiscated by the German forces for their own 
troops. Moreover, considerable pressure had been put on the local 
population to supply food to the camp. As a result, it was possible 
to give the POWs warm soup with horse meat three times a day as well 
as 100 grammes of bread. (400 grammes for those engaged in 
labour). (63) 
It was further evident, even at grossly over-crowded camps such as 
Dulag 240, that the most dire conditions could be improved given 
application and initiative on the part of the Rear Area officers 
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concerned. Following a transfer of authority at the Rshew camp in 
December of 1941, the new commandant made considerable efforts to 
reduce the death rate by improving the facilities, in particular by 
the construction of a heated hospital barracks. Until then most of 
the inmates had been living in dugouts in which they attempted to 
keep warm by building fires. Many of the POWs were already 
half-starved when captured and had been existing on schnapps and 
consequently were suffering from all manner of stomach complaints: 
9... nur solche Kranke aufgenommen werden, die laut ärztlichem Befund 
noch heilbar sind, wogegen die Kranken, bei denen eine solche 
Hoffnung nicht mehr besteht, so hart dies auch klingt, in der 
bisherigen Sanitätsbarracke ihrem Schicksal überlassen werden 
milssen. '(64) Whereas many camp commandants misdirected the energies 
of their staff and men to bureaucratic procedures including the 
categorisation of inmates, or merely disciplined the POWs to keep 
order, the officials at Dulag 240 employed their organisational 
talents in other more positive directions. An abandoned flour mill 
was revived in order to produce some two tonnes of rye per day, and 
the water supply was improved by repairing a pipeline which ran into 
Rshew. Until the army undertook this work, supplies had to be hauled 
in barrels from the nearby Volga. A significant improvement in the 
camp buildings was also achieved when the camp commander restored a 
burnt out saw mill which other German army units had scorned. He also 
obtained the necessary diesel fuel to resume plank production. This 
allowed the POW barracks to be rebuilt with cavity walls which were 
filled with saw dust and wood chippings as insulation. Before this 
time, the camp kitchen did not even have any side walls. (65) 
Despite such efforts, conditions were far from ideal. Reports noted 
that although the camp hospital was now heated, the air in the hut 
was still foul. More disturbingly, the Russian 'surgeon' was in fact 
a psychiatrist who tended to avoid the use of the limited quantities 
of anaesthetic available for operations, preferring instead to use 
hypnosis. All the same, the fact that the situation in this camp did 
not deteriorate over the winter of 1941/42 to the levels experienced 
elsewhere was primarily due to the initiative of the commander, who 
was in his seventies. But having said this, the whole project 
depended on the willingness of both KorQck 582 and AOK9 to cooperate 
in this attempt to surmount the difficulties. (66) 
Such assistance was no doubt encouraged by the decision of the 
Befehlshaber des rOckwArtigen Heeresgebietes Mitte to issue an order 
on the 16th November 1941 that required the inhabitants of villages 
that surrounded the POW camps to provide food and clothing for the 
inmates. For this purpose a spokesman was chosen from amongst the 
captured soldiers to appeal to the local magistrate for charity, with 
the aim of organising the permanent movement of supply wagons from 
the surrounding communities to the camps. (67) The effectiveness of 
such schemes was very dependent on local conditions. In some areas 
the civilian population responded with vigour, in others camp 
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commanders with an interest in the matter found themselves forced to 
pressurise the local community. (68) However, as with the proposals to 
release wounded POWs to the local population, the Army was often 
attracted by such schemes simply because they shifted the onus of 
responsibility away from the German military. Moreover, without a 
marked willingness on the part of AOK and Korfick to improve 
conditions (in extremis, by allowing supplies to be drawn from Army 
supply stores: Armee-Versorgungslagern) such projects were hopeless. 
Reports which deal with other camps in Kortick 582 indicate how 
appeals for assistance were in vain when Armeeoberkommandos disputed 
their responsibility for the problem: 'Meldungen an h6here 
Dienststellen sind wiederholt erfolgt, blieben aber erfolglos, weil 
sowohl Dulag 231 wie auch das Russische Gefangenenlazarett zur 
4. Armee geh6ren. '(69) 
Significant as these varied attempts to alleviate some of the 
hardships of the POWs are, they in no way alter the basic fact that 
the vast majority of the captured Red Army soldiers gained little 
benefit from any such 'exceptions to the rule'. Of the 3,350,000 POWs 
captured during 1941, over 60% had died by February of 1942; 600,000 
of them since the beginning of December 1941. KortIck reports drawn-up 
in early 1943 serve to indicate that concern as to the condition of 
the POWs continued to be a feature of military government throughout 
the active life of the Army Rear Areas. (70) While the very number of 
POWs who perished is, in itself, disturbing enough, it should be 
added that even some of the Rear Area officers who were associated 
with attempts to improve general conditions for the mass of POWs were 
not totally adverse to allowing the Nazi special agencies to 
undertake political scrutiny and removal of 'politically undesirable' 
elements from the camps. As subsequent more detailed material on 
relations between the German Army and the SS/SD indicates, these 
actions, along with the direct implementation of the Kommissarbefehl 
on the battlefield represent an even more sinister link between the 
military and the perverse value system of National Socialism. (71) 
Death, either by slow starvation and disease, or more rapidly as a 
result of the actions of the German Army guard units, was thus the 
fate that overtook the vast majority of the captured Red Army 
soldiers. Those who survived did so in ways that were were more often 
a result of accident and circumstance than design. Within weeks of 
the commencement of the war against the Soviet Union the manpower 
shortages which confronted the Wehrmacht forces demanded a rethink on 
the use of Russian personnel. The easy victory had failed to 
materialize and large numbers of troops were reallocated to the Front 
leaving the Rear Area troops in a precarious position. Not only did 
the KorOck units find it increasingly difficult to fulfill their 
allotted logistical role, but they were now faced with the beginnings 
of the partisan menace. 
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The situation was such that as early as the end of July 1941 the 
various Army Group Rear Area commanders were permitted, in 
co-operation with the respective H6heren SS- und Polizeiffihrer, to 
use demobilised POWs to create an auxiliary police force 
('Iandeseigene Hilfspolizei')(72) On the 6th October 1941, the 
Generalquartiermeister gave the three Army Group commanders the 
option to set-up, by way of an experiment in consultation with the 
SS, a 'Kosakenhundertschaften' (mounted formations) drawn from POWs, 
which was to be used to combat the partisans. (73) This was doubly 
significant, for it was the first time that the creation of auxiliary 
units drawn from the Russian population was permitted, the Cossacks 
being regarded by the Germans as Russians. General der Infanterie v. 
Schenckendorff went even further in suggesting that 
Reiterhundertschaften be formed from discharged Ukranian and White 
Russian POWs for service with the German security divisions. (74) The 
Befehlshaber des rfickwftrtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte was of the opinion 
that the instruction course on anti-partisan warfare held in late 
September 1941 had shown the pressing need to strengthen the 
Reiter-Zilge (mounted platoons) of the infantry regiments in order to 
carry out reconnaissance work and engage in skirmishes. The OKH 
agreed to this proposal in the middle of November 1941. (75) A month 
earlier, the Generalquartiermeister had authorised the Army Groups 
to create Hilfswachmannschaften (auxiliary units) using freely 
enlisted and suitable locals for security and guard duties. The SD 
was to be responsible for any matters of military security 
involved. (76) POWs could even be used to form a Pionierkompanie, 
provided its members were neither dressed in German field grey nor 
armed in any way. (77) 
Early in December 1941, the Oberbefehlshaber der 9. Armee, 
Generaloberst StrauB, who was responsible for the AGSSt. and Dulags 
in Korilck 582, recommended the greater utilization by the German 
armed forces of the labour resources of the POWs. He made much of the 
argument that the shortage of manpower and the military problems at 
the front necessitated the deployment of POW units under German 
supervision for rear area work of a menial nature. Somewhat 
optimistically, the redeployment of German forces made possible by 
such measures was seen as offering a means to achieve the hitherto 
illusive final victory over the Soviet Union: 'Sicherlich kann ein 
gut Teil der 'Handlangerdienste' hinter der Front durch Kriegs- 
gefangenene fibernommen werde (neben den bisher schon vorgesehenen 
Bau- und Nachschub-Btl. Lkw. -Fahrer in Nachschubkolonnen, BAcker, 
Schlachter, Pferdepleger in Pferdelazaretten, VeterinAr-Kp. usw., 
Mun. -Kanoniere, Telegrafenhandwerker in Armee-Nachtrichtenrgt. usw., 
Arbeitskrafte in Instandsetzungseinrichtungen aller Art usw. ). (78) 
AOK also envisaged that older German officers and men could be 
assigned to control the POW formations, thereby emphasising that it 
anticipated little in the way of insubordination from the captured 
soldiers. More cynically it argued that the means of control at its 
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disposal and the poor condition of the POWs further reduced any such 
risks. The fact that the POWs could be given a much lower allocation 
of food than the German troops was seen as especially advantageous: 
'Die Gefahr von Unbotmäßigkeiten wird für gering erachtet. 
Drakonische Strafen - wie in OKH Nr. 10000,11, Ziff. 8 bereits 
angeordnet - würden sie im Keime ersticken. Die völlig zermürbten und 
dem Hungertode nahen Kriegsgefangenen würden sich glücklich preisen, 
wenn sie auf solche Weise auch nur 2/3 der den deutschen Soldaten 
zustehenden Nahrung erlangen könnten, und nach Überzeugung der Armee 
in der überwiegenden Masse unermüdlich und fleißig die ihnen 
übertragene Tätigkeit verrichten. Alle im kleinen bisher dahingehend 
gemachten Erfahrungen bestätigen das. '(79) 
As for the fear expressed by the higher military echelons that 
German soldiers might be contaminated by contact with the Russian 
POWs, AOK 9 was of the opinion that the troops would be immunised 
against this by their 'inherent sense of superiority '(innewohnende 
Cberlegenheitsgeffihl). In keeping with ideological directives, it was 
also emphasised that POWs selected for work duties would be screened 
in order to avoid releasing the so called 'asiatic sub-humanity' from 
the camps. In any case, the view was held that it would be to 
Germany's post-war advantage if the Russians acquired some discipline 
and a little knowledge of the German language while under the close 
supervision of the Wehrmacht. (80) 
Heeresgruppe Mitte conveyed AOK9's proposal to all its subordinate 
Armeen and Panzergruppen, as well as to the Befehlshaber des 
rfickwArtigen Gebietes with a request for comments. The Kommandant des 
rOckwArtigen Armeegebietes (Korrick) 582 expressed some qualifications 
to these instructions from AOK and argued on the basis of proven 
experience against the use of POWs simply for fatigue duties or 
baggage handling. Instead he proposed that they be deployed in 
anti-partisan warfare. (81) It was envisaged that the strength of the 
POW units should be set at a maximum of 30% of the associated German 
forces. Korfick 582 also argued that too much store should not be set 
by the nationality of the POWs. KorOck, again somewhat at variance 
with AOK9, made the point that in an ideal situation the German armed 
forces would not have to make use of POWs, but as it was the horrors 
of the POW camps and the prospect of a better life with the German 
troops persuaded many POWs to cooperate. The emphasis was thus placed 
on improving the general condition of those recruited into auxiliary 
units: 'Aus idealen Gründen werden sich Oberhaupt keine Gefangenen 
zum Dienst in der deutschen Wehrmacht finden. Der Grund warum sie 
bereit sein werdenist der Schrecken vor dem Gefangenenlager und die 
Aussischt auf ein besseres Leben bei der deutschen Truppe. Das 
Mittel, sie willig und anhänglich zu machen, ist gute Verpflegung und 
gute Behandlung'. (82) 
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By the beginning of 1942 Hitler was demonstrating a willingness to 
accept these proposals from his military commanders, and by the 
summer KortIck files indicate that the use of POWs, not only as simple 
labour but also in anti-partisan duties, was a widespread 
practice. (83) The POW camp records of both KortIck 582 and Korock 532, 
for instance, contain references to requests made to Dulags to 
allocate selected inmates for just such activities, which ranged from 
work in the railway works at Bryansk to the formation of 
Hilfwachmannschaften. (84) Some escaped POWs actually turned 
themselves over to the Army in the expectation that they would be 
used as labour and not sent back to the camps. (85) 
The policy was not, however, without difficulties since the more 
dynamic role suggested by Rear Area Commanders often resulted in the 
sort of discipline problems which had influenced AOKs in their 
decision not to use POWs outside closely controlled limits. While 
early reports noted that the Russian Volunteer Units (Freiwilligen 
Regt. ) appeared reliable enough, as the war dragged on it became 
clear that some formations were prone to desertion, and it was not 
uncommon for Korfick to respond to even minor infringements of 
discipline by disbanding whole units and returning the men to the POW 
camps. (86) Korfick 532 also questioned the rate at which Pz. AOK2 
required it to form Russian units, particularly Pioneer Corps, and 
stressed that the task created all manner of security clearance 
difficulties. (87) 
Overall, the numbers who benefited from the amelioration of 
official policy was not that large given that the great majority of 
the three million and more POWs remained in the camps. At most some 
700,000 were used by the Wehrmacht in a variety of roles, but of 
these probably no more than 300,000 were actually removed from the 
camps and formed into German run security units. (88) As Korfick files 
stress, even in the anti-partisan formations the POWs often 
experienced all sorts of difficulties with regard to clothing and 
equipment. The poor condition of the weapons issued to such units was 
a particular concern and one which often seriously affected morale. 
The remainder of the POWs, who were engaged in manual work, may have 
received some increase in rations but, as the food tables above 
indicate, these still remained far from adequate, and led to gross 
undernourishment. Indeed, as the proposals made by AOK9 have shown, 
the option of underfeeding was one of the attractions of schemes to 
use captured enemy soldiers as replacement labour. (89) 
There was a great variation in the way such POWs were used and 
treated by the German troops, even within the same unit. On the one 
extreme, although Rear Area troops tended to regard the prisoners 
virtually as servants, they did develop a form of paternalistic 
attachment to some of them. Hence, Ortskommandanturen were often 
compelled to issue orders which stressed that POWs employed as 
grooms, lorry drivers, cooks and cleaners were not to be allowed to 
accompany German soldiers if and when the Wehrmacht units were 
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redeployed to other areas, but rather had to be returned to the 
nearest Dulag. (90) On the other extreme, POW formations in the Rear 
Areas were often assigned the most unpleasant dangerous work, with 
tasks ranging from hard labour on road gangs through burial detail to 
mine-clearing duties. (91) Certain Army units resisted pressures to 
use captured troops, preferring instead to employ civilians. Thus, 
large numbers of POWs were condemned to remain incarcerated in the 
camps. (92) 
Some idea of the degree to which the odious treatment of many Soviet 
POWs employed by the German forces reflected the character of the war 
in the East can be gained by a comparison with KortIck files relating 
to experiences in occupied France. The commander of Wachbataillon 
721, Hauptmann Kruschka, assigned to Korfick 582 in Chartres during 
January of 1941 was prompted to complain that the German troops, by 
assisting 'the French POWs with manual work and imposing only a 
relatively short working day, had taken the first step towards 
fraternisation. It almost goes without saying that comments of this 
sort were completely absent from the Rear Area files of the same 
Korilck during its service in occupied Russia: 'Die Gefangenen (French 
POWs) erschienen erst um, 10.30 Uhr und werden wieder abgeführt 16.30 
Uhr. Wiederholt ist es vorgekommen, dass die Männer der 1. Kp., in der 
Zeit in der die Gefangenen nicht da waren, Ausladungen z. B. von 
Kohlen zu Ende führen mußten. Sie haben auch schon gleichzeitig mit 
dem Gefangenen an der Ausladung von Zügen gearbeitet, wenn auch nicht 
Hand in Hand. Eine derartige Heranziehung von deutschen Soldaten zu 
solchen Arbeiten halte ich für unwürdig ... und 
ist der erste Schritt 
zu einer Verbrüderung mit den Gefangenen'. (93) 
A fundamental restructuring of policy in the East was in any case 
problematical since the German army, in expectation of a short 
campaign, had seen no need officially to concern itself with the 
matter of legal and administrative responsibility for captured Red 
Army soldiers. When, all the same, the problem did come to rest with 
the military they tended to exploit the argument that in contrast to 
the war in the West, legal technicalities did not oblige them to 
provide for captured Soviet troops, even those who they used for 
labour and security duties. To exacerbate this already dire 
situation, the economic agencies in , the East advanced strong 
political arguments against increasing the numbers of POWs engaged in 
work for the occupying forces. Despite the immediate additional 
manpower needs of the German army, an analysis of supply problems 
within the Reich suggests that those POWs already employed by Rear 
Area Units were not to be generously provided for. Even those already 
gainfully employed in the rear areas in support of the German forces 
were not to be generously provided for, and this was the background 
against which any schemes adopted over the Winter of 1941/42 were to 
be implemented. (94) 
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The armaments supply problem in the Reich eventually proved to be a 
major determinant of policy. While the demands of the food-supply 
balance in the Reich seemed to make a selective starvation policy 
against the Soviet POWs 'unavoidable' ('unumgInglich') the urgent 
needs of German war industries necessitated a very different 
approach. (95) The Nazi leadership found itself in a quandary. It 
desperately needed to make use of the Russian POWs as a workforce 
inside the Reich in order to increase the production of war 
materials. Yet, to have done so would have adversely affected the 
food-supply balance in the Reich and compelled Hitler to reduce the 
ration allowance for the German people. This dilemma remained 
unresolved at first because the breakdown of the transport network in 
the East and the incidence of disease amongst the POWs prevented them 
from being moved. Four fateful weeks elapsed between Hitler's 
Filhrer-Befehl of the 31 October 1941, which linked the demand to 
utilize captured Russian troops as labour with the need to provide 
adequate food, and the eventual decision of the OKH to make a tiny 
increase in rations (around 5% more calories). (96) In the meantime, 
the mass deaths continued and, more damaging in the long term, that 
year's harvest surplus and livestock yields were allocated for the 
use of the Reich and the German occupation forces. By the onset of 
the winter, virtually no food remained for either the POWs or the 
inhabitants of the towns. 
Consideration of the comparative death rate for POWs inside the 
Reich, which was noticeably high at around 18,5% (December 1941), 
indicates that the mortality rate in the occupied territories of 
around 47% (deaths from starvation and typhoid to the beginning of 
April 1942) was not the result of an unavoidable state of emergency 
('Notstand'), but a consequence of a determined starvation policy 
that allowed little scope for individual action. (97) When a measure 
of improvement finally became apparent from the spring of 1942 
onwards, it was very much the result of grim irony, for only the 
deaths of millions of POWs and Soviet citizens had improved the food 
supply situation for those who had survived. The vast majority of Red 
Army captives having perished, Rear Area commanders began to receive 
recommendations which suggested that the need to raise the quality of 
POW labour destined for the Reich warranted the allocation of 
resources to grow potatoes and vegetables in and around the 
camps. (98) 
The pragmatic bias of army thinking should be stressed, for given 
the marked absence of humane motives on the part of many, if not all, 
of the army officers it was natural that an accord could be reached 
with the National Socialist leadership. Directives from OKW, 
recommending a more positive approach to the POWs, which were 
received by AOKs and Koracks in the winter reinforce the 
interpretation that economic and propaganda benefits alone determined 
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this adjustment of policy amongst the higher military echelons. Any 
isolated attempts by energetic Rear Area and POW camp commanders to 
improve conditions must be seen in this fatal context. 
Subsequent material on relations between the German Army and the 
SS/SD takes up a number of themes, including the implementation of 
the Kommissarbefehl, in order to consider further the debate as to the 
link between the Wehrmacht and the perverse value system of National 
Socialism. 
### 
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German Army Relations with the SS/SD. 
The Formal Relationship. 
Any study of German army occupation policy in the East must address 
the highly controversial issue of the relationship between the 
traditional armed forces and the various agencies, particularly the 
Sicherheitspolizei and Sicherheitsdienst (SD), which operated under 
the umbrella organisation of the SS. (1) 
The introductory survey of the relevant literature has shown how 
over the last four decades historical opinion has moved from a 
position in which the Wehrmacht was regarded as essentially separate 
and distinct from the SS/SD, both in terms of attitudes and 
behaviour, to a stance where little differentiation is made between 
these 'two institutions of the Third Reich'. (2) Specialist studies by 
Jacobsen, Streit and Krausnick have been seminal in the destruction 
of the myth of an innocent Wehrmacht. Indeed, a position seems to 
have been arrived at which identifies common interests between the 
higher echelons of the German Army officer corps and the SS in the 
pursuit of ideologically based racial and economic policies of the 
most extreme kind. (3) The Wehrmacht, as the only force (potentially) 
capable of imposing restrictions on the annihilation programmes, 
patently failed to do so. In some instances it took the lead in the 
formulation of policy, such that any matters of dispute were reduced 
to crude institutional rivalry, involving lines of demarcation, not 
fundamental moral premises. It would be difficult, therefore, in any 
serious academic study not to question the juxtaposition of a morally 
upright and correct Wehrmacht on the one hand and the 'rule of 
terror' by the SS units on the other (stOrmische vorwlirts dringende 
Wehrmacht auf der einen Seite, die "Terrorherrschaft" der 
SS-Einsatzkommandos auf der anderen'), even if this line still has 
considerable currency in popular conceptions of the Third Reich. (4) 
Nevertheless, while the basic premise must be accepted as to the 
moral and social responsibility of the elites within the German armed 
forces for many of the excesses perpetrated during the Third Reich 
(be this in the form of toleration, passive support or even 
complicity in design), further research into the topic is warranted. 
As one critic noted in his flattering review of Krausnick's study of 
the relationship between the SS/SD Einsatzgruppen and the German 
Army; despite the 'essential" contribution made by the work there 
remains a need for ý'an as-yet still lacking comprehensive 
presentation of this aspect of German occupation policy in the Soviet 
Union'. (5) In-depth analysis is available on certain issues, but it 
tends to draw from an undifferentiated range of sources. This 
preserves the emphasis on the role of higher echelons within the 
German Army and neglects the 'thick description' available in a more 
clearly defined 'history from below' case-study. Consideration of 
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events in Korficks 532 and 582, as well as their adjacent Army Group 
Rear Area, permits a focused investigation which sets the 
relationship of the German military with the SS forces in the context 
of the dialogue between official directives from above and 
implementation of policy in the field. The available evidence also 
allows for discussion of the conflicts and anomalies which arose 
within single army units over fundamental issues, rather than seeing 
these as having existed only between various military formations. 
Policy in the Rear Areas must be placed in the context of the 
theoretical division of responsibilities and command structures 
agreed between the German Army and the SS both before and during the 
war, and the subsequent modification of these formal procedures. Much 
of the analysis depends on an assessment of the the extent to which 
these often imprecise guidelines were observed by both parties. 
The administrative arrangements employed in Army Group Centre 
(Mitte) were common to the entire Eastern theatre. In the zone of 
military operations (Gefechtsgebiet) and the Army Rear Areas (Korilck) 
the Einsatzgruppen of the Sicherheitspolizei and SD were formed into 
small Sonderkommandos (7a & 7b), usually only some 10 officers and 50 
men in strength. These units were expected to inform the military of 
their activities and were not in principle autonomous from the 
relevant front-line Army Corps (AOK), where precise matters of 
operational strategy were concerned. In the Army Group Rear Area 
(rilckwdrtigtes Heeresbebiet) the Einsatzgruppen were designated as 
somewhat larger formations of Einsatz-Kommandos (8 & 9) and these 
were generally more independent of the Army Commander (Befehlshaber), 
although they were theoretically obliged to keep the relevant 
Security Divisions informed of their activities. (6) 
Official military directives issued throughout the occupation 
period noted the distinction which these differing structures implied 
in terms of function and command precedence. Emphasis was placed on 
the separation of tasks between the Wehrmacht and the SS, as well as 
the ultimate authority which was supposedly held by Army commanders 
in matters involving military expediency. In practice, however, the 
exact lines of demarcation between the German Army and SS/SD in both 
front and rear areas were never clearly defined. Indeed, Christian 
Streit has gone so far as to adopt the view that any distinction 
between spheres of influence was 'almost meaningless'. (7) As both 
9systems' prescribed working co-operation between the Army 
(Abwehr/Ic) and the Einsatzgruppen the relatively small size of the 
SS/SD units tended to increase their reliance on the Army. There was 
something of an irony in this; for while the Einsatzgruppen were 
regarded by the military as 'invaluable' (Goldes Wert') because of 
the role they performed in helping to secure the Rear Areas, a 
complicated reciprocal relationship developed by which the Army was 
obliged to render increasing support to the SD. (8) Problems arose 
when such assistance extended beyond the basic arrangement of 
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supplying munitions, fuel and food. It might even be proposed that 
events took on a structuralist dynamic such that a form of symbiosis 
developed, but this should not detract from the argument that much 
still depended on the attitude of the Wehrmacht personnel directly 
involved. 
Regelung des Einsatzes der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD im Verbande 
des Heeres. 
1. Aufgaben 
a) Im rückw. Armeegebiet: 
Sicherstellung vor Beginn von Operationen festgelegter Objekte 
(Material, Archive, Karteien von reichs- oder staatsfeindlichen 
Organisationen, Verbänden, Gruppen usw. ) sowie besonders wichtiger 
Einzelpersonen (führende Emigranten, Saboteure, Terroristen usw). Der 
Oberbefehlshaber der Armee kann den Einsatz der Sonderkommandos in 
Teilen des Armeegebietes ausschließen, in denen durch den Einsatz 
Störungen der Operationen eintreten können. 
b) Im rückw. Heeresgebiet: 
Erforschung und Bekämpfung der staats- und reichsfeindlichen 
Bestrebungen, soweit sie nicht der feindlichen Wehrmacht eingliedert 
sind, sowie allgemeine Unterrichtung der Befehlshaber der rückw. - 
Heeresgebiete über die politische Lage . .... Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Geheimen Staatspolizei und den Abwehrstellen der Wehrmacht. 
Source: OKH, GenStdH. /GenQu., Az. Abt. Kriegsverwaltung Nr. 
11/2101/41 geh., dated 28.4.1941: BA/MA: RH22/155: 
Three aspects of occupation policy can be identified in which the 
relationship between the SS and the Wehrmacht was at its most 
contentious: 
The selection, handing-over and execution of special 
categories of Soviet POWs (especially the captured political 
commissars of the Red Army and those prisoners defined as 
Jews) be this in the field of operations or in camps 
(A. Gef. Sa. St. and Dulags) in the Rear Areas. 
IA more general, radical 'solution' of the 'Jewish Question' 
throughout the occupied territories, as well as the 
eradication of other groups designated as racially or 
socially 'undesirable'. 
iii. The draconian methods employed by German security units during 
the combined Army/SS anti-partisan operations that were 
carried out in the East. 
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It is hardly surprising, given the triumph of dogma over rational 
policy which so typified these areas of activity, that much 
established literature has sought to underplay the involvement of the 
Wehrmacht. In the matter of counter- insurgency warfare there was, 
admittedly, some willingness to acknowledge the association; albeit 
on the grounds of force of circumstance. Ideological factors were, 
however, so pronounced in official Nazi policy towards the Jews and 
the Red Army Commissars that any literature which implicated the 
German Army in the sinister activities normally associated with SS 
special units was bound to create passionate debate. Indeed, the link 
between the various, but related, elements which constituted the 
'policies of genocide' has only recently been clearly stated. (9) 
The inter- relationship between the various aspects of policy needs 
to be emphasised; for in many instances the deliberate blurring by 
the regime of the distinction between security and ideological needs 
was designed to accord a sort of quasi-legality to inherently 
criminal behaviour. Such an approach was evident from the very start 
of the campaign when vast numbers of Soviet troops fell into German 
Army hands, and it is to the fate of the captured Red Army commissars 
that the following section of the thesis first turns its attention. 
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The Commissar Order (Kommissarbefehl) 
After some months of formulation, guidelines were issued in the 
second week of June 1941 which allowed for the summary execution of 
all Soviet political commissars captured by the German forces 
(Kommissarbefehl). (10) These orders were a clear manifestation of a 
total disregard for international law and ran contrary to what was 
generally agreed to be every soldierly value and sentiment. Hence, it 
was hardly surprising that former high-ranking Wehrmacht officers 
strenuously denied that such actions had taken place in the areas 
under their control or had involved regular German troops under their 
commanded. (I 1) 
Recent research has made much of the involvement of the Army High 
Command (OKH) in the initial drawing-up of these directives, but any 
attempts to verify the degree to which the Kommissarbefehl was 
actually implemented remains problematical. (12) It can be argued, 
however, that the role of the Korilcks and Army Group Rear Areas in 
the process was probably of greater significance than that of 
front-line units. Once it became apparent that special measures were 
being directed against the commissars many took to disguising 
themselves as regular officers or simple soldiers. Rather than being 
dealt with at the point of capture, the individuals concerned were 
subject to a selection process in various locations in the Rear; in 
the first instance the Armeegefangenensammelstelle and subsequently 
the Dulags. (13) Front-line units did, of course, continue to capture 
Red Army soldiers -whom they took to be commissars, and the same 
applied to Rear Area security units engaged in mopping-up or 
anti-partisan duties, but the main focus had tended to shift away 
from the battle zone. 
The issue thus became two-fold and related to the treatment of Red 
Army soldiers identified as commissars at the time of capture, and 
the policy the military would subsequently adopt in assisting the SD 
units to detect and deal with this special category of prisoners 
within the POW installations in the rear. A selection process which, 
it should be added, might also apply to inmates of Jewish 
background. (14) According to F6rster, the higher echelons of the 
German Army responded to the task of identifying commissars by 
issuing directives in early July 1941 which ordered regular searches 
of the Army controlled POW camps. (15) As part of this process 
guidelines were also produced later in the same month which specified 
various categories of captured Red Army soldiers and the particular 
treatment which they should receive. The files of KorOck, 582 indicate 
that this documentation was received shortly afterwards, although at 
this stage the Army expressly precluded the SD units from entering 
the POW camps. Even in the-Army Group Rear Areas, the responsibility 
for handing over certain groups still rested with the military. 
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Treatment of Prisoners of War (according to categories) in 
Army Installations ('Armeegefangenensammelstellen') 
1. Volksdeutsche 
Ukranians 
Balts 
2. Asiatics 
Jews 
German Speaking- 
Russians 
: Possible use as interpreters 
: NOT to be sent to the Reich 
3. Political unreliables: Not to be sent to the Reich/ 
Commissars or Special measures to be taken by 
Agitators Camp Commandants on the basis of 
existing orders: (Aussonderungen). 
('The entry of Einsatzkommandos of the SD into the POW Camps 
of the Operational Area is out of the question! ) 
4. Officers: Unless required for tasks in the 
5. Various: operational areas, to be sent to 
the Eastern borders of regions 
under civilian administration. 
'All decisions in the Army Areas (AOK & Korfick) are to be made 
by the troops; 
In the Army Group Rear Areas: special categories are to be 
handed over to the Einsatzgruppen of the SD. ' 
(Adapted from: Gen. Qu. Abt. K. Verw, Az. Gen. zbV. b. obdH., Nr. 
11/4590/41 geh., (dated 24.7.1941) an Korfick 582 (Files for 
the period 24.2.1941 - 13.12.1941, BA/MA: RH23/219 &0371) (16) 
It has been argued that while the special measures 
(Sonderanordnungen) referred to in this document allowed for the 
execution by German army guard units of any commissars who were 
identified in the POW camp, the clear exclusion of the SD 
significantly restricted earlier agreements between the Wehrmacht and 
the SS which had proposed easy access for the SS units. (17) Streit, 
in fact, asserts that there is an indication that despite these new 
directives the SD was involved in the scrutiny ('CJberprrafung') of 
POWs from the very start of the campaign. Evidence from the files of 
Korfick 582, however, suggests that even where there was some measure 
of SD involvement in selection, the Army - itself tended to deal with 
matters inside the camps. (18) The outstanding issue is to determine 
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the reasons why during this period such a relatively small number of 
special category prisoners seem to have been dealt with inside the 
POW camps, or else, as the directives also allowed, handed over by 
the German Army camp commanders to the SD. (The period, that is, 
before October of 1941; thereafter Einsatzgruppen entry to the 
military controlled installations was eventually permitted, and the 
numbers dealt with appear to have increased markedly. (19) 
Military records from Kodick 582 indicate that Armeeoberkommando 9 
orders regarding local procedures for the establishment of POW 
installations (issued in September of 1941) had made it quite clear 
that any persons found to be commissars were to be interrogated and 
shot. (20) However, when Korilck 582 subsequently received an urgent 
message from AOK9 on the 23 November requesting details of 
activities in Armee-Gefangenen-Sammelstellen and Dulags under its 
command, there was no reference whatsoever in any of the 
documentation to Commissars dealt with under 'selection procedures' 
('Aussonderungen'). Moreover, Wachbataillon 720, which was also asked 
to supply information on the POWs under it control (in Kgf. Lager 
Wel. Luki) was the only unit to make reference to Jewish 
prisoners. (21) Even in their replies to a 'related' question on the 
numbers of POWs 'shot as partisans', all of the officers responsible 
for submitting the completed reports were eager to add to the rather 
vague wording of the original request and stress that the inmates who 
fell into this category had been handed over, to the SD. Similarly, 
the reports were fairly detailed on other matters such as general 
death-rates, but only A. Gef. Sa. St. 8 gave precise figures on the 
matter of 'partisans', while A. Gef. Sa. St. 8 stressed the prime role of 
the SD on the original document from Korack, which it annotated 
accordingly and returned. Even Wachbataillon 720, which reported 
that four Jewish prisoners had been shot, again cited the prime role 
of the Sicherheitspolizei (SD). (22) 
The apparent reluctance of the local German POW commanders to allow 
their guard units to carry out 'special measures' inside the camps, 
even against those designated as partisans (preferring instead to 
hand over the task to the SD) might be regarded as confirmation that 
there was even less interest in pursuing commissars; or, for that 
matter, Jews). Undoubtedly, there is much contentious historical 
debate on this specific anomaly. Specialist general studies, such as 
that by Streirn allude to the completion of false reports 
(Falschmeldungen) almost as a substitute for resistance on the part 
of military commanders 'torn between conscience and obedience' 
(Konflikt zwischen Gewissen und Gehorsam). (23) Other historians, less 
well disposed to apologist explanations, such as Rrster, argue that 
differing report procedures gave rise to incomplete records 
(Fehlanzeigen) which distort the large totals really involved. (24) 
In the first instance it should be noted, as with so much work on 
occupation policy, that there is a marked lack of quantified research 
on this topic. Estimates as to the, numbers of commissars killed 
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vary considerably, from Streit's calculations which propose a figure 
in excess of 580,000, to Streim's much lower estimate of around 
140,000425) As F6rster notes, even the variable tone of the language 
employed in reports causes confusion, with oblique references to 
'erschieBen' (shot); 'erledigen' (disposed of); 'behandeln' (attended 
to); 'erfassen' (seized); 'abschieben' (expelled) and 'umlegen' 
(killed). (26) While the more opaque of these terms were probably 
euphemisms for execution, certain historians, such as Joachim Fest, 
would contend that there is still uncertainty as to the fate of some 
of the commissars. The handing-over of special categories of POWs to 
the SD may not automatically have resulted in them all being killed, 
since some could have been assigned to security duties in the 
occupied territories. (27) 
On the basis of the material relating to the whole range of 
activities pursued by Rear Area authorities in both Kodick 532 and 
Korfick 582 - much of which has been discussed in the general section 
on the treatment of captured Red Army soldiers - certain propositions 
can be made. 
Given at best the indifference and at worst the hostility towards 
the POWs in their charge manifested by most German army camp 
commanders, arguments as to veiled forms of resistance seem 
unconvincing. Considerably more benefit could have been achieved for 
other, less contentious, categories of inmate with markedly less risk 
of compromise, yet the evidence even for this is scant. (28) 
Accounting errors resulting from the various bureaucratic procedures 
adopted by army units might be plausible, particularly in the case of 
front-line units more concerned with matters of an urgent operational 
nature. This approach only seems appropriate, however, to the case of 
the Armeegefangenensammelstellen reports specifically requested by 
AOK9, if the replies are taken to be deliberately vague as part of, 
an attempt by the camp officials to disguise. bureaucratic 
inefficiencies. 
More compelling is another argument which accounts for both the 
small numbers of POWs who were placed in special categories and/or 
dealt with under the special measures theoretically available by 
reference to the conditions under which A. Gef. Sa. St. had to operate. 
Even the motives behind this 'explanation' are multifaceted. The 
inaccuracies might be seen as a consequence of the limited time 
available to POW camps nearest the front for the processing of the 
vast. masses of captured Red Army soldiers before they were moved 
further to the rear. On a more sinister level, 'errors' might have 
been used to disguise the calculated decisions of A. Gef. Sa. St. 
commanders who were aware of the fate that awaited all the POWs 
either on the march to the rear or in the Dulags. There may have been 
a temptation to take advantage of this next stage of the 
transportation process in order to shift the effort and 
responsibility elsewhere. (29) Earlier evidence as to the 
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unwillingness of many of these A. Gef. Sa. St. commanders to feed any of 
those POWs transported further to the rear suggests that this theory 
of moral indifference and self-interest (set against a background of 
difficult conditions) seems more plausible than over-elaborate 
theories of ideological indoctrination. (30) 
In any event, the happenings in the front-line POW camps merely 
represented the first-stage of the Army's involvement, and by October 
of 1941 the military had moved to a position in which the SD were 
officially allowed to enter the Dulags in the Army Group Rear Areas 
in order to remove selected inmates, particularly commissars, 
politruks and Jews. (31) Although the elimination of those removed 
was performed by the Einsatz- and Sonderkommandos of the SD, the 
process necessitated close working co-operation with the German Army 
Camp commandants and their Abwehr (1c) officers. (32) Evidence for 
this link and the increased numbers of POWs who were removed from the 
camps as a result is available from F6rster's researches. Much is 
made of the report by the Intelligence Officer of Dulag 230 in 
Wjasma, Hauptmann Bernstein (for the period ending 18 January 1942) 
that some 200 Jews and politruks had been handed over to the SD; 40 
of the Jews and 6-8 of the politruks during his term of office 
alone. (33) This is not to say that the case is proved. Streim, for 
one, takes issue with the validity of this same report and argues 
that the POW area commander (Kriegsgefangen-Bezirkskommandant) 
regarded the figures as overestimates (rather in keeping with the 
earlier trend to produce inaccurate figures before the right of entry 
had been agreed in October). (34) 
The dispute as to the accuracy of this particular report accepted, 
the argument in favour of increased co-operation between the Army and 
SD can be advanced by noting the virtual absence 'of resistance to 
Einsatzgruppen entry into the Dulags. Indeed, 'nonconformist 
tendencies', as Krausnick calls this phenomenon, appear to be so rare 
that he, along with Streim and F6rster, cites the one prime example 
mentioned in Streit's work; the case of Major Wittmer. (35) The 
commandant of Dulag 185 in Mogilew was the subject of an official 
complaint by a functionary of Einsatzkommando 8, who noted the 
major's refusal to hand over a number of Jewish POWs to the SD on the 
grounds that the necessary approval from the Wehrmacht was not 
forthcoming: 'Der Major hatte es nämlich abgelehnt, jüdische 
Gefangene aus seinem Lager für eine Sonderbehandlung herauszugeben, 
da hierfür kein Befehl der zuständigen Wehrmachtsdienstelle 
vorliege'. (36) 
While the isolated nature of this episode certainly warrants its 
widespread citation, the authors concerned have ignored one of 
Streit's main observations: the fact that Major Wittmer appears not 
to have been reprimanded in any way for his lack of co-operation. (37) 
it would be presumptuous to see in this the argument that 
'resistance' was a readily available option. Despite the commander's 
equally clear reservations as to the value of the draconian measures 
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which the SS proposed against those merely suspected of being 
partisans, there is nothing to indicate a political motive in 
Wittmer's actions. Moreover, as reports from camps within Korack 582 
demonstrate, provided the necessary documentation was forthcoming 
there seemed little reluctance to hand over special category 
prisoners to the SD and Geheime Feldpolizei. (38) The lack of official 
follow-up to the SD complaint does, nonetheless, indicate the 
relative autonomy which camp commanders could exercise, if they so 
chose; an autonomy, that is, from the SS, and not the German Army 
whose directives were binding. 
This point might be developed by cross-reference to the material 
discussed earlier on the relationship between the POW camps and their 
superiors in the relevant Korfick and Armeeoberkommando. (39) Any 
concerted attempt to resist the entry of the SD into the camps or 
refuse co-operation would have depended on some sort of support from 
the relevant AOK (and Korrack). Officers would have had to be willing 
to suggest to OKH that such actions were based on operational needs; 
the major grounds on which the authority of the German army took 
clear precedence over the tasks of the SS units operating in the Rear 
Areas. (40) F6rster has noted that the Oberbefehslhaber der 
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Generalfeldmarschall von Bock, had made it clear 
in discussions with the Army Commander- in- Chief, von Brauchitsch 
during November 1941, that while the Army was responsible for the 
POWs, it accepted that the security needs of the Reich took 
precedence. (41) This, however, tended merely to confirm rather than 
determine the attitude of high ranking officers in the field. 
Already in July 1941, the Befehlshaber des rfickwArtigen Heeres- 
gebietes Mitte had indicated a desire to widen the application of the 
Kommissarbefehl and had requested clarification from the Army Group 
Command as to whether - or not all Red Army officers should be so 
regarded. (42) 
Admittedly, there is some confusion as to the extent to which the 
AOKs in general (AOK9 and Pz. AOK2 in particular) unreservedly shared 
similar views. It does seem on balance that while the front-line Army 
Corps commanders who authorised policy in the Rear Area POW camps and 
the KorOcks, may have manifested rather ambiguous views on the 
Kommissarbefehl, even those who criticised the order were neither 
willing nor able to enforce their views. (43) Thus, although Streit 
has noted the ban which Rudolf Schmidt (who was later to become the 
Befehlshaber of Pz. AOK2) placed on the implementation of the order 
during his early posting as the commander of the XXXIX Army Corps, 
there is considerable evidence that executions still took place. Much 
capital is made of the number of incidents (some 183 until the end of 
October) which took place in the Panzer Army area of operations 
during the period when it was under the command of Heinz 
Guderian. (44) There is similar evidence with regard to AOK9 that the 
corps had taken part in the implementation of the order since June of 
1941. The stance of the subordinate Korfick (582) was demonstrated not 
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only, as has been noted., in the orders relating to commissars which 
it transmitted to the POW camps in the Autumn of 1941, but by the 
directives it had already issued on behalf of AOK to its own 
subordinate units in the summer. (45) KortIck Befehl Nr. 11 (16 August 
1941), for instance, stipulated that commissars taken in action 
should not be sent to the nearest POW camps, but rather dealt with on 
the spot: 'Festgenommene politische Kommissare. usw. sind nicht in 
Gefangenen Sammelstellen abzuschieben, sondern nach den gegebenen 
Befehlen zu behandelen und von der Truppe oder Dienststelle gleich 
abzuurteilen'. (46) 
On the basis of reports dealing with actions undertaken by units 
operating in its various Ortskommandanturen it appears that this 
directive was being followed. For example, the files from OKI/593 
(Demidow) dated 28 September 1941 refer directly to the shooting of 
at least 3 commissars and the execution of a further 398 individuals 
under a general catch-all heading which includes this category 
(Partisanen, Kommissare und ParteifunktionAre). (47) Similarly, the 
records of OKII/930 for September of 1941 and Wach-Bataillon 508 for 
the the following December contain a number of references to the 
execution of Red Army commissars by German units. (48) German Army 
commanders continued to tolerate, if not openly approve of, the 
implementation of the Kommissarbefehl, be it in the field, or to a 
more marked extent by their willingness to allow the SD to remove 
inmates from the POW camps under their control, until well into the 
late autumn of 1941. It was only when the campaign lost its initial 
momentum towards the end of the year and the negative repercussions 
of the policy became a matter of concern that a modification was 
mooted. Increasing general resistance by the Red Army was, if 
anything, further intensified by the order which inevitably acted as 
a marked deterrent against any tendency on the part of Soviet 
officers to capitulate. Moreover, the inherent draconian tone of the 
Kommissarbefehl created a generally unfavourable mood amongst the 
entire population of the Rear Areas that was not conducive to German 
security. 
Despite the reservations that were evident from the early winter of 
1941, and the fact that German troops in the field were being urged 
to make a clear distinction between political commissars and ordinary 
soldiers in the Red Army, the order was not suspended until the 
spring of 1942. (49) Reports from units operating under Korilck 582 
refer to on-the-spot executions of commissars right up to this date, 
and notifications of those captured in Rear Area security operations 
can be found for the period until the midsummer of 1942. (50) 
Moreover, while the 'suspension' of the Kommissarbefehl in the 
operations zone was extended to include a modification of the 
9special measures9 in the POW camps in the Army Rear Areas, 
commissars who were not designated as deserters were still to be 
executed. (51) 
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It seems clear that at all levels of command in the Army controlled 
territories of the East, be it AOK, Korfick or Army Group Rear Area, 
the tendency was for the Kommissarbefehl to be implemented. Even if 
the occasions on which the German military acted alone are more 
isolated, it was the norm for the Army to offer considerable 
assistance to the agencies of the SS that went far beyond the supply 
of munitions, fuel and provisions. In this respect, F6rster is 
correct to criticise work that suggests the Wehrmacht as a whole 
circumvented or ignored the order. (52) There is evidence, however, 
that certain formations within larger units did not implement the 
Commissar Order and that there was a marked reluctance on the part of 
some POW camp commanders to co-operate with the Einsatzkommandos. 
Admittedly, in terms of the overall impact on policy in the East 
these 'exceptions to - the rule' were of little significance, 
especially in view of the absence of any support from higher 
echelons. Nonetheless, the very existence of deviation from the 
official line reinforces earlier arguments as to the potential 
autonomy of Rear Area commanders. The room for action available to 
those who were inclined to exercise this independence, or tolerate 
'dissent' on the part of subordinate units, was restricted not so 
much by ideological pressures as the temptation to develop a 
single-minded concentration on the operational aspects of the war. 
### 
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The "Jewish Question" in the Army Rear Areas. 
The annihilation of millions of Jews in the German-occupied 
territories clearly represents one of the most harrowing aspects of 
the Third Reich. It is hardly surprising, given the legitimate 
tendency to see the eradication of the Jews as a form of evil, that 
German historiography was long dominated by the belief that the Army 
leadership tried in vain to oppose the annihilation process and that 
the military was in no way involved with the wholesale murders. (53) 
Yet, the extensive range of 'demythologising' literature, cited 
throughout this study of occupation policy, is at its most vigorous 
with respect to this matter of the link between the Wehrmacht and the 
SS in the implementation of the Final Solution. (54) 
On the basis of the work by a cohort of historians including 
Streit, Krausnick and F6rster, any attempt to deny the involvement of 
higher echelons of the German armed forces in the implementation of 
anti-Semitic policies and use such arguments as a device to question 
the authenticity of the Final Solution itself would be unscholarly, 
if not immoral. This accepted, certain researchers have even gone so 
far as to suggest that while the events demand historical 
investigation and must always remain a matter of profound concern, 
any attempt to impose strictly rational explanations may in fact 
distort the enormous scale and barbaric character of what took 
place. (55) In this regard, analysis of the events of the holocaust 
from the perspective of administrative practice alone, as exemplified 
in the policy-making relationship between OKW, OKH and the Nazi 
state, while valuable, is clearly incomplete. (56) Work which adopts a 
different methodology and considers the ideological determinants of 
the behaviour of the higher officer corps, or in the case of very 
recent work, the more junior ranks, has derived much of its dynamism 
from the emphasis in such an approach on the human dimension. (57) 
Evaluation of the response of individual units in the field to the 
task of implementing policy can be regarded as a further refinement, 
which recognises the ad hominern aspects, yet places them in the 
context of wider processes. 
A starting point for any enquiry into the involvement of German Army 
Rear Area forces in the eradication of the Jews must be the formative 
experience of anti-Semitic policies which units such as KorOck 582 
gained during their posting in Poland. Krausnick argues that as far 
as the military leadership is concerned it was this period which 
'created the basic plan for "further arrangements" between the Army 
and the SS'. (58) Reports for this period indicate that while the 
German Army was well aware of the racial policies that were being 
pursued in Poland, its desire to distance itself did not extend to 
positive action. Hence while files for October of 1939 bemoan the 
negative effects of 'politically determined measures directed against 
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the civilian population with which the military had nothing to do' 
('bev6lkerungspolitische MaBnahmen, mit denen das Militdr nichts zu 
tun hat') the army continued to lend lateral support and more 
significantly began to refer to Jews as a separate category from the 
rest of the Polish population. (59) Thus, despite the concern 
expressed by certain officers, there was little, if any, support from 
higher echelons, and it can be argued that this cognizance on the 
part of the German Army of ideologically motivated policies, served 
to prepare the ground for a move towards collaboration by the 
military in the Soviet Union. Streit, in fact, argues that the 
concept of a war of annihilation in the East was not only made 
possible when the occupation of Poland indicated that the Army was 
unlikely to oppose such a policy but, moreover, that there were 
clearly defined major areas of ideological agreement between the 
Generals and the National Socialist leadership on the need to pursue 
rigorous anti-Semitic/anti-Bolshevik programmes. (60) 
During the Spring of 1941 the Army leadership's formulation of 
radical guidelines on warfare in the East (including the 
Barbarossa-Erla13 and the Kommissarbefehl) demonstrated its 'more or 
less unreserved agreement to conduct an ideological war'. The 
discussions between the Army Quartermaster General, Wagner and the 
Head of the RSHA, Reinhard Heydrich indicated that on the basis of 
its experiences in Poland, the German Army was prepared to give even 
more power to the Einsatzgruppen, because it anticipated criminal 
activities. Whether the military intended at this early juncture 
merely to 'avoid this stretch of dire, or give active support in the 
pursuit of racial values which it also endorsed are fundamental 
issues. (61) The attitude of the higher command within the armed 
forces might best be assessed by noting that until June 1941 there 
was no clear suggestion that Jews should be victims. But, by June 28, 
General Reinecke (Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office in the High 
Command) had held negotiations with Heydrich on the role of the 
Einsatzkommandos. Draft proposals were put forward which extended the 
categories agreed in the Spring meetings to include the Jews. (62) It 
should be noted, however, that the general execution of Jews in the 
Army Rear Areas as a whole was not permitted. 
in considering how and why this development came about, and the 
particular involvement of the Army Rear Areas, some indication should 
be given of the geographical and chronological character of the 
policies to eradicate the Jews in the occupied territories. The 
occupied territories were divided up into two areas. In the Eastern 
zone near the front the 'action' against the Jews began a few days 
after the towns and villages were taken and as soon as the Gestapo, 
Secret Field Police and SS (under the protection of the Wehrmacht) 
had established themselves. In the more westerly Rayons, the Baltic 
Republics, Belorussia, and the West Ukraine a different process 
occurred with the establishment of ghettos and work camps, which 
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remained in existence for a year or so. That is, until the end of 
1943 when the inmates were either eliminated on the spot or sent to 
the extermination camps at Treblinka, Sobibor und Majdanek. (63) 
Of the total of 2.2 Million Soviet Jews who were victims of the 
extermination policy, some 550,000 were dealt with by the 
Einsatzgruppen during the first six months or so of the occupation. 
These actions did not generally take place at the front (despite the 
fact that there is evidence to indicate that the 
Sonder/Einsatzkommandos were often allowed to operate alongside the 
German combat troops). As with the selection of special categories 
of POWs, including Commissars, they were implemented in the Rear 
Areas. (64) This figure of over 1/2 million which included Jewish 
women and children who had become victims from the late summer of 
1941, does not take account of the other 'categories' eradicated 
during this period; such as gypsies and those designated as 
'Asiatics' or mentally sick, whose numbers ran into the tens of 
thousands. (65) 
Even allowing for the argument that the failure of the German advance 
to reach the projected line from Archangel to Astrakhan concentrated 
the power of the SS/SD units into a much smaller area than originally 
envisaged, it seems illogical to imagine that the Einsatzgruppen 
units, which in total were a mere 3,000 men strong, could have 
undertaken this task without considerable assistance from the 
conventional German armed forces. (66) Streit argues that right from 
the start the army co-operated much more with the Sicherheitspolizei 
and the SD in the extermination of Jews than even the agreements 
between Heydrich and Army Quartermaster Wagner had allowed for. This 
trait was also manifest in the informal involvement of SD units in 
the matter of POW selection before the official agreement of October 
1941. (67) 
The motives which underlay this co-operation have been ascribed to 
the sympathy which many officers had with the view that the enemy 
facing the Reich could best be seen as 'Jewish Bolshevism'. Such a 
standpoint, which resulted in a blurring of the distinction between 
traditional purely military operations and ideologically determined 
actions, is evident not only in the personal pronouncements of the 
most high-ranking officers (so often cited in other studies), but in 
directives passed down to the troops in the field. (68) it 
should be noted, however, that at this early juncture the policy of 
the Army did not seem automatically to counsel the most extreme 
measures. For instance, an Abschrift received in September 1941 by 
the Army Group Rear Troops, which dealt with the matter of the Jewish 
population in the occupied territories, although clearly citing the 
Jews as a menace, advised in favour of their exploitation as slave 
labour: 'Der Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus verlangt ein rück- 
sichtloses und energisches Durchgreifen vor allen auch gegen die 
Juden, die Hauptträger des Bolschewismus. Es hat daher jegliche 
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Zusammenarbeit der Wehrmacht mit der jüdischen Bevölkerung, die offen 
oder versteckt in ihrer Einstellung deutschfeindlich ist, und die 
Verwendung von einzelnen Juden zu irgendwelchen bevorzugten 
Hilfsdiensten für die Wehrmacht zu unterbleiben. Ausweise, die den 
Juden ihre Verwendung für Zwecke der Wehrmacht bestätigen, sind durch 
militärische Dienstellen keinesfalls auszustellen. Hiervon 
ausgenommen ist lediglich die Verwendung von Juden in besonders 
zusammengefaßten Arbeitskolonnen, die nur unter deutscher Aufsicht 
einzusetzten sind. Es wird gebeten, diese Anordnung der Truppe 
bekanntzugeben'. (69) 
The mutual co-operation instigated at the very start of the campaign 
between the German Army and the SS forces was clearly influenced by 
perceived views of the best way to ensure the stability of the Rear 
Areas. One of the most sinister consequences of this agreement was 
the order from the Commanders of the Army Group Rear Areas which 
instructed the SD to evacuate all male Jews from those regions in 
which scattered Red Army forces were reported to be active. (70) In 
support of this move much emphasis was placed on the supposed link 
between the Jewish population and organised insurgents (partisans in 
particular) who were perceived as the major security risk facing the 
military authorities. This correlation between the Jewish population 
and the direct security needs of the military, it must be stressed, 
had never been proposed during the Army's earlier period of 
occupation duty in the West. Orders issued by KortIck 582 as early as 
August 1941 made much of the 'dangers' and were clearly designed to 
derive maximum benefit from the anxieties manifested by ordinary 
soldiers with regard to the terrorist campaign that was developing in 
the Rear Areas: 'Das hetzerische Wirken der Träger des jüdisch/ 
bolschewistischen Systems darf nicht dazu führen, daß in dem bereits 
ruhigen Gebiete der Kleinkrieg wieder auflebt'. (71) 
The impact of such pronouncements is apparent by reference to 
situation reports from the same Korfick which noted the approach taken 
by the German troops on the basis of this supposed link between Jews 
and the partisan menace. Ortskommandantur records for September and 
October of 1941 are fairly representative with their references to 
Jews being shot on the basis of suspicious behaviour. OK11/932 
commented that 'it had been necessary to shoot a suspicious and 
deceitful Jew' Cein stark verdAchtiger und Ifigenhafter Jude mu8te 
erschossen werden'), while OKII/932, referring to events in 
Ljubawitschi, reported the shooting of a number of Jews on the 
grounds that they had held anti-German meetings. ('deutschfeindliche 
Versammlungen abgehalten'. )(72) An extreme expression of this 
position is to be found in the files of the SS. Kav. Brigade which was 
on security duties during September 1941 in the Army Group Rear Areas 
behind Kor0ck 582. The report asserted that villages without Jewish 
inhabitants were never centres for partisan activity, but rather were 
regularly attacked and plundered by guerrilla bands: Terbindungen 
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der Partisanen Abteilungen untereinander werden vor allem durch Juden 
aufgerecht erhalten. Dörfer und Gehöfte, die judenfrei sind, waren 
bisher in keinem Falle Stützpunkte der Partisanen, wurden aber häufig 
durch Banden überfallen und geplündert'. (73) 
Documents on counter-insurgency policy continued to stress this 
same line, as is evident from files for the spring of 1942, when it 
was suggested that Jews made up at least 25% of many partisan 
groups. (74) However, as with the Abschrift referred to above, it did 
not always follow that the logical consequence of regarding all Jews 
as partisans or partisan sympathisers was an immediate eradication 
policy. OKII/930, while unreservedly adhering to the idea of a real 
menace, proposed instead a ghettoisation policy to isolate the entire 
Jewish population of its district, especially women and children whom 
it regarded with considerable suspicion: Tine besondere Gefahr 
bildeten die in dem Rayon herumtreibenden Juden. Diese dienten den 
Partisanenbanden als Verbindungsleute, übermittelten die Nachrichten 
und betätigten sich als Werben für die Partisanen. Hierbei waren 
jüdische Frauen und Mädchen in mehreren Orten tätig. Der Jude 
betätigte sich ausserdem als Hetzer in der Zeit, als sich in dem Raum 
von Smolensk die für den Kampf um Leningrad bestimmten Divisionen aus 
der Front lösten. Diese Vorgänge gaben den Partisanen starken 
Auftrieb. Die OK räumte mit dieser für dieser Nachschub-Wege 
heraufkommenden Post dadurch auf, dass die Juden durch die Bildung 
eines Ghettos in Rudnja von den Strassen des Rayons verschwanden. Die 
Bewachung des Ghettos wurden durch Männer des gebildeten ODs 
durchgeführt'. (75) 
Clearly, Army policy was much more complex than a simple association 
with the extermination policies of the SD units, and some regard 
should be given to a parallel initiative which approached the Jewish 
question from the standpoint of isolation and exploitation. 
Verwaltungs-Anordnungen for the period July to October 1941 are 
indicative of this approach with their emphasis on the registration 
(Kennzeichnung) and ghettoisation of Jews and the need to combine 
Jews in forced labour units to perform work for the German Army of 
occupation. (76) Local OK orders took up these points and also 
stressed the need to reduce contact with 'Aryans' to a minimum. (77) 
Nonetheless, on balance, this approach might best be seen as a later 
development and rather anomalous in the context of the first few 
weeks of the war when a formal separation of tasks evident between 
the Army and the SS was not always evident. During this phase in 
particular, Wehrmacht units gave assistance by deploying troops to 
cordone off mass-shootings and they also took part in combing 
operations (DurchkAmmungsaktionen). In a number of cases, OK and FKs 
took the initiative in schemes to make their areas 'judenfrei. 
The most pronounced co-operation with the eradication policies of 
the SD appears to have been in Army Group South. A random selection 
of reports from Korilcks and Feldkommandanturen for the period from 
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the summer of 1941 to the Spring of 1942 produces figures from just 
one Army Rear Area (Korfick 553) of some 20,000 Jews killed. (78) One 
OK within this command had taken over evacuated Jewish houses as its 
headquarters and was engaged in the distribution of the clothes of 
those it had helped to murder. Similar actions, albeit on a less 
marked scale, were evident in both the KorOcks to the front of Army 
Group Centre. OKI/593 (KorOck 582) had removed the Jewish population 
of its district by the second week in July of 1941 and was using the 
former synagogue as its administrative offices. (79) 
In Army Group Centre, as in the South, it was not only Jews who were 
the victims of racially determined policies. OKI/302 in Kalinin in 
its situation files for the week ending on the 23rd November 1941 
noted the general elimination of those it regarded as posing a 
security threat, as well as the recapture of mental defectives 
(unheilbare Irren) from the town's two institutions: 'Die 
Zivilbevölkerung wird - durch die GFP 703 und eine Abteilung 
Sicherheitsdienst überwacht. Unsichere Elemente werden durch sie 
. erledigt, ebenso aufgegriffen unheilbare Irren, die aus 2 Irrenanstalten entlassen wurden. Eine Zivile Hilfspolizei unterstützt 
die Arbeit mit Erfolg". (80) 
The continuity of such policies can be gauged from reports from the 
same Korfick for the following June (1942) which noted the success in 
eliminating undesirable elements: 'Die Aussmerzung politisch 
gefährlicher und asozialer Elemente innerhalb der Bevölkerung machte 
gute Fortschritte. Auch weiterhin wird auf die Säuberung der 
Bevölkerung von arbeitsscheuem und politisch unzuverlässigem Gesindel 
besonders das Augenmerk gerichtet'. (81) 
The one point of difference between policy in the two Army Groups, 
apart from the scale of executions, was that the forces in Mitte 
seemed to have been less openly anti-Semitic and to have disguised 
intensified actions by exploiting powers available to deal with 
general Rear Area Security. Kollektive Gewaltmal3nahmen (actions for 
dealing with supposed acts of resistance) thus merged into the 
Weltanschauung -motivated extermination by the Einsatzgruppen. 
There is much evidence of reprisals specifically directed against 
the Jewish population, where even the reports themselves indicate the 
absence of any clearly defined link to those eradicated. Two 
particular examples can be cited. The first is from the files of 
Feldgend. Abt. Mot. 696 dated 17.9-1941, which refers to the 
ambushing of two German soldiers while on patrol ('Tod zweier 
Soldaten auf Streife'). In reprisal for this attack, four Jews and 
four partisans were executed: 'Als Vergeltung fOr die Erschiessung 
der beiden Angehörigen des WachBatalion 721 wurden von der Abteilung 
(FG696) am 16.9.1941 4 Juden und 4 festgenommene Partisanen in 
Dobromysk erschossen'. (82) 
The other case, a month earlier, from Wachbatallion 721 dealt with 
an attack on a communication cable. The German officers who 
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investigated the matter, having failed to apprehend the culprits, 
agreed to execute seven Jews who happened to live near to where the 
incident had taken place: 'Da sich der Täter nicht sofort feststellen 
liess, habe ich im Einverständnis mit meinem Batls. Kommandeur sofort 
Kollektiv-Sühnemaßnahmen durchführen lassen. Die Juden Hahnin, 
Selektor, Hazahno, Chiger, Avidon, Kahan und Brohmin werden um 18.30 
Uhr erschossen. Die sieben Juden wohnten in dem Gelände, wo der 
Sabotageakt ausgeführt worden war'. (83) 
A quantitative analysis could also draw on further evidence from 
the files of the KorOck, involving other sub-units, in which Jewish 
women, as well as men, were shot on the grounds of supposed security 
needs. (84) The vigour with which this purge of the Rear Areas was 
pursued explains the apparent anomaly as to why there are so few 
references to individual Jews in the files of either Korlick 532 or 
582 for the period after the winter of 1941. The body of material 
which does deal with the 'Jewish question' after this date deals 
mainly with general guidelines, rather than specific cases. (85) 
Individual material is not, however, completely absent. As the Rear 
Area files indicate, the selection policy continued in the POW camps, 
as did Army operations both against Red Army stragglers still on the 
loose and the partisans. Dulag 230 (Simez), for instance, in Korrack 
582 noted in its reports for the 23 July 1942 that Jews and 
Commissars were still being handed over to the Geheime Feldpolizei 
and, in the case of KorOck 532, there is evidence that the SD tended 
to do as it pleased with regard to individuals who were officially in 
the hands of the Army. A report from a subordinate unit noted that a 
POW employed by the command for some months had gone missing. It was 
subsequently discovered that he had been shot by the SD as a 
'half-Jew': 'Ein schon seit Monaten bei der FK beschäftigter 
Kriegsgefangene war seit einigen Tagen vermißt; jetzt wird 
festgestellt, daß dieser als Halbjude vom SD erschossen ist'. (86) On 
an equally sinister level, there are references to the use of slave 
labour which include KorOck instructions that Jews were to bury the 
corpses of Russian POWs and were to clear mines from roads with rakes 
and rollers; a method somewhat obliquely termed 'MinensuchgerAt 
421. (87) 
'Apologist' literature normally responds to the charge that the Army 
was involved in the extermination of Jews in the occupied territories 
by emphasising the stress placed in orders from the Army Group Rear 
Area on the absolute need for German troops not to participate in 
actions undertaken by the SS. ('Grundsatzliches Verbot der Teilnahme 
an Judenerschiel3ungen'). (88) There may be merit to this argument, 
although the lack of data makes it is difficult to assess the impact 
of this 'directive' in restricting informal association by members of 
the Wehrmacht with the SS. Since it was deemed necessary to reissue 
the original order of October 1941 in March of 1942 and again in the 
following May, this seems to suggest-that events in the intervening 
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period had cast doubt on its efficacy. (89) Moreover, as has been 
mentioned in a different context, such orders often seem to have been 
more concerned with the negative impact of such involvement on German 
troop discipline rather than humanitarian considerations. (90) Thus, 
while the military authorities were generally insistent on the need 
for the ordinary soldiers to distance themselves from the shootings 
carried out by the SS Einsatzgruppen, there was little compunction 
against shooting Jews as hostages, if this seemed to serve the 
security interests of the army. Indeed, arguments regarding the need 
to pacify the rear area were also evident in the willingness of the 
German Army to assist in the ghettoisation, of the Jewish population. 
Overall, while the evidence underpins F6rster's doubts as to , the 
validity of Streit's assertion that the policies of the German Army 
were instrumental in the initial formulation of the National 
Socialist 'Endl6sung", the involvement of the military did facilitate 
and accelerate matters. It would be teleological, however, to 
describe this as being part of a conscious move to create the first 
stage in what was to be the final eradication of the Jews in the 
occupied territories. (91) Nonetheless, it is clear that in the 
implementation of policy in the field, Rear Area forces had gone far 
beyond mere logistical support, often as an almost reflex response to 
the German Army's anxiety on matters of security. This determinant 
of policy was to encourage further involvement with the SS/SD when it 
came to the matter of dealing less obliquely with the partisan 
threat. 
### 
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Combined Operations against the Partisans 
A great deal of anti-Semitic policy was pursued by the German Army 
under the guise of anti-partisan operations and, as the earlier 
discussion on this topic has stressed, this was an area in which the 
military were fully prepared to make extensive use of their 
deregulated power. (92) Rear Area security, as the main task of 
Korfick, created considerable anxiety and thus it is hardly surprising 
that while the Army may have shown less inclination to co-operate on 
matters of a more ideological nature, it was very willing to develop 
a close association with the SS/SD where its own immediate interests 
were concerned. As Streit argues: 'In fact, a fear of partisans 
(present from the beginning) and the subsequent partisan warfare that 
developed - however slowly behind the front - were the most important 
factors in increasing the troop's readiness to co-operate with the 
Einsatzgruppen. The troop commanders readily left the task of leading 
the battle against the initially small partisan movement, and of 
obtaining information about it, to the Einsatzgruppen, thereby giving 
them the opportunity for manipulation'. (93) 
Quantification and analysis of Korfick files has already indicated 
that brutality was a recurrent feature of counter- insurgency. The 
main issue to be considered at this juncture is the extent to which 
the involvement of the SD intensified joint-measures, and the degree 
to which the rather imprecise 'manipulation' (referred to by Streit) 
did in fact take place. 
Technically, the German Army was in overall control of anti- 
partisan operations, even small-scale undertakings, with the Abwehr 
office (1c) performing a key coordinating role. But, as AOK files for 
November 1941 indicate, the military was prepared to relinquish a 
great deal of its autonomy in day-to-day tasks: 'Zur Aufsparung 
vermuteter Partisanengruppen sind Sonderkommandos der Geheimen Feld- 
polizei, der Sicherheitspolizei and des SD sowie des Abwehrtrupps 
eingesetzt, die in engster Fühlungsnahme unter sich und mit der 
Truppe arbeiten. Aktionen zur Unschädlichmachung kleinerer 
Partisanengruppen werden von diesen Sonderkommandos selbständig 
durchgeführt. Größere Aktionen werden von der Armee fallweise 
befohlen'. (94) 
This tendency also extended to many KorOck commanders who were 
prepared to allow the Geheime Feldpolzei to exercise independent 
powers well beyond those specified in official documentation. The 
Army was also willing to derive benefit from the experience which the 
SS had gained during the first three months of the Russian campaign, 
as well as its earlier work in Poland and Western Europe. In early 
September 1941, von Schenckendorff, the Befehlshaber rOckwArtiges 
Heeresgebiet Mitte, had initiated an 'Erfahrungsaustausch' course to 
pool expertise. (95) Contributors, including the SS specialist on 
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counter- insurgency, von dem Bach-Zelewski, and the head of 
Einsatzgruppe B (which operated in Army Group Centre) not only 
advised on topics such as 'Zusammenarbeit von Truppe und SD bei der 
Partisanenbekampfung', but went so far as to arrange an authentic 
exercise against a local village. (96) There is considerable evidence 
from the files of Korrick 582 that such contacts served merely to 
underline an existing trend. An SS-Reiterbrigade had operated with 
AOK9 for a short period during the summer of 1941, and there are 
numerous reports from various Kommandanturen in the Rear Area 
regarding episodes in which the Army had passed over special tasks to 
the SD. (97) These included the interrogation and subsequent execution 
of partisan leaders by Einsatzkommando 9, and a number of joint 
actions in which the German troops had the support of both Police 
Bataillons and Sonderkommandos. (98) 
In absolute numerical terms such actions did not seem to have been 
characterised by any more deaths than most of the single-force 
actions in which the German Army security units were engaged. (99) 
However, reports on joint operations contain many more references to 
individuals and lay particular stress on the political dimensions of 
actions. To take just one example, the records of OKI/593 (Demidow) 
for the first week in September 1941 emphasised not only the numbers 
of persons shot after an anti-partisan operation, but stress the fact 
that some were publicly hanged in the local market place, after which 
placards were attached to their corpses. (100) - 
Subsequent reports from Korfick files for the period until the final 
evacuation demonstrate that close involvement had become a well 
established practice, with the German Army giving increased power to 
the Sicherheitspolizei and SD units to engage in 'cleansing 
operations' directed against various localities. (101) Some idea of 
the excesses committed by SD units can be gained from a typical Rear 
Area report (Stimmungsbericht) which noted the complaints made by a 
German-led Russian volunteer unit (Tietjen), whose members were so 
incensed by events that they had requested to be withdrawn from the 
area of operations: 'Auf das rficksichtlose Erschiessen der 
Zivil-Bevblkerung durch die "SS" in den besetzten D6rfern, in denen 
es nicht mehr zu Kampfhandlungen gekommen ist bzw. kein 
Feindwiderstand...., hat die gesamte Mompanie geaussert, im 
Wiederholungsfalle deartiger Massnahmen gegen die Zivilbev6lkerung, 
sich nicht mehr am Kampfe beteiligen zu wollen. (102) 
Despite an awareness of the counter- productive nature of the 
activities of the SD units and the attempts by some officers to 
pursue a less indiscriminate policy, the response of the military 
authorities - who recommended the return of the unit to a POW camp - 
indicated the Army's lack of an alternative approach and their 
consequent reliance on the assistance of the SS. Indeed, on the basis 
of a series of reports from the same KortIck for the winter of 1942/43 
it is clear that the SS forces were given total licence to engage in 
the most draconian measures. Specific mention was made of the large 
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numbers of individuals, including a high proportion of women, who 
were shot and 'sonderbehandelt' by Sonderkommando 7a. (103) 
Overall, the effectiveness of all joint operations between the German 
Army and the various elements of the SS depended very much on close 
and cordial relations at a personal level. Received wisdom on this 
issue tends to create the impression that there was little in the way 
of amiable contact between those concerned, the more traditional army 
supposedly resenting the rather parvenu character of its 
grival'. (104) However, such a view does not always accord with the 
evidence and this not only challenges attempts to dispute German 
Army involvement with the SS forces, but also forces a reappraisal of 
the character of the military. 
On an institutional level general documentation from the Geheime 
Feldpolzei units of the Army reported 'frictionless co-operation' 
('reibungslose gute Zusammenarbeit') with the , Einsatz/ 
Sonderkommandos, and this is reinforced by material from various 
Korijck files which make similar references to the 'smooth running' 
nature of the relationship. (105) Records from KorOck 532 not only 
place much positive emphasis on the regular nature of contact between 
Ic, SD and GFP, but specific reports went so far as to suggest that 
the various units all regretted the lack of a central organisation to 
further the existing co-operation. (106) Indeed, much was made of the 
fact that the most friendly relations existed between the Army Abwehr 
officers (1c), who were responsible for liaison work, and the various 
special units: 'Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen GFP, SD und den 
Abwehrgruppen vollzog sich weiterhin, inbesondere auch unter 
persönlicher Leitung des Abwehrsoffiziers der Armee, in 
kameradschaftlichen Formen'. (107) 
As the military intelligence officer (Abwehr) was supposedly 
responsible for the political control of the various military forces 
operating in the Army Rear Areas, including the GFP and the SD, this 
matter of personal contact was critical. Consequently, there is some 
point in noting that many Ic officers, while perhaps somewhat over 
age for combat duties, had been full-time soldiers ('aktiv') during 
the formative 1930s, and thus may have more readily identified with 
their SS associates than Korfick commanders, and other rear area 
officers. (108) There is also some evidence of a reluctance on the 
part of others to be assigned to the role of Abwehr officer, and such 
men have been less than meticulous in fulfilling their official 
tasks. The inclination was thus to shift much of the responsibility 
elsewhere in order to avoid the adoption of positions that would 
create friction. (109) Given that the SD were directly responsible for 
tasks including the vetting of members of the local civilian defence 
forces (Ordnungsdienst) as well as a great deal of interrogation work 
in conjunction with the GFP, it was understandable that some Abwehr 
officers adopted a subservient role. (110) A similar trait might also 
be discerned in the POW camps, where many Abwehr officers seem to 
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have been more inclined than their commanding officers to co-operate 
with the SD in the selection of special category inmates, such as 
Commissars and Jews. (111) 
Material cited by Streit, which refers to Korfick 582, appears to 
confirm that some degree of working co-operation between the Army and 
the SS agencies was the norm, both on an institutional and personal 
level. (112) However, while some form of personal association between 
officers of both the Army and SS units was almost inevitable given 
the institutional framework devised for the campaign in the East, the 
level of contact between ordinary troops of the German Army and the 
rank and file of the special units is more difficult to assess. There 
is evidence from the occupied territories as a whole to indicate that 
on individual German soldiers had involved themselves in the 
activities of the Einsatzgruppen, be it directly or as 'mere' 
spectators, in some instances by photographing events. (l 13) The 
concern expressed by Army commanders indicated that this was not a 
totally isolated phenomenon. Nonetheless, the directives to prohibit 
such behaviour, albeit motivated by the need to maintain strict 
discipline amongst the regular troops rather than on moral grounds, 
did seem to ensure that Army/SS relations were normally conducted on 
a formal institutional level. All the same, the relationship was far 
from unambiguous. As some post-war commentators have noted, the 
troops of the German army, irrespective of their fundamental attitude 
to the SD units, welcomed any form of assistance in their hard 
campaign against the partisans. (114) 
In itself restraints on active participation by members - of the 
German Army with the SS units may have limited the negative 
repercussions on troop discipline, but it in no way guaranteed a 
reduction in the indiscriminate abuse of military power. The argument 
can even be proposed that the - tendency of the Army to legitimise the 
most brutal and draconian measures by reference to a series of 
quasi-legal directives had the effect of reassuring the troops that 
such actions were , both necessary and excusable. Against this background, with criminal actions endorsed on a massive scale, 
conventional codes governing the behaviour of soldiers within the 
German armed forces came into question. It is to this matter of 
military justice that the thesis turns in the following chapter. 
### 
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Criminal Behaviour and Military Justice. 
A convincing argument can be advanced that a great deal of official 
German Army policy was 'criminal' in nature, both in the formal sense 
that it contravened accepted rules of warfare and in a more abstract 
sense that it was morally indefensible. (I) Evidence in support of 
this assertion can be drawn from a number of specific areas: the 
mass starvation and ill-treatment of millions of Soviet POWs; the 
draconian measures employed against the civilian population under the 
guise of anti-partisan operations and, the involvement of the 
Wehrmacht in the eradication of the Jewish population in the occupied 
territories. (2) 
Specialists on military law, such as Otto Hennicke, have not been 
slow to note that there are few, if any, references to either the 
victims or the perpetrators of such actions in the criminal 
statistics of the German armed forces. (3) This is hardly surprising 
if one remembers that in many instances 'unlawful' laws 
(verbrecherischen Befehlen) underpinned the official activities of 
the army. (4) Indeed, a great deal of anti-apologist literature, 
including Christian Streit's study of the POW question and 
Krausnick's work on the Einsatzgruppen, has made much of the concept 
that these decrees and regulations violated codes of international 
law. ('v6lkerrechtswidrigen Erlasse und Anordnungen'. ) (5) 
The legitimisation of the Wehrmacht as an instrument of murder and 
pillage ('Mord- und Raubinstrument') had an obverse dimension in that 
military law as it applied to the individual German soldiers also 
came to operate according to a very different philosophy from that of 
other armies. Overall, the more likely the action of a soldier to 
undermine the basic fundamental principle of obedience of the 
individual to the institution, the more likely was the offence to be 
a matter for punishment. The authority of the army was everything; 
the main concern of military law was the protection and preservation 
of discipline, not the pursuit of any esoteric concepts of justice. 
It might be argued that there was nothing exceptional in this, for 
most Western armies punished soldiers primarily for violations of 
discipline. The essential difference lay in the way in which military 
justice was fundamentally altered in an attempt to create a strong 
link between the National Socialist system and the armed forces, with 
the intention of reinforcing the Volksgemeinschaft. (6) On this 
premise, Wehrmacht justice might best be described, to paraphrase 
Karl-Dietrich Erdmann's terminology, as 'a structural element within 
the entire functional context of the National Socialist regime' which 
served as a stabilising factor for Nazi rule. (7) 
In order to facilitate this - end, the regime introduced a new and 
greatly strengthened system of military law shortly before the 
outbreak of war. The Military Legal Code (Militdrstrafgerichtsordnung 
- MStGO), which had set clear precedents for civil law from 
its 
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inception in the late 1890s (and in its 1935 version was as yet 
ungleichgeschaltet) was replaced by a markedly more illiberal Wartime 
Military Penal Code (Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung - KStVO). (8) These 
revised regulations followed on from the introduction of an anti- 
sedition law (Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordung - KSSVO) which 
intensified the punishment for desertion and also created a new 
offence of 'Zersetzung der Wehrkraft' (loosely translated by 
Messerschmidt as 'attempting to subvert the will of the people to 
fight'). (9) This was a politically motivated code much influenced by 
the myth of the 'DolchstoBlegende' with its inherent belief that 
defeat in 1918 was due to the collapse of morale rather than purely 
military factors. The extent to which Military courts complied with 
these politically motivated guidelines is a matter of considerable 
debate. In essence the arguments can be reduced to the question of 
whether Wehrmacht justice and National Socialism remained 'two 
distinct and mutually opposed entities' ('zwei neben- und 
gegeneinandergestellte GrHen'). (10) 
An historical paradox of analysis has emerged in that while the 
Wehrmacht is seen by some writers as a brutal agent of the Nazi 
state, others have noted that the individual German soldier was, at 
the same time, often himself a victim of the 'Justizterror' of 
military law. (l 1) Controversial studies, such as the Schweling/ 
Schwinge volume, have advanced rather bizarre justifications for such 
harsh disciplinary measures, including the suggestion that it was 
essential to maintain the German Army's capacity to continue the war 
('Widerstandswille') in order to prevent the Red Army carrying 
Communism right across Europe to the Atlantic. (12) More sophisticated 
material, including Martin van Crefeld's work on fighting power, has 
related the 'effectiveness in combat' of the German Army to, 'the sum 
total of mental qualities', including its philosophy of military 
justice and the methods of enforcing the codes. (13) 
These arguments can be exemplified by relating the relatively low 
numbers of army court cases and the accompanying severe sentence 
policy to the high individual military performance of the members of 
the Wehrmacht. Comparison with figures for the armed forces of the 
United States during the Second World War reinforces this point. Some 
1.7 million American soldiers came before military courts, as 
compared to around 630,000 German servicemen. Yet, whereas the US 
military courts only enforced 142 death sentences, at least 9,732 
German soldiers were executed (a further 6,000 sentences were 
commuted). (14) German figures for the First World War, when only 150 
capital judgements were made, confirm the discrepancy. At the same 
time, on a man-to-man basis, German forces inflicted casualties at a 
rate over 60% higher than the opposing forces, regardless of whether 
on the attack or the defence, and often when numerically 
out-numbered. (15) 
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A complementary proposition has been advanced by Crefeld that the 
brutal institutional treatment of many individual soldiers created an 
environment and value system which would allow them to 'commit any 
kind of atrocity as well'. (16) As far as Army rule in the occupied 
territories is concerned, these views are combined in Keith Simpson's 
assertion that '.. the German control over the Rear Areas was due in 
no small part to strong discipline, maintained where necessary by 
draconian measures against soldier and civilian alike'. (17) 
This is not however such a black-and-white issue as some writers 
would have us to believe. Material on the Army Rear Areas relating to 
both anti-partisan warfare and food/economic policy has stressed the 
brutal policies adopted by the military government towards the 
civilian population. Yet, at the same time as these actions, often 
underpinned by draconian directives, were taking place, Rear Area 
troops regularly received orders which reminded them of the 
punishments that would be imposed for unwarranted acts of violence 
against the civilian population. Similarly, although general orders 
proposed harsh treatment for those who were guilty of even minor 
infringements against internal army discipline, the available 
evidence does not always support the argument that sentencing policy 
against German troops in the hinterland was markedly severe. (18) 
Admittedly, there are methodological and structural problems in any 
analysis of this kind. As a result of wartime damage and losses in 
military archives, records for army courts at both central and local 
level are far from complete. Consequently this is not an easy area to 
research and any enquiry is thus open to the charge that the database 
is too small to produce significant conclusions. (19) Furthermore, the 
era of Army Rear Area government had generally come to an end by late 
1943, and it is after this period, with the increasingly frantic 
attempts to delay military defeat, that the so-called 'depraved orgy 
of coercion' with its 'explosion of death sentences' took place. (20) 
As the very survival of the Third Reich came under threat, the Nazi 
regime also responded by intensifying the ideological pressures on 
the military courts. Increasing numbers of cases were tried under the 
quasi-political code of 'Zersetzung der Wehrkraft', and by the end of 
1943 political education officers (Nationalsozialistische FQhrungs- 
offizier - NSFO) had been introduced into the Wehrmacht. (21) 
The restraints imposed on research into this topic do not, however, 
diminish the value of material drawn from the records of army courts 
operating in the rear areas. Material, in this instance from Koflick 
582 for the period October 1940 to December 1942, offers valuable 
insights into the role and function of military justice. It should be 
noted that the presentation of this material in some detail (rather 
than in simple tabular form) is a chosen approach designed to 
facilitate 'an immersion in the actual life of the observed'. 
Moreover, by this means the tone of the original material is retained 
in some measure and 'thick description' allows narration to act as a 
vehicle of historical discourse. (23) 
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Military Justice. 
The immediate impression gained from these Rear Area military records 
is that the overwhelming majority of the cases involved 
contraventions of military discipline which are to be expected in 
20th century wars. Hence, there are frequent references to offences 
such as neglect of guard duties, absence without leave (AWOL), 
insubordination, drunkenness, petty theft and infringements of 
traffic regulations. Furthermore, even allowing for the limited size 
of the data base and the problem of comparability over a longer 
period, the occurrence of these offences in KorOck 582 corresponds 
almost exactly with figures for the Wehrmacht as a whole. 
Offence: KoriAck Wehrmacht 1940-1944 
(as % of Total Offences) 
Military Theft 20-28% 25% 
(DiebstAhle) 
AWOL 18-20% 20% 
(Unerlaubte Entfernung) 
Infringement of Guard Duty 
(Wachverfehlung) 12% 13% 
Plunder 
(PlOnderung) 10% 4% 
insubordination 
(Ungehorsam) 7% 7-8% 
Desertion 
(Fahnenflucht) 24% 3% 
Negligent Use of Weapons 
(unvorsichtige Behandlung 
von Waffen) A <4% 
Drunk 
(Volltrunkenheit) <2% >4% 
Homosexuality 
(Unzucht zwischen Männern) <=1% 1-2% 
'Zersetzung der Wehrkraft': 
§5a KSSVO. - >1% >1% 
Self-Mutilation 
(Selbstverstilmmelung) >1% >=I% 
Source: Schweling/Schwinge; Messerschmidt; Hennicke & 
Seidler. (25) (Kortick: BA/MA: RH23/261-265) 
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Exceptions to the 'norm' include the number of prosecutions for 
plunder, which was over twice the overall percentage, and 
drunkenness, which was less than half the expected figure. Such 
discrepancies might best be accounted for by noting that Kortick units 
had the maximum possible opportunity, for whatever reason, to sack 
and spoil. The rate of prosecution for plunder was, if anything, 
abnormally low in view of the scale of such activities in the army 
rear areas. Similarly, with regard to alcohol misuse, although orders 
from Heeresgruppe Mitte indicated that drunkenness was regarded by 
the military authorities as a matter for concern, the figures 
probably reflect the fact that there was less likelihood of 
detection than at the front, because of the nature of service in the 
rear areas. (26) 
In respect of the sentences imposed by the Kortick courts, there 
appears to have been a marked reluctance to use to the full the 
increased powers of military law. The majority of offences were 
punished by terms of imprisonment far shorter than military justice 
actually allowed for and, more often than not, convictions were 
commuted to a few weeks close arrest, pending the cessation of 
hostilities. Indeed, the frequent decision to deal even with what 
were in theory 'serious criminal offences' under the relatively 
moderate Article 47 of the KStVO meant that cases never came before 
the court, but were dealt with by the military commander who tended 
merely to discipline the offenders. (27) , As the KorOck records, 
indicate Article 47 was used not only in respect of minor offences 
such as traffic violations or lesser infringements of guard duties, 
but in cases of plunder and even self-inflicted injury. (28) Perhaps 
the availability of this article might best be seen as a loophole 
that Army Commanders could utilize if they so desired, rather than 
recourse to the increased punishments technically available to them. 
The amendment of the MilitArstrafgesetzbuch of October 1940 had 
reduced the time relating to absence without leave from seven days to 
a maximum of three days, while the maximum penalty had increased from 
two years imprisonment to ten. Moreover, many of the cases tried by 
KortIck 582 as 'absence without leave' Q64 M/KStVO), were 
technically classifiable as 'desertion' (§70 M/KStVO), the punishment 
for which in wartime had been increased from a maximum of ten years 
to life imprisonment or death. In addition, Fahnenflucht could now 
lead on to charges of 'Zersetzung der Wehrkraft' (§5a KSSVO), which 
in theory was automatically a capital offence. (29) To cite, for 
instance, the case which came before the court in January 1942 of a 
young soldier who had overstayed his leave by a month because he 
chose to remain with a girl in Riga. Given the length of time he was 
absent, the sentence of four years was relatively lenient, the more 
so when it was commuted to six weeks close arrest. 
279 
Others may not have been quite so fortunate, as can be seen from a 
judgement passed in September 1941 which enforced a term of five 
years hard labour. Another verdict from the sessions held in August 
1941 resulted in a fixed sentence of twelve years hard labour. 
However, all the cases seem to have been judged on their intrinsic 
merit, with the motives of the defendants taken as the determining 
factor in assessing guilt, not abstract ideological arguments. Even 
in the September 1941 trial, where the accused had faced charges 
under paragraph 5a of the KSSVO, the final court ruling had been 
relatively lenient since the twelve-year sentence also reflected 
additional charges of plunder. The general tone of moderation is even 
more clearly exemplified by the details of a case brought before the 
Korfick court in December 1941. Although the death penalty was 
proposed for a deserter with a previous history of absence without 
leave (whose charges also included falsification of new call-up 
orders) his sentence was commuted, albeit it to imprisonment and loss 
of rights. 
The Feldkriegsgerichtsrat concerned adopted a similar sentencing 
policy on other offences to which National Socialist ideology had 
assigned quasi-political criminal status. This is very evident in 
the decision to revoke the death penalty imposed by another court for 
a case of self-mutilation deemed to be 'Zersetzung der Wehrkraft' 
(October 1941)(30) and, the 'army post weasel' whose classification 
as a 'Volksschadling' for the theft of care packages invited the most 
draconian punishment far in excess even of a long-term of hard labour 
(January 1942). (31) 
The Military Court in Korack 582 might thus be regarded as an 
example of what has, been termed the attempt to leave military 
justice within the framework of 'normative arguments'. Certainly, 
this would accord with the line adopted by the Schweling/Schwinge 
study of military justice and succinctly summed up in a review which 
asserted that army courts rejected National Socialist values in 
favour of accepted codes of judicial practice: 'Deutschlands 
Militärrichter waren besser als 'ihr Ruf. Sie hielten in der Zeit 
nazistischer Justizzerstörung weitgehend an dem normativen 
Rechtsdenken ihres Standes fest, sie halfen zahllosen Soldaten aus 
der Bedrängis.... Denn nicht die politischen, unter NS-Mentalität 
angeklagten Delikte bestimmten der Alltag der deutschen 
Militärrichter, sondern Strafbestände, die in jeder Armee verfolgt 
werden". (32) 
Although account must be taken of actual bias given Schwinge's 
wartime status as a military judge with the Luftwaffe, the overall 
tone of the work is reinforced by other specialist studies. (33) Franz 
Seidler in remarks on the sentencing policy adopted by military 
courts towards soldiers accused of self-mutilation concludes that 
while this was officially a serious crime, in practice there was a 
marked tendency towards leniency- 'Die kriegsgerichtlichen Verfahren 
gegen SelbstverstOmmler statzten sich fast aussehliel3lich auf 
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medizinische Gutachten. Geständnisse waren die Ausnahmen. Es ist 
kein schlechtes Zeichen für die Rechtsauffassung der Kriegsrichter, 
daß mehr als die Hälfte der Angeklagten mangels Beweisen frei- 
gesprochen wurde'. (34) 
Material of this sort could be taken as offering support to the 
embattled arguments regarding the role of the German Armed forces in 
the Nazi State. It might seem a relatively short step from the 
argument that military justice maintained its integrity and aloofness 
from National Socialist influences ('Wehrmachtjustiz sauber geblieben 
war und sich nationalsozialistichen Einflüssen, von Ausnahmen 
abgesehen, die es immer gebe, freigehalten habe') to more extensive 
apologist thinking on the Wehrmacht as an independent 
institution. (35) However, while conjecture must remain as to the 
fundamental motives underlying court decisions, there is some 
suggestion that the inclination towards leniency reflected manpower 
problems (as in the decisions drastically to commute often long terms 
of imprisonment), as well as a general concern with morale 
(exemplified in the line adopted on absence without leave and even 
self- mutilation). 
Even when the main concern is with the Army's policy towards the 
German rank-and-file, acknowledgement of the complicity of the 
military elite in the formulation and implementation of the 
Weltanschauungskrieg is fundamental. Studies of military justice 
which ignore this proven fact are palpably flawed. As the opening 
remarks of this chapter stressed, on a macro-level there is abundant 
evidence with regard to the institutional role of military elites, 
including higher echelons within the Wehrmacht judiciary, ('hohe und 
h6chste "Kameraden" der Wehrmachtjustiz') in the formulation of 
numerous barbaric pieces of legislation. The violations of the rights 
of POWs and civilians alike (the Kommissarbefehl and the 
Gerichtsbarkeitserlass) are prime examples. (36) Accordingly, the 
overall stance adopted towards individual German soldiers by the Army 
courts must be seen in the context of an environment where, in order 
to meet the supposed demands of the Volksgemeinschaft, the perversion 
of justice was the norm. Criminal behaviour was taking place all 
around them, and under such conditions those officers who attempted 
to adhere to traditional conventions of justice ('Straftatbestftnde') 
were liable to be regarded as nonconformist. 
In analysing the position of military judges it must be remembered 
that, notwithstanding their freedom of action during the periods of 
trial and deliberation, they did not live in a vacuum; their 
independence was only relative. (37) KortIck 582's involvement in the 
conference organised by the Oberstkriegsgerichtsrat of AOK9 in May of 
1941 and the policy review meeting on the eve of the invasion of 
Russia are two cases in point. The Rear Area's legal staff was fully 
represented on both occasions with Feldkriegsgerichtsrat John, 
Hauptmann Dr. Sarfert and Justizinspektor Milhlpforte in attendance at 
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the spring session, and John and - Sarfert participating in the June 
meeting. The ideological import of these gatherings might be gauged 
from the additional presence at the May conference of 
Ministerialrat Dr. Wunderlich and the amount of time given over to 
discussion of sentencing policy. This same topic figured even more 
prominently in talks held in mid June when, in anticipation of the 
coming campaign, the Wehrmachtsgerichtsbarkeit im Osten (which 
advocated the suspension of conventional rules governing the conduct 
of troops in wartime) was the main item on the agenda. (38) 
Participation in policy meetings of this kind does not, however, 
necessarily seem to have imposed rigid constraints on military 
courts, and Feldkriegsgerichtsrat John's sentencing policy with 
Korfick 582 appears to have continued to be guided by the coherent 
principles of conventional military justice. This fact might best be 
accounted for by reiterating earlier remarks on the degree of 
autonomy available to officers in the rear areas and a tendency 
towards pragmatism which took full account of immediate military 
needs. On this basis, John's promotion to Kriegsgerichtsrat in August 
1941, and his regular secondment to higher divisional courts at AOK9 
(more often as prosecuting counsel than for the defence) are thus 
probably a reflection of his competence. (39) 
A caveat should, however, be added to these remarks. The sentencing 
policy of these higher army courts was relatively severe and this 
reflects more than a simple increase in the incidence of offences as 
a result of the larger area of jurisdiction. For example, the charge 
of desertion (Fahnenflucht) tended to be imposed in preference to 
that of absence without leave, and as a result the available death 
penalty was more likely to be enforced. This observation is all the 
more pertinent if account is taken of decisions made by officials in 
KorOck 582 to refer large numbers of cases to 'other (higher) 
courts'. Those not dealt with at Armeeoberkommando divisional 
hearings (in this case AOK9) or by the Mobile Army Court (Bewegliches 
Heeresgefangnis) would probably have been passed over to the courts 
of the Army Group Rear Area in which the KorOck operated. 
The files from the particular higher body concerned 
(Oberstkriegsgerichtsrat in Heeresgebiet Mitte) record some 32 cases 
of desertion, 6 of absence without leave, and 5 of 'Zersetzung der 
Wehrkraft' during the first half of 1942.25 of the deserters were 
sentenced to death, as were two of those accused of Zersetzung der 
Wehrkraft, with a further soldier receiving the same sentence under 
the law for crimes against the people" (Verbrechen gegen das 
Volkssch5dlingsgesetz. )(40) Furthermore, although the Army Group Rear 
Area courts demonstrated a marked reluctance to impose draconian 
punishments on soldiers for relatively minor offences (such as 
infringements of guard duties or drunkenness) they did have resort to 
charges of a highly political nature - other than those mentioned 
above - including 'Rassenschande' ('racial disgrace') or 'Widerstand 
gegen die Staatsgewalt' ('crimes against the state'). (41) 
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Unfortunately, the records of the Army Mobile Courts in AOK9 and 
Korfick 582, which dealt with the increase of cases in July 1941, are 
not available. One of the main purposes of these mobile courts was 
to effect rapid military justice, which Messerschmidt infers resulted 
in a more harsh sentencing policy. (42) As Kriegsgerichtsrat John 
noted, most cases involved desertion or absence without leave 
accentuated by the strains of the rapid advance into the Soviet 
Union. However, these courts, as with those directly under AOK9, were 
intended to deal primarily with front-line combat units. Rear Area 
troops who were, in any case, more prone to AWOL infringements than 
desertion enjoyed a less rapid and, on the basis of the evidence, 
more lenient system of military justice. 
Overall, military justice in the Army Rear Areas must remain 
something of a 'grey area'. A large number of questions remain 
unresolved, not least the discrepancy in sentencing policy even 
within the same court. The great variation in dealing with absence 
without leave is a prime example, with sentences ranging from mere 
disciplinary action under Article 47 of the KStVO (February 1942) to 
a commuted death sentence (September 1941). Equally, there is no hard 
evidence to indicate how many sentences which initially involved the 
death penalty were eventually commuted, or the background to such 
decisions. 
As a general conclusion it can be stated that while in the 
Wehrmacht as a whole the level of infringements of the military codes 
was relatively small (as compared with the Western Allied armies) the 
sentencing policy in the Rear Areas, albeit less severe on occasions 
than certain authorities have suggested and certainly qualitatively 
different from that in the front-line, was often harsh. (43) 'Local' 
evidence, including the material from Army Rear Area 582, refines the 
overall picture and indicates the role that could be played by 
individual judges and army commanders who chose to attempt to limit 
the influence of ideological thinking. After all, the 
Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung allowed army commanders, including both 
Korfick and AOK, to exercise quasi-absolute powers (unbegrenzte 
AutoritAt) in accordance with their official role as Gerichtsheeren 
(supreme military authorities). (44) 
As with so many other facets of Rear Area rule, the use to which 
officers put their supposed autonomy and the related response of the 
rank-and-file presents a differentiated view of the German Army. 
Accordingly, the problem remains of reconciling the role the military 
hierarchy played in 'decriminalising' a range of brutal activities 
directed against both the civilian population and the captured enemy 
soldiers, while actively contributing, even inside the Wehrmacht, to 
generally accepted social values; a process which Hans Mommsen has 
referred to as "a show of petty-bourgeois normality'. (45) At the same 
time, history from below also qualifies any over-optimistic 
assessment of the degree and effectiveness of such actions, in much 
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the same way as 'exceptions to the rule' with regard to partisan 
warfare, food policy in the East or the treatment of POWs in no way 
detract from the scale of total suffering. 
Given the paucity of data on criminal justice per se, some 
consideration of morale is probably the only way to delve further 
into the subject. After all, sentencing policy aside, the vast 
majority of cases brought before the military court in Korlick 582 
would have been regarded as 'breaches of discipline' in most armies. 
Thus, in considering the motives behind such incidents, there is a 
need to examine the circumstances under which the individual soldiers 
found themselves. This matter will be taken up in the next section. 
### 
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Criminal Behaviour and Military Justice. 
The distinction between military law and justice in the Western and 
Eastern theatres is integral to the arguments regarding a 
conventional war ('Normalenkrieg') in Western Europe and a war of 
extermination ('Vernichtungskrieg') in the Soviet Union. 
See, for example, the remarks in Otto P Schweling/Erich Schwinge, Die 
deutsche Militärjustiz in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, NG Elwet 
Verlag, Marburg 1978,370ff. 
'Die Handhabung der Gerichtsbarkeit im Rußlandfeldzug, an der 
Ostfront und in den besetzten Teilen der Sowjetunion bedarf einer 
besonderen Darstellung, weil sich von dem Verfahren, an allen anderen 
Fronten und in allen anderen Bereichen, die während des zweiten 
Weltkrieges von der deutschen Wehrmacht kontrolliert wurden, 
grundsätzlich unterschied'. 
2. See chapters on POWs and Army/SS Relations, 201ff. & 234ff. 
3. Otto Hennicke, 'Auszüge aus der Wehrmachtkriminalstatistik', in 
Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, 1966 page 439ff. 
4. Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen 
Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, Stuttgart, 1978. 
5. Helmut Krausnick, 'Kommisarbefehl und Gerichtsbarkeitserlaß 
Barbarossa in neuer Sicht', in VfZG, October 1977, 
H Krausnick and H-H Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungs- 
Krieges, DVA, Stuttgart 1981. 
6. Manfred Messerschmidt, 'The Wehrmacht and the Volksgemeinschaft', 
in: Journal of Modern History, 1983, pages 719-744. 
7. Karl Dietrich Erdmann, 'Zeitgeschichte, Militärjustiz und Völker- 
recht: zu einer aktuellen Kontroverse', in GWU, 1979/3, page 131. 
8. Franz W. Seidler, 'Die Fahnenflucht in der deutschen Wehrmacht 
während des Zweiten Weltkriegs: Militärgesetzgebung', in MGM 
2/1977, page 23ff. 
9. Manfred Messerschmidt, 'German Military Law in the Second World War', 
in W Diest (ed), The German Military in the Age of Total War, Berg, 
Leamington Spa, 1985, page 325. 
10. Karl Dietrich Erdmann, 'Zeitgeschichte, Militärjustiz und 
Völkerrecht, in GWU, 1979/3, page 131. 
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Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, NG Elwet Verlag, Marburg 1978. 
Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the 
Barbarisation of Warfare, Macmillan, 1985 pages 27ff. 
'Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will', (W Malanowski), in; 
Der Spiegel, 36,1986, page 70. 
13. Martin van Crefeld, Fighting Power German and U. S. Army performance 
1939-1945, (Studies in Military History, number 32), Greenwood, 
Westport, Conn., 1982, page 3. 
14. 'Der Kerl gehört gehängt: die deutschen Militärrichter im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg% in Der Spiegel, Nr. 28,1978, pages 36ff. 
15. JF Dunnigan, The Eastern Front 1941-1945, Arms and Armour, 1978, 
pages 74ff. 
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1939-1945, Greenwood, Westport, 1982, page 13. 
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Eastern Front 1941-1945', in Royal United Services Journal, volume 
121,1976, page 46. 
18. 'Disziplin und unmilitArisches Verhalten von Wehrmachtsangeh6rigen 
in der Offentlichkeit', Kommandantur Befehl Nr. 10, Ortskommandantur 
Demidow (KorOck 582) dated 16 August 1941, BA/MA: RH23/223 (&0765) 
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21. VR Berghahn, 'NSDAP und geistige FQhrung der Wehrmacht 1939-1943, 
VfZ, 1,1969, pages 17-71. 
22. Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and 
the Barbarisation of Warfare, Macmillan, 1985, pages 27-39. 
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23. Georg Iggers (ed), The Social History of Politics: critical 
perspectives in West German historical writing since 1945, 
page 39-41. 
Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the 
Barbarisation of Warfare, Macmillan, 1985, pages 28,32 & 34. 
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Troop Morale and Fighting Power. 
The 3.5 million strong Wehrmacht which invaded Russia in 1941 can be 
regarded as representing a 'mirror image of the entire German people' 
and this concept is equally applicable to the troops who made up the 
Rear Area occupation forces. (l) Indeed, the soldiers in the Korficks 
and rfickw! irtige Heeresgebiete were in many ways more representative 
of a broad cross-section of German society than some of the 
front-line combat units, which had a bias towards youth. (2) This 
microcosm effect had been reinforced by the failure of the German 
advance during the winter of 1941/42 and the consequent increased 
deployment of units made up of young men to the battle-front which 
necessitated a conscription policy for the Rear Areas that drew on a 
range of occupational groups within the Reich. (3) 
Although the officer corps might be seen as somewhat of an 
exception, in that the rapid expansion of the Wehrmacht after 1935 
had created a reserve of potential promotees, even here the doubling 
in size of the military between 1939 and 1942 had forced the need for 
further conscription. (4) The Rear Area officer corps with its mix of 
professional (aktiv) soldiers, former- reservists, veterans and 
conscripts, certainly represented a considerable range of individuals 
in terms of age, occupational background and both civilian and 
military experience. This trait was reinforced by the particular 
requirements of military government which demanded specialists in a 
number of fields not usually regarded as the province of soldiers. 
Korilck 532, was fairly typical, with its staff made-up of three 
9aktiv' officers, and nine others whose civilian occupations 
included: landowner; lawyer; school teacher; farmer (and local 
mayor); bookkeeper; engineer and town clerk. (5) 
Armies are, of course, more than a simple aggregation of the soldiers 
that serve in them. As John Ellis has stressed, 'they, and more 
especially the regiments and divisions that constitute them, can be 
very homogeneous bodies whose traditions and standards of behaviour 
act as a powerful support to their individual members. (6) At the 
same time, while armies are especially authoritarian organisms with 
remarkably wide coercive powers, they are not capable of holding 
their men in line, unless there is some tacit consensus among the 
rank-and-file that such things need to be done. 
World War 11 was, nominally at least, an overtly ideological 
struggle, yet although the military/foreign policies of the Third 
Reich seemed to be the very embodiment of 'ideology in action', much 
debate exists as to what determined the behaviour of the German 
troops. (7) Demythologising literature, particularly that of 
Krausnick, Streit and F6rster, has taken Messerschmidt's general 
concept of an army indoctrinated by National Socialist values, and 
applied this idea to the conduct of the war in the East. (8) The 
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underlying argument stated that a mutuality of interest between the 
higher officer corps and the National Socialist regime encouraged and 
fashioned the most ruthless policies on the part of the military in 
their pursuit of a racially-based Weltanschauung. Recently, a similar 
line has been adopted in work which moves the focus away from the 
highest levels of the German Army to the junior officers. Bartov 
contends that this element of the military were motivated primarily 
by National Socialist values. An indoctrination process which 
originated in the 1930s had been reinforced by various techniques 
during the war itself. (9) 
It would be methodologically unsound simply to dismiss the weight 
of evidence assembled in support of such arguments. The Third Reich 
undoubtedly gave a high priority to the -inculcation of its 
ideological premises, and the National Socialist sympathies of many 
officers are well documented. (10). However, as Bartov himself 
acknowledges, the link between 'ideology and action' is still an open 
question. (I 1) Material from the files of the German Army Rear Areas 
offers the opportunity to engage in a 'careful study of individual 
soldiers and their beliefs during the war'(12), that acknowledges the 
role of political indoctrination, yet also considers other contingent 
influences. 
Few of the topics discussed in this thesis have failed to stress that 
the war in the East created suffering and misery on an horrendous 
scale. Ideological input accepted, this reflected the duration and 
scale of the struggle, its geographic and climatic background, and 
the toxic combination of modern industrialised technology and 
primitive human energy. (13) Yet, - while much emphasis is rightly 
placed on the way in which this conflict distinguished itself from 
previous European wars by the eradication of millions of 
non-combatants, this should not detract from the human cost as it 
affected those in the armed forces. (14) Accordingly, while not 
denying the arguments as to ideological determinism, any 
consideration of the behaviour of the German Army must take full 
account of the conditions under which the individual soldiers 
operated. Due regard should be given to the physical hardships, 
increasing casualty rates, and the related mental strain experienced 
by the troops not only at the front but often, no less significantly, 
in the Rear Areas. (15) 
Reports from the military hinterland, from as early as the first 
few months of the campaign, reflected the pessimism that had arisen 
as a result of the failure to achieve rapid victory. One particular 
Korrick sub-unit offered a simple but concise comment on the 
conditions under which it was having to operate when it noted that a 
summer characterised by 'flies, disease and water problems' had given 
way to a winter of 'food shortages, cold and blocked roads'. (16) 
Neigbouring units adopted a similar staccato language and added to 
the list of woes. Ortskommandantur 1/302 referred to 'disease, rats, 
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famine, cold, partisans, mines and air-raids'. (17) It is significant 
to note that at this early juncture in the war the main areas of 
concern were not always the enemy forces, but rather the natural 
elements and conditions facing the German forces. While popular 
literature tends to focus on the difficulties experienced by the Army 
in winter, military reports make it clear that there was rarely a 
season of the year which did not present problems. Apart from the 
conventional difficulties, such as frostbite, food shortages and 
exhaustion, Korfick records also refer to a number of apparently 
esoteric issues, which are in fact indicative of the range of 
problems confronting the ordinary soldiers. Korfick 582 files 
compiled at Wjasma in the period up to the Spring of 1942 are 
typical, with references to the increased risk of disease, either in 
winter because of the failure of inoculators to work in the extreme 
cold, or in summer because of the problems with latrines, drinking 
water, and the rat plagues which affected the town. (18) A perennial 
hazard was Fleckfieber as well as more aggravated forms of lice-borne 
infection such as typhus. Military orders regularly included 
notification of measures to combat the risk, including the closure of 
all the local cinemas, bordellos and hairdressers frequented by the 
German troops. (19) Morale was certainly not improved by the 
withdrawal of rest and recreational facilities or related orders 
which stipulated that the men should have their hair shorn by army 
barbers to no more than a matchstick's length. (20) To add to the 
day-to-day tribulations, mosquito infestation in parts of both Korfick 
532 and Korlick 582 made normal operations difficult and carried with 
it the risk of malaria. (21) An overall impression of the health 
hazards facing the troops can be gained from a typical medical 
report, in this case from Oberfeldkommandantur 399: 
Medical Reports for OFK 399 for the Period 
October to December 1942. 
20 Oct 31 Oct 10 Nov 20 Nov 30 Nov 10 Dec 
malaria 128 364 227 66 48 71 
TB 96 273 158 90 128 126 
gonorrhoea 71 128 - 78 51 89 58 
syphilis 22 23 7 10 32 13 
typhus 20 74 57 64 70 95 
scarlet-fever 40 98 78 47 41 40 
diphtheria 159 303 257 214 229 201 
meningitis 2 2 3 4 4 3 
spotted fever 40* 212 153 287 219 255 
rabies I 
Source: OFK 399,30.11.1942 (1227/42) (&040) & 564/42 20 11.1942, 
Abt. VII G. /W. Gesundheitswesen (137/42) (&071): BA/MA: RH22/206 
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Admittedly, during the first few weeks of the war morale did not 
appear to be a serious problem. The commander of Wach-Bataillon 720 
(KorOck 582), for instance, whose troops were in well-heated quarters 
and had the provision of a wireless and a good supply of old 
newspapers, commented that spirits were high. (22) However, as the 
earlier discussion of food policy and resources has made clear, with 
the onset of winter, units found themselves in a much less fortunate 
position, with dire shortages of proper rations and suitable 
clothing. The marked rise in the incidence of pilfering and plunder 
by German soldiers during this period was, as even the military 
command acknowledged, motivated as much by necessity as greed. (23) 
As a consequence, concern over the potential damage to the morale of 
the troops came to figure more prominently in official documents. 
Material on manpower resources has already demonstrated that this 
concern was very much bound up with the unfavourable comments which 
were expressed as to the age of many of the Rear Area troops and 
their lack of combat readiness. To take a typical example, Korilck 582 
informed AOK9 that LandesschQtzenbataillon 481 (which had been 
assigned to protect the railway from Basary to Rshew) was made up of 
such old and handicapped troops that the unit was simply not up to 
the task. Indeed, grave doubts were expressed as to its possible use 
in any military capacity. (24) Difficulties with such units became 
acute as long and often demanding tours of duty gave rise to health 
problems or aggravated existing conditions. The records of Gruppe von 
der Mosel -a KorQck 582 unit whose rank and file were on average in 
their late thirties - place considerable stress on these issues. (25) 
A 'Zustandsbericht' compiled in October 1942 was particularly 
explicit as to the combat limitations of the battalion and the strain 
imposed by unrelieved active service (over 3 months in the field) and 
the related health problems: 'Geringer und nur mässig ausgebildeter 
Ersatz (darunter Fahrer, Artilleristen usw. ) sowie zurückgekehrte 
Genesene haben zur notdürftigen Ergänzung geführt. Karnpfkraft ist 
durch diese Lage erheblich gemindert. ... die Truppe seit Anfang 
Juli 
fast ununterbrochen im Einsatz sich befindet und ganz selten Zeit und 
Gelegenheit fand. sich rein äusserlich aufzufrischen'. 
The unit's doctor was prompted to attribute the 'disquieting" 
(bedenklich) medical condition of the troops to intense exhaustion 
(starken Ersch6pfung) brought about by the dire conditions under 
which the men operated. Stomach and intestinal disorders such as 
enteritis and dysentery were rife, and poor accommodation had 
resulted in a high incidence of swamp-fever. The general poor health 
of the troops had deteriorated further as a side-effect of delousing 
treatment, with numerous cases of furunculosis (festering boils) and 
scabies. Over 150 men had been confined to the army field hospital 
over a period of less than two weeks and concern was openly expressed 
as to the unit's greatly diminished strength. (26) 
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Advocates of theories which point to the absence of any breakdown 
of fighting spirit in the German armed forces, despite the conditions 
under which they operated, might draw comfort from the concluding 
remarks of the report in which the officer responsible insisted that 
the Regiment would continue to do its duty: 'Das Regiment wird 
selbstverständlich jederzeit seine ihm befohlene Pflicht tun'. (27) 
However, there was little evidence of any real confidence in this 
assertion, for equal stress was placed on the increasing 
deterioration in the psychological mood of the troops, and there was 
also a marked unease as to combat ability, fitness and morale: 
'Abschließend darf ich melden, daß die geschilderten Umstände 
stimmungsmaßig und m. E. psychologisch verständlich, ausserordentlich 
deprimierend auf die Truppe gewirkt haben .... verstärken sich meine Sorgen über Einsatzfähigkeit, Gesundheitszustand und Stimmung. '(28) 
Some concept of the prevalence of such problems throughout the rear 
areas can be gained by quoting from notes made by the chief 
psychiatrist attached to Pz. AOK2 (KorQck 532). The medical officer 
referred to the 'heavy burden on the troops' brought about by 
9periods without obvious results or great events, periods of waiting 
and small-scale war, all against a background of day-to-day 
hardships'. (29) Other military reports, ostensibly produced in 
response to apprehension regarding the inability of over-age and 
ill-trained troops to respond to the demands of anti-guerrilla work, 
were also forced to evaluate the wider issue of troop morale. As 
early as April 1942, Korfick 582 reported on the poor performance of 
the latest Rear Area security units to be assigned to the command. 
These formations manifested problems of over-age, poor state of 
health, lack of training and difficult family circumstances: 'Der 
Einsatz der Landesschutz-Bataillone im Rahmen der 221. Division beim 
Unternehmen gegen Glinka hat bereits gezeigt, daß mit einer solchen 
Truppe Erfolge nur schwer zu erringen sind. Infolge der mangelhaften 
Gefechtsausbildung sind zudem die Verluste größer als bei einer 
Fronttruppe. 50% der Verluste sind Tote. Mit einer solchen Truppe 
sind auch im Kampf gegen die Partisanen, welche mit Maschinen-Waffen 
ausgerüstet sind und das Gelände kennen, kaum Erfolge zu 
erzielen'. (30) 
Rear Area commanders were particularly reluctant to deploy these 
soldiers because many of the troops, by virtue of their age, had 
large families at home in the Reich. Kortick had also been allocated a 
large number of young men who were only sons, and this created a 
similar dilemma. The Wehrmacht was only to well aware of the impact 
on popular opinion of losses from amongst these sensitive groups. In 
Landschutz Bataillon 738, for example, reports for July 1942 recorded 
15 men who fell into the first category (Tinderreiche VAter(n)') and 
22 in the second (einzige S6hne'. )(31) As the general military 
situation deteriorated and the better troops were moved to the 
front-line, this feature became more Pronounced, and by August 1942 
the number who fell into both these categories had risen by seven. 
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Command noted the restraints imposed on the batallion by the 
limitations of such troops and the additional problems caused by 
invalided men: 'Die Einsatfähigkeit des Bataillons ist durch die 40 
einzigen Söhne und kinderreiche Väter, die nur im rückwärtigen Dienst 
verwendet werden können, sowie durch die Zahl der g. v. Leute 
(körperlich behinderte) wesentlich eingeschränkt'. (32) 
Concern for those with large families extended into day-to-day 
military activities. The Abwehr officer with KorOck 532, Alexander 
Freiherr von Seebach, in his autobiographical account of the period 
quotes the remarks of a colleague who had insisted on taking the lead 
on a track where there was a risk of mines; on the grounds that he 
had only one child, while Seebach was the father of five. ('Sie haben 
fünf Kinder, ich nur eines'. )(33) 
When Korfick commanders, despite serious reservations, were 
compelled by force of events to deploy substandard units, lack of 
training inevitably produced high losses. This may in part account 
for the lethargy and lack of fighting spirit observed amongst units 
which had been exposed to combat conditions in the rear. However, 
similar traits were also evident in formations newly deployed in the 
rear areas, and this seems to reflect the general state of anxiety 
that was so prevalent amongst men with family commitments who had not 
expected to be conscripted for active service. Reports from Korack to 
to Army Group Centre, of which the following is fairly 
representative, give some idea of the reaction of many officers to 
the situation: 'Ein Kompanie Führer meldet wörtlich: "Noch nie stand 
ich vor einer Kp., die bezüglich ihrer geistigen Haltung so schlecht 
war. Es fehlt an ernstem Willen zur Hingabe an die Sache, die Leute 
sind ohne Energie, müde und schlaff. Die Angriffsmoral fehlt völlig. 
In der Kompanie befinden sich sehr viel kinderreiche Familienväter, 
die das 45. Lebensjahr überschritten haben und unglücklich darüber 
sind, nun in einem Gefecht eingesetzt zu werden"'. (34) 
Traditional studies have long made the point that 'among the scant 
German forces responsible for the security of vast alien areas, 
partisan activity regardless of its military significance was bound 
to promote a state of nervousness and insecurity'. (35) The 
psychological impact on the individual soldiers was expressed 
succinctly in a traditional form by the pessimistic lyrics of a ditty 
that was popular among rear area security units in 1942: 
'Vorne Russen, Russians to the front of us, 
Hinten Russen, Russians to the rear of us, 
und dazwischen And in the middle 
Wird geschussen. (36) Shooting. 
A marked reluctance on the part of many troops to engage the enemy 
wasý hardly surprising since the insurgents developed an increasingly 
fearful reputation, which literature more concerned with arguments as 
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to discrepancies between German and partisan losses is inclined to 
obscure. (37) Files containing medical reports which graphically 
described the mutilation of German soldiers unfortunate enough to 
fall into enemy hands had a particularly damaging effect on morale 
and only served to intensify feelings of isolation and danger. (38) 
As Von Seebach's comments on this matter indicate, even the 
front-line combat units drafted into the rear areas of AOK9 for 
special, anti-partisan operations were loath to leave the main 
thoroughfares and pursue the resourceful guerrillas deep into the 
woods and swamps: 'Die Partisanen stellten sich in das Sumpfwasser, 
legten sich Schilf und Zweige auf den Kopf und ließen die 
Panzergrenadiere, die sowieso keine Lust hatten, vorbeiziehen'. (39) 
It might be argued that in relative terms troops in the rear areas 
during the early stages of the war were not subject to the demands 
and stresses that were an integral part of front-line combat duties. 
There was a price to be paid for this, however, since KortIck units 
accordingly received relatively fewer concessions in terms of leave 
and allowances. Food, in particular, was severely rationed in order 
to increase supplies for those at the front. (40) Even when the 
escalation of the partisan threat in the hinterland produced some 
levelling in the conditions under which the war was fought, the 
differentials, especially with regard to priority for leave, remained 
in favour of the front line troops. (41) In any case, as the overall 
strategic position of the Wehrmacht deteriorated, so did the 
possibility of any improvement in the rear areas. By April 1942, over 
123,000 of the combat troops with the 9th Army (the AOK to which 
Korack 582 was attached) had not been home for a year or more, and 
this did not bode well for the rear area soldiers. (42) 
Against such a background, it was hardly surprising that much 
attention was focused on the difficulties which arose over the 
delivery of personal mail from the Reich. (43) Soldiers in the East 
were told that they would receive letters from home within the space 
of a couple of weeks, but in practice delivery dates often ran into 
months. (44). In the case of Gruppe von der Mosel, files for the 
spring of 1942 noted that over six weeks had elapsed since the last 
correspondence had arrived and a further delay was expected. The 
impact on those soldiers who were awaiting news of families in areas 
of Germany subjected to Allied bombing raids was described as 
especially severe: 'Bereits heute ist also jeder Einzelne seit über 6 
Wochen ohne Nachricht von seinen Angehörigen; weitere Wochen ohne 
Nachricht stehen uns vor. Da eine Teil der Truppe aus luft- 
gefährdeten Gebieten stammt, ist die Sorge um Nachtricht aus der 
Heimat besonders groß'. (45) 
By the early Spring of 1943 when the German forces were unable to 
maintain the static front and the the partisan menace in the rear had 
reached epidemic proportions, some officers continued to express 
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optimistic views that undoubtedly owed more to ideological belief 
than hard reality. Even these reports, however, could not avoid 
acknowledging that for many less committed soldiers, especially 
amongst the rank and file, the war was taking a considerable toll. 
In the case of Bataillon Behne (a subordinate unit of 
Sicherungs-Bataillon 722 in KorOck 582) conditions had become dire 
and the ill-equipped troops found it virtually impossible to continue 
to function in the severe sub-zero temperatures. The men of the unit 
had no snow-shoes, or even leather shoes for that matter, and were 
forced to wear felt-boots for which they had no spare socks but only 
one badly worn pair. They spent virtually all their time in 
camouflage suits in order to try to keep warm, but to little effect 
since the cold and shortages of food had given rise to all manner of 
health problems, including frostbite, snow-blindness and renal 
disorders. In one company over half the troops were suffering from 
diarrhoea. The officer in charge insisted that despite all of these 
problems the 'iron will to hold out to the end' ('eiserne Wille zurn 
Durchhalten") remained, but even he was forced to admit that there 
was evidence amongst the ordinary soldiers of chronic fatigue 
(Ermfidungserscheinungen) and in some instances derangement and 
disorientation bordering on insanity (Geistesgest6rtheit). (46) 
Although the problem was qualitatively rather different, it was not 
just the rank-and-file who gave the military authorities cause for 
concern and criticism. Despite the arguments put forward as to the 
National Socialist fervour of the German army officer corps, files 
from both KorOcks make reference to the limitations of some of those 
in positions of responsibility. (47) In the case of 
Landschutz-Bataillon 738, for example, reports drawn up in June 1942 
(only two months after those mentioned above) commented that many of 
the unit's limitations could be ascribed in part to the inadequacies 
of the commanding officer, who appeared both nervous and pessimistic: 
, Es dürfte aber zum Teil an der Person des Kdeurs. liegen, der 
ausgesprochenen nervös und schwarzseherisch veranlagt, sich in die 
neuen Einsatzverhältnisse noch nicht recht einfinden konnte'. (48) 
Elsewhere, even amongst officers with a high level of commitment, 
contingent circumstances gave rise to problems which impaired 
performance. Those men not directly involved in active combat duties 
could be affected and demanding administrative responsibilities for 
tasks such as the supply of troops in transit through the rear areas 
often produced signs of acute fatigue. This was particularly evident 
from the early winter of 1941 onwards when the urgent need to 
reinforce the front-line army corps created all sorts of problems. 
The Ortskommandantur at Wjasma in Korfick 582, for example, made 
reference in reports for early November 1941 to the damage done to 
the health of rear area personnel forced to work day and night by 
candlelight in order to facilitate the movement of reinforcements: 
'Das Quartieramt ist wegen des starken Zustroms, besonders durch 
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wilde Einquartierung von Truppen und Dienststellen ohne Meldung, sehr 
überlastet and hat bereits 2 Kranke infolge ununterbrochener Tag- und 
Nachtarbeit bei Kerzenlicht'. (49) 
Some idea of the unrelenting demands of such duties can be gained 
from other files which refer to the difficulties caused in Rshew the 
following year (1942) by further hasty troop movements, and also the 
need for KorOck officers to deal with associated problems of false 
alarms and rumour-mongering. (50) Matters were not helped by the fact 
that many of the senior officers in the Rear Areas were increasingly 
of the opinion that their work was not fully appreciated and that 
there was a failure to- perceive that the dangers and hardships were 
as pronounced behind the lines as they were at the front. Documents 
from Korfick 532 in Bryansk, for instance, stress the hard and 
unpopular nature of military government work, not just because of the 
immediate threat posed by the partisans, but also because of the 
acute hostility directed by the civilian population towards the 
German 'occupiers' (Okkupanten), a term of abuse which the army 
offices themselves appreciated reflected the influence of the 
partisans. (51) 
Certain officers in Korfick 582 expressed similar complaints, and 
the widespread nature of such opinions can be fully gauged from 
comments which emanated from the Army Group Rear Areas. Given the 
much larger size of these administrative units, and the commensurate 
increased responsibilities which devolved upon senior army officers, 
the remarks in one particular document from the spring of 1942 are 
especiallylelling: 'Es besteht daher nach wie vor trotz Ablehnung 
durch OKH der dringende Wunsch, das ominöse Wort 'Rückwärtiges 
Heeres-Gebiet' in Fortfall zu bringen, welches unberechtigterweise 
in der Heimat die Ansicht aufkommen lässt, als handele es sich hier 
uni hinterste Etappe. Dieses der Etappe ähnliche Wort 'rückwärtig' 
veranlasst die besten Div. Kdre. sich um ein Frontkommando zu bemühen. 
Andererseits mussten zeitweilig unterstellte Kampfdivisionen zunächst 
sehr eingehend belehrt werde, daß hier von einer Etappe nicht 
gesprochen werden kann, was sie dann allerdings sehr schnell, durch 
eigene Verluste belehrt, lernten! Ich wiederhole daher nochmals die 
Bitte, das Wort 'rückwärtiges' ändern zu wollen'. (52) 
It might be argued that the pessimism and disaffection expressed by 
some officers was simply a reflex response to the complex problems 
which military government imposed on the German army of occupation, 
and that examples of genuine deep-seated malaise were the exception 
rather than the rule. In the same way, while -the lack of 
fighting 
spirit and problems of morale amongst some of the rank-and-file may 
have been far from isolated, there was little evidence that soldiers 
were prepared to carry such responses to the extreme of desertion, 
let alone mutiny. Taken as a whole, the German troops in the Army 
Rear Areas seem to have been little different from their front-line 
comrades-when it came to displaying legendary tenacity and fighting 
power under the most adverse conditions. (53) 
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Having acknowledged this general observation it is, however, 
pertinent at this juncture to remind ourselves of Roderick Floud's 
assertion that historians should not preclude the possibility of 
$contrasting the behaviour of an individual or group with the 
collective behaviour of larger numbers of people considered as a 
whole'. (54) There are, in the case of the ordinary soldiers in 
particular, clear examples of various 'strategies for survival, 
which challenge the accepted view - be it in the form of eulogy or 
condemnation - of the German Army and its members as a sort of 
inexorable machine. 
Statistics on the incidence of self-inflicted injury 
(SelbstverstOmmelung) or feigned illness (Krankheitssimulation) 
offer some indication of the extreme responses that might be adopted. 
Franz Seidler suggests that soldiers who attempted to 'escape' the 
war in this manner included not only those suffering from an acute 
reactive response to events such as intense enemy action, the death 
of comrades or bad news from home, but in many cases the chronic, 
almost endogenous, problem of prolonged war-weariness. (55) Precise 
quantitative analysis is admittedly not easy given the difficulties 
in differentiating cases of this sort from injuries genuinely 
sustained in combat or as a result of accidents and ill-health, but 
numbers probably exceeded 23,000. (56) The rate of detection itself 
offers an insight into the problem. As earlier discussions on 
Wehrmacht criminal proceedings have shown, many commanding officers 
and in some cases military courts, tended to avoid the use of the 
full disciplinary powers technically available to them, preferring 
instead to - sentence troops for the less serious offence of 
'Wehrkraftzersetzung'. This can be interpreted as a reflection of 
concern ýfor overall morale within units, as well as the equally 
pragmatic consideration of manpower limitations. (57) 
Many rear area soldiers also came to realize that an increase in 
fighting effeciency would increase risk, as there was a natural 
tendency to deploy better-trained units for more demanding security 
work. Incompetence was thus seen as a form of protection. There was 
even a suggestion in reports emanating from Korilck 582 that some 
soldiers were using a number of ploys in order deliberately to avoid 
engaging the partisans in combat. A high-priority directive issued in 
October of 1942 noted that although military strongpoints (mainly 
blockhouses along the railway lines) had plentiful quantities of 
ammunition, instances had been reported in which the supplies had 
been quickly exhausted, apparently out of panic. In a number of cases 
hand grenades had been thrown when the enemy was over 100 metres 
away. The suspicion was expressed that such actions were a deliberate 
strategy designed to give the German guards a reason to abandon their 
posts: 'Es liegt die Vermutung nahe, daß die Stützpunktbesatzungen 
ihre Munition so schnell wie möglich verbrauchen, um ihren Posten 
dann wegen Munitionsmangels aufgeben zu könnenl. (58) Korück invoked 
the threat of court martial for those who disobeyed orders and 
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demanded that positions were not to be deserted once the ammunition 
was used; troops were to use hand grenades in an effective manner 
and, if necessary, engage in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. 
Episodes such as these suggest that the internal organisation of the 
Germany Army, which Martin van Crefeld sees as so vital to the 
maintenance of brutal fighting power, had broken down. (59) In this 
respect, mention has already been made in the earlier thematic 
discussion of anti-partisan warfare of individual army units which 
exploited the opportunity that isolation offered them and virtually 
abandoned the war. (60) The very existence of the phenomenon certainly 
reinforces arguments as to the consequences of inadequate 
organisational control. More importantly, given the collusion that 
was necessary on the part of the non -commissioned officers involved, 
it further calls into question the conclusions of literature more 
narrowly concerned with advancing arguments as to ideological 
conditioning within the officer corps. Massive indoctrinational 
effort may well have been employed, especially amongst junior 
officers and NCOs in order to try to sustain morale and thus fighting 
spirit. (61) However, consideration of the behaviour of the entire 
rank-and-file under abnormal 'autonomous' conditions suggests that 
the influence of National Socialist values was often of little 
consequence. Almost paradoxically these deviations from the 'norm' 
indicate that the decision by groups of soldiers to take collective 
action under varying circumstances derived, to use Shils and 
Janowitz's terminology, 'from the steady satisfaction of certain 
primary personality demands.... that is, from the loyalty of the 
individual to his 'primary' group, the men of the unit with whom he 
was in constant physical touch'. (62) 
Acceptance of this -argument does not, it must be stressed, 
necessitate a move towards a new position in which the influence of 
ideological conditioning is denied altogether. The weight of 
evidence, including that assembled in this thesis, demonstrates that 
many officers were undoubtedly motivated by National Socialist 
beliefs. Rather, it would be very much in keeping with the concept 
that ideas influence action to note Messerschmidt's assertion that 
while the 'officers were more prone to ideological arguments .... the 
ordinary soldiers, who for practical reasons or just out of 
resignation simply wanted to 'last out', were less worried about the 
connection between National Socialism and patriotisml. (63) 
Self-preservation and, as a function of that, the attitudes of one's 
comrades had, it cannot be denied, sinister aspects. When 
organisational control functioned 'normally' the pressure to achieve 
higher success rates, - coupled with violence borne out of frustration, 
prompted ý certain units to create the 
illusion of efficiency by a 
resort to tactics directed indiscriminately against the civilian 
population. Some of the indirect methods used in an attempt to pacify 
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the rear areas, such as the taking of hostages to 'guarantee' the 
integrity of lines of communication, or 'kollektive GewaltmaBnahmen', 
could be taken to reflect the military limitations of the German 
forces, as much as they did the Army's moral indifference. Material 
from the files of other areas of military government, particularly 
Serbia, adds weight to this assertion. The evidence points to a clear 
correlation between the inferior quality of the troops and violent 
methods, reprisal actions in particular being used to 'compensate, 
for manpower shortages. (64) 
Measures proposed by senior rear area officers to try to improve 
the performance of the troops under their command were certainly far 
from popular with the men. This was evident in the case of KorOck 532 
where day-and-night training exercises were introduced along with 
increased target practice, in an attempt to remedy the failure of 
soldiers to shoot and hit saboteurs who were regularly spotted in 
action on the railway lines. (65) No doubt the rigours of army duties 
in the Soviet Union came as a considerable shock, especially for 
those of the generation which had neither combat experience from the 
First World Wai nor time spent as conscripts in the interwar years. 
Even those who had seen some rear area duty in Poland, or more 
particularly France, would have found the change from 'Vichy Spa 
life' disturbing. If they also happened subsequently to be wounded in 
the much harder environment of war in the East, as were a high 
proportion of those assigned to rear area duties, then all the more 
likely was this to effect military performance and individual values 
and attitudes. (66) 
The obvious question remains, of course, as to why units such as 
Gruppe von der Mosel and Bataillon Behne did not, nevertheless, 
disintegrate, despite all the dire warnings to this effect. The 
preceding arguments notwithstanding, ideological indoctrination as 
a determinant of the capacity of the German forces to continue to 
'hold out to the end' need to be subjected to some further scrutiny 
in a more direct context. (67) In other words, while due regard must 
be given to the attempts of the National Socialist regime to instill 
the racially based values of its Weltanschauung into the members of 
the German Army, the response of those on the receiving end needs to 
be considered. 
Various propaganda -techniques, including the use of film, radio, 
military newspapers and political lectures, were employed within the 
German armed forces. Recent, historical writing has placed 
much emphasis on the efficacy of this 'ideological education. 
Bartov, for one, argues that many front-line combat soldiers were 
highly receptive, and 'welcomed these indoctrinational efforts and 
even demanded their intensification'. (68) However, the evidence from 
both Korilck 532 and Korfick 582 puts a rather different gloss on the 
issue, and reinforces the point which Bartov himself acknowledges as 
to the difficulties in quantifying the precise extent and depth of 
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ideological conviction among the troops on the Eastern Front. (69) 
The earlier discussions of German Army relations with the civilian 
population have indicated that a great deal of official literature 
stressed the themes of Russian racial inferiority and the menace 
posed by the 'Jewish-Bolshevik' system to the very existence of the 
Reich. Emphasis was also placed on the dangers which the German Army 
faced from the barbarous soldiery of the Red Army and the partisans, 
and these views were often mirrored in the tone of Korfick reports. 
Hence, it would be logical to suppose that this helped to determine 
the often brutal behaviour of many rear area soldiers towards 
captured POWs and civilians alike. (70) This accepted, the role of 
9political indoctrination' can easily be overstated in this context, 
as it also can in the somewhat separate issue of troop morale. Korrick 
comments on the matter of troop morale, for instance, present a 
picture of life and values inside the German Army which appears 
remarkably 'normal'. This is immediately apparent from the references 
to the off-duty and recreational activities of the troops. 
Soldiers in both KorUck 532 and Korrick 582 were able to receive 
broadcasts from the military radio transmitters (Soldatensender) 
which the army propaganda department operated from a number of sites 
including Smolensk, Klinzy and Mogilew. The propaganda units were 
also concerned with the press, and newspapers and periodicals were 
produced for distribution to the German forces via the relevant 
Armeeoberkommando. The front-line Propaganda Company attached to 
AOK9, for instance, issued three main newspapers for the troops: An 
Armeezeitung which was entitled 'Der Durchbruch'; a Nachtrichtenblatt 
'Das Neuste', and an Urlauberzeitung 'Im SF-Zug', each of which had a 
print-run of over 50,000 copies. (71) As the few examples which 
survive in the archival files of these Koracks indicate, the clear 
National Socialist tone to these publications manifested itself in 
the inevitable promise of final victory and, perhaps more 
significantly, in the anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik cartoons and 
')editorials'. (72) However, Feldkommandantur records indicate that 
soldiers were more eager to obtain newspapers from the Reich for 
while these were also tainted by clear ideological bias, they also 
contained, to use the modern parlance, 'human interest' stories. (73) 
A great deal of off-duty time was, in any case, taken up with trivial 
and undemanding pursuits. This is apparent from requests that the 
troops be sent parcels containing items such as table tennis 
equipment, gramophones and records, harmonicas and board-games such 
as 'Ludo', 'Halma' and 'Battleships'. (74) 
Theatre was also popular with the German troops in the East, and 
here again, as material from Korilck 532 indicates, the men 
demonstrated a marked bias towards light entertainment. Comedies such 
as 'Das verrockte Hotel' and 'Flitterwochen', which were performed by 
various armed forces concert parties in theatres at Bryansk and 
Ordzhonikidzegrad, as well as nearby army field hospitals, were 
reported as having played to 'packed houses'. A Kraft durch Freude 
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Truppe was so popular with its rendering of 'Ein bisschen verliebt, 
ein bisschen verrackt' that it was immediately booked for a return 
engagement, as was a production of 'Musik, Tanz und Gesang'. (75) The 
local Russian theatre, which the German military had reopened, was 
equally popular and played daily to full houses of some 400-600 
German soldiers. In contrast, Korfick noted that moves to introduce 
some ideological content into the proceedings by means of lectures 
were far from successful. Even when an attempt was made to do so in 
an entertaining manner, talks, such as that by the head of the local 
army propaganda company, entitled 'Eine Reise vom Brenner nach den 
Oasen von Lybien' were regarded as unpopular. (76) 
As with the theatre, the cinemas in Bryansk offered continuous 
performances and this, combined with very low admission prices, 
allowed some 9,000 soldiers to be entertained each day. Admittedly, 
it is. difficult to assess the impact of the newsreels which 
accompanied feature films but there it is clear that soldiers 
expressed a definite preference for romance and comedy films. The 
programme for the autumn of 1942 included popular offerings such as, 
'Die Sache mit Styx', 'So ein FrOchtchen' and 7entrale Rio'. (77) As 
the examples cited elsewhere indicated, German officers were quick to 
point out that escapist films including 'Hallo Janine', were much 
better received by the men than serious works such as the politically 
inspired biopic of 'Robert Koch'. (78) Parallels might be seen here 
with recent work on working class culture, which presents a view of 
community life much at variance with accepted 'view from above' 
stereotypes. This is very evident in the marked aversion of 
supposedly politicised groups to socialist/marxist literature, and 
their preference instead for popular mass reading material such as 
adventure stories. (79) 
Rear Area commanders did seem to be more concerned with maintaining 
the morale of the troops by a regard for- their general well-being, 
rather than through direct ideological indoctrination. For example, 
Korfick's request to Pz. AOK2 in October of 1942 that a 
Ffirsorgeoffizier (welfare officer) be attached to the unit made no 
reference whatsoever to political requirements, stressing instead the 
emotional needs of the men. (80) Army records relating to the period 
when the welfare section was operational indicate that the officer in 
charge appeared to be concerned exclusively with personal matters. 
Moreover, although the much more directly ideological post of 
Bearbeiter fCir Wehrgeistige FChrung (official for spiritual, i. e. 
political, leadership) had been in existence with the 
Armeeoberkommandos since July of 1942, there is no mention of the 
activities of these officers in the files of either KorOck 532 or 
Korfick 582. (81) 
The heyday, of military government in the rear areas of the East was 
over by December 1943 when Hitler established the National- 
sozialistische Fahrungsoffiziere (National Socialist Leadership 
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Officers) in the German armed forces. In any case, as Martin van 
Crefeld notes, the NSFO units were introduced to prop-up flagging 
morale rather than create basic ideological maxims. (82) As work on 
this topic of 'spiritual guidance' ('Geistige FUhrung') demonstrates, 
the overall impact of these quasi-political commissars on the 
ordinary troops was limited. Volker Berghahn, for example, quotes 
statistics obtained from the office that censored service mail which 
indicate that over 90% of the letters from units with active NSFO 
personnel were devoid of any political content whatsoever 
(Ifarblos'). (83) This is not to suggest that the basic political 
attitudes of the troops were a matter of indifference to rear area 
commanders. In circumstances where it was thought possible that 
German fighting moral might be eroded byý enemy propaganda immediate 
counter-measures were urged, as is evident from the response of 
Korrick 532 to a determined aerial leaflet campaign by the Soviet 
Regime in the summer of 1942: 'Einige Flugblätter sind bei sachlicher 
Beurteilung als wirkungsvoll zu bezeichnen, inbesondere, so weit sie 
innerdeutsche Verhältnisse behandeln und an das Gefühl des Lesers 
appellieren. Rechtzeitige Gegenmassnahmen scheinen als 
, Schutzimpfung' für die Truppe angezeigt'. (84) 
Despite high-level concern, specialist studies such as that by 
Ortwin Buchbender indicate that Red Army propaganda had little direct 
effect on the vast majority of German soldiers, other than by adding 
to underlying anxieties. (85) This is hardly surprising given the 
first-hand experience which most German troops had of the enemy. 
Accordingly, the will to continue fighting should not be ascribed to 
National. Socialist indoctrination so much as to the realization on 
the part of the German soldiers that there was no alternative but to 
continue the war. The Hitler myth may have remained a powerful 
motivating concept for large sections of German society - the members 
of the Armed forces included - but, given the revealed bankruptcy of 
the regime's basic tenets, Crefeld is probably correct to argue that 
the average German soldier 'did not as a rule fight out of a belief 
in Nazi ideology; -indeed the opposite may have been nearer the truth 
in many cases. (86) 
Any attempt to analyse the overall mood of the German troops and the 
impact of National Socialist ideology clearly remains both 
problematical and contentious. Some insight into the ambiguities of 
the issue might be gained from Franz Seidler's work which has 
asserted that the incidence of venereal disease offers an indicator 
of morale: 'In der Streitkräften galt die Ansteckung der Soldaten mit 
Geschlechtskrankheiten als Barometer für die Moral der Truppe. 
Steigende Zahlen signalisierten eine sinkende Moral, sinkende Zahlen 
waren ein Zeichen für wachsenden Kampfgeist'. (87) 
Evidence which has already been referred to elsewhere in this 
thesis certainly demonstrates that the problem , of sexually 
transmitted disease had reached almost epidemic proportions in the 
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Wehrmacht. (88) Deprivations of barrack life, separation from family 
and friends and the relative lack of entertainment, despite all the 
attempts to alleviate these difficulties, were undoubtedly at the 
root of the problem, and all seem to reinforce arguments as to 
problems with morale. On the one hand, the decision of the armed 
forces to sanction prostitution by the establishment of 
army-maintained bordellos, despite a range of accepted ideological 
objections, tends to advance the argument that official Policy was 
far from immune to pressure from below. An extreme indication of this 
could be seen in Seidler's observation that the Reich continued to 
maintain the manufacture of prophylactics for use in these brothels 
despite acute rubber shortages which threatened war-industry 
production. (89) On the other hand, the array of measures adopted by 
the military to organise and regulate the troops who frequented these 
brothels indicated the strict disciplinary control that the army 
continued to maintain over its soldiery. This was manifested even in 
the decision, supposedly on security grounds, not to introduce into 
the bordellos in the Eastern territories some of the refinements 
normally available in the West, such as light refreshments in the 
form of, table wine or beer. (90) 
Seidler, in fact, goes so far as to assert that the incursion of 
the regime into this most intimate of areas demonstrated the attempt 
by the National Socialist state to manage and control all aspects of 
life: 'Um die Machtfülle des totalitären Staates zu demonstrieren, 
gibt es ... kein absurderes Beispiel als darzutun, wie der Soldat auch in seinen intimisten Bereichen 'verwaltet' wurde. ... Totale 
Lebensordnungen kennen keine Schranken vor individuellen Tabus. Der 
Intimbereich des Soldaten wurde Teil des amtlichen Betreungs- 
programms. In dem Augenblick, in dem Soldat ein Wehrmachtsbordell 
betrat, war ý er eine Fülle von Vorschriften und Verhaltensanweisungen 
unterworfen. Ihre Einhaltung wurde überwacht. Selbst die Stillung 
seiner sexuellen Bedürfnisse lag nicht in einem befehlsfreien 
Raum'. (91) 
in this regard, a regime which apparently failed to recognise even 
the most basic tabus might equally be expected to show little respect 
for established values regarding the value of human life. Yet, at the 
same time, the marked unwillingness of the regime to acknowledge the 
very existence of these official military bordellos, or more 
importantly, the brutal character of the policies which it was 
pursuing in the East, was further confirmation of the apparent 
contradiction between the 'normality' of the Third Reich (in terms of 
both bourgeois or for that matter popular values) on the one hand, 
and the horrific crimes it generated on the other. (92) Inconceivable 
as the argument might first appear, there is a need to consider the 
degree to which appeals to conventional and traditional moral codes 
buttressed blatantly unconventional and immoral behaviour. 
Faced with such apparent contradictions, account must be taken of 
the emphasis the regime placed on the pseudo-legality of actions 
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which the troops were required to take against captured enemy 
soldiers (particularly political commissars), partisans, Jews and 
other elements of the civilian population. Hostility and indignation 
was deflected, if not entirely suppressed, by Nazisms appeal to a 
value system which has recently been described by Wolfgang Mommsen as 
a 'totally perverted sort of morality. (93) This is not, of course, to 
deny that the National Socialist state advocated, encouraged and 
finally implemented barbaric and wicked policies in the East which 
offended against all the values associated with the great progressive 
and humanitarian movements in history. As such this 'absolute and 
most corrupt form of the exercise of power' undeniably represents the 
lowest point in German history. (94) Yet, while this assertion is 
indisputable, arguments which advocate caution in attributing this 
9enormous crime against humanity' to the person of Adolf Hitler 
alone apply equally to the belief in some form of collective guilt on 
the part of the German people, of whom the members of the armed 
forces were a integral and instrumental component. (95) In this 
context, ý ideological conditioning alone seems inadequate as an 
explanation for the apparent willingness of the German army to 
implement fundamental elements of this policy and to continue to do 
so even when objective reality indicated that victory was impossible. 
A more fruitful approach would be to accept that the findings of 
Ian Kershaw's work on popular attitudes and opinions inside the Third 
Reich apply equally to life within the German armed forces at the 
time. If, as he contends, 'the vast majority of Germans were neither 
committed Nazis nor convinced anti-fascists' it seems logical to 
accept the overall conclusions of his research; the combination of 
terror and intimidation on the one hand, and the gross, if 
superficial, politicisation of life on the other, promoted a 
depoliticisation of the masses which found its expression in the 
futility of opposition and the atomisation of 'opinion formation' 
(Meinungsbildung). (96) Acceptance of this conclusion, has the 
advantage that it does not drastically interfere with the work of a 
range of historians who have advanced powerful arguments in support 
of the view that various elements within the German armed forces 
accepted and affirmed the basic premises of National Socialist 
ideology. Not simply those, it should be added, who formed the 
influential elite which dictated policy, although 'affirmation' 
(Bejahung) and even 'partial identity (Teil-identit5t) were probably 
more pronounced and certainly more significant, but a range of 
individuals drawn from the entire gamut of ranks and functions 
within the Wehrmacht. (97) Neither does it challenge the pessimism as 
to the effectiveness of any coherent form of opposition to the Nazi 
regime from within the armed forces. Rather, the immediate relevance 
of this concept stems from Kershaw's conclusion that the 
de-politicisation (Entpolitisierung) of the German masses (and by 
inference the millions of Germans who made up the rank-and-file of 
the German Armed forces) created some sort of vacuum. (98) - Attempts 
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to fill this void with pseudo- integrative values such as the 
Hitler-Myth (or anti-Semitic, anti-Bolshevik and anti-Slav 'beliefs') 
may in practice have furthered the de-politicisation process and by 
intensifying the atomization of society have encouraged the retreat 
into primary group loyalties. (99) 
The very nature of modern industrialised warfare had, in any case, 
rendered individual action insignificant. Large-scale total war with 
its technocratic and highly functional means-end analysis had 
developed its own internal dynamic. (100) As one reviewer of Geyer's 
work on the subject noted, the motivating force behind the actions 
and attitudes of soldiers in the field was no longer discipline from 
above as exercised through the regulations and orders of officers, 
but the need to exploit all available resources in order to maximize 
military performance and minimize the capacity of the enemy to 
resist: 'Die Bewegung des Soldaten im Felde wurde nicht mehr durch 
Disziplin von oben, durch regeln, Vorschriften und die persönliche 
Kontrolle durch den Offizier, sondern durch die Ausnutzung von 
Geländeeigenschaften, durch das je persönliche und sachgemäße 
Verhalten des Soldaten unter Feindeinwirkung und durch die Nutzung 
günstiger Gelegenheiten bestimmt. Sein Verhalten und das Verhalten 
ganzer Einheiten wurde durch die Maximierung der eigenen 
Feuerleistung und die Minimierung der Feindeinwirkung geleitet(IOI) 
Moreover, total and terroristic warfare was pursued without any 
regard for the civilian population or the social consequences of 
actions. Thus, instead of placing too much reliance on arguments as 
to the impact of ideological factors in determining policies, there 
seems to be equal purpose in considering the structuralist/ 
functionalist view that National Socialism exploited rather than 
created the conditions under which individual responsibility for 
actions was denied. (102) To quote from one commentator on Alexander 
Kluge's critique of traditional German historiography, 'whilst most 
individuals were capable of the most appalling direct brutality (as 
is the case in most societies, for differing reasons), the whole 
mechanism could only function in situations where the victims became 
abstract quantities in a larger process and where the tormentors 
themselves enjoyed a degree of abstraction'. (103) As Hans Mommsen 
reminds us, 'the political and bureaucratic mechanisms that permitted 
the idea of mass extermination to be realized could also have 
occurred under different social conditions'. (104) Accordingly, the 
argument applies as much to the members of the German armed forces as 
it does to other sectors of society during the Third Reich that 
9otherwise normal individuals can be led astray when they live in a 
permanent state of emergency'. (105) 
Contrary to the belief that the collapse of legal and institutional 
structures was integral to this process, it can be suggested that in 
many ways the continued functioning, albeit in a drastically modified 
fashion, of powerful institutions and bureaucracies - including the 
Wehrmacht - was crucial. Indeed, for those soldiers, especially 
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elements of the officer corps, who were in sympathy with the 
extensive aims of National Socialism this only served to accord some 
form of legitimacy to their actions. For the few who engaged in 
active resistance it tended to render their actions impotent when 
confronted with the power of the institutional forces ranged against 
them. For the great mass of the ordinary German soldiers the 
contingent 'normality' of much of their lives within the armed 
forces, even in the context of the abnormality of their occupation 
duties in the East, probably did more to condition behaviour than any 
abstract ideological notions. 
In the event, military government in the East was a short-lived 
phenomenon, and within two years of the start of the campaign the 
system was in decline. The endphase of German Army rule in the 
Soviet Union is the theme of the following, penultimate chapter of 
this thesis. 
### 
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The Collapse of Military Government. 
By the early summer of 1943, the front which had remained virtually 
static for nearly two years was on the point of collapse, and German 
military government in Russia went into decline. (1) Although the 
Wehrmacht troops engaged in a series of defensive operations that 
delayed the end of the war in the East for almost two further years, 
the heyday of Army Rear Area rule was past. In a last major coherent 
operation (normally referred to as the 'Trek') which had begun 
during the late winter of 1942/3, Korfick forces attempted to effect 
some sort of orderly withdrawal. (2) The resulting chaos and 
destruction which ensued, however, again reflected the ambiguities 
and inconsistencies which had characterised so much of earlier Army 
policy in Russia. The German military increased its predominant 
tendency to pursue brutal and barbaric policies, which appeared to be 
based more on ideological premises than conventional strategic 
considerations. At the same time, albeit with little, if any, 
significant impact on the final horrific outcome, some soldiers and 
officers advocated and occasionally attempted' to implement less 
drastic measures. 
As the remnants of army rear area files which survive from this 
period indicate, there is no doubt as to the fact that brutality 
prevailed. In KorOck 582, for example, orders for the mass evacuation 
of the area, which were issued from February of 1943 onwards, 
stressed that the 'total war' situation which now prevailed 
necessitated the most extreme measures; 'mit HArte, nach den 
Erfordernissen des totalen Krieges'. (3) An extensive and ruthless 
policy of seizure and destruction was instigated, with the German 
troops instructed to lay waste to everything that could not be 
removed, including livestock, agricultural produce, buildings and 
equipment. In effect, scorched-earth policies of this sort 
('Verwilstungsmal3nahmen') with their emphasis on techniques such as 
'Auflockerung' (dispersal); 'Raumung' (evacuation); Uhmung 
(paralysis) and 'Zerst6rung' (devastation) turned vast tracts of the 
occupied territories into a desert. (4) 
Members of the civilian population who might have been of value to 
the advancing Soviets were also included in these schemes, and plans 
were made for them to be evacuated along with the retreating German 
forces. The inhabitants for whom the Germans had no use were 
abandoned in order to impede the Red Army. In accordance with these 
directives, all men between the ages of 14 and 55 years were regarded 
as prisoners of war and forcibly moved westwards, along with women 
aged 14 to 45 years of age. The old, infirm, handicapped 
(Iverkrappelt) and women with large numbers of children under the age 
of ten were all to be left behind. (5) Vast march columns, often with 
more than 50,000 people, were forced to, move great distances under 
the most dire conditions. The bewildered and usually terrified 
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refugees - who were mainly female - had limited supplies of food and 
little opportunity to take even the most basic of their meagre 
personal possessions. (6) Reports from the Ortskommandantur at Wjasma 
in Korfick 582 for February of 1943 give some indication of the scale 
of the problems and human suffering facing the ordinary Russians 
caught up in this process. German troops operating in the area had 
taken the few available carts, sledges and horses which the peasants 
had hitherto managed to cling on to; thus making it impossible for 
the civilians to take any of their belongings on the Trek. In the 
depth of winter, although many of the locals had no proper shoes and 
were forced to bind their feet with cloth, the army insisted that 
columns of evacuees walked along the sides of the roads in order not 
to interfere with German military traffic. (7) 
Many of the inhabitants, who resigned themselves to their fate and 
passively abandoned their homes and villages, were vilified by the 
others who remained. The'feeling of betrayal amongst those who were 
due to leave was alluded to by a Wehrmacht officer who remarked that 
'the Germans had promised much to those who had co-operated; but they 
could not deliver: 'Die Deutschen hätten der mitarbeitenden 
Bevölkerung schon viel versprochen, aber nicht halten können'. Little 
support was forthcoming, however, from the ordinary German troops 
whose attitude to the entire population had been hardened by the 
increased partisan attacks that took place in the outlying parts of 
the district-(8) As Mulligan's study of the entire central sector of 
the front indicates, it was during this time that German army losses 
exceeded those of the guerrillas for the first time. (9) 
By the summer of 1943, although the weather was less of a problem, 
overall conditions had, if anything, deteriorated. In Smolensk 
(Korfick 559) which had become a command centre for the two rear areas 
which Armeeoberkommando 9 now controlled (Korfick 532 having been 
transferred to its jurisdiction following the redeployment of Pz. AOK2 
to the Balkans) situation reports reflected the chaos and mood of 
despair. (10) A Lagebericht -dated 19 August commented that the 
majority of the population expected the Germans to be driven out of 
the entire area. In the surrounding countryside the morale of those 
who had collaborated with the occupying forces was dangerously low, 
and many Blirgermeistern were afraid to leave the local defence force 
strongpoints or even the safety of their homes because of the spate 
of assassination attempts. (Il) The Geheime Feldpolizei, which by this 
time was very much an adjunct of the SD, was being used to enforce 
discipline amongst the various Ordnungsdienst units and Russian 
auxiliary troop formations (Hiwis) in order to try to stem the 
increasing incidence of desertion to the , partisans and the 
indiscriminate misuse of power in pursuit of personal gain. (12) The 
rounding up of the local Volksdeutsch community and illegitimate 
children with German fathers only intensified the mood of despair, 
while the kidnapping of other young people for economic purposes 
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inevitably produced intense resentment. (13) Korfick was given to 
comment that girls as young as seven years of age (who were faced 
with transportation to the Reich or the misery of working as cleaners 
for the Wehrmacht) were manifesting clear signs of discontent. (14) 
Food was in extremely short supply, and German attempts to deal with 
this problem were particularly hard on the local women who were 
forced to spend long evenings in the fields after a day spent digging 
earth fortifications. The women worked alongside the few men who were 
available and it was normal for both sexes to spend a minimum of 14 
hours per day engaged in heavy labour. (15) Despite their efforts and 
hardships the supply situation only worsened, and prices on the black 
market were virtually out of control. A loaf of very poor-quality 
bread cost around 25 Reichsmarks (compared with the 1942 maximum of 
5 RMs. ) while butter and spinach were in excess of 100 Reichmarks per 
kilogram. (16) 
The mood of crisis which now pervaded the city was not without 
effect on the army of occupation, and these same KorOck reports note 
that many troops were openly discussing whether Germany could still 
win the war. (17) There is no evidence that any official action was 
taken to deal with what could clearly be regarded as defeatism. If 
anything, the decision to increase the production of Samogon (a 
spirit distilled from potatoes) gives some idea of at least one 
response to problems of morale. (18) This strategy was highly 
reminiscent of that adopted earlier in the war for certain German 
army guard units who reacted badly to the conditions under which 
Soviet POWs were confined. (19) Smolensk was on the verge of social 
as well as military collapse, as was evident from another report from 
the local Korilck which referred to the lawlessness, corruption and 
immorality that was rife in the city- 'Das Ergebnis ist eine 
vollkommene Enttäuschung der Bevölkerung. Überall herrscht 
vollkommene Rechtlosigkeit, Mißbrauch und Unordnung, inbesondere auch 
seitens der Polizei, wobei es für die Bevölkerung keine Stelle gibt, 
wo sie ihr Recht suchen oder ihre Klagen vorbringen könnte. Gut und 
behaglich leben nur diejenigen., die sich mit Schwarzhandel befassen 
oder sich der Prostitution hingeben, sowie diejenigen, die sich in 
der einen oder anderen Weise bei deutschen Dienststellen eingerichtet 
haben'. (20) 
The approach which the German ý forces almost invariably adopted to 
the problems created by the evacuation was typified by a further 
Korrick report which concluded with the phrase that 'only the ruthless 
use of armed force was of any help in such circumstances, (Ihilft nur 
racksichtslose Waffengewalt'). (21) 
Although the weight of evidence demonstrates, that brutal methods of 
this sort were the general rule, isolated references in rear area 
files indicate that at least some German soldiers were not 
completely indifferent to the dire plight of the Russian population. 
These occurrences may be simply dismissed as, at best, aberrations 
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or, at worst, cynical gestures based on motives of self-interest. 
However, as has been stressed throughout this thesis, despite the 
need to recognise that the official hard line dominated and 
persisted, it remains a matter of methodological principle to 
acknowledge the very existence of countervailing attitudes. (22) 
Reports received in July 1943 from Stalag 397 (a Trek staging post 
at Kromy), for example, indicate that although overall conditions 
remained dire, certain army units were making provision to try to 
alleviate the rigours of the evacuation. Old and infirm civilians, as 
well as young children, were allowed to accompany their families. A 
limited number of wagons and handcarts had been made available by the 
military, and march columns had received warm soup and tea both on 
arrival and departure from the camp. (23) During the previous winter 
when most German commanders had ordered harsh measures against those 
who tried to avoid forced evacuation - including the use of mounted 
troops to scour the countryside - some of these same officers had 
attempted to encourage a more positive mood on the part of the local 
population. Civilians were allowed to take their possessions, and 
stopping-off points were set up along the routes of the Treks. At 
selected sites butchers would slaughter some of the animals which the 
civilians had brought with them, in order to provide food for the 
onward journey. (24) Elsewhere, there was some indication that the 
army units which guarded the few Soviet POWs who still survived in 
the rear area camps were encouraged to refrain from the 
indiscriminate punishment of the men in their charge (either by 
corporal punishment or by deliberately withholding rations) as they 
were marched further to the west. (25) 
Even those army officers whose utterances indicated that they were 
motivated primarily by pragmatic considerations when they advocated a 
different, less crude, approach in the pursuit of military goals were 
not always able to ignore the underlying immorality of what was 
taking place. Recommendations attached to the situation reports from 
Korack 559 in Smolensk, for example, acknowledged, albeit somewhat 
obliquely, the error of the racially-based policies that were still 
being pursued in the East- 'Das deutsche Oberkommando das russische 
als gleichberechtigt anerkennt. Das Russische Volk darf nicht als ein 
Volk niederer Rasse betrachtet werden, sondern ihm sind die gleichen 
bürgerlichen Rechte zuzuerkennen, wie den übrigen Völkern 
Westeuropas'. (26) 
Material of this sort does not, it must be recognised, suggest any 
significant amelioration of overall policy or, for that matter, any 
latent potential to alter the sum result of German army actions. 
Moreover, as Norbert MQller has stressed, the very scale and 
character of the destruction caused by the retreating German Army 
refutes any attempt in apologist writings to argue that such 
behaviour was an inevitable expression of the 'necessities of war' 
(Kriegsnotwendigkeit) or that the Wehrmacht confined its activities 
to legitimate military targets. (27) 
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While it is difficult to come to terms with the degree of human 
suffering, the scale of the destruction is all too evident, even in 
rather unsatisfactory attempts at a balance sheet assessment of the 
impact of the war in Army Group Centre as a whole. Thus, although it 
remains impossible to quantify precisely how many of the 13,000,000 
million Soviet troops who died in the war perished on this sector of 
the front, it does seem likely that it was here that the great 
majority of the 3.5 million Red Army POWs who fell into German 
captivity were killed. (28) Similar problems exist if an attempt is 
made to determine how many of the one million Soviet Jews who were 
murdered during the war died in the forward combat areas, rather than 
in the extermination camps. Research suggests that at least 200,000 
were eliminated by troops in the field. (29) Estimates as to the 
number of civilians killed in Heeresgebiete Mitte (which it must be 
added did not experience the horrific seige operations of the sort 
directed against Leningrad) suggest a number in excess of 250,000 
lives lost. In Bryansk alone some 60,000 may have perished. While the 
overall figures do not take account of the deaths from hunger and 
disease which resulted from German policies, it is significant to 
make a comparison with the number of partisans killed; probably no 
more than 50,000. (30) 
Some indication of the type of demolition operations engaged in by 
the retreating Wehrmacht can be gained from isolated statistics on 
those parts of the Korticks which constituted the rear area of AOK9 in 
1943. In Wjasma, Gshatsk and Rshew fewer than 800 buildings remained 
standing after the German withdrawal. Over 150,000 people had been 
forcibly evacuated from these three centres alone, while in the 
countryside around Systschewka, 137 of the district's 248 villages 
were razed to the ground. (31) These statistics, it should be 
stressed, do not take into account the communities destroyed by the 
rear area forces during the numerous collective reprisal actions 
('Kollektive GewaltmaBnahmen') that took place in the period before 
the German retreat. (32) 
As for the Wehrmacht forces themselves, it is difficult to 
establish how many of the 3,250,000 soldiers who lost their lives in 
the East did so in this sector, particularly since the agonising 
continuation of the war produced enormous casualty figures on both 
sides during the endphase of the conflict. (33) (It is also a matter 
of conjecture whether the estimated one million or more German POWs 
who died in Soviet captivity can be cited in this particular 
context. )(34) Matters are equally imprecise as far as the rear area 
forces are concerned. German losses in Army Group Centre have been 
put at around 52,000 for the period up to the end of formal military 
government in late 1943. (35) On the basis of sources which assume 
that some 250,000 German troops operated in the central hinterland, 
casualty rates during this relatively favourable period of the war 
would have been in excess of 20 percent. (36) 
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Mechanistic exercises of this sort might be pursued even further by 
the introduction of numeric data relating to other conflicts. (37) 
However, the limititations of quantification prompts an approach to 
the overall subject matter with a more sensitive awareness of the 
individual human parts that constituted the impersonal whole. It is 
this maxim which underpins many of the observations that are made in 
the following, concluding section of this thesis. 
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Conclusion-. 
This research study of German army rule in the Soviet Union has 
ranged across a number of highly controversial issues. It is 
appropriate, therefore, in a summary of the immediate findings of the 
thesis also to bring out some of the wider implications of the work. 
Five years ago, the 'simple' conclusion arrived at could have been 
encapsulated in the concise statement that, 'the systematic killing 
of some 6 million Jews, the death of more than 3 million Soviet 
prisoners of war and the murder of unknown millions of innocent 
civilians during the occupation of Russia are dark pages of German 
history which the Wehrmacht helped to write. ' At that time, the 
9state of the art' made demythologising accounts of the German Army's 
relationship with National Socialism almost obligatory. In essence, 
the statement still holds true. Perhaps more importantly, it still 
deserves to be expressed, for despite- the weight of scholarly 
research which offers a highly critical interpretation of the 
Wehrmacht's role in the East there are those who refuse to accept the 
9painful findings' of this new orthodoxy. (1) In this respect, the 
evidence assembled in this thesis by means of 'history from below' 
would appear to confirm many of the controversial arguments advanced 
by 9history from above' which seek to demonstrate that the German 
armed forces as a whole were implicated in this racial war of 
annihilation and extermination. 
There is a certain nalvety, however, to any history which enters 
into the fluid state that characterises so much research into the 
Third Reich and expects definite answers when 'open questions' are 
more likely. (2). As Wolfgang Mommsen cautions us, while the facts 
must be faced squarely 'it is necessary to go beyond moral 
indignation and investigate the objective causes that made human 
beings, who were otherwise quite ordinary, not to say civilized, 
actively take part in these policies. Historians must, therefore, not 
only look into the ideological and political issues, but also take 
into account the social, socio- psychological and institutional 
factors that made this genocide possible'. (3) Clearly, such a brief 
requires that full acknowledgment must be given to the role that 
ideology played, in determining action. Indeed, many of the findings 
of this research have added substance to the arguments expressed by a 
powerful cohort of historians, including Krausnick, Streit, Forster 
and more recently Bartov, which catalogue the National Socialist 
sympathies of large sections of the German officer corps and the 
manner in which these found expression in the barbaric policies 
pursued by the Army in the East. For many soldiers, indoctrination 
with Nazi values did not simply permit but actually demanded that the 
war in Russia be pursued with little or no regard whatsoever for 
conventional codes of behaviour. Many rear area officers were no 
different from their front-line colleagues in this respect. As the 
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Kor! Ack files demonstrate, their willingness to conduct an 
ideologically based war of extermination manifested itself in the way 
National Socialist thinking intruded into a range of activities; the 
starvation and terrorisation of the civilian population - as part of 
crude economic exploitation or under the guise of anti-partisan 
operations, the elimination of millions of Soviet POWs - either by 
deliberate neglect, or murder in the case of political category 
prisoners, and active assistance in the extermination of European 
Jewry. Military government files from the pre-1941 period only serve 
to confirm the view that the Polish campaign had inaugurated the 
process, while details of the French experience- reinforce the 
ideological line by noting that the same troops adopted fundamentally 
different policies in the West., 
Ideological determinism is an attractive explanation, as the 
detailed material available throughout this research is very willing 
to accept. Carried to extremes,, however, it creates an 
undifferentiated view of the German Army, which in general ignores 
both the findings of recent research on social attitudes within the 
Third Reich and the specific evidence produced in this thesis as to 
the variations in both motivation and behaviour on the part of 
individual soldiers. Moreover, while it is fully accepted that in the 
wider historical context there are dangers in a crude dismissal of 
the role of ideas in influencing action, there are similar hazards in 
failing to acknowledge the importance of objective realities and 
contingent circumstances. 
An extremely complex picture of social behaviour and attitudes during 
the Third Reich has emerged over the last decade, very much as a 
result of the way in which 'history from below' approaches have 
massively extended the source base. One of the most important overall 
results -of this research has been, in Ian Kershaw's words, - to 
9suggest strongly that it is easy to exaggerate the nature of changes 
in values and attitudes under Nazism'. (4) Accordingly, while the 
great majority of Germans did not respond to the regime in an 
actively critical fashion neither did they take on board all the 
ideological constructs of National Socialism. True, indoctrination 
with a new value-system was effected to some extent within various 
social groups and institutions, including the Wehrmacht and its 
officer corps, but National Socialism had come nowhere near to 
completely eradicating conventional moral standards and values. (5) 
The idea of a Volksgemeinschaft -a 'national community' based on 
racial and ideological uniformity - remained equally illusory, 
despite the appeal which this radical but vague concept held for 
certain groups within German society, especially youth. (6) These 
observations are as pertinent to the German armed forces as they are 
to society as a whole during the Third Reich. After all, some 10% of 
the population served in the Wehrmacht at one time or another and by 
the summer of 1941, as National Socialism reached the pinnacle of its 
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power, the three million and more men who made up the Eastern Army 
were a mirror image of the entire German people. Those who found 
themselves deployed to rear area duties probably reflected a even 
wider range of social and occupational backgrounds, age groups, 
abilities and, perhaps, attitudes than did many of the front-line 
combat units. 
At one level, the troops who made up the Korracks and Army Group Rear 
Areas were administrators. In this regard they were, to quote Martin 
van Crefeld, like all modern armies who 'employ only a small and 
diminishing fraction of their manpower on direct combat related 
tasks. More and more of their personnel are specialists of every kind 
whose jobs differ little, if at all, from those of their counterparts 
in civilian life'. (7) These soldiers ultimately had most of the 
responsibility for implementing the details of occupation policy. 
National Socialists of all shades undeniably played a crucial role in 
this respect, but the variety of approaches adopted to the problems 
of military government also reflected differing political standpoints 
as much as it did bureaucratic practice within the German army and 
the specific influence of the deteriorating situation under which the 
rear area forces operated. 
Even the most critical literature admits that there were officers 
who objected to the fateful developments as the indiscriminate abuse 
of power took its horrific toll. No doubt Streit is correct to argue 
that 'such opinions did not have a broad basis for the embodiment of 
the German Army was formed by other soldiers'. (8) All the same, it 
would be wrong simply to dismiss these 'non-conformist' tendencies as 
an aberration. Many of the rear area commanders whose war diaries are 
cited in this thesis exemplified what Kershaw has called the 
9generation gap between those who had reached adulthood in the 
imperial or Weimar eras and those who had experienced little else 
other than Nazism'. (9) Seminal work on occupation policy, especially 
that of Alexander Dallin, has long made this point as to the 
reservations felt by such older officers towards overt political 
warfare. If Klaus-Jtlrgen MOller is correct, and modernisation trends 
within the German army during the Nazi period have been overstressed, 
than these men did- indeed represent an 'old guard' relatively 
untouched by the ideological tenets of the regime. (10) It would seem 
a short step from such arguments to the view that a 'residual' 
officer class - with a value system derived from the pre-1933 period 
- continued to exist within the new Wehrmacht, and that under certain 
conditions (such as those that prevailed in the occupied rear areas 
of the Soviet Union) they displayed their true honourable colours. 
Certainly, Omer Bartov's work, which has stressed the link between 
the 'youth of the officers of the Wehrmacht and their potential 
susceptiblity to National Socialist ideology', can be introduced in 
order to develop this argument. (Il) Yet, while the decentralised 
organisational structure of the Wehrmacht, which was manifest to an 
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extreme degree in rear area military government, left much to the 
discretion, not to say intuition, of individual Korrick commanders, 
the evidence presented in this thesis clearly indicates that only a 
select few took advantage of their relative autonomy and attempted to 
modify policy. (I 1) In large measure, Streit is right to argue that 
9even a significant element of those soldiers who were opposed in 
some way to National Socialism were prepared to pursue the struggle 
against Bolshevism by any means available'. (12) The 'partial 
identification' (Teilidentitat) of many officers with the 
anti-Communist and anti-Semitic concepts of Nazi ideology is, 
however, an incomplete explanation, despite its obvious merits. Case- 
study material relating to the activities of individual camp 
commanders who were responsible for Soviet prisoners of war indicates 
that isolated schemes designed to improve conditions for the inmates 
were doomed to failure as much by vast impersonal forces outside of 
individual control, as they were by the ideological inflexibility of 
other officers. In the same way, equally abnormal attempts by army 
officers to obstruct SD units in the course of selection procedures 
directed against special category prisoners were futile if the end 
result was merely to inconvenience overall policy; and not question 
fundamentals. 
The organisational structure of military government, which in 
principle allowed for independent action; was by its very nature so 
amorphous and opaque that all non-essential tasks became 
compartmentalised and down-graded in importance. Concerted and 
effective large-scale action to deal with the massive problems facing 
rear area commanders was, as the comments of many officers show, out 
of the question. The German army reserved its single-minded 
concentration on the operational aspects of the war to the detriment 
of everything else. Under such conditions Korilck officers were 
naturally predisposed to display the tendency, identified by Crefeld, 
of approaching complex tasks by asking, 'what is the core of the 
problem? '; rather than the more sophisticated option of seeking 'its 
component parts'. (13) The techniques developed to deal with the 
partisan menace typified this approach with army officers inclined to 
use massive and indiscriminate applications of force. Senior elements 
within the Nazi leadership, and this includes elements of the officer 
corps, may well have welcomed the opportunity to pursue crudely 
ideological policies under the cloak of anti-partisan operations. At 
the same time, manpower and resource constraints left those who 
questioned such schemes little other option but to participate, even 
if the end result was to submerge the rear, area forces even further 
in the mire of brutal and unrestrained violence. Many rear area 
commanders resolved this dilemma by an ambiguous, policy which on the 
one hand stressed concern for the image of the Wehrmacht, yet at the 
same time tolerated and often openly approved of the most draconian 
measures. The strange juxtaposition of material in many KortIck files 
makes this point very apparent, with detailed criticisms of the 
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9shameful' and 'dishonourable' behaviour of German troops alongside 
comments urging increased coercion in pursuit of elusive military 
goals. 
Pragmatism certainly emerged as the major determinant in the majority 
of instances where a less brutal policy was pursued. Nonetheless, 
even if circumstance rather than design figured prominently in such 
decisions, reservations should be expressed over claims that 
pragmatic considerations were merely crude substitutes for the 
preferred ideological approach. (14) Admittedly, as our discussion of 
various aspects of rear area policy - including the moves to 
alleviate the hardships of the civilian population or the POWs has 
shown - many Korilck commanders were inclined to use the term 
pragmatism in order to stress that any such actions did not 
constitute a more fundamental critique of official policy. Other 
officers, while couching their remarks along similar lines, used the 
opportunity to express serious reservations as to the basic premises 
on which the war was being conducted. Indeed, much of the critical 
literature which is so eager to 'demythologise' the concept of an 
honourable Wehrmacht often draws a great deal of its evidence and, 
perhaps more importantly, its outraged tone from the personal records 
and comments of those same soldiers it seeks to condemn. (15) 
Afterall, as this thesis has demonstrated, many of these officers 
were writing not for posterity, but an audience of their peers. 
It must be stressed, however, that evidence of dissent from the 
official line does not offer any succour to the opinion put forward, 
amongst others by Alexander Dallin, that matters could have been 
very different if only the conflict had been conducted by other 
means. Our account of the Kaminski experiment demonstrates this all 
too well, for here was a scheme designed to reach the same ends as 
earlier policies (the domination of the Soviet heartland), but by 
another route. The radical and extensive aims of National Socialist 
foreign policy assigned a specific role to an occupied Russia, while 
at the same time the Soviet Regime's full realisation that this was a 
struggle in which the very existence of the communist state was at 
stake precluded anything other than a total war. All the same, while 
it has become academically fashionable to dismiss virtually the 
entire officer corps of the German armed forces as co-conspirators of 
National Socialism, care should be taken in allowing such views to 
obscure the hard evidence which points to those few who did not 
conform to this stereotype. Even those who saw the need to act but 
did not, might best be seen not as candidates for Dante's lowest 
level of the inferno, but the men of Plato's world who hoped to hide 
behind the wall until the storm was past. Indeed, the very existence 
of countervailing tendencies - lends substance to Manfred 
Messerschmidt's claim that the 'silent opposition of an unknown 
number of soldiers throws doubt on the image of the Volksgerneinschaft 
as a thoroughly stable socio-political entity'. (16) 
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The confusion which so characterised the war and the dilemmas which 
it gave rise to were at their most pronounced on the ground. Kortick 
files indicate that to the ordinary German soldiers upon whom the 
task devolved of implementing policy in the field a great deal of 
official National Socialist thinking appeared very different in 
practice than it did in theory. It would be naive to suppose that the 
continual emphasis which the Nazi regime placed on the worthlessness 
of the Soviet population - both civilians and soldiers alike - was 
without impact but, unlike the officer corps, ideological 
conditioning played much less of a role in determining the behaviour 
of ordinary soldiers than did immediate objective influences. 
The participation of the troops in all manner of activities which 
contravened accepted moral codes of behaviour should be seen not 
simply as an indication of the motivating power of Nazism's 
pseudo-religous maxims, but more so as a conditioned response to 
constraints imposed by the organisational structures which 
characterise all armies - independent of political allegiance - and 
the inherently brutal nature of the war in the East. No doubt the 
internal organisation of the German army was geared up to allow for 
the maximum use of force and this, in turn, made a significant 
contribution to the barbarism of the conflict. Irrespective of 
whether this was a reflection of larger historical processes or a 
deliberate tactic on the part of the Hitler regime - in order to 
fulfil its racial and economic goals - the ordinary soldiers faced 
the same dilemmas and uncertainties. (17) 
Most of the time, the chaos, confusion and lack of permanence which 
typified life in the areas of military government was exploited by 
higher command in order to justify the extraordinary use of power and 
violence by the armed forces. Almost as a paradox, the'breakdown of 
conventional rules of warfare in these 'lawless territories' was used 
as a pretext to demonstrate to the ordinary soldiers that any form of 
activity - irrespective of absolute values - was both necessary and 
desirable. (18) Despite this, 'pressure from below' was not totally 
absent. While it might not strictly be correct to use the term 
'public opinion' ('6ffentliche Meinung') in respect of the way in 
which the views of the troops on the ground influenced policy, the 
stress which the Army leadership placed on the legitimacy of a whole 
range of policies- ranging from hostage-taking to collective 
reprisal actions against villages merely suspected of aiding the 
partisans - gives a clear indication of the need to overcome inherent 
resistance on the part of many troops to such conduct. (19) True, case 
study evidence indicates that researchers such as JOrgen Rrster are 
correct to argue that the 'rigorousness' with which such policies 
were pursued cannot be explained simply on grounds of the needs of 
security or pragmatic considerations. Nazi ideological thinking did 
lay behind such measures, but it was convenient to instill the idea 
of military necessity into the rank-and-file. As this thesis has 
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shown, orders which were originally formulated at the highest level 
with clear National Socialist principles in mind often appear to have 
lost much of their political tone by the time they were passed on to 
the troops in the field. Emphasis on the demands of the war was a 
concept which mirrored reality, unlike so much else that made up the 
vague and often impenetrable constructs of Nazi ideology. Once the 
the process of brutality had been set in operation it became emmeshed 
in all aspects of occupation policy and an internal dynamic 
developed. Accordingly, there is still something to be said for 
Dallin's maxim that the civilian population were beaten between the 
hammer that was the German army and the anvil that was the 
partisans. (20) Nonetheless, as this thesis demonstrates, this is also 
a cause and effect problem, and full account should be taken of 
reports which show that the German forces were the first to act. 
Despite the significance of the remark made earlier which 
acknowledged that on one level the rear area forces were 'mere' 
administrators, the soldiers in the rear areas came increasingly to 
perform active combat roles, for which many of them were physically 
and psychologically ill-prepared. Rear area files continually stress 
that severe difficulties arose as a result of the strains imposed by 
a combination of harsh climate and hostile terrain, while limitations 
in manpower and resources only served to exacerbate problems. The 
unrestrained use of power, which had been demonstrated at the 
beginning of the campaign as an expression of the belief that a 
military solution was possible, gave way to a mood of anxiety and 
isolation that invariably prompted the resort to increased violence; 
but this time out of despair rather than confidence. (21) Even during 
the short-lived phase at the start of the campaign, when there had 
been the initial hope of rapid victory, the conflict in the Soviet 
Union had never seemed an easy war to the troops of the German army. 
For many the sheer scale of events diminished any sense of personal 
responsibility and created an environment inwhich self-interest was 
best served either by strict adherence to official directives, or the 
abuse of military power. Large-scale unofficial looting and plunder 
by individual troops and army units indicated that contraventions of 
army rule were most likely to be prompted by necessity, not less 
tangible humanitarian ideals. All the same, many of the Korfick files 
indicate that the mix of self-interest and indifference was 
interspersed with occasional acts of humanity. Such compassion was, 
moreover, not always confined to spontaneous gestures by individuals 
in which the odd piece of bread was given away. Entire army corps 
took it upon themselves to set-up communal kitchens for the 
inhabitants of communities, often despite official disapproval. 
As a basic premise, it must be stressed that higher authorities 
were able to dissuade commanders and troops from pursuing such 
actions, the overall suffering of the Soviet population makes this 
all to clear. Sound as this bland conclusion may be, it fails to take 
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account not only of the existence of the phenomenon but, more 
importantly, that moves to prevent such practices were rarely 
successful when the army leadership made appeals to ideological 
criteria. The deciding factor was more often force of circumstance, 
when Qrganised expropriation schemes and reductions in supplies to 
the troops themselves rendered generosity a liability. Official 
policy was also more effective when it intensified the 'emotional, 
distance between the individual members of the army of occupation and 
the civilian population by restricting opportunities for anything 
other than a merely functional relationship. 
Ordinary soldiers thus found themselves increasingly confined to 
the closed world of the army unit in which they operated. Value 
systems in these circumstances derived, almost as a paradox, from the 
military's capacity to maintain a sense of normality within the 
institution. Korfick files indicate that this was exemplified in a 
number of ways, not least by conventions of justice within the armed 
forces. On the basis of material which takes into consideration the 
brutal measures enacted by military courts during the endphase of the 
war, historians such as Manfred Messerschmidt are probably justified 
to stress that the great majority of Wehrmacht legal officers readily 
accepted the fundamental concepts of Nazi thinking. (22) Nonetheless, 
the evidence from the rear area files examined in this thesis 
suggests that the imposition of such value systems was not the chosen 
method of influencing troop behaviour. Indeed, a resort to increased 
draconian punishment was significant in spite of rather than because 
of its ideological premises, since it pointed to the limitations of 
other attempts to inculcate National Socialist values amongst the 
rank and file. 
Morale in many of these rear area units was certainly well below 
the levels which stereotyped literature on the German armed forces 
would have us to believe. In part this can be attributed to the fact 
the rear area units were 'abnormal' in that they represented those 
elements of the German male population who would not under ideal 
conditions have been enlisted for military service; never mind 
exacting security work. This certainly applied to the formations made 
up of over-ageý. and militarily unfit men whose resentment manifested 
itself in lethargy and lack of fighting spirit. That the men in the 
vast majority of units continued to participate in all aspects of the 
war should not be taken to indicate a basic commitment to National 
Socialism. Admittedly, the various strategies employed by the 
military authorities to maintain the willingness of the troops to 
hold out included political indoctrination, but German soldiers 
appeared generally unreceptive to such pressures and -were more 
influenced by the belief that there were no options available, other 
than to continue the war. As with the arguments that have been 
applied to senior Korfick officers, the tentative conclusion which 
emerges from material on the rank and file is that continued 
participation in the war was often in spite of rather than because of 
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Nazi ideology. In many ways this reflected a long -established and 
highly developed sense of social discipline, and when this showed 
signs of collapse National Socialism resorted not to its own vague 
racial and political maxims but first to patriotism and ultimately to 
increased repression. 
Motivation to continue the war or refuge from its harsh reality was 
to be found not in ideological beliefs, which apart from the Hitler 
Myth had rarely been of any great significance for the ordinary 
soldiers, instead the troops relied on immediate primary group 
loyalties. The army provided the framework in which 'individuating, 
physical threats were kept to a minimum. Spatial proximity with 
colleagues and the satisfaction of basic needs encouraged a attitude 
of mind that further compartmentalized policy and intensified the 
denial of individual responsibility for actions. (23) The limited 
import of ideological conditioning was even more evident under 
9abnormal' conditions, when organisational control did breakdown and 
certain soldiers displayed extreme 'strategies for survival'. 
Self-mutilation and desertion may well have been the exception rather 
than the rule, but incidents in which German troops resorted to 
various ploys to avoid the risk of death or injury were sufficient to 
provoke official comment. The detailed discussion which was given 
over in earlier chapters to the 'slipper soldiers' who opted out of 
the war by establishing a formal truce with the partisans, or their 
less fortunate comrades who had to resort to feigned displays of 
incompetence, did not, of course, represent the 'norm'. Yet, such 
instances need to be rescued from the obscurity and condescension of 
histories which fail to contrast the behaviour of an individual or 
group with the collective behaviour of large, numbers of people 
considered as a whole. 'It is undeniable that the majority view 
prevailed, yet such exceptions reinforce wider arguments which 
question the degree of ideological conformity within Nazi German as a 
whole. At the same time, the emphasis in this thesis on the 
tordinary', not to say mundane, character of life within the German 
army reinforces the trend in modern German social history to 
Onormalise' our interpretation of socio-political behaviour within 
the Third Reich. 
In any study which deals with the worst excesses of the Third Reich 
there is a powerful tendency to regard National Socialism as sui 
generis and move from this to the position that the war in the East 
was a $unique phenomenon in human history'. (24) As various studies 
have shown, there seems little point in offering a serious challenge 
to this assertion by engaging in some form of 'comparison of 
barbarities'. (25) The marked contrast with German army policy in the 
First World War makes this point all too clearly, and in more general 
terms so does reference to specific wars which have aroused great 
debate, such as that for Algerian independence, or the mass-murder 
perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia (Kampuchea). (26) 
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Despite the attempt that appears to be emerging on the part of 
certain 'Tendenzwende' historians, the Hitler period distinguishes 
the German Vergangenheit from that of other nations. (27) 
Any attempt to 'understand' (Verstehen) why Nazi Germany 'exercised 
barbarism on an unprecedented scale' or recover from the sources the 
story of 'what it was actually like' (wie es eigentlich gewesen war) 
runs the risk of merely emphasising the view that National Socialism 
seems beyond rational explanation. Ideological determinism certainly 
belongs in the equation, as does Geyer's concept of the tendency of 
modern industrialised war to reduce both victims and aggressors to 
mere commodities, but the end product is an even more toxic 
combination, and perhaps all the more horrific, if full recognition 
is also given to the human dimension. Almost paradoxically the 
outcome of research into the daily lives of ordinary Germans, 
particularly those in the German armed forces who were intimately 
involved in the most brutal aspects of the regime, is to point to the 
degree to which perfectly normal individuals can- collectively 
participate in the most abnormal actions because of, rather than in 
spite of, the appeal to moral values. 
The image of Nazi Germany that emerges is in many ways more 
troubling than the conventional stereotype of total conviction and 
control. As James Sheehan remarks, 'while it was always frightening 
to imagine a nation swept away and dominated by the Nazis, it is 
surely no less frightening to consider that the Nazis were able to 
accomplish much of what they set out to do without acquiring 
unquestioning allegiance or imposing complete control'. (28) It was 
not necessary for Germans, even those who were members of the armed 
forces, to believe, nor even necessary for them to approve; 
compliance, not conviction was required. 
##### 
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Glossary of Selected German Terms and Abbreviations, 
(with their English Equivalents). 
Abteilung Abt. section, subsection 
Abteilung- 
Kriegsverwaltung. Abt. Kr. -Verw. military government 
Abwehr Abw. military intelligence 
Abwehrofficer A. 'O. (AO) Abwehr officer 
Armeeoberkommando AOK H. Q. of an Army 
Amee-Wirtschafts- AWiFU AOX staff officer for 
fiffirer economic affairs 
Armeegefangenen- 
sammellstelle A. Gef. Sa. St. forward POW camp 
Befehlshaber des 
11 rUchwfirtigen Befh. rUckw. - Commander, of the Army 
. 
Heeresgebiete H. Geb Group Area 
Briefbuchnummer Br. B. Nr. report number: 
Buridesarchiv- 
Militfirarchiv BA/MA 
Durchgangslager Dulag POW transit camp 
Einýatzgruppe EG(r). SS/SD special force 
Einsatzkommando, MOO. section of an Mr. 
. 
Feldkommandantur FK military government 
office ('district'). 
-Geheim Geh. secret classification 
Geheime GFP Army Secret Field 
Feldpolizei Police 
Geheime Kommandosache Geh. Kdos. top secret 
Generalquartiermeister GenQu Chief supply/admin. 
officer of Army. 
Generalstab des Heeres GenStdH Army general staff 
Heeresgebiet H. Geb. Army Group Rear Area 
Heeresgruppe H. Gr. Army Group 
Hilfswillige JIM. auxilliary volunteer/ 
non-German. 
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Kommandeur des rückw. 
Armeegebietes KorUck Amy Rear Area Command/ 
Commander 
Kommafidierender General 
der Sicherungstruppen Komm. Gen. d. Commanding General of 
Sich. Tr. security troops 
Kriegsgefangenen- 
Abteilung Kgf. Abt. POW section of OKW 
Kriegsgerichtbarkeit sphere of military law 
Kriegssonderstrafrechts- 
verordnung KSSVO military anti-sedition- 
law 
Kriegstagebuch KTB military journal 
Lagebericht situation report 
LandwirtschaftsfUhrer La. FU. lowest admin. German 
agricultural official. 
Militlirgericht military court 
MilitArstrafgerichts- 
Ordnung Mst. Go. military legal code. 
Oberfeldkommandantur OFK, military government 
office ('divisional') 
Oberkommando des Heeres OKH Amy High Command 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht OKW Armed-Forces Command 
Obeiýkriegsverwaltungsrat senior adminisrative 
legal councillor 
Ordnungsdienst OD indigenous auxilliary 
police 
Ortskommandantur OK military goverment 
office ('urban') 
Reichsministerium fUr die 
besetzten Ostgebiete RMfbO Reichs Ministry for the 
Sicherheitsdienst 
Sicherheitspolizei 
Sicherungs-Bataillon 
Sicherungs-Divisionen 
Sonderkommando 
Tagebuch-Nummer 
Tdtigkeitsbericht 
/ 
Occupied E. Territories 
SD SS. security service 
Sipo SS security police 
Sich. Btl. security. battalion 
Sich. Div. security divison 
SK SD special unit 
Tgb. Nr. KTB entry no.: 
TAtig. activity report 
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Vertrauensmann V-Mann informer 
Waýh-Bataillon Wach. Bntl, guard unit 
Wehrmachtfdhrungsstab WFST Operations staff of 
the OKW 
Wirtschafts-Inspektion Wiln Economic Inspectorate 
Wirtschafts-Ronunando WiKdo sub-division of WiIn 
Zentralhandelsgesellschaft 
Ost ZO/ZIIO Central Economic 
Organisation East for 
agricultural produce 
U 
1. 
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I 
Organisation of German Amy Staff in 
Amy Group (Ileeresgruppe) & Army Headquarters (AOK) 
Operations Group_(_FUhrungsabteilung) 
Operationsabteilung 
(Operations Branch): Ia' 
1. Ordonnanzoffizier des Stabes 
(Special Missions Officer): Ia/01 
Ausbildungsoffizier 
(Training Officerj: Id 
Feindnachrichtenabteilung 
(Intelligence Branch): Id 
Feindnachrichtenwesen und Abwehr- 
off izier 
(Intelligence Officer): Ic/A. O. 
Supply-Group (Quar teriermeisterabteilun ý) 
Versorgungsabteilung 
(Supply Branch): OQU 
. Allgemeiner Versorgungsoffizier 
(General Supply officer): OQU/Qu. 1 
Sicherungsoffizier 
(Security Officer inc. POWs): OQu/Qu. 2 
AmeewirtschaftsfUhrer 
(Amy Economics Officer): OQUAV Wi 
MilitArverwaltung 
(Military Occupation Officer): OQu/VII 
Feldgendamierie 
(Milita'ry Police):. Feldgend 
Intendant % 
(Administrative Officer): IVa 
Arzt 
(Medical Officer): 
_ -IVb Veterinar 
(Veterinary Officer): Ivc 
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AdAuntantur (Personnel Grou 
1. Adjutant (for officer personnel) Ha 
2. Adjutant (for enlisted personnel): IIb 
Richter (Judge Advocate): III 
Nationalsozialistischer Fiihrungs- 
offizier 
(Nazi Political Guidance Officer): VI 
Chef der Zivilverwaltung 
(Ilead of Civilian Adminstration): VII 
Source: Guides to German Records Microfilmed 
at Alexandria (VA. ) United States of America. 
Volume 67: Records of German Field Commands: 
Rear Areas Occupied Territories, and others. 
(Part 11). 1968, pages x-xi'. 
/ 
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Chronolgy of Major Actions involving the German Amy 
during its Advance and Retreat in Ifeeresgruppe Mitte: 
Advance: 
Bialystock and Minsk 22.06. - 10.07.1941 
Smolensk 02.07-- 05.08.1941 
Roslawl 08.07. - 09-08-1941 
Smolensk taken 16.07.1941 
(Kiev taken) 19.09.1941 
Jelnja and Smolensk (defensive) 26.07. - 01-10-1941 
Kritschew and Gomel 09-08-- 20.08.1941 
Welikije Luki -21.08. - 27.08.1941 
Wjasma and Bryansk 02.10. - 20.10.1941 
Failure of drive towards Moscow 04.10. - 05.12.1941 
Kalinin 18.1l. - 14.12.1941 
. Defence of German line. before Mosc ow 04.10. - 18.04.1942 Static warfare in the Army Group area 19.04: - 04.07.1943 
Retreat: 
Defensive battles 05.07. - 27.12.1943 
Orel evacuated 05.08.1943 
Bryansk evacuated 20.09.1943 
Smolensk evacuated 25,09.1943 
Witebsk evacuated October 1943 
, 
Gomel evacuated November 1943 
Source: 
Werner Haupt, Heeresgruppe Mitte 1941-1945, 
Hans-Henning Podzun, Dotheim 1968, page 380ff. 
S 
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Norück Operational Areas 
5D1 Nordpolen, Ostpreußsen (3A) from. 8.11.1939 
525 Finnland 
530 Südpoland (BA) from 1.4.1940 
531 Südrußland, Nordukraine, Oberschleiien (lPz. A) 
1.4.1942 
532 »Rußland Mitte (2Pz. A. ) from 1.4.1942 
Mittelrußland 
fizechsel (9 Armee) August 1943 
Oder 
536 Belgium, N. France 1940 
H. Gr. Nord - 1941- 
16. Armee 1942 
Kurland 1944/5 18. Armee W. Befh. Ostland 
540 Südpoland (10 Armee) 
550 Oberrhein (7 Armee) 1.7.1940 
Poland AOK 18,4,12 
France AOK 1& 12 
Südrußland Aok«17 1.10.194 
Kaukasus 
Krim 
' 
Nordukraine, Polen 1944/5 
553. Polen 18 Armee 15.3.1941 
Kronstadt 5.5.1941 
Südrußland 11 Armee 22.6.1941 
Krim (11 Armee to Leningrad) 15.9.1942 
556 Afrika 
559 Balkans (2 Armee) Mai 1942 
Mittelrußland (4 Armee) 
Ostpreußen 1944/5 
560 France, Greece 
,- 580 Poland 
(4 Armee) 1939 
Belgium, N. France 1940 
Mittelrußland (2 Armee) 2.7.1941 lb 
Woronosch, Pripjet, Warew 
Balkans 1943? - 
582 Polen (8 Armee) 18.9.1939 
Nil. Befh. Posen 28.9.19.79 
Wehrkrels IX 20. ýA940 
France (9 Armee) 5.6.1940 
Mittelrußland 18.4.1941 
Balkans 2 PziArmee August 1943 
(Exchange with 9 Armee) 
583 Belgium, N. France. (2 Armee) 7.11.1939 
Nordrußland (18 Armee) 21.10.1940 
I 
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584 West (16 Armee) 
Nordrußland April 1941 
585' West (6 Armee) 
Sudrußland, Stalingrad 1941 
Nordukraine, Sudrußland (4 Pz. Amee) 1943 
588 France 
590 Mittelrußland Korück Pz. Amee OK 3 1941 
593 Sudrußland 4 Pz. Armee 
6 Armee 15.10.1942 
Armee Abt. Hollidt. 12.1.1943 
6 Armee 
(570) K AOK 7 
Source: 
Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und 
Waffen SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1939-45. 
Verlag Es Mittler u. Sohn GMBII Frankfurt a. Main 1976 
Volume 11. 
* 
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0 
Register of Persons 
von Arnin, H-J, Generalleutnant: Commander 17th Pz. Div. 
von dern Bach-Zelewski, E, SS-Obergruppenfilhrer: HSSPF Ruffland Mitte 
Backe, H, Staatssekret! ir im Reichsernahrungsministerium, 
Reichsern! ihrungsminister from 1942 
Bernhard, Generalleutnant: KorOck 532 (from 22.04.1942-) 
Brand, Generalleutnant: Korrick 532 (until 21.04.1942) 
Brautigam, 0, Dr.: Stellv. Leiter der Hauptabteilung im RMfdbO. 
von Brauchtisch, W, Generalfeldmarschall: Oberbefhlshaber des 
Heeres 1938-1941. 
von Gersdorff, R-C, Frhr., Major i. G.: Ic/AO der HGr. Mitte 
Groscurth, H, Obertsleutenant i. G.: la der 295th Infantry Divison 
1941- 
Guderian, H, Generaloberst, Oberbefehlshaber der Pz. Gruppe 2 
(16.11.1940- 21.12.1941) 
Halder, F, Generaloberst: Chef des Generalstabs des Heeres 
Hoepner, E, Generaloberst, Oberbefehlshaber der Pz. Gruppe 4 
Kaminsky, Bronislaw, Brigade Leader, M Lokot (Korück 532) 
Keitel, W, Generalfeldmarschall: Chef des OKW 
Kitzinger, K, Generalleutnant: Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ukraine 
von Kluge, G, Generalfelsmarschall: Oberbefehlshaber des A0K4 
Krebs, H, Generalmajor: Chef des Stabes des A0K9 
von Manstein, General d. Infanterie: Oberbefehlshaber AOK 11 
Model, W, Generaloberst: Oberbefehlshaber A0K9 (15.01.1942- 
03.11.1943) 
von Reichenau, W, Generalfeldmarschall: Oberbefehlshaber A0K6 
Sauckel, F,: Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz 
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Schellbach, 0, Generalleutnant: Korück 582 
von SchenckendorffM, General d. Infanterie: Befehlshaber des 
Rückwärtigen Heeresgebietes Mitte 
Schmidt, R, General d. Panzertruppen:. Kommandierender General des 
XXXIX. Armeekorps & (K. Gen. des Pz. A0K2 from 22.12.1941- 14.07.1943) 
Seebach, Alexander Freiherr von, Ic Officer with Korück 532, 
(after transfer to A0K9) from January 1943. 
Strauß, A, Generaloberst: Oberbefehlshaber A0K9 
(30.05.1940- 14.01.1942) 
Thomas, G, General d. Infanterie: Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- 
und Rüstungsamtes im OKW 
Wagner, E, General d. Artillerie: Generalquartiermeister im ý 
Generalstab des Heeres 
Wittmer, Major., Kommandant des Dulag 185 
### 
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Documents: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
Richtlinien für das Verhalten der Truppe in Rußland. 350 
'Kennt ihr den Feind' (Korück 532 files) BA/MA: RH23/218 352 
'Disziplin und unmilitärisches Verhalten von Wehrmacht- 
dated angeh6rigen in der bffentlichkeit' (Korfick 582) , 
16 August 1941, BA/MA: RH23/223. 353 
PzAOK2 response to 'KollektivgewaltmaBnahmen' action, 
(Gruppe Gilsa: KortIck 532) dated 11.9.1942 BA/MA: RH23/26. 354 
Document regarding hostage taking to protect railway lines, 
Kortick 532, dated 6.9.1942, BA/MA: RH23/26. 355 
Comments on troop response to the above order, 
Korrick 532, dated 24.9.1942, BA/MA: RH23/26. 356 
Series of documents relating to a protest made by a junior 
officer against a shooting incident in OKII/930, 
Korack 532,24 September to 29 October 1941, 
BA/MA: RH23/228. 357 
Report regarding the deaths and shootings of Soviet POWs 
in various camps controlled by Korfick 582, 
Korack 582, dated 26 November 1941, BA/MA: RH23/222. 366 
Orders from AOK9 warning troops of the consequences of 
allowing Soviet POWs to escape. 
Korack 582, dated 2.10.1942, BA/MA: RH23/267. 367 
Orders instructing troops to improve the treatment of 
Soviet POWs. H. Geb., dated 24.11.1942, BA/MA: RH22/218. 368 
Verwaltungs-Anordnung from Army Group Rear Area Command 
regarding: 
Curfew and identification marking of Jews. 
(VA, Nr. 1,7 Juli 1941, BA/MA: RH23/270) 369 
Establishment of a Jewish Council; ban on the evacuation 
of Jews, and forced labour for Jews. 
(VA, Nr. 2, BA/MA: RH23/270) 370 
Reprisal measures against local communities, 
(VA, Nr. 9,21 October 1941, BA/MA: RH23/270). 371 
(Superimposed bold numbers with 000 prefix -are author's own 
classification. Documents referred to in the endnotes of the 
thesis are prefixed with &0. ) 
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Anlage i zu 01ýW/IIFSt/Abt. L. IV/Qu 
Nr. 44560/41 9. K. Chefs. 19. Ausf. 
R-ichtl. ii). iei) Aär das Verhalten der Truppe in Rußland. 
I. 
1. Der Bolschewismus ist der Todfeind des natIonalsozIalIst- 
ischen deutschen Vollres. Dieser. zersetzenden Weltanschauung, 
und ihren Trägern gilt Deutschlands Kampf. 
2. Dieser Kampf verlangt rücksichtloses und energisches Durch- 
greifen gegen bolsr-hewistiscjle Retzer, Freischärler, 
Saboteure, Juden und restlose Beseitigung jedes aktiven oder 
passiven Widerstandes. 
3. Gegenüber allen Angehörigen der Roten Arme&- auch den 
Gefangenen- ist äußerst"e Zurückhaltung und schärfste Achtsam- 
keit geboten, da mit heimtückischer Kampfweise zu rechen ist. 
Besonders die asiatischen Soldaten der Roten Armee sind un- 
durchsichtig, unberechenbar, hinterhältig und gefühllos. 
4. Bei der Gefangennahme von Truppeneinheiten sind die Whrer 
soArt von den Mannschaften abzusondern. 
III. 
5. Der deutsche Soldat sieht sich in der Union der Sozialist- 
ischen Sowjetrepubliken (U. d. S. S. R. ) nicht einer einheit- 
lichen Bevölkerung gegenüber. Die U. d. S. S. R. ist ein Staaten- 
gebilde, das 
- 
eine Vielzahl von- slawischen, . kaukasischen und 
asiatischen Völkern in sich vereinigt und das zusammen- 
gehalten wird durch die ýGewalt der bolschewistischen Macht- 
haber. Das Judentum is in der U. d. S. S. R. stark vertreten. 
6. Ein großer Teil der russischen Bevölkerung, besonders die 
durch das bolschewistische System verarmte- landbevälkcrung, 
steht dem Bolschewismus innerlich ablehnend gegenüber. Im 
nichtbolschewistischen russischen Menschen ist das National- 
bewußtseln mit tiefem religlösen Gefiihl verbunden. Freude und 
Dankbarkeit über die Befreiung von Bolschewismus werden ihren 
Ausdruck häufig im kirchlicher Form finden. Dankgottesdienske 
und Prozessionen sind nicht zu verhindern oder zu stären. 
0 
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11 
350 
7. In Gesprächen mit der Bevollcerung und im Verhalten gegenüber 
Frauen ist größte Vorsicht geboten. 
Viele Russen verstehen deutsch, ohne es selbst -sprechen zu 
können. 
Der feindliche Nachtr-ichtendienst wird gerade im besetzen 
Gebiet- besonders am Werk sein, um Nachtrichten über 
militärisch wichtige Einrichtungen und Maßnahmen zu erhalten. 
Jede Leichtfertigkeit, Wichttigtuerei und Vertrauensseelig- 
keit kann deshalb schwerste Folgen haben. 
IV. 
K, 
8. Plirtschaftsgüter aller Art und ». ilitäriscJte Beute, * ins- 
besondere Lebens- und Futtermittel, Detreibsstoff und 
Bekleidungsgegenstände' sind zu schonen und sicherzustellen. 
Jede Vergeudung und Verschwendung schädigt die Truppe. 
Pländerung' werden nach den Militürstrafgesetzten mit den 
schwersten Strafen geahndet. 
9. VorsIcht belm Genuß von erbeuten LebensmItteln! Wasser darf 
nur in gekochten Zustand genossen werden (Typhus, Cholera). 
Jede Berührung mit der Bevölkerung birgt gesundheitliche 
-Gefahren. Schutz der. eigenen Gesundheit ist soldatische 
Pflicht. 
10. jür Reichskredith-assenscheine und -mänzen sowie für deutsche 
ScheIdemänzen im Wert von 1 und 2 Pfennig sowie 1,2,5 und 
- 10 Reichspfennig oder Rentenpfenning besteht Annahmezivng. 
Anderes deutsches Geld da; -f nicAt verausgabt werden. 
Source: BA/MA, RW4/v. 524 
G-R Ueberschär, Unternehmen Darbarossa: der deutsche 
Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941,1984, 'page 312. 
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St-8 
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An Korück 532 
Gltd.: An Gruppe Gilsa, 
1 An nachr. XXXV. , und L1II. A. K. , an XL1 u. 
. Eine LieldunG über die* Erschießung von 1/6 verdächtigen 
Landeseinwohnern im rückw. ArmeeGeblet jýibt wir Veran- 
ý. 0 lassung darauf hinzuweiseng daß Lundeseiziwolinerg h; uGen 
die nur der Verdacht einer Betätibung iiii Bandenwesen be- 
steht, nicht zu erschiessen sind, Derartige Elemente ge- 
hören in ein GefanGenenlager. Flanlose Erschiessungen 
treiben, die Bevölkerung iii die Itände der Batiden. 
Ich bitte die Herren Koiamandierenden Generale, *diese 
Weisung noclunals in ihren Befehlsbereichen bekannt zu 
Geben. 
tsez. Sclunidt, Ilz. A. U. K. 2, la/Id, Nr. 1896/112 eeli. 
I 
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Iteque, 6.9.42. il k 532 
ßetra Sicherheit. 
iýOZUKI ohne. 114t 
Sprenßwti39hlUgo und Youerüberftill& auf ]ýihiiibüwont 
1 .. Vorminunr, von Wee; en und äh. Ulichen-lausen i=Ier noch 
1- nicht nach. Fortt; esotzt fallen deÜtuche Soldaten'nol- 
olleu heimtÜckischen Anochlü£; en zum Opfer. Es ist unbý- 
i 
1; . 
dingt nbtiß# daß dem endlich mit rÜcknictiteloneit Vor- , 
SeltunGeraaAnahmen entroroiigetroteit wird. 
, »i , 
4-. / in Zukun£t sind an ahleit zu sichernden Eineubahn- und 
pUlbalmstrocken Geiseln festzusetzen, bei jedem er- 
,. f 
folrreiähen feindlichen Anachlar, sind mindentenn 5 Gel- 
seln, bei der Atinelilnailtýlle tiutzuhtüiipon. Sind boi dem i 
Uknaohlaß Deutsche tödlich verung; lilcl,. t oder schwor ver- 
wundetg oo eind für jeden Deutschen iaindentonn 10 uoi- 
. .. %.. sein aufzuhängen. vie Geiseln sind 
den den gefährdeten 1 
Strecken benachbarten Ortschaften und in iluion den pa: ý- 
tIoanenfreundlichen, Kreisen ohne Rücksicht eitit dan Ge- 
schlecht zu entnelmen. 
Die ortsamsUsnige BevölkerunG int übar die bonýeichtIG- 
f 
'. ' 
teil VorgeltuugnmaPimhmen aufzuklären und agfzufordorzig 
1 in der Ijähe, herumtreibenden Banden *zu untor- 
ýdie 
z oh 
richteng um diesen eine letzte Möglichkeit zur fried- 
il liehen Rückkehr zu geben. 
Die Einheiten melden binnen 8 Tagen die Zahl der funt- 
gesetzten Geiseln und die Urtochaft sowie in jedem n- 
seitall in der Wußemeldung die Zahl dor GehWistoný 
Jür den Xor(Ickt 
Der Chef des Stuben 
Oborst i. G. 
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X0rUo 532 f al; t6ý, ti 49 £240() 0 42 4 .... .t 
Lix vom 
wor-)on 
M 'j0£ullln fort G. )s112 betr, 
.i bei 11. luli ihroa 
lierielit zu urtoilen, ist die i-, ovüliýprutit; 
deutLicheiä bC. Lutz zu atelten' und ot3 üInd "i. üiucl. L-lei 
pulIkto £er-tue cLalit, Jali ole wit iartit; ancii in 
iievielitinG Duil Lierade La Doruich dienur die 
mieten ulGelt tald .. %ltcriifo erfuj.. zit '3i)idt lutit (Ilfat2e 
ijourtollunts roluhlich ol)tit-iiutiticii 
-iteit davon@ dnn -. rjlillose t. ieldiiiii. eti beL Jýorück v(ji, Ilc(; oiig aus 
denen einwandfrei licirvoi-Oeltt, diiii faot überjA1.1 In dort Dör- 
fern glemeritts eitzqn, diý in Vert)IiiduiiV, uit (Ivii Amden nte- 
dieser j-. rwiibtttig Ist in dew ljot: u. %il t, (iiiii; 1; 1 die (jai- 
Z den. Sollten diese .. -Irklich nicht vtwbttiidezi suin, will die 
tlich tilt"tiv am llalainc., )iutdr4 &ufhli. irutit-; 
und 1, ilnetauuctieii botollisent co erttfüllt iiatturk. -eijül) die Vat- 
von Verl., "oltuni; ontaßiutlktien. Ue i-outrititziiiiL; von wenditj,. eit lb 
Geiseln ist Überall durchzufillwün. Die &, rliüiie; unt; kaim von 
Üall zu Fall entschieden worden, LlzLI; Uoboucl iut tiljur, daß 
wir die Aufgabe habeng deutoches Lebeit zu agt, Utzeng und 
da ist jede Weichheit vblli(S fehl nta 111 tze. und eine Vor- 
nUndigung am deutschen l; lute, j e- . *' 
.b. rertellerl 
--7 4ý i* (t JO r4 Puchu 
r. /T.. D 777 
ciler, la 1 geKTB. 
thilliz 5ý .. 3 
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Oques aon 24. Sopt. 1941. 
M. -H. ill'ola-1 
OC jr t. I. f) .1".. 0 (I n: ý $Ili, zro., .. _ kompaudautur budnjý die liacýiricht, dakx Uri I-R. co Ubr ncxll 
E-Ind. JnfO; 
i (IA. 
Kontroll cd er 
Ubx, -* Cs n ov,:, o 
11 cu in bucl ni a, I: qricIi um icf-, c Lci L LI'- 
v, ciprid. Den waobhabenden Unteroffz. des 
1. Zuges 
t-1. 
4Yifi 
t' eioh 
M-ýinuc dahing, phoud. untorrichtet, dwys die EK r. r. e. 61 
EL -h ciLurUa-; v! L; 
hc Ex, ý- q hi o3 so up Y0u re 
iihxen dUrf en . Di ese -' telluncruc. bme brucht el der viach. 
Pabende 
'Uýtexoffz. LteinhauEer-dem Or'tlukommandautep bittinvittTr Gxcf 
Jxch zum '-Usu'ruck-* Der Ortskommandant erh-Urto daraufbir . t, -0 dp c tr dic Vcxcvttvýcxturty' dcx 12*E-chl rcr-urr. Uboxnebmen werde. 
Die Ipsohi ez,, sung mUsse um 18.00 Uhr duroh6efUhrt werden. 
Dazu ben6tige er vom Zuý-, 10 LUnuerdie res'tlichen 13 Mýitircr 
von der Uendarmerio goutoll 
Gec, on*18.00. Uhr xUokte das K9. mmando mit 9 Partisanon in 
p i`uc Mg e-ý, 0h1.0 1cP, neu IM, zurz rý- q 1i ier, s un ig, c. t (, IIeuu It e' r dc... c, kdjut. -atEn CbltL. --tr2-p ab. N2oh der Anhutift gab 
ObIta . 
'Stern Auordnungon und Befehle hekanut die 7011SU311dir, 
U131jutir, warclu Und SwAt pine oiviE; re bexvouit'Lit aut-16. uten. 
J. 'un widde der c3: Ete. PEZXtiE-FUI 
ý. 
oiL iusc. ýliegexoffizior) 
zum L11'J"a 
IL 
viorauf Obltn. Stern ihm die Pit-ole auf die -uruct EcUtE. - ur'. d 
einen Schuk-s abGab. Der rus. Fliegeroffz sank soh3: U. p, in den 
Oxaluen. -7-cu zr; elt'eu taid 
drittou lier-s cr c-bcufr. 11t-- 
ZU EiCh fUhren ULd ciledlote diýE; e inrqjeicher, 6eiLe. 1juxch dioe Ubripm"Pa U; au= unruhip- ver- Z3 Euqhten Ejo-m louzuxeibý-cp, eis euu, tand ein Hand emenge und 
eine rauferei, mit atisohliessender, unvorantwor licher, ! (, bcrE- 
Gc"1111'cher Lchiecceifji. Lligleioh vouxde bcob. -nchtct duE. r. der 
ruk; s. cliegcieffo. Y. -i(d*ei aus dgm Graben etiep, und io kluuht I 
in 1-, ýol-tut; g Luduja erivxlff. lirci 1-briter r-&Lmfrj aie 
ýcrfolp, 
I- 'U ut; auj uj, d vc.,; o: sen doni 'Kben in 200 Lrt cy 1: 11tj c-l-ritir riE: e ex ji U hrc Lid dirscz VO 2 (; 'cl L 6- E; hLbcu Obltu. Btr3-rj rjit rncrxc-n 
Schiltzen di 0 'Ost 11 Ohen Pýiti ULnbn' duxoh Schiesrem Um-plegt. 
paoh BeendiGung der Schic-Eirci-ei lvgrju dic cinzelnen 
7'(: 3. E-. t: jFut it urd gcriqirrm 
in 4em vorgezehenen Graben vext-oharrt. 
/ u ant 
... - ' 
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Ortmkom=anclantur 11193o. 0-ý'. p. den 5. Cktobar 1ý41; 
'13#57, Urý: Bericht obltnt., Tunz; ingers 3*Redf, roachbtl', 
50. v; 24.9,1941, 
I ung von Partisanen. 11 Erschiess 
An 
r,. o=mndant des rückre Ariaooaeblets 582 
Abt, 
Z,. im Bericht des Oberleutnants Tunginger über Partisanener - 
csung am 13t. 9,. 1941 ist zu sagen, dass dieserden Tatsachen nur schies 
. wenig entspricht. 
ý, . zu Absatz 
1. Dass ich persönlich mit Unterofrizier Steiniiauser'ver- 
handelt habe$ erinnere ich mich nicht# halte es aber 
für unwahrscheinlich, da die Bestellung das Xonu', iandos 
ache eines Kommandanten ist, nicht & 
ZU Abs--tz_2. Es vird kaum möglich sein, bei E: rekution sauberer und 1- .-k 
>-- -. 
L 
soldatisch würdiger zu verfahren, wie bei dar Orts -. 1 
kommandantur 11/930 darauf gehalten wird; 
Ein Fliegerof: Cizier murde überhaupt nicht erschossen, 
sonderri an Ko= andanten des rückwe, Armoogebieten 582. 
abgeliefert; Der fragliche Partisan Tiar ein ehemaliger 
Serneant der roten Armee und hatte' bei den Pnrtisanen 
die Stelle eines sogenannten Roten Konmandeurs inne, t 
Bei dem Verhör hatte sich dieser Partisan unaabährlich 1 
: wie eine Bestie beno=cn, so dass, oberleutnant Stern ' r 1 
alle Veranlassung hatte, die zur Exekution an£; otrotcnbn 
0 
Mannschaften zu äusserster Achtsan*cit zu ermdlinen, Z- 
mnl. untor (Ion 11, irtiaanon nooli andare delivier n Duraohun 
.i waren. 
, ýI Zur liandlungaTioise den oberleutnant Stern bei der Er- 
schiessung selbst ist zu sagen, dass er nicht anders t 
handeln konnte# wann er sich nicht der fahrlUssigen 1 
preichabe von Gofnneenen schuldig' inachen wolltp. Auf 
Ort % . j* 
die Brust liat'Oberleutnant Stern die Pistole nicht. So. 
.. / 
. 
A, 
. t. setzt,. wohl aber aus unmittelbarer 1jähe geschorisant, 
e 1., ,0ý, j)je sogenannte Unruheg die bei den Partisanen entstanden 
war, hatto ihre Ursache nicht In der Ersohieaaung den 
Roten Komriandeurs durch Oberleutnant Stern, sondern ist 
vieLachr auf eine Verabredung der Pnrtisanen zur go ýe/' 
- J, ýfe ý ; 
7. 
raeinsamen Flucht zu suchony zu welcher der Kor. uliandcur 
2 
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durch seinen Fluchtversuch das Zeichen gab. Dies geht auch 
daraus hervor, jias er. sich gleich beim Öffnen den Uli 
aus derd Wanen drännte. worauf er beim ersten aofortiaen 
4.. r Fluchtversuch angehalten und 
dicht unterhalb das Herzerns 
getroffen wurde, Von " unverantvortlicher, lebensgeftUir. - 
licher Schlosserei w kann überhaupt nicht die Rede sein* 
Oberleutnant Stern hatte den kl, aren Bofehl gegeben: " Nicht 
schiessen, 1 11 Dies können die Mannschafteng welche bei der 
Erschiessung zugegen raren, bezeugen, denn dieser Bofchl 
wurde prompt. ausgeführt; Die BehauptunG übur die endgülti ge 
Erl--digung des Roten Kommandeurs, der In Richtung auf 
Rudnja geflohen sein solle ist eine gä=lich unhaltbaro 
Behauptungi zumal sie bui der Deleuohtung auf 3oo zitr- . D 
gänzlich unmöglich war. Der frakliche rartisan, war auch 
.A«-, - --- nicht in Richtung auf Rudnja entlaufen, sondern vernuchte .' 
. LCLU J. t: IIU 
( Karte 1 e* loo ooo Witebsk Blatt Nr. 11 - 36 - IV ( Ost 
zu ontko=on. Der Wahrheit entspricht, daso der Gefreite 
Kops von der Ortskommandantur 11/930 auf Befehl von Ober - 
leutnant Stern dem schwervorTzundeten Partisan nachlief, 
und ihn nach etva 25o iatr einholte und orledigteý. 
DelDerl: t muss zu Abshtz 2) noch Tierden, dass', weder eirr Un - 
teroffizier noch ein Mann des Erschiessungskommandos die 
berufene Person 'sein dürftey die Befehle des die YXekrution 
leitenden Offiziers zu kritisieren; und das es sie ausser - 
ger. Uhnlich empftinden worden musg,... dass ein Orfizierpolch 
unangoýrachte Kritik zum Gegenstand einer JIeldung macht, 
zwr. al ihra Gelegenheit gegeben wart sich jederzeit beim .. 
verant, rörtlichen Koruaandanten . 
persönlich zu informieren. 
Zu JLbsatz 3)Dieser-Absatz ist glatt erýundenb Er-Ist dazu. Sonignet, 
den Eindruck eines Schlheht: Coldes zu irweckeng wovon keine 
Rede sein kannp da Leichen nicht rahllos im Gelände lier - 
umlagen, Die Erschicssung der 8 Partisanen fand um der dazu 
vorgesehenen Stelle stattg Und die'Leichen wurden wie üb - 
licht nach dem der ýod durch einen Sanitätsunteroffizier. 
einwandfrei festgestellt worden war, dortselbst begraben; 
oberleutnant Stern. erstattete mit sotort nach der Er - 
schiessung pflichtgemäss genaue Meldung üb dieselbe. 1011 
konnte seine Wiassnahme nur Rutheissen! 
7 
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Kommandant S. tabsquartier, den GeOktoljor 1941. 
d. r(icki7. jý. (reb. 562 
(u 
Bericht 
13etr.: Erschießurir, von-Iartistitione 
Herrn 
Ilittiiioi. -gtvr Grv: r 'Y r Ei 0 11. 
Ortskomnandantur 11,1930. 
6 Der vorliegende Bericht bedarf noch in einigen Tunkten 
der. Ergänzung. Folgende Yrat; en müsten Genau benntwortet 
werden: 
XIOD 1. ) Vollär wu. (3te oberlt. Stern von der Absicht der 
. Partisanen gericinsvii die 1flucht zu orf, -, rei: ren 7 
2. ) Hat der rote KOmmendeur einen kler erkennbüren 
Fluchtversuch unteiciioitu; ieii, versuchte er wegzulaufen, 
oder Imt Oblt. Stern diese Absicht nur aus der 
Weigerung, sich zu setzen, entnommen ? 
111111r, des roten Y,. dcltrs. Mit Obcrlt; Steril nach Erschiej 
auch nocl, den 2s und 3. lartimmen persönlich er- 
schossen ? Wenn ja, aus, volchem Grunde. 
4. ) Hat Oblt. Stern sich auch noch. an der L-; rschiaßuntý 
der restlichen Vartisanen persönlich boteilirt 
Oberst. 
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gommandant StabsquarticY, den -7. blctobcr 1941. 
d. rUclM. A , GCU - c82 o4l QU .. 
A: 0. I<'.. ,) 
IjaKyrý:. A. 0; K-9, O. Qu. /t,; u. 2 Yom 1.10.41 
C? L-orquartlj. -rmc. j: jj0, r,. -i 
I. N'. . .1- 'T. 10-1 .: r-tisohiesswig von Partisanen. - r-"'G. . -'Il AL 4, Nr, J 
VI An. At. 
A, O.! C. c, ". ),, 0. . u-/(ýu. 2. 
, "*urUck lait don Ert; (Anniaimn der onaestollten Untotsualmlig. ' 
I: orUck ist der AuffassunG, dal3 die al: tivo 13etailicunr, 
Offiziers an der-l-; rschiessunG von lartisanon unnnLabrocht. 
und eines Offizicr's'un%,.,, UrdiG ist, es bei denn bei Gefalir irl 
Vorvug. -Dies zati. B im vorlierenden Falle als, reGebon rinGeselien 
r1t. orn in die cm n. GeneraW..,.. Sche"bach . 4- . ierde St 
Sinne belehrei 
0. it At 
Unq: 10 
0 7 Oberst. 
. -NILSFID-I. 
- /0 
1.15 -&-r &4 
J. 
.Ii Tf ). i., -I. I 000583 
Ilaaz ,3j, - oh-Batit , ý'j 0, -- 1, 29., 10.1941., 
lie tr.:: Ersohiessung von Partibancla, Waoh-Batl.. 50 Aril geheftet 
Jn der Atilage : roioht die Kompanie dao:, Al- . tonbUndol betr. Ersohiesming von Partisanen zuruok, untor BoifUgung oinex Stellungýnafime des- Oblta. -Jun - 93 ngýr. 
TIP 
Ila up tma nn u Komp . 1-uhv ID r- 
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OrtskoAiandantur II/93o. -0*Uop den Okt; 1941, 
ericht OberlAutnant Juncineýer; 
pefr.: 11-. sc'.,. iiessung *jon Partisanen, 
Herrn 
Oberst Graf Ti o1 :r :rskoe 
Korpi, ýin: adant des rückw. A=eorobiats 582 Abteilung Qu, 
zu 1) Aus seiner eigenen Beobachtung, dabs der Rote Komuan, *, 
.t dou'tmit den anderen Partisanen tuscheltet ihnen beim 
Aunsteigen ein Zeichen gaý und-sioh auffällig vordrVingend 
als erster aus dem Wagen begab. Später wurde von einem 
Bogleitmiann gemaldeti dass die Partisanen schon während 
der Fahrt unruhig getuschelt hätten; 
zu 2) Der Rote YornEuicleu: b liatg in dem er sich loszureissen. ver- 
suchte, eini%n-ijr; eideutilgen Fluchtversuchtunterno=cn; 
Zu 3) Aus den gleichen Grunde erschoss Oberleutnant Stern noch 
2 weitere Partisanene 
i- Eine aussergenöhnliche Handlung sehe ich In der Erschiesý- .. 
sung der Partisanen durch Oberleutnant ätern nicht; üa 
es-Einheiten gibt.. bei denen die ]ýxakutionen ledirlich 
durch Offiziere ausgeführt worden; wie, ich, es hier ira Reriý- 
i fto x* 
.'C 
ment>-Generals Lechner erlebt habe, De 
zu 4) Nein; 16, . 
eater 
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An 
Ortsko mmandantur II/93Q 
z. 11. don Rittmci. -oterc Graf YsTrooh. 
venn ich im vorliec; enden Fall das Vcrhalýcn des Oberlta, 
stcrn den Upict Vinden entarrechond der vorfasetzten Diaziatstallo 
Exq.; rinUber als richtiG anerkatint hobo, so tudchte. loh dooh. 
aligenein iicincr Ansicht doltin Aiisdruch Cobent . 
dr-O loh dia 
nf Ur i., .-1. ejL. -. cnhUndig9 
Bet(Ali&'UIIG Ton Uffizieren an ExeLcutione 
nicht richtig und der 1NUrde des deutschon Offizziern filr niaht 
cnýcrrcchond hnltc. Der Offizier gebraucht ocitio V. nffa nur il'it 
1. ,, cii Salbsty-rteidigung,, notfallst zur Axif- -ur reohtnýUrifj, 
reahtorhal-biznG der Nuntie szzuah t, Vorcitclung von Vlucht*rcrauchon I 
u#U. Letz ;; res habe ich als vorliegend crachtet. 
I? ic)! ersuche, Oblt, Storn im vorstelict)dcn Sinlio 
I anzu -I '- 
Generalleutnent* J 
'ýtA 
fit 141.1- Ni0i w 
V.; I, +,! ý- .:! IA %. -ý4. wA I 
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Bet. r. e. Stellungnahme zum Beiicht Dem 
cLer OrtskommancLantux-II/930 Baäf .. ilaoh-Batl. - 50 6 vom 5. *Oktober 1941 a. ä. D. 
Obltn Stern hat dem befr. Komarek als Dtellv. ilaohhabenden 
und darnach der Oxt*kommandant pexsönlioh, dem nao habüncion 
Uffz. Steinhauser ausdxüoklich und wiederholt erklärt, daso 
ýxpohiesoung übernehmv sie ciie Vorantwoxtung der ,n rurcLen 
ogar noch mit cLom Zusatz dass dio 0, ts der Ortskommandant sx 
kommandantur-Waohe übeiaies seine Wache iioi, 'iiber die er 
Výi Verfügen könne. 
'ZU p- Partisanen nicht um einen --, ) Daps es sich 
bei dem tzagl. 
., 7 
Col* 
iogeroffizi d einen sogenannten roten Fl: ier s012 ein UM ý 
ý1 Kommandeur handelte, war aer ýiaohmannschaft nicht bekannt. 
Man hatte jeäenfalls in ihm den gleichen Mann wiederorLr%nnt, 
der tags zuvor von Obltn. -Stern peroonlioh mit dem Gefangener 
v; art zusammen zum Austreten be r, leitet worden war naohdeM 
'. Obltn. Stein sich zuvor duzoh. Xbgabe eines Pistoiensohussei3 
in die luft ilberzeup ,t 
hatte cLass D'eine ýistole intakt yar. 
Schon aus dies ein Grunde hat t e. di ü Mannsohaf t keinen Zweif ol 
an der verbreiteten Meinung, aaso ps cioh = einen Offz. 
handle. - Der rote KommancLeur hat keinerlei Anstalten gemacht, 
sich loszureissen 'viel weniger der z17eite und Cixitte Partisan. Ledigli h die 'Neigerung sioli zu setzen konnte für 
Obltn. Stern die Veranlassung Seint persÖnlioh einzugreifen. - 
Der rote Kommandeur hat sich auch vieder beim Ooffnen (los 
Wagens herausgedrängtg - er wurdp als -letzter eingeladen u1111 usýeladen wurde - noch hatte 
er irgend einen Fluohtversuoh un einommen. ,6ý 
I' Die Partisanen mit geknebelten Händen und mit verbundunEn ; 
&ugen stanaen georannt in Beihe vom Wagen biD oA p Meter 
zum Graben aufgestellt. Obltn. Stern befahl dann den 
schützeng ihre Gewehre ge enseitig dazaufhin zu kontrolliereti 
ob jedes einen SOhut38 im 
gauf 
habe. -Dioser Befehl wurde, so 
-i 0 ungewöhnlioh er vorkommen musste, ausýeführt, ohne (iaso inex 
aer Partisanen einen FluohtverBuch un ernommen hiýtte und i 
x. obgleicä üie, Anor(inung, geiaue nicht beruhigend iyixkun konnte. II 
1 Die unverantwortliche und/go14 o144gArliohe Sohiesserei begann 
.. 
erst als die drei Erst. en erschossen warenilfler Eistu wieder 
ans 
äem. Crraben herausgesprungen und ein, Te der Uebriga 
aUSZt1101SElen YOrSUChtee 
Daso ein Uffz-, oder ein Mann Befehle nicht zu icritisiolcn* 
hat steht ausser Zweifel. Jm vorliegenden Falle, handelt ea 
sioL aber um einen anderen Sachverhalt. Jnfolge der unt- 
% .. etandenenliauferei w Mindesten Zwei Ijä, 
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des 'Eroohi eas ungskommandos atIrt2h die Ahabe (leo Gewehr- 
sohusses durch einen Foldgenaarrion unmi telbar in Ihrem Lebenjefahrdet. Ep war damit ihr gutes Locht und ihre 
pf li 0 dies zur Konntnin ihren Vorgesetzten zu bringen. - 
jm leichen Sinne war es 2flicht des Vorgesetzton, aui An- 
i foAern der Vorgesetzten höheren DienDtsfellu Trahxhoitage- 
0 treu zu berichten, 
3) Es bleibt eine nicht a-bzuleugnonas Tatsacho, claes nach Be- 
i endigung der Sohiesserei div Partisanen einzeln im Gelando horumlagen gesammelt und gemeinsam mit Ausnahme des 
esehenen 'raben voroohaxxt wurden. roten KQMMUUCLUUXD$. im vorg 
&, 
'hat ausser seinem Pistolenmagazin Zu 4) Obltiä. - Stein 9 daß er 1 fianz versohoso auch 8 Sohuso aus dem Gewehr ües Soläaten ichl abgegeben, und einige weitere Schüsse aus dem Gowehr 
des Soldaten H"aizmann. Oöltn., Stern hat sich alDo auch an 
Ersohiessung duz xestliohen Partisanen p02: sönlich be- 
5. Nach der Rückkehr des Ex£%obiossungt3kommandos versammelte 
i 
Obltn-, Stein die Männer UM sioll und erklärte ihnen: 
"Männer man äohn eig 
Obltne, 
Für die Eloht'iCkeit aer Absohrift 
Hauptmann U. -Komp. -Ziihrer 
/ 
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Stabi3quartier, den 26*Ilovombar 19419 
derüokvi. h, t. ', cb, 532 
(ZU 
Oerýu. /(ýu. 2 vom 23.11,41. 
Betr. Abr,;. *tnre. von Kriegsgefangenen. 0, 
An 
A. O. K, 9, O-Qu. /Qu-2. 
L 
22.6. I. ju. 2. 
1603torbt n1s 11 Gla Cs- go- 
IGO_ 
Partis, flo- stor-. 
Fnrtin. flo- 
ersoh. hen 
Ron 
orsch. hon 
xj =0 
A. Gcf. ss-st. 7 34., 0 37 580 0 6Z I 
xx) .. I xx) 
jL. beffsasste 8 It) 187 6 2. 
xx) -I xx 
Waoh-Batle 508 0 75 -17 0' 07 
- xx) y1soi-Batl.. 720 74 4 ?2 123 10 
.. Dulag 240 xxý) 18 10 0' 91 11 
63 0 
umme bei dcll* qorilck 582 untorý 450 6 '72 796 
, tellten Lsgcrn: ý-- 
=U nsx=n .. -!. -I .. 
%) -rartiSan6nvcrddohtipe vrurden dem S. D. UberC,, eben. ,I 
XýC) Dio ineisten Geflohenen boi. -a FlU011tversuch oder boi i 
dor VerfolGunG erschossen. 
In der Zeit vom 14.10. - 31-10. unteratand Dula(; 240 dem 
13ofelilsh. rdalm.. liceresef)biets. In dieso Zoit'fallon die 
rot unterstrichanon Zahlen.. Sie sind in der 0 6samts=me 
fjLr die Zeit vom 2.10s - 15.11. (blau) anthalien. 'N 
oborst. 
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Abschrit't 1 
&rrlegober 'A, 
11. QU*g den 21119419412)- k, )vii: '. ý. ndo 
9 
bw 
ge f un 1-, en e 
t pne r-luchtversuche von Kriegsý, erungnon haben einen (; rlgnr n häufie f an ene UmfanE, ont*enor., iii-icn, der zeigt, daß do Kr erprp 
nu, 'lvrordi. ýntlioli E: oprglos b,. )wneht rerden. Din soforgirp 
Über- 
prIfun- der getroffenen Evi7achunC. eimalincit)ti%c3iL Ist erford-. rlicli. I LLtigkült und Lilo Nähe dur Front, die Zunahine der Dandent 
fliv Dese: k-rung. der Vvrsorcunrslt%re der Davölk. nrun hob n giln- 
ntiC. c 139dJ-ii(,. ttni! uii fUr er: VolLzreiche Flucht roselinffen. Selbst i ä e. - nz ute 13c!, týndlutiC putsreipliende Ernährun b horig-3 zuverl fwit sind keinu Gowähr duli din (; eren ýtion c, -it und Willit?, F- . sich nicht Iait Flucht denken trügen. Düs Entlnufen von - b sl fl dV h 
go 
agern o egung en un erp ten, Küc Gefenronen nui3 Lazure 
jei--t in nehreren Fällen dt-ý- Geßenteil. 
Alle Llienststellen sind für dip bei ihnen * * 
. Die getrofrennn vernnttiortlioh '-ri. tid Dienststellen zu über- 
1 cý ýrdcrlichciifalls zu erränzeri und laufend zu Ubar- ! 'L 
Mir vonn iei Gefangenen täglich be£ den Gorpn 4 on nloC. orn g 1 i tibU; F%holt und a 
, 
1, Yogobt, n werdon, CupilGt für die beso 14b g- onde 
9- 
3i 2 h i ' t t ll I 2 - C viel a. en. etim or fluc D e. ls s c ' 2. Jedo Dienststelle, ge Krierr, (ofenGene beschäftit; t, meldot ý 
oý (-ilitr Flucht sofort unmittelbar A. O. K. 99 Abt. Ic/ A. 0. 
j., 1z9111 d(', r entflohenen Krierý3ýs etenronein g *2 4 (; (. ttiraum rersunrilungobon dersel en j(Iuch tort 90 
und Dionstatelle des fUr die Ber. achuna 
verentwortlichen DisziplinervorGesatzten. 
dc II i' ärunt., . «r scituld: rrago sind in jodom einzolnen Falle die u. flnai, -. iie-ii di, - rür dps mitlaurgn veruntvort- i. V III t teilunrnaimie dar Ziilschcjivorgg- 
lijLelboi st üutýriýfana wielIcit VirýOtzun rsiýlit e , 1'1 oh 
fi 
f, 
c j re ei en en VorgoSe z en vo - 
h u;, -f t. Rutuin sind Ucgep die Scýuldigon zu ergruiren, Kri tos co Untersuch n ann i k n rn(; q onuacn V. -% . &.. " 3- j h. nziýtoi *tung dcr I.,., if., ccgof3iigunon ist noch nicht al'iComein 
ulei- '; Besondere Anordnungen', 11r. 33 
vom u-d 1,1x. 40t1im 7; 6ý42 wird veNwiccon :i : 11 Kenn . 11Z1 li tig russiso er Kribgetengoner 
odor hol an vipreckirgon Stülk : DU auf dcr link(in Brustt)eito mit dcr Aufschrift "K(,: r". avch -ýuf dý: r, Rückscito-dor Uniform die Aufedhrift v-oilior olfarbo - zi*, eckmtii3i(. p, mIt So loblona - au: r- 
I Uird. Hölio dur Buchstnbon lo cm, bui Nungel un Fiirbo sind in ar, -tur Linie dio mit, dout - n, 3ýt. n odur ditjoon ähQlichci Uniforristücken bokloldoton 
 zu cnnzu hnon. " --e Von«den Divisio,. iuti und Gon. 1'%. omrýinndoty sind Stroiron cinziteutzen, unGunügund odur nioht vOrscllrlftsmUi(; aakonnzulohnotoil f08t-zunolmý)ri habon. 
.. AZinooobcrkoTn 0 L E, os Gunorti oaja c iza Entwur: r f; timniohriot Xroba 
,18 F; j-r. A. 1.1 
s ' h e , l 
I 
i 
I 
010,87 ) 
"') 
1 Edr. Gen. a. Sich. Tr. u. Befh. H. Geb. Don/Qu. (Kgf)Ne. 91/42 aeh. v. 24,11.1942. or 1-. b1at t_. 
sowjeticcher Kriegsgef anGeirer. 
_ 
Die Behandlunt-, feindlicher Kriegsgefangener beeinflußt in. 
militäri schert politischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht weitge- 
liend wisere Kriee. ofW, ýrunr-. 
Ilichtige Behr. 2idluný heißt gerechte Behandlung. Gerecht--it; - 
i-t? die Härtv dertg luo sie erforderlich lstg nicht ausachließ . t. igt nicht nur milit4risches Gesetzp sondern auch ein Gebot der 
Die 4'Lrt unserer '. L: riegsgafnn, -enenbaha-ndlung wirkt sich nur 
'Liche Front und deren Hinterland aus, die Kunde von ru. - die feind. 
ter Aufnalm, ' und Mehandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangonor wirl 
Iýý >Cer £: 0, - -ganda einen starken 
Schlag vorsetzeng die nerischen rrop, 
: feindliche Froiit zeinUrben und die unter der roten Herrschaft 
en Menschen in ihrer Hoffnung auf den deutschen Sieg ., noch lebend d0 Die BevorzuGung der Überläufer in Verbin ung mit lInch. 
Ticht ilber eute 1: riegsGefangenenbehandlune, wird bei den Rotar- 
=iston die Auffassung festiCzeng in der Kriegegefangenachaft eine 
. to Gelet! OIÜIG: 
Lt zu söheng den Krieg zu überstehon... 
politisch Trirkt sich unsere Xriegsgefangvn 
' enbahandluni; 
be- 
sonderd in der Bevölkerung der besetzten Gebiete aud-Ilicht mit 
'Unrecht schließt sie von der Art 9 mit der Ihre krieg; gef angrnen 
Vollr. sGenossen bolaandelt -nerLeilt auf die grundsUtzliche 7. instol- 
--, ii.. in. lles SieGers ZUM g-Inzen- Volk. Die freiwillige Mitarbeit der 
,, 33e3völkerung an 
der Lanclesauanutzung und am Niederaufbau, ist 
nicht zu entbehren. Die Kriiegsgefangenehbehandlung muß au: £'Grtxnd 
stimitr smäßigen Aus - _C, wirkung auf 
die Haltwig der Bavölkerwij 1. 
tsrache Reclinwig. tragen. 
.. 
1 --- .I, 
dieser Tz. ' wirtschaftlich ist das lý. riogsgefangen'enproblen von ýcoon- 
derer Bedeutung» Kriegsgefangene bilden als'Arbeitskraft einen 
der von Truppe und Heimat voll erkannt und ausgenutzt vier- 
I 
werty 
- ý-- «1-----. -«§ -. M. - ---- -. -y-. 
i 
;, dOXI Mum, 'Ju-r binsa-uz von iiraegagelanpnen 
: eullunG der LUcken in der RUstungsind' 
zur Aus- 
, rýxjeGsgefaiiGenen arbeitsfiihig? arbeit 
ustrie verlangzt, da'B die- 
fr. riorden, Iý 
Syrillia und gcound. orhalLoll 
.., 
Die schnelle Eillstellurio von Facharbe, itern und Xriopgefail- 
ni schen, Kennt ilia se'n genen nit besonderen tech -du Gunsten. der eiga- 
., nenýTrodukti, 
on iBt, beson". Iera anzustrebon, 
Kricgogef -Wigolic I die i1ir S61iicksal a113 91ticklichea Ion 
c:: Ipfin, -Aen, diesen Krieg in' gesicherter Lage zu Uberstchenj wer- 
deR ale Propna-indisten unserea Rampfee. und durch Jhre Leistung 
in-der Mstungswirtschaft wesentlich dazu bQ: Ltrtq; onp den, SicG zil. 
beschle,, uiiGen. 
Darumt 
"Wsreichonde E=W=ung ýund gute BellcuidlunG 
,., ler Xriegagef angenon von Zeitpunkt, i1irer 
u-cfangeluichine an I 
Siclatbare Bovorzugung, aller OberlUufor, I 
,. S 0' hneller Lbtransport, allor 1CridSugcfanGejjczj 
nach rUolcwdrtsýj 
INN - %, 0, I. 
., 0., A, (0, jy. ý. jý 
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- no iijen tr1 1. 
1. Bestellung von Buergermeistern in deA Gemeinden- 
In erster Linie sind politisch und fachlich zuverlaessige Personen, die nach Moeglichkeit der 
Volksgruppe der Weissruthenen angelioeren sollen, bis auf Widerruf mit der Leitung des Duergermeitter--i'. 
amtes zu beauftragen. 
2. Der Buergermeister vertritt die Gemeinde. 
3. Er ist Dienstvorgesetzter aller im Dienste der Gemeinde beschaeftigten Personen. Er stellt 
1-1 sie ein und entlae. --st sie. > 1,4. ý Der Buergermeister tratzt die Verantwortung fuer die gemeindliche FinanzwirtichAft. , 
5. Alle Einwohner, die bereits am 21.6.1941 in der Gemeinde ansaissig waren, sind durch den 
Buergermeister neu zu -erfassen und zu registrieren. 6. Die Buergermeister haben sofort dafuer zu sorgen, dass alte Einwohner mit entiprechenden 
Personalausweisen versehen werden, aus ' 
denen liervorgeht: Name, Vorname, Geburtsdatum und-ort, 
Wohnung, Familienstand, Berur, Aufenthalt und 13eschaeftigung, Zustaendigkeit, Konfession, Volksgruppen- 
zugelloerigkeit und Staat. eangehoerigkeit. 
7. Den Buergermeister trifft die Mithaftung bei Verutbung von Sabotageakten innerhalb des 
Gemeindebezirkes. 
Er hat mit allen MittelnýSabotagakte zu verhindern. Seine Pflicht ist es, insbezonere Iner eine 
Utberwachung der lebenswichtigen betriebe Sorge zu tragen. 
8. Den Buergermeister und seinen Stellvertreter beruft in Gemeinden bis zu 20.001) Einwohnern 
der Ortskommandant und in Orten tieber 20.000 Einwohnern der Feldkommandant. 
11. Verbot des Verlassens der Wohnung wachrend. der Nacht- 
1 1. Die Bevoelkerung hat Mch in der Zeit.: von 21.00 Ubr abends bis 5.00 Uhr morgens in ihren 
Wohnung-en aufzuhalten. 
2. Ausnahmen genehmigt'. auf schriftlichen Antrag der. iuer den' Wohnort'zustaendige Ortskom- 
in lant. 
Als Ausnahme gilt ýZ. B. - Nachtarbeit Iri lebenswichtigen Betrieben, Dienst als Arzt oder Hebamme * 
und Krankentransport. 
. 3. 
Zuwiderhandlungen werden von den Ortskommandanten mit den schaerfsten Mitteln bestraft. ' 
Als Suehne-Behelfsmassnahmen kommen z. 8. in Frage: Voruebergehendes Festsetzen bei knapper 
' Verpflegung, Anbinden, Heranziehen zu Arbeiten. 
111. Kennzeichnung 'von Juden und Juedinnen: .... r., to , . ý, . ýtý 
li Alle Juden und Jucdinnen, die sich im besetzten russischen Gebiet aufhalten und das 10. Lebens. ' 
jahr ueberschritten haben, sind mit sofortiger Wirkung verpflichtet, am rechten Aermel der Kleidung und 
Ueberkleidung einen - mindestens 10 cm breiten - weissen Streifen' mit dem gelben Zionsstern oder 
einen 10 cm grossen gelben Fleck züi tragen. 0 
2. Diese Armbinden 
' 
bczw. 'Flecke haben sieh die Juden und,. Jutdinnen selbst zu verschaffen 
und mit dem entsprechenden ' 
Kennzeichen zu versehen. 
3. Das Gruessen von seiten der Juden und Juedinnýn wird ausdruecklich verboten. 
4. Zuwiderhandlungen werden von dem nach dem Wohnort zustaendigen Ortskommandanten 
, durch strenge Behelfsmassnahmen gesuehnt. (Vergl. Abschnitt 11,3). 
IV. - Sc li aec-htvýrbott 
. 1. Mit sofortiger 
'Wirkung wird das Schacchten, d. h. die durch allmaebliche Entziehung des - 
. Blute., lierbeigefuchrte 
Toetung von Tieren zum Zwecke des sogenannten koscheren Fleischgenusses 
verboten-, 
2. W' er sich des Schaechtens schuldig macht. 1ýrigLd4i95 den Ortskommandanten streng begtraft. 
ni- -'-, Ake Str, -fe.. wil den Totte,. ' trifft den Mittaeter. Anitifter und r"- - 
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die al., retigii*)-, e FelerlichLeiten %-en den bestellen. 
den j(ircheilgesellschifteit veranstaltet werden, 
i., t die Getielitli! 4, tliig de% Feld: (0111iiiaildalltell 
oder der futeprechenden Dienetstelle erforder- 
. lich. Anträge Mild geiti-Iýý; s ZiFfer 6 der Richt. 
... linien fuer das Verhalten der Truppe in 
der 
, gowjettinion zu bellindchi. 3. Zusaminenroltungen. die sich gegen Ailord- 
nungen deutscher Dienctstellen und der voll 
eiiige:; ctztel. l Organe richten, Mild 
untersagt. 
4. Zuwiderliaiidlutigeli sind 
, 
sch. ärfstens zu 
Vii. Schul we seil. 
Sämtliche Schulen ünd Lehr-metalten Im be- 
. eetztei rti., -iýclicii Gebiet bleiben bis auf wel. 
teres reschlosAell. 
vill. 
ýlizeigellflichtige 
Krankheiten. 
1. Wer an Trnäioiii (. 'igý-Iiiisefie Augehlmink. 
lielt). Puhr, Thylilitis, Fleckfictter, Rueckfallfie- 
tier. cholerl, florkeil. Pest, 11-. ipt). itacifiel)cr, 
Y%, »eilsclic Krinklicit, Fieber oder 
Lepra erkrankt igt mid dies tveiss oder den 
Uilistinden nach innchmeil hat die Nlicht, 
eich voll einem Arzt lik: zu ýciller eildguchi- 
gen Auslicilting 1)cliaii(triti yti las. -en tind allen 
Anforderungen zur 1 leilittig der krankheit Folge 
zu leiden. 
2. Ist. der Erkrankte minderjachrig oder 
unterstellt er einer Vorniundschaft oder Pileg- 
schalt, so haben seine, Eltern, der Vnrilitilld 
oder sonstige init seiner Fuersorge betrauten 
Personcil furr-seine Behandlung zu sorgri). 
ý. Jeder Arzt ist verpflichtet, dem Ortsleollt- 
mandanten oder der entsprechenden Dienststelle 
ueber jeden Fall einer -ven ihin festgestellten 
Erkrankung schriftlich binnen» 48 Std. Meldung 
zu erstatten. In der Anzeige ist die erkrankte 
Person zu begeichnen und nach Moeglichkeit 
die Ansteckungsquelle b2k-ýillittzugel)eil. 
4. Der Ortskominantlant oder die entspre- 
cliende Dieti3tstelle sind verpFlichtet, fuer Icralik- 
heitsverdacchtIge Personen eine ýierztliche Uil- 
tersuchung und erforderlichenfalls a(-r71liche 
Behandlung oder holierniag-, ýmilinien anzuord- 
lien. Die. ge sind notfalls ttiitc-r militicrischein. 
c, cler polizeilichem Ziviiig durchzuftiehren. 
Tracheinverdacchtig ist jede zur Woliiiiiiigs- 
gerneinschaft eines Trachomkranken gelioere n- 
. cle 
Pereoll. 
5., Die Wolinstietten der Erkrankten Mild 
näch Anweisung des Arztes bzw. den zii5taeildi- 
gen durch d. ii Huergerineister 
zu deNinfiziereii. 
6. Zuwiderhandlungen shid etreng zu be5trate-i. 
JX. Einftiehrting des Arbellsmitiges fver die 
jtiediýclie Devoellcerutig(lesl)e. retzteii russischen 
Gebietes. 
1. Fuer die im tic. eetzteii m., siýClicii GýA)kt 
n -oni ýJuden -iid fuer Alatliner % 
voilendeten Lebemjahre' und flit--r 
Frauen -voiil'Vollcildetcil 16. -50. Lebeill;. ialll*e 
der'ArLeitgzi%*atig mit sohirtiger Wirkunt', ' eM- 
geflielirt. Die Iiiden werden zu die. eiti Zweck 
ilich der Erfassung in Zwailgsarbeitstr(1111). 9 
zu. tiiiinieilgcfiq. kt. 
2. blit sofortiger Wirkung Igt es allen im 
-besetzten Gebiet wohnhaften juden untersagt, 
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uuu ( JU ihren Wollm'Itz oder Ihre Unterkunft niiiie 
e. ... chriftliche Genehmigung der Ortskommandan. Xturen 
oder der entsprechenden Dienststellen 
lieber die Geil) ei 1i(legrenze ihres bisherigen 
Wohnsitzes hinaus zu verlegen oder sich auf 
Wililderschaft Zil begebeii. 
3. Die Erra. ", tilig (ler Arbcitspflichtigelldurch 
die Ehitrugung in die Erhissungskartel erfolgt 
durch die Duergerilleister. Die Duergernielfer 
. clil. J lieben den Jtidcil-1Zaeteil fuer die Vollstaeii- digkelt und Richtigkeit der Erfa. ssung veratit. 
wortlich. 
Sie erlasseil fuer dieseit Zweck einen Aufruf 
durch den Judeurat. 
4. Der Arl)citeeiii. natz erfolgt jeweile durtli 
b-csniidereil Abruf der deutschen Dienststellen. 
(\\li liniiiiiiiii(It). Abt. Aiheit odci- IV \\II), der 
Urt, let)iiiiiiiiid; iiitur oder der eithprechendeit Weitehtelle. oder In deien Auftriig ti, ircil (lie lýitcri., eriiielster oder der 111 (Icil Getheinden 
eingerichteten d\rbeitnveriiiittlutigsstelicil. 
Der Eliiz«itz erfolgt nur, wenn einheinlisclie 
irische Arbeitskrocfte nicht niehr zu Verfuegtiiig 
stellen. 
Die zur Zwangsarbeit einberufenen Juden 
haben zum angeordneten Zeitpunkt auf dem 
bestimmten Soilitlielplatz puenktlich zu erscilei. 
iien. Mit sofortiger Wirkung wird allen arbelts. 
pflichtIgen Juden untersagt, In Ihrem Besitz 
befindlichtsi berufliches Handwerkszeug ohlie 
schriftliche Genehmigung der Ortskommandan- 
tur. zu verkaufen, zu verpraenden oder sonst 
därucber zu verfuegen. 
5. Ein Darlohn wird nicht ge)vatlirt. r,. ei(sjiiii Verpflegung gegeben werden, weim der jude 
keine andere Betaetigung gegen Entgelt 
austiebt. 
6.1 Zuwiderhandlungen gegen 2'4 werden 
voni Ortskoninlandanten streng bestraft. 
X, 'Ergaenzüng zu deh Verwaltungsanordnun- 
gen Nr. 2 zu Ziffer IV. lc. '' 
Juden und andere Einwohner, die vor deni 
22. Juni 1941 in Gemeinden ostwaerts der Be- 
re. ginn ansiessig waren, wilehrend des Krieges 
aus Ihren Wohnorten geflucchtet sind, ' (Itiert'eit 
vorlactifig nicht in ihre lIchilalsorte zurtieck- 
kehren. Nach jeweiliger Vorverlegung des Ge- 
bietes des Delli. rticclew. Heeresgebiet Mitte 
kann die Rucckkehr der luden jeweils bis 10 kni 
vor elie befohlene Linie vor der Ostgreitze, des 
itieckw. licere. sgebietes z. B. zur Zeit, Linie 
.I erfolgen. XI. Jagdauiuebting und Jagdwarten. 
Ollmter Jagullerr ist der Berli. rtleclciv. 
. licrresgel)iet Alitte. Die Allstleb-ing der Jagd durch 7. i%-ilpkridtieit Ist %erboteil. Vuer Ange. 
linerlýe derl, deutschen Welitillacht ticcl-Irr CI-4 
('er Zu. stimniung des zustilendleen l-'el(Ilif)lll- 
mindanten oder der entsprechenden DieiiRt.,: telle. 
Die von den Ortsicommindanten pder den 
eiit. cpreclietideii Dienststellen - 
bescliIigilalltilici, 
i. «ii"(lwafrcll - 'ýýiiid sicher aurzube'wahren und 
ortliititigstiiaesslý' * zu pflegen. Eine Atiegabe dieser Waffen hat i. Zt. zu unterbIciben. Die 
Ortelcommandlitluren hobell flie fle. 9c111.1911211111- -. teil warten nehst Munition aurdern Dienstwege 
listennlaessig bis zufil 15. August 1941 den) 
p PIMP 91 .99 
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liceresgebietes Pillite 
Abt. VII I Kr. - Verw. - Az 20. - 00'0139 
PV P-mem-11hing, sail Ord 111111gen Ni 001 
1. Sühnemasstialtnien gegen die Genielndeeln- 
wohner. 
Durch Plalent Nr. 29 des Befli. des Gebietes 
.; ind die Bürgermeister und Dorfältesten7 für 
die Sicherheit im Umkreis der Geineinden ver- 
-orden. Gleichzeitig ist gernacht %% 
der Gemeinde angedroht, diss bzi einem durch 
Versäumnis der Gemeinden erfolgreichen Par- 
tisanenangriff eine bestimmte Anzahl voll 
Einwohnern ernhos sen wird. 
Diese schwerwiegende, aber durchaus ge- 
- rechte 
Alassilallnie ist cleit Bürgermeistern von - 
den F. K. und 0. X. in geeicneter Weise ver- ýýtändlich zu inachen. Die Bürgermeister sind 
dabei auf folgendes hinzuweisen: 
1: In dem gemeinsamen AbwellrIcimpf gegen 
den Liolý; cll.? %%-ignitis ist jcder zür aktiven Mitar- 
beit verpflichtet. Wer sich davon amschlieset, 
ist als Anhänger des Bolschewismus zubetrach- 
teil und muss dementsprechend behandelt wer- 
den. 
2. Zur Erfüllung'dieser Mitarbeit haben die 
Gemeinden Y(I 
a) Die zur Bewichmit, heran. tvzogenen Orts. 
cimvollner erhalten zur Kennzrichnungdie 
Übliche weisee 
- mit dein 
Zugatý fiilrspersoiiil; da sie aber 
nicht Angelffirige des OD sind und dem- 
entsprechend keinen Au-, weis, erhilten 
kilinnen, c-Ilid sie nur in der geschlm. z. senen 
Ortschift oder in nächster Nähe'clerselben 
zu verwenden. 
b) [(iiiii im einzellien Falle die von 
partiýt. )iieiiaiitzi iffen 117w. Aii-, cl)iýlgrii nicht 
durch die Gemeindekräfte 5c11). ýt erfolgen, 
(z. 13. OL, (-rlcgetilicit der 
Partisanentrupps oderEinsatzüberlegener 
Warfen). !: o iszt miter Aufrechterlinliting 
des LyelneindlIchon (ler 
nIchFleil deutýChen WellrInachUeililleit 
d«is VorhandenFein von Parlisinen sofort 
zu melden. F. K. oder 0. K. organisieren 
Meldeweg. 
c) 'Sind an und WegTen ParliNanen 
lit-met ht worden, bline daen es den Wichor- 
gillen gelungen hel. cie zu NerIlichlen, -zo 
Filld fill den gerillt(letell 'Strisgen und 
We-eil von (Icil Biirtyeriiicizterii 
.I pl - posten atifztt,; telleii, ilid die in der Durch- 
fahrt begriffencil deutschen Welirtnacht- 
Rechnen, 
. pflanzen-und Tierkunde, 
lIchilatkunde, 
Deutsch (als einzige 'r-renidsýracite tind 
ReligionsuntertIcht kann erteilt weiden 
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angehörigen auf das Vorhandensein der 
Pirtisanen hinweisen. 
3. Diejenigen Einwohner, die 'vom Vorhanden- 
sein von Partisanen oder versteckten Waffen 
oder Gerät der Partheinen Kenntnis erhiltet, 
haben sofort der nIchsten deutschen Weljj' 
'- vilchtsdienststelle, dein Bürgernicister oder de, (1 
Leiter des OD. Mitteilung zu tilaclicil. Unte; -- e lassung der Meldung wird mit dem Toi, e 
bestraft. 
.-1 
11. Wiederaufnahme des SchulunterrIchts. 
Die biglier iitir*sowjetiFcii erzogene jugeii'd 
bildet ohne Beaufsichtigung und Erziehung eine 
stete Gefahr für die Offentliche Sicherheit und 
. für die Partisanen ein willfillriges Werkzeug. Daher I%t die Einrichtung eines geordneten 
Schulwesens durch die F. H. (Kriegsverwaltungs. 
gruppen) In Angriff zu nehmen, 
111 Sowjetrussland lestanden neben den 
allgemeinen Schulen die unvollAändige 7 klas- 
Sige und die Vollständige 10 1(IOS!, ige Mittel. 
schule. Zunichst Ist nur (Icr Wiederaufbau der 
7 Massigen Schule als Volksschule durchzufüh. 
reil. 
Zu diesem Zwecke wird die allgemeine 
Schulpflicht für die erischen Kindervonivollen- 
deten. 8. bis*v. olleiideteii 15. Lebensjahre ein. 
geführt. 
Die Errichtung der Volksschulen bleibt zu. 
nächst auf die Stadtgemelnden beschränkt. 
Träger der Volksschule hzt die Stadtgenieinde. 
Folgende Vornrhelten eind nitqztif(Illr 
* 
eit- - 
Ilerrichtung von Schtilgeb-Nuden, Registrie. 
rung, der Schulkinder, Erfassung geeigneter 
LehrkräFle und Ihre Überprüfung durch den 
SI), Att-iizrbeittiiit-1, von Lernbehelfsmittchi (evil. 
durch Vervieifältigungsripparite) als Er-. eitz rilr 
flie nicht verwendbircii sowjelischen Lehrbücher 
und Gestiltung des Lehrplanes. 
Der Lehrplan ist auf folgenden Fächern auf- 
zullitien: 
Erlernung der fleinialspriche, In Gebieten 
mit Überwiegend weisirussischer BevÜlkerung, 
l(Ollillit litir wel. s. grussisch, 111 Grgenden fillt 
Überwiegend russischer Bevölkerung kömint 
nur. rii. -z. eimcli In Betracht. Die Erlernung 'der 
Sprache uinfisst Legen, Schreiben, Rechtschrel. 
bung und Grammatik. 
imtl. eiti und Gesang, 
WerkunterrIcht, 
Leibestibtitigen (keine vormilitirigche 
Atvebildung) 
zunächt nur als Wahlfach), 
jedoch nicht durch Geistliche. 
t 
. .. . w. 
*r 
I. 
0 
"1' 
" I' 
I 
ARCHIVAL SOURCES: 
Bundesarchiv-Militftrarchiv. Freiburg i. Breisgau & Koblenz 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
[Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria (VA. ), 
United States of America, concordance numbers have been given 
when available. ] 
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Archival Sources: 
Bundesarchiv-Militgra rchiv/ Alexandria Guides Concordance 
KorUck 632 
BA/MA Alexan dria Guide Volume 38 
RH23: Page File Item No. Date of File 
20 30 53 19030/1 15.02.1942- 31.03.1942 
21 30 53 /2 16.02.1942- 20.03.1942 
22 30 53 /3 08.02.1942- 31.03.1942 
23 30 53 /4 16. 
, 
02.1942- 24.03.1942 
24 36 -70 27894/1 01.04.1942- 31.12.1942 
25 36 71 /3 17.09.1942- 02.10.1942 
26. 36 
. 
71 /4(2) 29.07.1942- 30.12.1942 
27 37 73 29239/1 March to December 1942 
28, 37 73 /2 01.04.1942- 31.12.1942 
29 37 73 /3 01.04.1942- 28.07.1942 
- i., - 
I 
" 
- 
. 
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Archival Sources: 
Bundesarchiv-Militfirarchiv/ Alexandria Guides Conco rdance 
KorUck 582 
BA/M. A Alexandria Guide Volume 38 Date of File 
R1123: Page File Item No. 
202 21 37 P02022 11-09.1939- 03.11.1939 
203 28 50 17326/4 22.08.1939- 05.10.1939 
204 28 50 /2 *no concordance 
205 28 50/55 /3 September-October 1942 
206 16559/1 *no concordance 
207 27 48 /2 20.09.1939- 12.04.1940 
208 22 39 W4204 04.06.1940- 24.06.1940 
209 24 41 8401/1 25.06.1949- 15.03.1941 
210 24 41 /2 22.06.1940- 15.03.1941 
211 24 41 /3 ditto 
212 - 24 41 /4 ditto 
213 24 41 /5 ditto 
214 24 41 /6 ditto 
215 28 49 16559/3 09.06.1940- 06.07.1940 
216 28 49 /4 16.02.1940- 14.03.1941 
217 28 51 17326/7 16.11.1940- 27.01.1941 
218 26 43 14885/3 'March- December 1941 
219 27 48 16552 24.02.1941- 13.12.1941 
220 28 51 17326/8 28.02.1941- 13.12.1941 
221 29 51 /9 13.07.1941- 31.12.1941 
222 29 61 /10 07.07.1941- 31.12.1941 
223 29 51 /11 14.09.1941- 31.12.1941 
224 29 52- /12 08.05.1941- 3i. 12.1941 
225 29 52 /13 30.05.1941- 31.12.1941 
226 29 52 /14 14.08.1941- 31.12.1941 
227 29 52 /15 18.07 . 1941- 06.11.1941 228 29 52 /16 09.05.1941-, 31.12.1941 
22P 29 52 /17 07.04.1941- 31.12.1941 
230 29 52 /18 04.07.1941- 31.12.1941 
231 29 52 /19 December 1941 
232 28 50 17326/1 22.06.1941- 20.03.1942, 
2j3 25 
' 
43 14885/1 01.03.1941- 31.12.1941 
234 26 43 /2 ý0.04.1941- 30.09.1941 
235 34 65 24617/1 61.01.1942- 27.06.1942 
23P 34 
.. 
65 /2 28.06.1942- 29.09. 1942 
. 237 34 065 
/3-1 01.01.1942- 29.09.1942 , 
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238 34 65 /3-2 ditto 
239, 34 66 24617/5 01.10.1941- 31.07.1942 
240 30/68/1 Not in A. Guide 38 
241 34 66 25228/1 01.01.1942- 28.09.1942' 
242 34 67 /2 02.01.1942- 12.10.1942 
243 34 67 /3 07.01.1942- 12.11.1942 
244 34 67 /4 16.01.1942- 18.09.1942 
245 34 67 /5 08.03.1941- 19.08.1942 
246 -35 67 /6 
247 34 66 24617/4 01.01.1942- 07.09.1942 
248 35 67 25228/7 26.01.1942- 14.06. 
, 
1942 
249 35 67 /8 08.02.1942- 08.11.1942 
250 36 71 27955/6 01.09.1942- 28.02.1943 
251 36 72 /6-2 ditto 
252 130/68/2 
253 /8 
254 27955/2 See R1123/ 256 
255 13/68/4 
256 36 71 27955/1 01.09il942- 14.02.. 1943 
257 36 71 /1-2 ditto 
258 43 91 75209/1 01.01.1943- 14 , 02.1943 
259. 43 91 /1-2 ditto 
260 10/68/5 
261 40 83 39524 19.02.1943-30.06.1943 
262 130/68/6 
263 /7 
264 /3 
265 32 69 2130/8 -01.10.1941- 30.06.1942 
266 39 80 36156/1 01.02.1943- 10.03/1943 
267 39 80 /2 ditto 
268 28 50 17326/5 June 1939 (1935) 
269 28 50 /6 20 June 1939 
270 130/68/6 
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Archival Sources: 
Bundesarchiv-Militfirarchiv/ Alexandria Guides Concordance 
BA/MA Alexandria Guide Volume 38 
R1123: Page File. Item No. 
KorUck 631 
14 37 74 31373 
19 38 77 34308/5 
Koriick 553 
68 30 56 20383/7 
71 30 56 /10 
72 30 56 /11 
98 33 64 ý4410/7 
99 33 64 /8 
loo., 33 64 /9 
101 , 33 64 /10 
KorUpk 559 
132 36 73 29236/6 
154 43 90 45668/6 
155 43 90 /7 
KorUck 560 
165 25 42 1157/5 
KorUck 580 
167 21 36 P824 
168 21 36 P824a 
189 38 76 33616/4 
191 39 81 31516/2 
192 39 81 /3 
i 94 40 81 /5 
Date of File 
15.06.1942- 15.09.1942 
30.06.1943- 31.07.1943 
23.07.1941- 
28.08-1941- 
ditto 
25.09.1942- 
01.04.1942- 
01.04.1942- 
01.07.1942- 
28.08.1941 
10.09.1941 
18.11.1942 
18.11.1942 
15.07.1942 
31.10.1942 
02.09.1942- 26.02.1943 
01.07.1943- 31.12.1943 
20.08.1943- 14.02.1944 
07.01.1941- 20.05.1941 
26.08.1939- 04. iO. 1939 
07.08.1939- 27.09.1939 
24.06.1943- 30.0q. 1943 
i6.07.1943- 31.07.1943 
1 9.04.1943- 22.07.1943 
16.08.1943- il. 08.1943 
0 
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KorUck 
' 
583 
, 
278 38 78 34 735/2 01.04.1943- 30.06.1943 
279 38 78 /3 01.07.1943- 30.09.1943 
280 38 78 /4 01.10.1942 -31.12.1942 
KorUck 584 
300 40 82 37735/2 01.01.1943- 28.02.1943 
301 40 82 ditto ditto 
Korilck 593 (KorUck Pz. AOK4) 
351 32 60 i3588 18.01.1942- 19.05.1942 
I 
/ 
I 
F- 
/ 
S 
377 
Archival Sources: 
Bundes archiv-Militfirarchiv/ Alexandria Guides Conco rdance 
RUckwd rtige Ifeeresgebie te Mitte. 
BA/MA Alexandria Guide Volume 38 Date of File 
RH22: Page File Item No. 
224 1 2 14684/2 21.03.1941- 31.08.1941 
225 1 1 /3 01.09.1941- 31.12.1941 
226 1 1 /4(l) 14.03.1941- 31.12.1941 
227 1 2 /4(2) 
228 1 2 /4(3) 
ý29 9 14 24693/1 01.01.1943- 30.06.1942 
230 9 15 /2 ditto 
23i" 9 15 /3 ditto 
233 15 26 31491/2(i) 02.11.1942- 31.12.1942 
234 15 26 /2(ii) ditto 
235 ý 15 26 /3(i) ditto 
236 15 26 /3(ii) ditto 
245 15 26 /3(ii) ditto 
248 9 15 24693 /6 01.01.1942- 30.06.1942 
250 6 8 18916/1 24.01.1942- 31.03.1942 
. 
251 6 8 /2 04.07.1941-w- 31.03.1942 
RUc1cwd rtige Heeresgebiete Nord. 
BA/MA Alexandria Guide Volume 38 Date of File 
RH22: Page File Item No. 
259 5 7 18320/6 pl. 01.1942- 31.03.1942 
ý71 1 2 14768/5 December 1941 
278 no concordance 
ý51 no concordance 
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lit 
RUckwArtige Ifeeresgebiete SUd. 
BA/MA Alex andria Guide Volume 38 Date of File 
RH22: Page File Item No. 
9 4 6 16407/8 27.10.1941-ý- 20.11.1941 
12 4 7 /11 03.04.1941- 25.10.1941 
77 12 23 30910/14 Sept. to Dec. 1942 
97 14 25 /34 01.07.1941- 30.09.1942 
133 18 30/33 39502/31 02.08.1943- 15.10. *1943 
158 19 32 39502/60 April 1943 
171 5 7 16407/18 01.09.1941- 31.12.1941 
178. 19 32 39502/56 01.03.1943- 31.12.1943 
201 20 33 75839/1 1941/1942 
202 20 33 /2 ditto 
203 20 /3 ditto - 
204 20 33 /4 ditto 
205 15 . 27 33450/2(1? ) 10.07.1941- 30.09.1942 206 10 19 27089 16.05.1942- 18.01.1943 
M See KorUck 582 
208 20 34 75907/(l? ) 27.07.1942- 08.10.1942 
215 20 34 751561/1 1941-1943 
298 20 34 75156/1 Ditto (as. RH22/215) 
218 5 20 29160/3 25.10.1942- 30.11.1942 
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Archival Sources: 
Bundesarchiv-Militfirarchiv/ Alexandria Guides Concordance 
Reichsministerium ftir die besetzten Ostgebiete 
BA/MA Alexandria Guide Volume 28 Date of File 
R116: Page File Item No. 
5 12 13 EAP99/63 na 
10 44 82 /374/170 1943/44 
11 44 82 /374 as R6/10 
13 /170 
14 /170 
25 /170 
38 Q1 101 EAP99/1025 January 1945 
49 23/24 23 /57 1943 
50 /99 
/1035 
- /1036 51 no concordance 
52 no concordance 
64 EAP99/63 See R6/5 
75 25 25 /68/170 1941-1944 
82 25 25 /170 
95 25 25 /68 
96 25 25 /68 
99 25 25 /68 
125 25 25 /68 
136 25 25 /68/170 
137 25 25 /68/170 
143 54 94 EAP99/494 
25 25 /68 
155 25 25 /68 
156 25.25 /68 
159 25 25 /68 
161 25 25 /170 
-165 25 25 /68- 1941-1942 
-24 23 EAP99/66 
166 /63 
177 25 . 25 /68 
l79 25 . 25 A8 
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183 16 16 EAP99/20 1943 
185 ý4 24 /67 1943 
189 /170 
190 /170 
198 25 25 '/68 
24 23 /66 
207 /170 
209 /1143 
213 55 94 EAP99/490 8th December 1942 
/499 
/66 19th February 1942 
217 24 24 /67 
218 /399 
/1071 
/1231 
219' 24 24 /67 
229 /1047 
232 /374 
235 24 24 /67 
238 44 82 /374 September 1943 
244 61 101 EAP99/1026, 
246 12 13 /63 
248 25 25 /68 
-254 /157 
266 EAP99/i57 
269 no concordance 
210 12 13 /63 
277 /63 
281 EAP99/110 
/172 
/384 
/498 
286 24 23 /66 
287 /59 
/60 
/65 
/66 
24 ý4 EAP99/67 
25 24 /68 
/78 
/153 
/399 
-/1059 /1280 
28P 24 24 /67 
289 24 23 /66 
291 25 24 /69 
265 25 24. /68 
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302 24 23 /66 
304, EAP99/157 
308 24 24 EAP99/68 
309 /68 
324 /170 
333 44 82 /374 
334 24 24 /67 
335 /67 
336 /67 
341 25 24 /68 
344 /170 
24 24 /67 
372 /170 
385 25 BAP99/68 
417 /170 
/68 
419 /67 
426 /68 
/66 
430 56 98 BAP99/536 1942-1943 
431 /536 
432 /536 
433 /536 
57 98 /548 
434 56 98 /536 
449 30 . 35 /124 450 30 35 /124 
456 sloo 
486 (Vol. 8) 43 66-C-12-44/213 
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The German Army and National Socialist Occupation Policies in 
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